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Biennial Report of

THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

JULY 1, 1943, to JUNE 30, 1945

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR

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Biennial Report of

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

For the first time since assuming this office six years ago, it is possible for me to report that the security of the United States of America is entirely in our own hands. Since my last formal report to you on the state of the Army, our forces in Europe, air and ground, have contributed mightily to the complete destruction of the Axis enemy. In the Pacific, Japan has been compelled to sue for an end to the war which she treacherously started. For two years the victorious advance of the United States sea, air and land forces, together with those of our allies was virtually unchecked. They controlled the skies and the seas and no army could successfully oppose them. Behind these forces was the output of American farms and factories, exceeding any similar effort of man, so that the peoples everywhere with whom we were joined in the fight for decency and justice were able to reinforce their efforts through the aid of American ships, munitions and supplies.

Never was the strength of the American democracy so evident nor has it ever been so clearly within our power to give definite guidance for our course into the future of the human race. And never, it seems to me, has it been so imperative that we give thorough and practical consideration to the development of a means to provide a reasonable guarantee for future generations against the horrors and colossal waste of war as well as security for that freedom we recently left to the hazard of mere hope or chance.

The Nation is just emerging from one of its gravest crises. This generation of Americans can still remember the black days of 1942 when the Japanese conquered all of Malaysia, occupied Burma, and threatened India while the German armies approached the Volga and the Suez. In those hours Germany and Japan came so close to complete domination of the world that we do not yet realize how thin the thread of Allied survival had been stretched.

In good conscience this Nation can take little credit for its part in staving off disaster in those critical days. It is certain that the refusal of the British and Russian peoples to accept what appeared to be inevitable defeat was the great factor in the salvage of our civilization. Of almost equal importance was the failure of the enemy to make the most of the situation. In order to establish for the historical record where and how Germany and Japan failed I asked General Eisenhower to have his intelligence officers promptly interrogate the ranking members of the German High Command who are now our prisoners of war. The results of these interviews are of remarkable interest. They give a picture of dissension among the enemy nations and lack of long-range planning that may well have been decisive factors of this world struggle at its most critical moments.

As evaluated by the War Department General Staff, the interrogations of the captured German commanders disclose the following:

> The available evidence shows that Hitler's original intent was to create, by absorption of Germanic peoples in the areas. contiguous to Germany and by the strengthening of her new frontiers, a greater Reich which would dominate Europe. To this end Hitler pursued a policy of opportunism which achieved the occupation of the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia without military, opposition.
>
> No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan. Although the High Command approved Hitler's policies in principle, his impetuous strategy outran German military capabilities and ultimately led to Germany's defeat. The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is one of constant conflict of personalities in which military judgment was increasingly subordinated to Hitler's personal dictates. The first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of von Blomberg, von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective conservative influence on German foreign policy.
>
> The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, and the Low Countries developed serious diversions between Hitler and the General Staff as to the details of execution of strategic plans. In each case the General Staff favored the orthodox offensive, Hitler an unorthodox attack with objectives deep in enemy territory. In each case Hitler's views prevailed and the astounding success of each succeeding campaign raised Hitler's military prestige to the point where his opinions were no longer challenged. His military self-confidence became unassailable after the victory in France, and he began to disparage substantially the ideas of his generals even in the presence of junior officers. Thus no General Staff objection was expressed when Hitler made the fatal decision to invade Soviet Russia.
>
> When Italy entered the war Mussolini's strategic aims contemplated the expansion of his empire under the cloak of German military success. Field Marshal Keitel reveals that Italy's declaration of war was contrary to her agreement with Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree that it was undesired. From the very beginning Italy was a burden on the German war potential. Dependent upon Germany and German-occupied territories for oil and coal Italy was a constant source of economic attrition. Mussolini's unilateral action in attacking Greece and Egypt forced the Germans into the Balkan and African campaigns, resulting in over-extension of the German armies which subsequently became one of the principal factors in Germany's defeat.
>
> Nor is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized

that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea, and air forces in the Far East.

In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan.

Here were three criminal nations eager for loot and seeking greedily to advance their own self-interest by war, yet unable to agree on a strategic over-all plan for acccomplishing a common objective.

The steps in the German defeat, as described by captured members of the High Command, were:

1. *Failure to invade England.* Hitler's first military set-back occurred when, after the collapse of France, England did not capitulate. According to Colonel General Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the German High Command, the campaign in France had been undertaken because it was estimated that with the fall of France, England would not continue to fight. The unexpectedly swift victory over France and Great Britain's continuation of the war found the General Staff unprepared for an invasion of England. Although the armistice with France was concluded on 22 June 1940, no orders to prepare for the invasion of Britain were issued prior to 2 July. Field Marshal Kesselring stated that he urged the invasion since it generally was believed in Germany that England was in a critical condition. Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of Staff of German Armed Forces, however, stated that the risk was thought to be the existence of the British fleet. He said the army was ready but the air force was limited by weather, the navy very dubious. Meanwhile, in the air blitz over England the German Air Force had suffered irreparable losses from which its bombardment arm never recovered.

2. *The Campaign of 1941 in the Soviet Union.* In the Autumn of 1941 after the battle of Vysma, the Germans stood exhausted but apparently victorious before Moscow. According to Jodl, the General Staff of the armed forces considered that one last energetic push would be sufficient to finish the Soviets. The German High Command had neither envisioned nor planned for a winter campaign. A sudden change in the weather brought disaster. The Red Army defense, a terrific snow storm, and extremely unseasonable cold in the Christmas week of 1941 precipitated the strategic defeat of the German armed forces. Impatient of all restraint, Hitler publicly announced that he had more faith in his own intuition than in the judgment of his military advisors. He relieved the commander in chief of the army, General von Brauschitsch. It was the turning point of the war.

3. *Stalingrad.* Even after the reverse before Moscow in 1941, Germany might have avoided defeat had it not been for the campaign in 1942 which culminated in the disaster at Stalingrad. Disregarding the military lessons of history, Hitler, instead of attacking the Soviet armies massed in the north, personally planned and directed a campaign of which the immediate objectives were to deprive the Soviet Union of her vital industries and raw materials by cutting the Volga at Stalingrad and seizing the Caucasian oil fields. Beyond these concrete objectives was evidently the Napoleonic dream of a conquest of the Middle East and India by a gigantic double envelopment with one pincer descending from the Caucasus through Tiflis and the other from North Africa across Egypt, Palestine, and the Arabian desert. The campaign collapsed before Stalingrad with the magnificent Russian defense of that city and in the northern foothills of the Caucasus, where a break-down of German transport to the front left the German armor stalled for 3 weeks for lack of fuel in the critical summer months of 1942. Field Marshal Keitel in reviewing this campaign remarks that Germany failed completely to estimate properly the reserve of Russian industrial and productive power east of the Urals. The statement of both Keitel and Jodl is that neither was in favor of the Stalingrad campaign, but that the recommendations of the High Command were overruled by Adolf Hitler.

4. *Invasion of North Africa.* Allied landings in North Africa came as a surprise to the German High Command. Field Marshal Kesselring, who, at the time, was commanding all German forces in the Mediterranean except Rommel's desert task force, states that his headquarters did expect a landing and had requested reinforcement by a division. However, Kesselring's fears were not heeded by Hitler and Goering. Allied security and deception measures for the landing operations were found to have been highly effective. Only when the Allied fleets and convoys were streaming through the Straits of Gibraltar did the Germans realize that something very special was under way, and even then false conclusions were drawn: either that the Allies intended to land in rear of Rommel in the Middle East, or that these were British reinforcements en route to the Far East, or supplies for starving Malta. Since no advance preparations had been made by the Germans to repel such an Allied invasion of North Africa,

all subsequent efforts to counter the Allies suffered from hasty improvisation. Defense continued, however, because, as Field Marshal Keitel now states, since evacuation was impossible, the Germans had only the choice of resisting or surrendering.

5. *The Invasion of France.* All German headquarters expected the Allied invasion of France. According to Colonel General Jodl, both the general direction and the strength of the initial assault in Normandy were correctly estimated; but Field Marshal Keitel states that the Germans were not sure exactly where the Allies would strike and considered Brittany as more probable because of the three major U-boat bases located in that region. Both agree that the belief of the German High Command that a second assault would be launched, probably by an Army under General Patton, held large German forces in the Pas de Calais area. Both Keitel and Jodl believed that the invasion could be repulsed or at worst contained, and both named the Allied air arm as the decisive factor in the German failure.

Prior to the invasion, important divergencies of opinion developed between Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Commander in Chief West, and Rommel, commander of the threatened Army Group. Rundstedt desired to hold his armored forces in a group around Paris and in Eastern France; Rommel to push them forward to positions in readiness close to the coast. The Rommel view prevailed. Von Rundstedt was subsequently relieved by Colonel General Von Kluge.

Soon after the Allied capture of Cherbourg, dissension again broke out in the High Command. Von Kluge and Rommel wished to evacuate all Southwestern France, blocking or destroying its usable ports. They believed that a continuation of the fight in Normandy could only end with the destruction of their Western Armies and that they should withdraw before disintegration began. Von Kluge recommended defense on the general line: lower Seine-Paris-Fontainebleau-Massif Central. Hitler refused to accept this recommendation, relieved Kluge from command, and reappointed von Rundstedt as Commander in Chief West. Under direct instructions, Rundstedt continued the battle of Normandy to its final denouement. Hitler himself ordered the Avranches-Mortain counterattack and was much surprised when it completely failed. Keitel expresses further surprise at the audacious exploitation of the American break-through at Avranches during this counterattack, and particularly of the thrust towards Brest.

6. *The Ardennes Counterattack.* The German offensive in December 1944 was Hitler's personal conception. According to Jodl, the objective of the attack was Antwerp. It was hoped that overcast weather would neutralize Allied air superiority, and that an exceptionally rapid initial break-through could be achieved. Other German officers believe that this operation was reckless in the extreme, in that it irreparably damaged the comparatively fresh armored divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army, the principal element of Germany's strategic reserve, at a moment when every available reserve was needed to repulse the expected Soviet attack in the East.

7. *The Crossing of the Rhine.* Even after the failure of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, the Germans believed that the Rhine line could be held. The loss of the Remagen bridge, however, exploded this hope. The entire Rhine defensive line had to be weakened in the attempt to contain the bridgehead, and the disorderly German retreat in the Saar and Palatinate rendered easy the subsequent drive eastward of the Allied Armies towards Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich.

Not only were the European partners of the Axis unable to coordinate their plans and resources and agree within their own nations how best to proceed, but the eastern partner, Japan, was working in even greater discord. The Axis, as a matter of fact, existed on paper only. Eager to capitalize on the preoccupation of the western powers in Europe, Japan was so greedy for her own immediate conquests that she laid her strategy, not to help Germany defeat Russia and Great Britain, but to accumulate her own profit. Had the way been open Germany and Japan would have undoubtedly joined their armies in Central Asia, but to Japan this objective was secondary to looting the Far East while there was no real force to stop her. The War Department General Staff's analysis of Japanese objectives follows:

> The Japanese, for many years, bolstered by a fanatical belief in divine guidance and their own spiritual and military supremacy, had planned the domination of the Far East and eventually the world. Japan in her inland empire was not self-sufficient. She required broader land areas and access to oil, rubber, and other raw materials if she were to become a major industrial world power. This principle of expansion was outlined in the "Tanaka Memorial" purportedly a secret memorandum prepared for Hirohito by the Jap Premier in 1927. Authentic or not, it provided the pattern which Japan has followed, culminating in the great Pacific conflict.
>
> Strategically, Japan was well poised in 1941 to carry out her aims in Asia. All the major world powers who normally

maintained the status quo in Asia were absorbed in the war in Europe. France had been overrun and eliminated. England was threatened by German invasion. The U. S. S. R. was attempting to repel a German invasion on her Western front reaching to the gates of the capital. The United States had become the Arsenal of Democracy, with major efforts directed toward the support and preservation of our European Allies.

The Tripartite Pact had been signed, giving Japan a free hand in Asia. She had a large and relatively well-equipped army and a moderately good air force well trained by actual combat in China. She had obtained by forced agreement a staging area in French Indo-China. She had a fairly large navy especially strong in the transport craft available. She had accumulated by great national economy a good stockpile of strategic matériels at home for the initial effort and with each successive conquest she obtained new and important areas from which other supplies of materials could be drawn, such as oil, rubber, and metal. The Japanese mistakenly believed in the hearty cooperation of "liberated" peoples of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with their huge labor pools. Japan considered herself ready to strike.

Japan's objective was the conquest, consolidation, and eventual domination of the whole Far East. She intended to make her conquest in a rapid surprise drive which would overpower all resistance, to form an iron ring of outer defenses against which the spiritually inferior, pacifistic combination of opponents could beat themselves into weariness, while she consolidated her gains at leisure.

The best estimate of Japan's plan for the accomplishment of her objectives appears to be the following:

1. Neutralize or destroy the U. S. Pacific Fleet by an attack on Pearl Harbor.
2. Drive rapidly south overcoming the Philippines and the Southwest and South Pacific Islands in order to cut sea routes of supply or attack from the East and gain the vast natural resources of the East Indies.
3. Cut China's supply line from the west by an invasion of Burma.
4. Form a flank by the seizure of the naval base of Singapore and the islands of Sumatra and Java.
5. Isolate or possibly invade Australia.
6. Invade the Hawaiian Islands via Midway.
7. Invade the Aleutian Islands to form a northern flank, dependent on initial successes and retained momentum.
8. Bring the American Northwest under aerial bombardment, raid our West Coast aviation industries, and then seize critical areas.
9. Stimulate unrest to eventual revolution in India.

The Japanese strategic plan initially failed when she missed the opportunity of landing troops on Hawaii, capturing Oahu and the important bases there, and denying us a necessary focal point from which to launch operations in the Western Pacific.

There can be no doubt that the greed and the mistakes of the war-making nations as well as the heroic stands of the British and Soviet peoples saved the United States a war on her own soil. The crisis had come and passed at Stalingrad and El Alamein before this Nation was able to gather sufficient resources to participate in the fight in a determining manner. Had the U. S. S. R. and the British Army of the Nile been defeated in 1942, as they well might if the Germans, Japanese, and Italians had better coordinated their plans and resources and successive operations, we should have stood today in the western hemisphere confronted by enemies who controlled a greater part of the world.

Our close approach to that terrifying situation should have a sobering influence on Americans for generations to come. Yet, this is only a prelude of what can be expected so long as there are nations on earth capable of waging total war.

On 6 August the entire world learned from President Truman's announcement that man had entered into a new era—that atomic power had been harnessed.

This discovery of American scientists can be man's greatest benefit. And it can destroy him. It is against the latter terrible possibility that this nation must prepare or perish. Atomic power will affect the peaceful life of every individual on earth. And it will at the same time affect every instrument and technique of destruction. But the atomic bomb is not alone among the scientific advances that make the possibilities of the future so terrifying. The development of aircraft and rockets and electronics has become equally incredible. In order to prevent any possible misconception of the terrible potentialities of the future, I asked the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to prepare an estimate of the capabilities of other modern weapons. His report is confined to the certainties but, as is obvious from the atomic bomb, the developments of the war have been so incredible that wildest imagination will not project us far from the target in estimating the future. Much of the information has until now properly been classified highly secret in our development research laboratories, at our testing establishments, or in the combat units. However, it is now so important that the people of the United States realize the possibilities of the future, that I here quote from General Arnold's report:

At the start of this war we had bombers capable of 200 miles per hour with a combat radius of 900 miles, effective operational ceilings of 24,000 feet, and bomb load capacity of 6,000 pounds. Today our development of this type aircraft has given us bombers capable of carrying 20,000 pounds of bombs to targets 1,600 miles away at speeds of 350 miles an hour and altitudes of over 35,000 feet. Radar has improved our bombing technique so that we can now attack a target effectively even though it be obscured by weather or darkness. We will produce within the next few years jet-propelled bombers capable of flying 500 to 600 miles an hour to targets 1,500 miles away at altitudes of over 40,000 feet. Development of even greater bombers capable of operating at stratospheric altitudes and speeds faster than sound and carrying bomb loads of more than 100,000 pounds already is a certainty. These aircraft will have sufficient range to attack any spot on the earth and return to a friendly base.

In 1941 our propeller-driven fighters were limited to speeds of 300 miles an hour, a range 200 to 300 miles, and effective ceilings of 20,000 feet. Today our conventional fighters have speeds of 500 miles an hour, combat ranges of 1,300 miles, and effective ceilings of 35,000 feet. Improvement of our jet fighters may well produce within the next five years an aircraft capable of the speed of sound and of reaching targets 2,000 miles away at altitudes of above 50,000 feet. When the barrier of compressability has been hurdled, as it surely will be, there is no practicable limit to the speed of piloted aircraft.

At the onset of this war demolition bombs ranged in size from 20 to 2,000 pounds with a few light case 4,000 pound blast bombs. The explosive filling of these bombs was standard TNT. During the war, new bombs have been developed the entire range from small 4-pound antipersonnel missiles to 22,000 pound deep penetration city smashers. At this very moment we are making a single bomb weighing 45,000 pounds to keep pace with the bomber, already under construction, which will carry such a load. Air ordnance engineers have blueprinted a bomb weighing 100,000 pounds.

When World War II began we had no rockets. So far the most spectacular rocket of the war has been the V–2. This weapon has extended artillery range to 200 miles with little sacrifice in accuracy. Defense against such weapons requires piloted and pilotless aircraft capable of fantastic speeds, or powered missiles capable of finding, intercepting, and destroying the attacker in the air and at his launching sites or by methods and devices as yet undeveloped. We can direct rockets to targets by electronic devices and new instruments which guide them accurately to sources of heat, light, and magnetism. Drawn by their own fuses such new rockets will streak unerringly to the heart of big factories, attracted by the heat of the furnaces. They are so sensitive that in the space of a large room they aim themselves toward a man who enters, in reaction to the heat of his body.

All of these weapons and their possible combinations make the air approaches of a country the points of extreme danger. Many Americans do not yet understand the full implication of the formless rubble of Berlin and of the cities of Japan. With the continued development of weapons and techniques now known to us, the cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, or San Francisco may be subject to annihilation from other continents in a matter of hours.

The Navy, now the strongest in the world, will protect our shores against attack from any amphibious enemy who might challenge through the sea approaches, but we must also now be prepared to oppose stratospheric envelopment with the techniques and weapons discussed above. It is clear that the only defense against this kind of warfare is the ability to attack. We must secure our Nation by ourselves developing and maintaining these weapons, troops, and techniques required to warn aggressors and deter them from launching a modern devastating war against us.

With the realization of these facts will also come a highly dangerous and attractive doctrine. It will be said that to protect itself this nation need only rely on its machine power, that it will not need manpower.

This doctrine will be closely akin to the doctrine of negative defense which destroyed France. The folly of the Maginot line was proved early in the war but too late to save France. The folly of the new doctrine which has already begun to take shape in the thinking of many Americans would also be proved early—but probably too late to save America.

The only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack. And that power cannot be in machinery alone. There must be men to man the machines. And there must be men to come to close grips with the enemy and tear his operating bases and his productive establishment away from him before the war can end.

The classic proof of this came in the battle of Britain. Even with the magnificent fighter defense of the Royal Air Force, even with the incredible efficiency of the fire of thousands of antiaircraft guns, controlled and aimed by unerring electronic instruments, the British Islands remained under the fire of the German enemy until the final stages of the war.

Not until the American and British armies crossed the channel and seized control of the enemy's territory was the hail of rockets lifted from England. Not until we had physical possession of the launching sites and the factories that produced the V weapons did these attacks cease.

Such is the pattern of war in the 20th Century. If this nation is ever again at war, suffering, as Britain did in this war, the disastrous attacks of rocket-propelled weapons with explosive power like our own atomic bomb, it will bleed and suffer perhaps to the point of annihilation, unless we can move armies of men into the enemy's bases of operations and seize the sites from which he launches his attacks.

There is no easy way to win wars when two opponents are even remotely well matched. There is no easy way to safeguard the nation or preserve the peace. In the immediate years ahead the United Nations will unquestionably devote their sincere energies to the effort to establish a lasting peace. To my mind there is now greater chance of success in this effort than ever before in history. Certainly the implications of atomic explosion will spur men of judgment as they have never before been pressed to seek a method whereby the peoples of earth can live in peace and justice.

However, these hopes are by no means certainties. If man does find the solution for world peace it will be the most revolutionary reversal of his record we have ever known. Our own responsibilities to these efforts are great. Our diplomacy must be wise and it must be strong. Nature tends to abhor weakness. The principle of the survival of the fit is generally recognized. If our diplomacy is not backed by a sound security policy, it is, in my opinion, forecast to failure. We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly, cost us millions of lives and billions of treasure. The reasons are quite understandable. The world does not seriously regard the desires of the weak. Weakness presents too great a temptation to the strong, particularly to the bully who schemes for wealth and power.

We must, if we are to realize the hopes we may now dare have for lasting peace, enforce our will for peace with strength. We must make it clear to the potential gangsters of the world that if they dare break our peace they will do so at their great peril.

This Nation's destiny clearly lies in a sound permanent security policy. In the War Department's proposals there are two essentials: (1) Intense scientific research and development; (2) a permanent peacetime citizen army. I will discuss these essentials in detail later in this report. The importance of scientific research is the most obvious to the civilian, but the importance of a peacetime citizen army based on universal military training is of greater importance, in my opinion.

Nothing will contribute more to an understanding of the needs of future security than a clear understanding of what has occurred in this war, the strategic decisions, the reasons for them, and the operations by which they were executed. The press and radio have given the American people a thorough day-by-day account of the progress of the war within the limitations of necessary security; never before have the details of military campaigns been so quickly, so accurately, and so completely reported. Yet because of the very bulk of the information plus the blank spots of essential secrecy it has been difficult for the public to place the developments in their proper perspective. It now becomes possible to examine them in retrospect with an emphasis more nearly approaching that which history is likely to give them.



VICTORY IN EUROPE

VICTORY IN EUROPE

The Strategic Concept

The period covered by my first two Biennial Reports was a time of great danger for the United States. The element on which the security of this nation most depended was time—time to organize our tremendous resources and time to deploy them overseas in a world-wide war. We were given this time through the heroic refusal of the Soviet and British peoples to collapse under the smashing blows of the Axis forces. They bought this time for us with the currency of blood and courage. Two years ago our margin of safety was still precarious but the moment was rapidly approaching when we would be prepared to deal with our enemies on the only terms they understood—overwhelming power.

In no other period of American history have the colors of the United States been carried victoriously on so many battlefields. It is with profound satisfaction and great pride in the troops and their leaders that this report is submitted on the campaigns which crushed Italy, Germany and Japan.

It is necessary to an understanding of the Army's participation in these campaigns that reference be made to the decisions which launched them. The forces of the United States and Great Britain were deployed under a single strategic control exercised by the group known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As described in a previous report, this structure of Allied control was conceived at the conference of December 1941, when Prime Minister Churchill, accompanied by the chiefs of the British Navy, Army, and Air Forces, came to Washington and met with the President and the American Chiefs of Staff. It was the most complete unification of military effort ever achieved by two Allied nations. Strategic direction of all the forces of both nations, the allocation of manpower and munitions, the coordination of communications, the control of military intelligence, and the administration of captured areas all were accepted as joint responsibilities.

The President and the Prime Minister, with the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, made the decision at this first conference that our resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany, the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan.

In April 1942, President Roosevelt directed me to proceed to London, accompanied by Mr. Harry Hopkins, for a conference with the Prime Minister, the War Cabinet, and the British Chiefs of Staff, regarding the tentative plan for the invasion of the continent in a cross-Channel operation. There a general agreement was reached that the final blow must be delivered across the English Channel and eastward through the plains of western Europe. At that time the Red Army was slowly falling back under the full fury of the German assault, and it was accepted at the London Conference that everything practicable must be done to reduce the pressure on the Soviet lest she collapse and the door be opened wide for a complete conquest of Europe and a probable juncture with the Japanese in the Indian Ocean.

In the discussions at this conference, a tentative target date for the cross-Channel operations, designated by the code name ROUNDUP, was set for the summer of 1943. However, the immediate necessity for an emergency plan was recognized. It was given the code name SLEDGEHAMMER and was to provide for a diversionary assault on the French coast at a much earlier date if such a desperate measure became necessary to lend a hand toward saving the situation on the Soviet front.

Here the Western Allies faced a shortage which was to plague us to the final day of the war in Europe—the shortage of assault craft, LST's, LCI's, and smaller vessels. At least six divisions would be required for a diversionary action in order to be of any assistance to the Red Army, and all the resources of England and the United States were searched for vessels or barges that could be employed in the Channel. Outboard motors and marine engines in pleasure craft in the United States were appropriated for this purpose. An extensive building program for landing craft was agreed upon, which necessitated a heavy cut-back or delay in the construction then underway of certain major combat ships for the Pacific Fleet. Also there were added to the production program in the United

States a great many items which would be required for build-up—engineering and railroad equipment and rolling stock, pipelines, hospital set-ups, communication matériel, and a multitude of items to be required for airfields, camps, docks, and depots in the British Isles for the actual Channel crossing and for the support of our troops once they were in France.

In June, the Prime Minister and General Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, returned to Washington for a further discussion of SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, and a possible operation in the Mediterranean. During these discussions, the Allied situation in North Africa took a more serious turn, culminating in the loss of Tobruk. The discussions thereafter were devoted almost exclusively to the measures to be taken to meet the threat facing Cairo, Rommel's forces having been checked with difficulty on the El Alamein line. Further advances by his Afrika Korps, with its Italian reinforcements, and German successes along the southeastern portion of the Soviet front threatened a complete collapse in the Middle East, the loss of the Suez Canal and the vital oil supply in the vicinity of Abadan. It was a very black hour.

In July, Admiral King and I went to London for further meetings with the British Chiefs of Staff, to determine if there were not something that could be done immediately to lessen the pressure on the Soviet, whose armies were facing a crisis. Poverty of equipment, especially in landing craft, and the short period remaining when the weather would permit cross-Channel movement of small craft, ruled out the diversionary operation SLEDGEHAMMER for 1942.

After prolonged discussions, it became evident that the only operation that could be undertaken with a fair prospect of success that year was TORCH, the assault on North Africa. Landings there would be a long way from Germany, but should serve to divert at least some German pressure from the Red Army, and would materially improve the critical situation in the Middle East. It was therefore decided, with the approval of the President and the Prime Minister, to mount the North African assault at the earliest possible moment, accepting the fact that this would mean not only the abandonment of the possibility for any operation in Western Europe that year, but that the necessary build-up for the cross-Channel assault could not be completed in 1943. TORCH would bleed most of our resources in the Atlantic, and would confine us in the Pacific to the holding of the Hawaii-Midway line and the preservation of communications to Australia.

General Eisenhower, who was then established with his headquarters in London, directing the planning and assembling of American resources, was, with the generous acceptance of the British Government, appointed Commander in Chief of the British and American Forces which were to carry out the landings in North Africa. On 13 August he received the formal directive to proceed with the operation. The target date was fixed for early November.

We have since learned that the German plan at that time was to attempt the defeat of Britain by aerial bombardment and by destruction of her army and resources in the Middle East. Colonel General Jodl, Chief of the German Armed Forces Operations Staff, has disclosed that it was Hitler's plan to break through Stalingrad and Egypt, and join these two salients in the Middle East.

The heroic defense of Stalingrad and General Montgomery's crushing defeat of Rommel at El Alamein dislocated these gigantic pincers. The further development of the operations in North Africa from the east and the west, and the Soviet offensive from the Volga proved to be the turning points at which the Axis was forced on the strategic defensive.

In January 1943, the President and the Prime Minister, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, met at Casablanca. It was then apparent that our North African operation was to be successful, even beyond original calculations. Tunisia was a lure into which the German command continued to pour great quantities of men and matériel, commitments that were certain to be disastrous for the enemy once the winter rains ceased and the low clouds over the Sicilian Strait cleared, in the face of overwhelming Allied superiority on the sea and in the air. At the conclusion of the North African campaign, enemy killed and captured numbered 349,206 Italian and German troops, and there had been captured or destroyed on land alone nearly 200,000 tons of enemy matériel.

The problem before the Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca was the next movement to be made following the completion of the Tunisian campaign. It still would have been preferable to close immediately with the German enemy in Western Europe or even in Southern France had that been possible of achievement with the resources then available to General Eisenhower. It was not.

Axis control of the Mediterranean islands and the entire reach of the southern coast of Europe from Franco's Spain to Turkey denied our communications also across the Mediterranean and forced our shipping into a 12,000-mile detour around the Cape of Good Hope. The United States was still involved in the process of a vast mobilization. The Chiefs of Staff therefore considered whether we had the strength to move directly to Italy or what might be the best intermediary steps. It was decided to assault Sicily (operation HUSKY) and, with the approval of the Heads of State, General Eisenhower was advised on 23 January:

> The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved that an attack against Sicily will be launched in 1943 with the target date as the period of the favorable July moon.

Even though a full-scale Mediterranean campaign now was imminent, it was resolved at Casablanca to resume amassing in the United Kingdom as quickly as possible the forces necessary to invade Western Europe. This build-up was to be one of the most tremendous logistical undertakings in military history.

It required provision for the transportation, shelter, hospitalization, supply, training, and general welfare of 1,200,000 men who had to be embarked in the United States and transported across the submarine infested Atlantic to the United Kingdom. The hospital plan alone, for example, called for 94,000 beds in existing installations, conversions, and new construction. The program was later increased by tent accommodations for 30,000 more beds. Living quarters had to be furnished for the assault forces and their supply troops. There had to be provision for 20,000,000 square feet of covering, storage, and shop space, and 44,000,000 square feet of open storage and hard standings. Parks for 50,000 military vehicles were planned; 270 miles of railroad had to be constructed. More than 20,000 railroad cars and 1,000 locomotives were to be shipped to the United Kingdom. The Air Forces required 163 fields, seven centers for combat crews and replacements, accommodations for 450,000 men, and 8,500,000 square feet of storage and shop space.

Two-thirds of the vast program of air installation required new construction by British and United States engineers. At the same time the invasion operations required detailed planning for the installations we would have to build once ashore in France—hospitals, depots, shops, railroads, pipelines, and bridging materials. There was stored in the United Kingdom, for example, all the construction materials necessary to rehabilitate completely the port of Cherbourg, the destruction of which was inevitable.

By July 1943 the flow of matériel from the United States to Britain had reached 753,000 tons a month which later was to increase to 1,900,000 tons in the month preceding the attack. It was necessary to construct and to allocate from existing resources a total of 3,780 assault craft of various types and 142 cargo ships. A great many of the assault craft were ocean-going vessels.

Not unmindful that an invasion across the English Channel against an entrenched German Army was an operation unequaled in possibility for a major disaster, the Allied commanders decided to undertake the great strategic bombardment that was to weaken Germany militarily, industrially, and economically. It was clear from the start that this program would require the tremendous resources of both American and British manpower and that critical shipping required for the build-up of the ground forces in England would have to be diverted from this purpose. The strategic bombardment of Germany was to be the mightiest air assault ever conceived. It is now certain that the decision was a sound one.

Accordingly, at Casablanca the American and British air force commanders were directed to launch and increase steadily the intensity of an assault that would continue day by day, around the clock, to reduce the enemy's capacity to resist when our armies would come to grips with the German Army on the continent. In order of priority, targets for the long-range heavy bombers were submarine construction yards, the aircraft industries, transportation, oil plants, and other critical enemy war industries.

Before the assault of Sicily was actually undertaken, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff met again in Washington in May. This meeting, designated the TRIDENT Conference, may prove to be one of the most historic military conclaves of this war, for here the specific strategy to which the movements of the land, sea, and air forces of the American and British Allies conformed was translated into firm commitments. There were changes in detail and technique after the TRIDENT Conference, but the Pacific strategy was sustained, and the first great objective, the defeat of the European Axis, Germany and Italy, and their satellites, was accomplished.

It was at this Conference that the combined Chiefs of Staff decided to extend Allied influence in the Mediterranean to the point where Italy would be forced to withdraw from the war. They also approved the plan of the United States Army Air Forces to strike Germany a serious blow by reducing her great oil resources at Ploesti. The first effective attack was carried out on 1 August 1943 by a force of 178 B-24 heavy bombers. Our losses were heavy, 54 bombers, but the cost to Germany's ability to wage mechanized warfare was immense. The Axis had been obtaining 3,000,000 tons of oil a year from Rumania. The continuing Ploesti attacks materially dried up this source.

At the TRIDENT Conference plans for a direct assault from the United Kingdom into Europe's classic battlegrounds were reaffirmed. Even though we were now firmly entrenched in North Africa, to have attempted to force Germany from the south across the Alpine barrier was on the face of it impracticable. In Europe's innumerable wars no vigorously opposed crossing of the Alps had ever been successfully executed. Operation OVERLORD, the new code name for the assault of France, which replaced ROUNDUP, was formally accepted and, for the purposes of planning, the spring of 1944 was designated as the target date. General Eisenhower was directed to send to the United Kingdom beginning 1 November seven seasoned divisions which were fighting in North Africa, and which would fight in Sicily, even though this meant that at the very moment he would be committing his forces in a full-scale campaign in Italy, he would be obliged to release two Army Corps of seasoned troops.

Nor was Japan neglected at the TRIDENT Conference. It was decided to maintain an unremitting offensive pressure on the Japanese even while our forces closed in to deliver the knock-out blow to Italy and we were gathering the tremendous resources in the United Kingdom that would be necessary to force the continent. Japan would be approached both from the west and from the east. On the Asiatic mainland it was determined to build up the flow of matériel to China via the air route over the "hump" and to initiate aggressive land and air operations to reestablish surface communications with beleaguered China. In the Pacific, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were directed to move against the Japanese outer defenses, ejecting the enemy from the Aleutians and seizing the Marshalls, some of the Carolines, the remainder of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the remainder of New Guinea.

From the TRIDENT Conference, the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke and I proceeded to General Eisenhower's headquarters at Algiers for a series of conferences lasting from 29 May to 3 June. At TRIDENT final conclusions had not been reached as to the extent to which the Mediterranean advance should continue so that General Eisenhower might be left in a position to exploit every favorable opportunity. In his villa at Algiers we discussed the future in detail, and he was authorized to proceed from operation HUSKY in Sicily as he saw fit with the intent of eliminating Italy from the war. But it was our purpose to avoid the creation in Italy of a vacuum into which the resources of the cross-Channel operation would be dissipated as the Germans had bled themselves in the North African campaign.


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

FORTRESS OF EUROPE

Victorious in North Africa, the Allied armies now had to meet and defeat the German armies of the West. It was also hoped to drive Italy out of the war, but both objectives could not be accomplished in the same operation. Behind the Alpine barrier, Nazi Germany could well feel secure from our attack. Where General Eisenhower stood in the summer of 1943, he had only two possible routes to Germany —through Southern France where his maneuver would be sharply restricted in the Rhone Valley or through Salonika in Eastern Greece where the Wehrmacht would have had the advantage of meeting both the Western Allies and the Red Army on the same front. It was imperative that the main United States and British forces be concentrated in the British Isles in preparation for a landing in France and an advance across the plains of Western Europe.

The Fall of Italy

Formal reports from the theater commanders on all of the operations of the last two years have not yet been received in the War Department and this general account of the operations of the United States Army during that period is based on official messages, informal reports, and other pertinent documents which are now available. They are believed to be sufficiently complete for the purposes of this report. Throughout the war, the Army was one part of a team composed of the sea, air, and ground forces of the United States and Great Britain and other members of the United Nations. It is therefore necessary to a description of the participation of the United States Army units in the fighting that the operations of the entire team be outlined.

The amphibious assault of the island of Sicily was launched on 10 July 1943. For weeks airfields, rail lines, and enemy fortifications on the island and in Sardinia and on the Italian mainland had been reduced by aerial bombardment. Pantelleria had surrendered on 11 June after an intense air and naval attack. The small islands of Lampedusa and Linosa had fallen a few days later.

The attacking force—the Fifteenth Army Group—was under General Eisenhower's deputy commander for allied ground forces, Gen. Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander. It consisted of the American Seventh Army, under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., on the left and the British Eighth Army, under Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, on the right. The Seventh Army assault force was made up of the II Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley and a separate task force under Major General Lucian K. Truscott. The II Corps consisted principally of the 1st and 45th Divisions, and a paratroop force. The task force was made up of the 3d Division with a combat team of the 2d Armored Division. In the British Eighth Army were two corps, including four infantry divisions, two brigades, and an airborne division. These troops were embarked from Algeria, Tunisia, the Middle East, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Naval Commander in Chief under General Eisenhower was Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham. Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt was the senior U. S. Naval officer.

A wind which had sprung up the night preceding D-day attained near gale proportions as our convoys approached their rendezvous. The wind subsided somewhat before H-hour, but conditions continued quite unfavorable for landing. In compensation, the storm had put the beach defenders off their guard.

General Eisenhower wrote me 17 July:

> . . . . All the initial invasion moves were carried out smoothly, and an astonishing lack of resistance was encountered on the shoreline. Captured Italian generals say we secured complete surprise. The airborne operations, which were executed about three hours ahead of the landing, were apparently the first real notice the defenders had of what was coming. Our parachutists and the British glider troops got fairly well into their positions in spite of very high winds and bad navigating conditions. The landings on the east coast were not greatly troubled by the weather, but the 45th and 1st Divisions had an extremely bad surf. Admiral Cunningham told me that he considered the United States Navy landing operations, under Admiral Kirk (with the 45th Division), to be one of the finest examples of seamanship he had ever witnessed . . . .

The wind also disrupted our airborne landings which were scheduled to be made inland from Gela a few hours before H-hour. Although scattered over a wide area and suffering heavy casualties from our own fire directed at transport formations which were off the prescribed course, the paratroops had a decisive effect on the successful landing.

General Eisenhower described these tragic difficulties as follows:

> . . . The most difficult thing we have to solve is to work out methods whereby friendly aircraft can work over our troops and vessels with safety. Take for example one operation: We were quite anxious to assemble all the fighting elements of the 82d Division in the rear of Patton's line as a general reserve, since all the evidence showed that he might receive some rather serious counterattacks. Two nights after the original landing, we laid on a very carefully coordinated plan for bringing in the remainder of the 82d Division. Sea lanes were established with the Navy and all troops were carefully warned as to what to expect. In spite of this, the troop-carrying planes encountered some fire before they got over the shore and from then on we had a very unfortunate experience. Some German night bombers came in at the same moment that our troop-carrying planes did and the dropping of bombs and flares made all the ground troops open up a maximum fire. In addition to this, a local counterattack, which took place at too late an hour to warn the airborne troops, apparently allowed the enemy to establish a fire zone near the selected landing ground. The combination of all these things resulted in quite serious losses. My present reports are that we lost 23 planes, while personnel losses as yet are unestimated.



OPERATION
HUSKY

> A later operation on the British front brought out the lesson that when we land airborne troops in hostile territory, we should *not do so in successive waves,* but should do it all at once. In the first wave, where we had surprise, losses were negligible, but in the two succeeding waves they were very large.
>
> Even in the daytime we have great trouble in preventing our own naval and land forces from firing on friendly planes. This seems particularly odd in this operation, where we have such great air superiority that the presumption is that any plane flying in a straight and level course is friendly. Spaatz has written Arnold at considerable length on this subject, and he is convinced, as I am, that we are going to have to do some very earnest basic training in both ground and naval forces. Otherwise, we will finally get our air forces to the point where they will simply refuse to come over when we want them. Generally speaking, we are on the strategic offensive, which means we *must* have air superiority. Therefore, we should teach our people *not* to fire at a plane unless it definitely shows hostile intent . . .

By sunrise, three hours after the assault, beachheads had been established along 100 miles of coast, from just south of Syracuse to west of Licata. Our troops were moving inland, northeast of Gela, on D+1, when the Germans directed a heavy armored counterattack against the 1st Division. It was beaten off largely through expert use of artillery and naval gun fire. This action provided the most critical moment of the invasion.

The problems of supply over the beaches were especially acute during the first two days. The needs of the combat troops were urgent but adverse weather and occasional enemy air attacks made unloading of ships difficult and hazardous. The beach-supply operation first proved the excellence of our 2½-ton amphibious truck, the "DUKW," an official designation which quickly became popularized as "DUCK."

General Eisenhower advised me:

> . . . Last Monday morning I made a quick tour along the American beaches, in order to get a visual picture of unloading operations and also to have a personal visit with Hewitt and Patton. I must say that the sight of hundreds of vessels, with landing craft everywhere, operating along the shoreline from Licata on the eastward, was unforgettable. Everybody I saw was in good heart and anxious to get ahead . . .

In the first two days of the invasion more than 80,000 men, 7,000 vehicles, and 300 tanks had been landed; several small ports had been placed in operation; at least six airfields had been captured and were being prepared for use.

Allied aircraft gave close support to ground operations, flying up to 1,200 sorties each day. Heavy bombers knocked out the few airdromes remaining serviceable to the enemy, and the ground troops were advancing rapidly. All air operations were under the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces headed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder with Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz as Commander of the Northwest African Air Forces. All heavy bombers were organized into the Strategic Air Force under Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle.

By 16 July the battle line ran from a point just south of Catania on the east to Porto Empedocle on the west; about one-quarter of the island was in our hands. On 22 July, General Patton's forces in a rapid thrust across the western end of the island occupied the key port of Palermo. Further east the troops forged steadily ahead through rugged mountains stubbornly defended by the enemy. By the end of July only the northeastern corner of the island remained to the enemy.

Catania, the east coast bastion which had held up the advance of the British Eighth Army, fell early in August. The Germans and Italians were already withdrawing across the Strait of Messina under heavy air bombardment and continued pressure by our ground forces. On 16 August patrols of our 3d Division entered Messina from the west simultaneously with British units from the southeast and the next day organized resistance ceased. In 39 days the Sicilian campaign had ended. Through use of a heavy concentration of antiaircraft guns the Germans managed to extricate thousands of their first-line panzer and airborne troops as well as a considerable amount of light equipment over the Strait of Messina to the mainland. Nevertheless, for the Axis the loss of Sicily was a major military disaster. Their casualties totaled 167,000 of which 37,000 were Germans. Our casualties totaled 31,158 killed, wounded, and missing.

General Eisenhower reported:

> . . . Nine months after the first landings in North Africa, the Allied Force had not merely cleared its shore of enemy forces, but had wrested from him the Sicilian bridge to use as our own in an advance onto the Italian mainland . . .

On to the Boot

Operation HUSKY, as we had hoped, precipitated a political disaster for the Axis. On 25 July, King Victor Emmanuel proclaimed the resignation of Mussolini. In August the President and the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs of Staff met at the Citadel at Quebec, the meeting being designated the QUADRANT Conference. By now the Italian Government

OPERATION AVALANCHE



was ready to quit. Marshal Badoglio had established contact with General Eisenhower in an effort to negotiate a surrender without the knowledge of the Germans. General Eisenhower was instructed to accept the unconditional surrender of Italy and to obtain the greatest possible military advantage from this development. He was to seize Sardinia and Corsica and attempt the establishment of air bases in the Rome area and northward, if feasible, maintaining unrelenting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy. At the same time, he was directed to coordinate his plans with the requirements of operation OVERLORD.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference also conceived the operation against Southern France designated operation ANVIL and arrived at these conclusions:

> Offensive operations against Southern France (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces) should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the Toulon-Marseille area and to exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. Air nourished operations in the southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated . . .

On 8 September, the day before American troops landed on the Italian mainland, the unconditional surrender of Italy was announced. On 9 September and the succeeding days the principal elements of the Italian fleet surrendered.

Compelling reasons had developed for the invasion of the Italian mainland. The operation (AVALANCHE) would enable us to capitalize on the collapse of Italian resistance; it offered a field for engaging German divisions which otherwise might operate against the Red Army and later against the forces in France; it would provide airfields from which the German homeland and the Balkans could be bombed from substantially shorter range; it would complete Allied control of the Mediterranean.

Canadian and British divisions of General Montgomery's Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina under cover of heavy artillery and air bombardment and landed on beaches near Reggio Calabria and Villa San Giovanni on 3 September. The beachheads were quickly secured, and the Eighth Army advanced northward through Calabria.

Six days later the U. S. Fifth Army under command of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark disembarked on beaches along the Gulf of Salerno. It landed with the VI Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. E. J. Dawley on the right and the British X Corps on the left. The VI Corps was composed principally of the 36th and 45th Divisions. American Rangers and British Commando units landed on the Sorrento Peninsula, north of the port of Salerno.

The enemy had suspected that we might undertake an amphibious operation against the Naples area, and as a result enemy reaction to the Salerno landings was swift and vigorous. It was evident that the German High Command had decided that its only hope of salvaging the situation arising from the surrender of the Italian Government lay in holding the Allied forces south of Naples until fresh dispositions could be made. On D-day the Germans made several local tank attacks. By 13 September the German XIV Panzer Corps was in action, and both the American and the British Corps were under heavy attack. The situation was critical.

General Eisenhower and his ground force commander, General Alexander, fully anticipated that they were in for a heavy fight at the foot of the Italian boot. They had estimated that eight German divisions were available to oppose the landings. Two were in and north of Rome. The Hermann Goering Panzer Division and the 15th Motorized Division were in the Naples area, and four more first-class divisions (the 16th and 26th Panzer, 29th Motorized, and 1st Parachute) were south of Naples. The enemy forces in the south were heavy in armor. General Alexander, on the other hand, had to lodge assault infantry on the mainland first. The shortage of shipping made it impossible for him to bring his own heavy armor into the fight until the British 7th Armored Division started to unload on D+5. A further handicap was the necessity of making large forces available for the OVERLORD build-up at this time. The U. S. 1st and 9th Divisions and 2d Armored Division which had fought in Sicily were already staging for their movement to the United Kingdom. Later the 82d Airborne Division was withdrawn from the fighting at Salerno and sent to Britain.

The narrow margin on which we were compelled to allocate our resources so that Germany might be defeated at the earliest possible moment required superhuman effort by troops and commanders. Every available combat aircraft of both the Tactical and the Strategic Air Forces was thrown into the action. Bombers flew two missions a day, isolating the battle area and pounding German strongpoints. During the four critical days our Air Forces flew 3,000 sorties and dropped 2,150 tons of bombs in close support of the ground action. Naval gunfire supported the ground troops, and the Navy kept the stream of reinforcements coming in. On 13 September, and again the next day, reinforcing troops of the 82d Airborne Division went ashore. By the morning of 15 September the assault was firmly established, the high ground commanding the beaches had been taken, and the crisis had passed. While the fighting was in progress during these critical days General Eisenhower found time to inform me:

> . . . We are very much in the "touch and go" stage of this operation. We got the Italian Fleet into Malta and, because of the Italian surrender, were able to rush into Taranto and Brindisi where no Germans were present. Our hold on both places is precarious but we are striving mightily to reinforce.
>
> Our worse problem is AVALANCHE itself. We have been unable to advance and the enemy is preparing a major counterattack. The 45th Division is largely in the area now and I am using everything we have bigger than a row boat to get the 3d Division in to Clark quickly. In the present situation our great hope is the Air Force. They are working flat out and assuming, which I do, that our hold on southern Italy will finally be solidified, we are going to prove once again that the greatest value of any of the three services is ordinarily realized only when it is utilized in close coordination with the other two . . .

On 16 September, patrols of the Fifth and Eighth Armies met 40 miles southeast of Salerno uniting the fronts of General Alexander's Fifteenth Army Group. The critical phase of the Italian campaign had ended.

Shortage of assault shipping and landing craft continued to haunt our operations. A single division, for example, required for its landing at Salerno 30 LST's, 24 LCT's, 39 LCI's, 9 large transports, 4 freighters, and numerous miscellaneous small landing craft. Nevertheless, during the first 18 days Navy crews and Army service troops landed over the Salerno beaches a total of 108,000 tons of supplies, 30,000 motor vehicles, and 189,000 troops.

Allied Air Established in Europe

The advance on Naples followed the successful completion of the fighting at Salerno. The Fifth and Eighth Armies under General Alexander were now deployed abreast. The Fifth occupied Naples and its harbor on 1 October and the Eighth Army reached Foggia, seizing its extensive system of airfields. Field Marshal Kesselring, commanding the German Forces in Italy, withdrew northward to delaying positions along the Volturno River. Sardinia had been evacuated by the Nazis on 20 September and on 4 October the evacuation of Corsica followed.

The capture of Foggia airfields confirmed our hold on the mainland. Fighters based in Sicily could carry enough gasoline to operate only about 15 minutes over the Salerno beachhead. Now they could be based in large numbers close to the battle area. From Foggia our heavy bombers could easily strike at the passes crossing the Alps, attack Germany air installations in Austria and factories in southern Germany, and raid industrial and transportation centers in the Balkans, aiding the Red Army. In addition the B–17's and B–24's of the Strategic Air Forces could reinforce the efforts of the Tactical Air Forces in isolating the Italian battle area.

Movement of the heavy bombers and fighter forces into Foggia was a tremendous undertaking because of the equipment necessary to establish new runways, pumping plants, pipe lines, repair shops, and warehouses. For some weeks a considerable portion of the shipping was devoted to the movement of the Air Forces onto the Italian mainland. By the end of the year 35,000 combat airmen with their supporting forces were established in Italy. There were two heavy bombardment groups, two medium groups, and two fighter groups operating from 10 airfields. The fall weather made it necessary to overlay the runways with steel mat. Pipe lines and pumping stations, largely recovered from North Africa, had to be installed to permit the necessary flow of aviation fuel to the airdromes. This build-up of air power consumed approximately 300,000 tons of shipping during the most critical months of the Italian campaign. So heavy were the shipping requirements of the Fifteenth Strategic Air Force, activated 1 November 1943 under General Doolittle, that the build-up of our ground forces in Italy was considerably delayed. This decision was a difficult one for General Eisenhower since the delay would give the enemy a heavy superiority in ground troops for a considerable period.

There were now 11 Allied divisions in the Italian line, but the Germans had at least 24 on the Italian mainland. Although 14 of these were in Northern Italy outside the combat zone, the enemy was in a position to build up a considerably greater defensive force than General Eisenhower had available for his attack. The additional Allied air power and the threat of a landing further north by General Patton's Seventh Army were counted on to deter the enemy from moving his divisions south from the Po Valley. This threat was exploited by skillful use of General Patton and his headquarters. Following the Sicilian campaign, the Seventh Army headquarters, which no longer had any divisions assigned to it, was moved to Corsica. General Patton's mysterious movements throughout the Mediterranean area kept the Germans guessing where the Seventh Army, which they had learned to fear so much in Sicily, might strike next.

Early in November the II Corps, then commanded by Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, moved to the mainland of Italy from Sicily. German plans to hold the line of the Volturno were frustrated when on the night of 12–13 October the II Corps and the VI Corps, now commanded by Maj. Gen. J. P. Lucas, of the Fifth Army forced crossings of that river. Destroying every bridge and culvert en route, the Germans withdrew to the "winter line" which they had been preparing feverishly since the Allied landings on the mainland. This defensive position stretched across the peninsula, following generally the lines of the Carigliano and Sangro Rivers, about 75 miles south of Rome.

The Slugging Battle for Rome

Winter had arrived. Heavy rains were falling and streams were in constant flood. The resources of our engineers were taxed to keep in place the temporary bridges on the vital supply routes. Vehicles and men mired deep in mud.

Despite the difficulties there was no relaxation of pressure. The purpose was to seize Rome as quickly as possible and engage the maximum number of German divisions. The offensive was a series of attacks and pauses, the immediate objectives being key terrain features. It was the hardest kind of fighting. The Germans had mined the roads, trails, natural cross-country routes of advance, and even the stream beds. To reinforce terrain barriers the enemy constructed strongpoints in which he skillfully employed mine fields, wire entanglements, log-and-earth emplacements, and automatic weapons. Machinegun and mortar emplacements, many of them dug four or five feet into solid rock, covered every approach. To deal with them the artillery was heavily reinforced by batteries of the heaviest field pieces we had produced. The 240-mm Howitzer and the 8-inch gun were rushed from the United States.

In December the Fifth Army arrived before the entrance to the Cassino corridor to Rome. The 2d Moroccan Infantry Division arrived in Italy at this time and was assigned to it. The United States had agreed to equip eight French infantry and armored divisions including supporting troops. The Moroccan division was the forerunner of the *Corps Expéditionaire Français* which, under the leadership of Gen. Alphonse Juin, greatly distinguished itself in the hard fighting of the months that followed.

Allied interest in the Eastern Mediterranean shifted to the Balkans following the conclusion of the North African campaign. Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton's Ninth Air Force based in Northeast Africa bombed strategic targets there, including the Ploesti airfields and, with elements of the Royal Air Force's Middle East Air Command, dropped supplies to the hard-pressed patriot forces.

The Eastern Mediterranean had constituted a separate theater under British Command until 5 December 1943 when the entire offensive in the Mediterranean was brought under one command. On that date the Combined Chiefs of Staff delegated to General Eisenhower responsibility for all operations in the Mediterranean other than strategic bombing. Three weeks later on 24 December, he was appointed Supreme Allied Commander of the invasion forces from the West, meaning from the British Isles, and was ordered to England to take over the final preparations. General Montgomery, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, and General Bradley joined him there. Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson was named Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Mediterranean Area, to succeed General Eisenhower, and Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, U. S. Army, was appointed his deputy. Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver W. H. Leese assumed command of the British Eighth Army. General Clark continued in command of the Fifth Army.

At this time Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz was selected to command the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe with headquarters in London, and General Doolittle was appointed commander of the Eighth Air Force, vice Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, who assumed command of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Maj. Gen. Nathan F. Twining was given command of the Fifteenth Strategic Air Force and Maj. Gen. J. K. Cannon continued in command of the Twelfth Tactical Air Force.

Early in January the French Corps, under General Juin, took over the right sector of the Fifth Army Front



FROM CASSINO TO THE ARNO

from the United States VI Corps, which was withdrawn to prepare for the Anzio landings. The Fifth Army then launched its attack against the line of the Garigliano River.

To disrupt communications in the rear of German forces in the Cassino area, the VI Corps landed on beaches near Anzio, 25 miles south of Rome, on 22 January. The landing forces included the 3d United States Division, a British infantry division, and American Ranger and parachute units. Reacting swiftly to the threat to his rear, the enemy rushed both infantry and armor to the Anzio area; the Hermann Goering Panzer Division was hastily shifted to the beachhead area and other divisions were sent down from Northern Italy. By the end of January the Allied troops in the beachhead faced a perimeter of strong German forces. With observation from the surrounding hills the Germans were able to deliver persistent accurate artillery fire throughout the flat beachhead and against ships near the shore.

Defeating the initial effort to capture Cisterna, the enemy drove in an attack to split the beachhead and annihilate our forces ashore. A masterful defense, in which the 3d and 45th Divisions suffered heavily but fought magnificently, halted the counterattacks which reached their peak of intensity on 17 February. Later in the month, the Hermann Goering and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions led another unsuccessful drive aimed at Anzio.

Further south the Fifth Army offensive had been halted before strong defenses of Cassino. Some of the bitterest fighting of the war raged at this point. Determined attempts to capture the town failed in the face of fanatical resistance by crack German units—notably the 1st Parachute Division, which General Alexander termed the best German division on any front. Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Deputy Allied Commander, wrote me on 22 March:

> We are struggling here with time. On March 15th I thought we were going to lick it by the attack on Cassino and advance up the Liri Valley. We used air, artillery, and tanks, followed closely by infantry. I witnessed the attack from across the valley. It got off to a start with excellent weather. The bombing was excellent and severe, and the artillery barrage which followed it and lasted for two hours was even more severe and accurate, with 900 guns participating. Two groups of medium bombers, followed by 11 groups of heavies, followed by three groups of mediums, started on the minute at 8:30 a. m. and closed at 12:00 noon, the groups coming over every 10 minutes up to 9:00 oclock and thereafter every 15 minutes. In spite of all this and with excellent support all afternoon with dive bombers and artillery fire, the ground forces have not yet attained their first objective. Consequently, the tanks which were to attack in mass could not get started. These results were a sobering shock to me. The infantry had been withdrawn in the early morning hours five miles to the north of Cassino. When they arrived back in the town of Cassino at approximately 1:00 o'clock close behind the barrage, the Germans were still there, were able to slow up their advance and even to reinforce themselves during the night by some unaccountable means.
>
> The attack is still going on but it is my opinion that all we will gain will be the town of Cassino and possibly a bridgehead over the Rapido in that vicinity; General Alexander must then stop and regroup his forces, which he hopes to accomplish by the 15th of April.

After regrouping, the Fifth and Eighth Armies launched a coordinated offensive on 11 May. As the attack got underway, the U. S. VI Corps, now under Maj. Gen. L. K. Truscott, struck out from Anzio beachhead on 23 May. The attack was made by the 3d, 34th, and 45th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Armored Division, the 1st Special Service Force, the 100th Japanese Infantry Battalion, composed of Americans of Japanese descent, and two British divisions. The 1st Special Service Force drove east to pave the way for a junction on 25 May with other Fifth Army forces advancing northwest along the coast. These forces included the 88th and 85th Divisions which had recently arrived from the United States and entered the line in March and April. Activated after 7 December 1941 and composed almost entirely of selectees, these two new divisions fought as veteran units in their first combat assignment, overcoming extremely heavy resistance. This was the first confirmation from the battlefield of the soundness of our division activation and training program, which was described in detail in my last report.

The units from the south then moved to Anzio from which the beachhead forces were already thrusting northeastward for the final drive on Rome. On their right the French Corps under General Juin struck into the heart of the German positions covering the Liri Valley and precipitated a general withdrawal to the north of Rome. The Italian capital fell to the Fifth Army on 4 June, two days before Allied forces began the invasion of France.

We were weakened seriously in the intense fighting along the approaches to Rome by our inability to replace the casualties promptly. On 4 February General Devers had reported:

> Casualties have been unusually heavy for the past 10 days, particularly in infantry. Clark reports 3d Division casualties alone total 2,400 infantry. A shortage in the 34th Division is 1,300 and in the 36th Division, 3,000. Since present operations involve simultaneous use of all divisions, it is imperative that table of organization strength be maintained.

Two weeks later he again reported:

> Replacements allocated to this theater are not adequate to sustain operations in Italy on the present scale. At the present time the United States part of the Fifth Army has an effective net shortage of 13,072 officers and men.

This shortage of men needed so desperately in our battle line resulted from the inability of the Selective Service System to meet the Army's call for manpower the previous summer. In July, Selective Service had delivered 194,000 men of the Army's call of 235,000. In August and September the Army had requested 175,000 men a month and received 131,000 in August and 122,000 in September.

Pursuit to the North

Pursuit of the enemy was energetic even though we were now making heavy withdrawals in preparation for ANVIL, the attack in Southern France which was scheduled for August. Between mid-June and the last of July more than a division a week was withdrawn from the forces in Italy to train and stage for this operation. The 45th was ordered out of the line on 14 June, the 3d on 17 June, and the 36th on 27 June. The United States IV Corps under Maj. Gen. W. D. Crittenberger moved into the line in place of the VI Corps, which had been withdrawn 13 June. The French Corps of four divisions (1st Motorized Moroccan, 3d Algerian Infantry, 4th Moroccan Mountain, and 2d Moroccan Infantry) were withdrawn between 2 and 21 July, and replaced by the II Corps which had been out of the line for a rest.

To compensate partially for this heavy drain on his resources and to utilize more fully antiaircraft units which were no longer required in such large numbers as a result of our increasing air superiority, the theater commander retrained several groups as infantry to form the 473d Infantry. At this time the 442d Infantry Regiment, composed of Americans of Japanese descent, was fighting with distinction on the left flank of the Fifth Army. Thus, by the end of June, Pescara, 95 miles east of Rome, had been captured and the Allied line extended across the peninsula through Lake Trasimeno. In July the Fifth and Eighth Armies gained 50 miles. After heavy fighting lasting two weeks, Florence fell to British troops of the Fifth Army. Five days later United States troops captured Pisa. Meanwhile, the Eighth Army had passed through the Apennine Divide, and on 21 September captured Rimini in the valley of the Po.

During the withdrawal of troops for ANVIL, one American division, the 91st, had arrived to reinforce the Fifth Army. On 15 September a combat team of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force moved into the Fifth Army line in the Valley of the Serchio River. Before the end of autumn the entire Brazilian division was in the line. During this same period one of the Army's two Negro divisions, the 92d, which had reached Italy during the late summer and fall, was assigned to the IV Corps.

The advances had brought General Alexander's Allied armies up against the "Gothic Line," an elaborate transpeninsular defense system which the Germans had been preparing since early in the year. Despite the heavy diversion of troops to other theaters it was decided to launch another general offensive on 10 September for the purpose of breaking through the Apennines into the Po Valley. While the U. S. Fifth Army assaulted the Gothic Line frontally through the mountains, the British Eighth Army, now commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir R. L. McCreery attacked northwest from Rimini. This offensive involved our troops in some of the bitterest and most difficult fighting of the Italian campaign. The jagged Apennines and bad weather seemed almost insurmountable obstacles.

After three months of this costly but successful penetration of the Gothic Line, the Allied command prepared in December to drive on Bologna, but pressure against the western flank of the Fifth Army and diversion of Eighth Army units to meet the political crisis in Greece disrupted these plans. Meanwhile the Germans had time to refit and strengthen their forces and establish a new defensive position. Kesselring was under orders to hold south of Bologna. In addition to German replacements, the enemy brought up units of Mussolini's Fascist Republican Army, which had a strength of four new Italian divisions.

On 12 December 1944 Field Marshal Alexander replaced Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson as Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean area. General Wilson was promoted to Field Marshal and senior representative in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff. Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark moved up to command the

Allied armies in Italy and Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott assumed command of the Fifth Army.

In January the Fifth Army was reinforced by the 10th U. S. Mountain Division which gave a fine exhibition of battle efficiency on its initial employment. During the winter, three Italian combat groups entered the line of the Eighth Army. These small gains were more than offset by a February directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff which ordered the transfer of five British and Canadian divisions to the European Theater. The directive was later amended to send three to France, one to the eastern Mediterranean, and retain one division in Italy for possible use in the impending final battle. This movement of more than 125,000 combat troops was accomplished in complete secrecy and gave Marshal Montgomery's Northern Army Group on the Rhine additional power to the surprise of the enemy.

During the fall and winter months, the Tactical and Strategic Air Forces pounded away at communications over the Alps and in Northern Italy. With opposing ground forces so nearly equal in strength, the Air Forces represented our margin of advantage and made the maintenance of German forces in Northern Italy most difficult while our own was unmolested. In addition, Italy-based aircraft assisted the Yugoslav patriots. Closely coordinated with the attacks staged from Britain, the Strategic Air Forces struck heavy blows at oil and rail targets in Austria and southern Germany, averaging weekly bombloads of nearly 4,000 tons.

The Final Phases

Ground action on the Italian front in the late winter was limited to small but important advances in the mountains southwest of Bologna. The strategic aircraft kept up the pressure on communications and industrial targets beyond the Alps, reaching as far north as Berlin.

On 9 April, General Clark's Fifteenth Army Group launched its spring drive, known as operation GRAPESHOT. The Eighth Army led off with an attack across the Senio River west of Ravenna. In spite of unusually heavy air and artillery preparation, the offensive met stiff opposition from the German Tenth Army in approaching the Argenta Gap. Five days later, after the enemy had presumably had time to dispose himself to meet the Eighth Army attack, the II and IV Corps of the Fifth Army threw their weight into the offensive from positions in the Apennines south and southwest of Bologna.

After a week of heavy fighting our troops broke into the Po Valley and entered Bologna from the west and south. At the same time, Polish forces of the Eighth Army entered the city from the east. The Fifth Army columns beyond the city swept up the great highway leading to Piacenza—the ancient Via Emilia—and, by-passing Modena to the east, drove toward the Po south of Mantua. Pursuing the disorganized enemy to the river, bridgeheads were quickly established across the Po on 23 April. The Eighth Army met determined resistance in Ferrara, but by the 25th had crossed the Po in force. On the same day, our forces on the Ligurian Coast captured La Spezia with its naval base. The German armies were virtually destroyed south of the Po, the bulk of their equipment being either destroyed or abandoned.

The final week of the war in Italy brought wide advances throughout northern Italy. Bridging many rivers that flow south from the Alps, the Eighth Army swept northeast along the Adriatic coastal plain, liberating Padua, Venice, and Treviso. While Fifth Army infantry and mountain troops drove into the foothills of the Alps along the Brenner route, other armored columns and motorized infantry raced up the valley of the Po and by 29 April had reached the great city of Milan.

On every side effective support was received from the Italian patriots. After seizing Genoa, our Ligurian forces drove beyond Savona to make contact with the French. Advance elements of the 442d Japanese-American regiment reached Turin. Resistance collapsed everywhere; more than 160,000 prisoners were taken by the Allied armies. By the first of May, Eighth Army troops advancing on Trieste had made contact with Yugoslav partisans at Monfalcone. On 2 May 1945 the commander of the German armies in Northern Italy found it impossible to continue the bloody struggle and capitulated.

The Italian triumph is a striking demonstration of the solidarity of the United Nations. Fighting under the Fifteenth Army Group, at some time during the Italian campaign, were Americans, British, Canadians, French, New Zealanders, South Africans, Poles, Indians, Brazilians, Italians, Greeks, Moroccans, Algerians, Arabs, Goums, Senegalese, and a brigade of Jewish soldiers.



FINAL OFFENSIVE IN ITALY

The entire campaign was slow and bitter. The Allied troops did not have the superiority they enjoyed in Western Europe, where geography had compelled us to make the great effort. Nonetheless, the Italian campaign made a heavy contribution to the successes on the Western front, pinning down German forces which Hitler needed badly to reinforce his weakened armies, both in the east and west. The troops participating in the Italian campaign should feel as great a satisfaction in the defeat of the Axis enemy as those of the larger forces which drove into the heart of Germany from the west and made contact with the Red armies.

ORDER OF BATTLE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS AS OF 2 MAY 1945

[The order of battle of our Allies is not shown below Army level, except to show U. S. division under their operational control.]

Unit	*Commander*	*Location*
Fifteenth Army Group	Gen. Mark W. Clark	Florence, Italy
Fifth Army	Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott	Verona, Italy.
II Corps	Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes	Italy.
10th Mountain Division	Maj. Gen. George P. Hays	Italy.
85th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter	Italy.
88th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Paul W. Kendall	Italy.
IV Corps	Maj. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger	Italy.
1st Armored Division	Maj. Gen. Vernon E. Prichard	Italy.
34th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte	Italy.
92d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond	Italy.
British Eighth Army	Lt. Gen. Sir R. L. McCreery	Italy.
91st Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. William G. Livesay	Italy.
U. S. Army Air Forces in MTO	Lt. Gen. J. K. Cannon	Caserta, Italy.
Twelfth Air Force	Maj. Gen. B. W. Chidlaw	Florence, Italy.
XXII Tactical Air Command	Brig. Gen. T. C. Darcy	Italy.
Fifteenth Air Force	Maj. Gen. N. F. Twining	Bari, Italy.
XV Fighter Command	Brig. Gen. D. C. Strother	Italy.

Operation OVERLORD

In November and December 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had met with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the SEXTANT Conference in Cairo and then with the President, Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin and his Military adviser at Teheran. By that time it was clear how the defeat of Germany could be brought about—but the Allies were beset by innumerable specific problems of implementing the desired strategy.

The greatest of these by far was the critical shortage of landing craft. Those available for the top priority operation OVERLORD in Normandy still seemed insufficient and there were many other vital operations that had to be undertaken if we were to maintain the initiative on the global battlefronts. Even though an attack in the south of France was considered essential to the success of OVERLORD, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had previously directed that 68 landing ships be returned from the Mediterranean Theater to the United Kingdom beginning 15 January to meet the requirements of the cross Channel assault as then planned. Despite these additional ships, it became evident that there would not be sufficient landing craft in Great Britain by the invasion target date to provide a sufficient margin of safety for the hazardous amphibious assault. Therefore, upon their return to Cairo from Teheran, the Combined Chiefs resolved that more strenuous measures must be taken to permit a broadening of the initial landing in Normandy. The Mediterranean Theater could be bled no further. Only sufficient resources were left there for an assault force of two divisions for Southern France, and military intelligence indicated that while this force could probably overcome anticipated German resistance on the Riviera coast, the rapid development of the operation northward up the Rhone valley would not permit further reduction. The remaining possible source for additional landing ships was in the shipyards of Great Britain and the United States. Such an increase in time for OVERLORD would require a miracle of production since these shipyards were already overcrowded and working at furious speed to maintain the heavy existing schedule of landing craft production, as well as that for the construction of destroyers and destroyer escorts urgently required to combat the German submarines.

An added complication at this time was the possibility that Turkey might enter the war on the side of the United Nations, exposing herself to attack by Bulgaria. The possibility of operations to support her in the eastern Mediterranean had to be considered.

At the same time there was grave concern over the situation then obtaining in Asia. The Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, met with President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and their military advisers at Cairo, and all were convinced that a determined effort must be made to reestablish surface communications with our Chinese Allies in 1944. Agreement was reached for operation CAPITAL in which the forces of Admiral Mountbatten and General Stilwell were given the mission of investing Northern and Central Burma. It was realized that the success of these operations could be made much more certain by an amphibious landing in the Bay of Bengal, but there were not sufficient landing craft to insure the success of our European offensive and at the same time undertake a landing on the shores of Burma.

Victory in this global war depended on the successful execution of OVERLORD. That must not fail. Yet the Japanese could not be permitted meanwhile to entrench in their stolen empire, and China must not be allowed to fall victim to further Japanese assaults. Allied resources were searched through again and again, and strategy reconsidered in the light of the deficiencies. These conclusions seemed inescapable: France must be invaded in 1944, to shorten the war by facilitating the advance westward of the Soviet forces. At the same time German technological advances such as in the development of atomic explosives made it imperative that we attack before these terrible weapons could be turned against us. In addition, the pressure on the Japanese in the Pacific must not be relaxed. Communications with China must be reopened. Resources were allocated accordingly. The balance was extremely delicate but we had to go ahead.

When General Eisenhower was selected as the Supreme Allied Commander for OVERLORD after the resumption of the conference at Cairo in December, he received this directive:

> You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.



OPERATION OVERLORD

This is the perspective with which the Allied Supreme Commander viewed his problem. The English Channel was the most difficult barrier to the invasion of Western Europe because of the navigational hazards and the extreme tidal variation along the French Coast. But once firmly ashore anywhere from the lowlands to the Franco-Spanish border, there would be unlimited freedom of maneuver and ample opportunity to improvise communications for the Armies driving on the German heartland.


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Falmouth
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Accompanied by his Deputy Commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, General Eisenhower arrived in Britain in mid-January. Almost immediately he wrote:

> It is obvious that strong and positive action is needed here in several directions. The location of various headquarters, the exact pattern of command, the tactics of the assault, and the strength in units and equipment, are all questions that have not yet been definitely settled. The most important of all these questions is that of increasing the strength of the initial assault wave in OVERLORD.

The search for greater resources for OVERLORD continued until it seemed that the time and energy of the Allied commanders was almost completely absorbed by a problem that defied solution. We had gone to the shipping experts and the shipyard owners to urge them to bend greater than human efforts to step-up the output of their precious landing craft. The shipyards broke all records to meet our requirements but there still were not enough landing craft in sight.

After intensive calculations which taxed the endurance of the military and naval planners, two major decisions were made. The target date of invasion was advanced from early May to early June, even though this pushed us closer to the time when weather conditions would turn against us. The operations in Southern France, which were originally to be made simultaneously with the attack on Normandy, were delayed months so that landing craft could be used first in the Channel, then rushed to the Mediterranean to do double duty both in OVERLORD and ANVIL.

The Preparations

At the time of the QUADRANT Conference at Quebec in August 1943, there had been but a single United States division in the United Kingdom and our trans-Atlantic shipping effort was concentrated on filling the heavy requirements of the Mediterranean campaign. By late August 1943, shipping was partially released from this heavy southern commitment and troops again began to pour into the British Isles. On D-day, 6 June 1944, the strength of the United States Army in that theater was 1,533,000; in the interim an average of 150,000 men had been transported each month.

The build-up of this force, together with a corresponding accumulation of supplies of all kinds, involved a tremendous job of transportation, and special credit must be given to the Navy for its vital part in the undertaking. An enormous administrative task was also involved, since facilities for quartering and training such large forces had to be provided within the limited area of the United Kingdom. The efficiency of the preinvasion build-up is exemplified by the speed with which units landing in Britain were provided with their essential arms and equipment. Through a system of preshipping and storing, the Army Service Forces were able to have equipment distributed and waiting for each unit on its arrival. Within a maximum of 30 days after debarking, divisions were fully equipped and ready for action.

The units arriving in the United Kingdom from America were well trained, especially in fast-moving corps and army operations over large areas; those coming from the Mediterranean were battle-tested. Nonetheless, everything possible was done during their staging period in the United Kingdom to increase their combat efficiency despite the limited terrain available in a densely populated and cultivated countryside. The troops which were to make the assault landings maneuvered realistically on beaches and ground which approximated the target areas. In the early spring of 1944, joint exercises of the ground, sea, and air forces which were to make the attack were held along the southern coast of England. It was a full-dress rehearsal.

Three weeks before the invasion General Eisenhower wrote:

> There is no question at all as to the readiness of the troops. They are well trained, fit, and impatient to get the job started and completed. In forecasting future possibilities, it is, of course, necessary that we seek ways and means to bring to bear those factors in which we enjoy a great superiority over the enemy. These are control of the sea, command of the air, including resources in airborne troops and armor. I am trying to visualize an operation in which we would bring in behind the initial beachhead a great strength in armor and seek an opportunity to launch a big armored attack in conjunction with a deep and very heavy penetration by airborne troops.

Victory In The Air

By 1 July 1943 the Allied strategic air assault of Air Chief Marshal A. T. Harris' Royal Air Force Bomber Command by night and General Eaker's Eighth Air Force by day on the fortress of Europe was in full swing and was producing important results. Single raids in which the air force delivered bomb loads of more than 500 tons had been carried out. Serious inroads had been made on the combat power of the German fighter force.

These results had been obtained with an American air fleet of less than 1,000 heavy bombers and 1,000 planes of other types. By D-day, the strength of the United States air forces in the United Kingdom exceeded 3,000 heavy bombers and 6,500 first-line planes of other types. The attacks on Germany continued with increasing intensity and shattering power.

The climax in air war came in February 1944, when the Luftwaffe made a powerful effort to sweep our day bombers from the skies. The battle raged for a week. It was fought over Regensburg, Merseburg, Schweinfurt, and other critical industrial centers. The German fighter force was severely crippled, and our attacks continued with unabated fury.

From the time of the Eighth Air Force's first heavy bomber attack on 17 August 1942 until V-E Day, United States airmen had dropped more than 1,550,000 tons of bombs on western European targets. During 1943, following successful attacks on the enemy's submarine yards and bases, the effort of our precision bombers was concentrated against aircraft and ball-bearing manufacturing plants, airdromes, and communications. The German fighter command, already outclassed in aerial combat, was further reduced by inability to get replacements. The RAF Bomber Command concentrated upon the destruction of the Ruhr-Rhineland industries and the undermining of the morale of industrial workers.

In order to exploit more fully the flexibility of our bombardment, particularly against German industrial targets, the Eighth and Fifteenth U. S. Air Forces were combined on 1 January 1944 to form "The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe." Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz was placed in command. The component forces continued to be based in the United Kingdom and in Italy respectively.

In the late spring of 1944, synthetic fuel plants and crude oil refineries became the prime targets. Captured documents now show that the bombing campaign succeeded in reducing production between May and October 1944 to five percent of the former monthly output.

The attack on German industry was coupled with strikes on German communications. Vital rail junctions and the canals which were so important in the enemy's transportation system were repeatedly bombed. During a single month—May 1944—more than 900 locomotives and 16,000 freight cars were destroyed in Western Europe. The effects of this phase of the air assault were enormous, for transportation and communications are the life arteries of a modern industrial state engaged in total war.

Medium bombers and fighter-bombers of Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton's Ninth Air Force, which moved from the Middle East during the fall of 1943, struck enemy airfields in diversionary attacks so timed as to reduce the concentration of enemy fighters which might oppose the passage of the heavy United States bomber formations. Diversionary fighter sweeps further dislocated the enemy's air opposition. As the range of fighters was increased through the installation of additional fuel tanks, they were employed more and more to escort bombers to targets deep in Germany.

As the aerial offensive mounted the enemy was forced to withdraw fighters from the support of his armies in the East to meet the threat from the West. This was an important factor in enabling the Soviet air forces to maintain superiority on their front.

It was not merely overwhelming numbers of planes which gave our air assault its great effectiveness. There were important, almost revolutionary, improvements in techniques and in equipment. To reduce the excessive aircraft losses in long, round-trip bombing flights exposed to constant enemy interception, a system of shuttle-bombing between bases in the United Kingdom and North Africa was initiated in mid-August 1943. The shuttle-bombing run was shortened as the advance in Italy continued. A shuttle system between Italy and the U. S. S. R. was inaugurated with a heavy raid on rail communications in Central Europe on 2 June 1944. Soon thereafter, shuttle-flights were made between the United Kingdom and the new Ukrainian bases.

Radar bombing technique, first employed in the fall of 1943, improved constantly. All-weather bombing approached reality; our bombers used the cover of darkness and inclement weather to achieve surprise, yet still hit their target with precision.

In the spring of 1944, three months before D-day, the Allied air forces, while still hammering at their strategic targets, began directly to prepare the way for the invasion. Through destructive attacks on key bridges and rail centers, the "invasion coast" was effectively isolated. As a result of this preparatory bombing, the ability of the enemy to shift reserves to the critical area was severely restricted. Since the outcome of an



amphibious operation hinges on the relative ability of the opposing forces to build up strength in the critical areas, this air preparation was a decisive factor in the success of OVERLORD. Even with favorable Channel weather, it would have required at least 15 weeks for the Allies to land as many divisions as the Germans had available in Belgium and Northern France.

The Assault

The beaches of Normandy were chosen for the assault after long study of the strength of German coastal defenses and the disposition of German divisions. The absence of large ports in the area was a serious obstacle, but it was offset in some measure by the relative weakness of the German defenses and elaborate construction in Britain of two artificial harbors to be emplaced off the beaches.

The selection of target dates and hours for the assault required an accurate forecast of the optimum combination of favorable weather, tide, and light conditions. Moonlight was desirable for the airborne operations. D-day was scheduled for 5 June; this date was changed to 6 June because of unfavorable but clearing weather. Hundreds of craft, en route from distant ports on the west coast of England, were already approaching the invasion area; they had to backtrack or seek shelter in the overcrowded harbors on the south coast. The final forecast for the attack day predicted high winds; the sea was still rough, but rather than accept a delay of several weeks until tide and moon provided another favorable moment, General Eisenhower made the fateful decision to go ahead.

At 0200 hours on 6 June 1944, the American 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, as well as British airborne troops, were dropped in vital areas in the rear of German coastal defenses guarding the Normandy beaches from Cherbourg to Caen.

The seaborne assault under the over-all command of Field Marshal Montgomery was made on a broad front; British and Canadian forces commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey and American forces commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley deployed against 50 miles of coast line. Aerial bombardment of beach defenses along the coast began at 0314, preliminary naval bombardment at 0550, shortly after sunrise. At 0630 the first waves of assault infantry and tanks landed on the invasion beaches.

German defenses on all beaches were formidable; they consisted first of bands of underwater obstacles designed to break up formations of landing craft; mines were freely used to make these obstacles more lethal. The beaches themselves were heavily mined and strung with wire. Concrete pillboxes and gun emplacements were sited to deliver withering crossfire along the beaches. All exits leading inland from the beaches were blocked by antitank walls and ditches, mine fields, and barbed wire. Further inland, mortars and artillery were sited to deliver indirect fire on the beaches. Open fields were blocked against glider landings by patterns of heavy stakes, but complete intelligence gathered up to the moment of assault provided detailed knowledge of enemy dispositions and enabled the troops to breach the defenses.

In the American sector, the beach areas totaled 10,000 yards in length. Every 75 yards a landing craft loaded with assault infantry touched down at H-hour. Assault veterans charged down the ramps, picked their way through the bands of obstacles, and immediately provided cover for the work of naval and engineer demolition crews which followed close behind. Each crew had a specific task to perform in clearing lanes for subsequent waves of craft carrying infantry, artillery, vehicles, and supplies. Naval gunfire and air bombardment hammered at artillery and mortar positions, pillboxes, and gun emplacements.

Resistance by German ground elements was stubborn, and bitter fighting developed in many sectors. Our long campaign against the Luftwaffe had greatly weakened its capacity for combat and, as a result, there was no effective air opposition to our highly vulnerable initial landings. Reinforcements continued to pour ashore, and by nightfall on D-day, five American divisions, the 1st, 4th, 29th, and 82d and 101st Airborne, with tanks, artillery and other reinforcements, were firmly established. Also ashore were advance detachments of the headquarters of Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow's V Corps and Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins' VII Corps. The British build-up in their sector was on a corresponding scale. Additional divisions still afloat were



BREAKOUT

being landed in a steady stream, constantly augmenting the superiority which our assault troops had already established over the German defenders.

By the second morning it was clear that the beachhead was secure and that the greatest and longest step toward the destruction of the German armies of the west had been taken. The "crust" of the German coastal defense system had been broken. The German boast that an invading force could not remain ashore for nine hours had been flung back on the now desperate defenders.

Shortly after D-day the Combined Chiefs of Staff met in London in order to be immediately available should an emergency arise requiring a prompt decision on some matter beyond General Eisenhower's jurisdiction as Supreme Commander. The assault went so well that it was possible on 12 June for the Combined Chiefs to visit the beaches of Normandy and observe at first hand the magnitude of the undertaking and the gallant and skilfull manner in which the Allied forces were overcoming the resistance of the veteran German soldiers.

Our Army feels great pride in the Normandy assault. So must the Navy and our British Allies. The Navy's mission was to transport the troops across the Channel, to land them properly on the beaches, and to support the landings with gun and rocket fire. If the Allied navies had not performed this task brilliantly, the invasion would have failed before it was well begun. The combined planning of British and American staffs, working together as a single team with excellent knowledge of enemy dispositions, resulted in precise execution of an operation so complicated that it almost defies description; its success must be attributed in great measure to wholehearted Allied cooperation, as well as to the stout hearts and fearless courage of the men. The destruction of rail and road communications by the air forces and their constant strafing of the highways continued to prevent the enemy from concentrating a superior force against the beachhead.

The Breakout

The second phase of the invasion had two objectives: first, the capture of the port of Cherbourg; and, second, the build-up of sufficient forces and matériel to enable the forces to break out from the beachhead and strike toward Germany. Now the fighting grew fiercer. After a bitter and costly struggle, Cherbourg fell on 27 June to the 4th, 9th, and 79th Divisions of General Collins' VII Corps. Damage in the harbor was so extensive and difficult of repairs that until the late fall thousands of tons of matériel were still pouring over the beaches. Other Allied forces had, by 1 July, deepened the beachhead by advances up to 20 miles in the area between Caen and St. Lo against increasingly stubborn resistance in the aggressively defended hedgerows of the Cotentin Peninsula.

General Eisenhower wrote on 5 July:

> The going is extremely tough, with three main causes responsible. The first of these, as always, is the fighting quality of the German soldier. The second is the nature of the country. Our whole attack has to fight its way out of very narrow bottlenecks flanked by marshes and against an enemy who has a double hedgerow and an intervening ditch almost every 50 yards as ready-made strong points. The third cause is the weather. Our air has been unable to operate at maximum efficiency and on top of this the rain and mud were so bad during my visit that I was reminded of Tunisian wintertime. It was almost impossible to locate artillery targets although we have plenty of guns available. Even with clear weather it is extraordinarily difficult to point out a target that is an appropriate one for either air or artillery.

In spite of the lack of a major port, the build-up in the beachhead was completed late in July. On 1 August the 12th U. S. Army Group, later designated the Central Group of Armies, became operational under the command of General Bradley. Its two armies—the First, under Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, and the Third, under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., totaling 13 infantry and 5 armored divisions,[1] had been assembled in the beachhead area. The Canadian First Army under General Crerar and the British Second Army under General Dempsey composed the 21st Army Group, later designated the Northern Group of Armies, commanded by Field Marshal Montgomery. These armies were still dependent on beachhead supply for their sustenance. Even with unseasonable bad weather which severely damaged and almost destroyed one of the two artificial port installations and halted unloading operations many times, an average of some 30,000 tons of supplies and 30,000 troops were handled every day. These achievements, without precedent in history, were not anticipated by the German defenders and, consequently, their plans for the defense of the French coast had not taken them into account.

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[1] U. S. Divisions in France, 27 July 1945, Infantry: 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 35th, 79th, 83d, 90th; Armored: 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th.

General Bradley was able, on 25 July, to mount the offensive which broke out of the beachhead at St. Lo and Avranches and carried the lines swiftly forward to the Meuse River. Preceding the ground attack 1,500 heavy bombers and hundreds of other combat aircraft dropped more than 3,390 tons of bombs on enemy positions on a narrow front. The crushing power of the air attack and its paralyzing effect on the enemy's movement blasted the way for rapid penetration of German lines. While observing preparations for the attack, one of the Army's outstanding soldiers, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, was killed by misdirected bombs of our own air force. Though his loss was a tremendous shock to our divisions, which he had organized and trained, he undoubtedly died in the way he preferred—in battle. General McNair was utterly fearless.

The break-out gave General Eisenhower an opportunity to deliver mighty blows at the shaken enemy. At the height of this action he wrote:

> My entire preoccupation these days is to secure the destruction of a substantial portion of the enemy forces facing us. Patton's Third Army, on the marching wing of our forces, is closing in as rapidly as possible. His deployment through the bottleneck near Avranches was exceedingly difficult but we have now got the strength on that wing to proceed definitely about our business. We have detached only one corps for the conquest of the Brittany Peninsula so as to have the maximum forces for the main battle. Within a week there should be real developments on the present front.

He seized his opportunity, directing a vigorous pursuit of the shattered German forces. There followed a campaign which for speed and boldness has few parallels. Following the First Army's break-through, the Third Army, under General Patton, utilizing a heavy preponderance of armor, thrust forward from the Avranches breach on 2 August and cut off the Brittany Peninsula by 6 August, isolating the bulk of the 2d Parachute and 265th, 266th and 343d German Infantry Divisions. The next move was to establish a southern flank along the Loire to protect our main effort heading eastward against attack from the south. These were preparatory moves. While they were in progress, General Hodges' First Army and the British Second Army were repulsing and crushing heavy attacks which the enemy launched in the desperate hope of driving a wedge to the sea through Avranches to cut off General Patton's forces.

On 13 August the Third Army swept north from Le Mans around the southern flank of the German Normandy position in the direction of Argentan. Simultaneously, Canadian forces of the British Second Army drove south from Caen toward Falaise. This pincers movement created the "Falaise pocket," in which 100,000 enemy troops were captured, thousands more were killed or wounded, and thousands more thrown into disorder as they escaped toward the Seine through the "Falaise-Argentan corridor" held open by desperate German resistance. The Germans realized that the battle for Normandy was lost and they began withdrawing beyond the Seine under heavy pressure from both the ground and the air. The Seine crossings were raked by fighter patrols. Turning eastward from Le Mans and Argentan, the Third Army raced for the river with such speed that supply by air was often necessary to maintain its momentum. By the capture of Mantes on 18 August the German escape route was confined to crossings of the lower Seine northwest of Elbeuf.

Continental Envelopment

Meanwhile, on 15 August, operation ANVIL was executed by the U. S. Seventh Army under Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch in landings on the southern coast of France, which further weakened the fast-deteriorating position of the German Army in France. Preparations for this operation under the general supervision of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, had been under way, while the campaigns in Italy and Northern France were in progress. The very threat of such a landing had held substantial German forces of the First and Nineteenth armies immobilized in the south of France, preventing their deployment against our forces in Normandy. A naval force, comparable in size to the one which participated in the American landings in Normandy, had been assembled. An air offensive, conducted chiefly by the Allied Strategic Air Forces, prepared the way for the invasion by sustained attacks on vital enemy communications and installations in Southern France.

The Seventh Army landed southwest of Cannes in ideal weather. The area had been selected as the most favorable approach to the Rhone Valley. The landing force consisted of elements of General Truscott's VI Corps, our 1st Special Service Force, and French commandos. A British-American Airborne Task Force jumped astride the Argens River west of St. Raphael the night preceding the seaborne assault and seized the pass through which our forces would debouch. By 28 August the beachheads were firmly established and



OPERATION ANVIL

the advance up the Rhone Valley was well under way.

The operations had been substantially aided by the efforts of the French underground. The landing of our VI Corps had been followed up immediately by the landing of divisions of the French I and II Corps of General de Tassigny's First French Army, which quickly captured Marseille and Toulon; by 1 September Nice had fallen. While the main force swept west to the Rhone, before moving northward, a task force from the American 36th Division under Brig. Gen. Frederic B. Butler headed directly north from the landing beaches through Gap, seized Grenoble and then turned northwest toward the Rhone to cut off the German columns retreating up the Rhone Valley. This drive into the rear of the German Nineteenth Army greatly facilitated the rapid advance of the main body of the VI Corps up the Rhone Valley. Lyon fell on 3 September and the advance northward continued unabated.

On 15 September other United States and French forces were combined into the 6th Army Group (later designated the Southern Group of Armies) commanded by Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers. He was succeeded as Deputy Theater Commander in the Mediterranean by Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, former Deputy Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army.

The Liberation of France

On 25 August the 2d French Armored Division of the First U. S. Army entered Paris, as the battered remnants of the German army which had defended the Normandy coast fell back north of the Seine. The Germans had suffered at least 400,000 casualties, of which more than 200,000 were prisoners of war. The units which had escaped destruction were forced to abandon the major portion of their equipment.

As the enemy withdrew he had left behind substantial garrisons to defend the critical seaports: Brest, St. Nazaire, Lorient, Dieppe, and LeHavre. In order to prevent the Allies from developing harbor facilities to sustain the advance of the gathering millions, the Germans freely expended thousands of men to make the supply problem difficult if not impossible of accomplishment.

Despite these obstructions, by 5 September (D+90) 2,086,000 Allied troops and 3,446,000 tons of stores had been put ashore in France. This was an outstanding logistical achievement, but nevertheless we were still in urgent need of additional ports if we were to support adequately the fast-moving offensive across France that was operating on a dangerously thin supply basis. Many divisions had a very limited supply on hand.

On 5 September the Ninth U. S. Army under the command of Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson began operations under the 12th Army Group for the reduction of Brest and other French ports, where four German divisions were bottled up. Dieppe fell on 31 August; LeHavre on 11 September; Brest on 19 September. The most strenuous efforts were made to put these ports into operating condition. Tonnage began moving through Dieppe on 7 September and through Le Havre on 9 October. Brest was too heavily damaged and too distant from future fields of operations to justify immediate reconstruction.

The defeated German armies now were streaming across France, heading for the shelter of the Siegfried Line. They were under constant air attack. On the ground General Bradley's First and Third Armies, driving northeast from Melun and Troyes reached the Aisne and the Marne, sweeping aside the German rear guards. Field Marshal Montgomery's forces crossed the lower Seine, invested LeHavre, and pushed on to the Somme. On crossing the Aisne, the 7th Corps of the First Army turned northward and raced on to Mons in a brilliant stroke that cut off five of the retreating German divisions. The pocket thus formed yielded over 22,000 prisoners with heavy additional losses of killed and wounded.

Overrunning Reims and Chalons, our Third Army pushed eastward, nourished often by air supply, and by 7 September had reached the line of the Moselle from Nancy to the vicinity of Metz. On 11 September elements of the Third Army contacted Seventh Army columns northwest of Dijon. Four days later the 6th Army Group passed to operational control of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, severing its fighting connection with the Mediterranean theater, though its supply was continued for some time from Italy. On 16 September approximately 20,000 occupational troops of the German Army from the Biscayne Bay area, moving northeastward toward Germany, surrendered to the commander of the U. S. 83d Division southwest of Orleans.

To the north, our First Army had crossed the Belgian frontier on 2 September, captured Liege on the 8th, crossed Luxembourg, and entered Germany on the 11th. The enemy had been kept completely off balance. As the Allies approached the German border, supply lines were stretched to the limit and the marching columns of the armies were maintained only by the full use of air transportation, fast double-lane, one-way track routes, such as the famous Red Ball Express from the Normandy beaches to Paris, and other emergency measures. Logistical difficulties now began to slow down the advance. Time was needed for the opening of additional ports and for the relaying and repair of hundreds of miles of French railroads.

The following extract from a report by General Eisenhower indicates the severity of the campaign in France and illustrates the tremendous needs of our armies during this campaign, in addition to the routine consumption of huge quantities of gasoline and rations:

> Losses of ordnance equipment have been extremely high. For instance, we must have as replacement items each month 36,000 small arms, 700 mortars, 500 tanks, 2,400 vehicles, 100 field pieces. Consumption of artillery and mortar ammunition in northwestern Europe averages 8,000,000 rounds a month. Our combat troops use up an average of 66,400 miles of one type of field wire each month. (The AEF during the entire First World War expended less than 10,000,000 rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition.)

The British 21st Army Group liberated Brussels on 3 September and Antwerp the next day. They crossed the Dutch frontier on 12 September and by the 15th the Channel coast was cleared as far north as Zeebrugge with the exception of the isolated enemy forces holding out in key ports.

On 9 September 1944 General Eisenhower reported:

> The hostile occupation in force of the Dutch Islands at the mouth of the Schelde is certain to delay the utilization of Antwerp as a port and thus will vitally influence the full development of our strategy.

Again on 21 September he wrote:

> Right now our prospects are tied up closely with our success in capturing the approaches to Antwerp. All along the line maintenance is in a bad state—reminiscent of the early days in Tunisia—but if we can only get to using Antwerp it will have the effect of a blood transfusion.

The efforts of the British forces on the north flank were to be devoted for several weeks to clearing the enemy from these islands. After bitter fighting involving heavy losses, featured by river crossings and amphibious landings, the last of the positions was cleared on 9 November. By 27 November the port of Antwerp was in operation but under heavy fire of the vicious German V-weapons which fell at one time at the rate of one every 12½ minutes and caused thousands of Allied civilian and military casualties and cast grave doubt for a time as to the advisability of continuing the operation of the port.

The ports of southern France were vital to the U. S. Seventh Army and the French First Army in the Southern Group of Armies. Toulon and Marseille were in operation late in September. Since then 14 divisions were moved through Southern French ports, in addition to an average daily unloading of over 18,000 tons of supplies. Two railways were placed in early operation, including the double-track main line through Lyon and Dijon, and thousands of tons of supplies moved daily over these lines and by truck to forward railheads. Port capacities and transportation facilities were sufficient to meet the requirements of the entire Southern Group of Armies and also to assist in the supply of the Central Group of Armies until the stubborn defense of the water entrance to Antwerp was reduced.

After the port of Antwerp became operational, it handled on an average of over 25,000 tons of stores daily, despite the V bombs. This tremendous increase in our over-all port capacity made it unnecessary to devote more precious time and manpower to reopen the shattered ports in Brittany, which, although now in our hands, were much more distant from the front lines than Antwerp.

Having overcome the acute shortage of port facilities, the primary bottleneck in the supply line then became transportation from the port supply dumps to the front lines. To improve this situation our Engineers, Transportation Corps, and other supply troops in Lt. Gen. J. C. H. Lee's communications zone performed miracles in repairing and building railways, operating large high-speed truck convoys, and extending fuel pipelines from the ports and terminals of 16 cross-Channel pipelines to the forward areas. At one time 70 miles of pipe were being laid in a single day.

The Westwall

As the Siegfried Line was approached, and the port and enlarged transportation facilities became adequate, General Eisenhower advised the War Department that tactical plans for the final assault of this fortification required greater ammunition resources than those provided, and requested a maximum production effort in the United States. He forecast the expenditure of some 6,000,000 artillery and 2,000,000 mortar shells monthly in order to reduce the Siegfried Line. In this country


BATTLE OF FRANCE

an urgent demand was made for maximum production; fast rail and water transportation was utilized to make shipments direct from the production lines to the gun positions, and rationing to less active theaters, as well as stabilized fronts in the European theater itself, became rigid. Only by these measures was it possible to serve the thousands of guns behind the major assault efforts and secure an adequate supply of ammunition for the final battles against Germany.

Field Marshal Montgomery struck through the air at the northern flank of the Seigfried Line on 17 and 18 September. The U. S. 82d and 101st and one British airborne division, all elements of Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton's newly formed First Allied Airborne Army, landed in Holland astride the Meuse, Waal, and Lower Rhine rivers in the Eindhoven-Arnhem area. This was the largest airborne operation ever attempted, requiring the employment on the first two days of 2,800 planes

PATH OF THE RED ARMY

Along this highroad to Berlin was destroyed two-thirds of the German Wehrmacht. As Soviet forces drove westward and General Eisenhower's armies drove eastward through France, Adolph Hitler had only rivers and man-made defensive lines to prolong his end. The mountain barriers of Southern Europe gave him small safety.




ATLANTIC OCEAN
PORTUGAL
Bay of Biscay
FRANCE
Brest
Loire
Paris
GREAT BRITAIN
IRELAND
London
Rhine
Rotterdam
NORTH SEA
GERMANY
Bremen
Prague
Elbe
Berlin
Oder
DENMARK
Copenhagen
NORWAY
Oslo
BALTIC SEA
Vistula
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SWEDEN
Stockholm
LITHUANIA
Kaunas
Riga
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Richard Edes Harrison

and over 1,600 gliders. Several airborne operations had been planned for the period following the break-through in Normandy, but so rapid was the Allied advance that events overtook the plans in each instance. The operation in Holland achieved only partial success. The American 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, landing near Eindhoven, seized crossings of the Meuse and Waal Rivers. The British Second Army was able to establish contact with these divisions after the second day. The important bridgeheads were held in the face of desperate German counterattacks. The British airborne division, landing in the more remote and exposed Arnhem area north of the Lower Rhine, was subjected to concentrated attacks by superior enemy forces. It was finally forced to withdraw south of the river.

Meanwhile, to the south, our First Army was forcing its way into Germany. Aachen was strongly defended, and a bitter battle ensued before it fell on 21 October. On 3 October the Ninth Army had been brought up from the western coast of France and entered the line between the First and Third Armies. Then on 23 October the Ninth Army was moved to the northern flank of the First Army above Aachen. By the end of November the Third Army, driving toward the Saar, had reduced the formidable Metz area and the defenses along the Moselle and Seille Rivers. A Southern Army Group offensive into Alsace-Lorraine brought the 2d French Armored Division of the U. S. Seventh Army to Strasbourg on the Rhine in late November and the First French Army to the river between Mulhouse and the Swiss border. Between the two armies remained a sizable portion of the Alsace known as the Colmar pocket.

During the third week in September the Combined Chiefs of Staff were again in conference at Quebec with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. The whole of Northern France and substantial parts of Belgium and Luxembourg were in Allied hands. But General Eisenhower reported that enemy resistance was stiffening as he approached the German frontier. He reported that it was his intention to prepare with all speed to destroy the German armies in the west and occupy the German homeland. He considered that his best opportunity to defeat the defenders in the west was to strike at the Ruhr and Saar, confident the enemy would be compelled to concentrate most of his available resources in defense of these essential areas. He preferred the northern approach into Germany through the Cologne plain for reasons which the map makes obvious.

Early in October I made a hurried 9-day inspection trip to the Western Front, visiting American corps and divisions from the Vosges Mountains north to Holland. At that time many of the infantrymen had been in almost constant combat since D-day in June. After many computations and exchanges of radio messages with the War Department to determine the effect on our hard-pressed and delicately balanced shipping situation, it was decided to rush the movement from the United States of the infantry regiments of 9 of the 11 remaining divisions ahead of the scheduled departures of the entire divisions. This was for the purpose of relieving those regiments which had been in combat for an excessively long period and to give immediate increased strength and striking power to our armies facing a most difficult winter campaign.

With the promise of a large increase of supplies through the port of Antwerp in late November, and with more than 3,000,000 troops on the Continent, General Eisenhower in mid-November launched a charging offensive to penetrate the Siegfried Line and place himself in position to cross the Rhine.

Not in years had European weather been so unfavorable for grand-scale military operations. Resistance was bitter. The Siegfried defenses were formidable as anticipated, and our divisions paid heavily for each inch of ground they tore from the fanatical Nazi defenders. Nevertheless, by 4 December the Second British Army had cleared the west bank of the Meuse and the Ninth Army had reached the Roer. East of Aachen troops of the First Army fought splendidly through bloody Hurtgen Forest, taking heavy casualties and inflicting heavy losses on the stubborn enemy. The dams of the Roer were seriously inhibiting General Eisenhower's progress. He wrote:

> He (the enemy) is assisted in that area, however, by the flooded condition of the Roer River and the capability he has of producing a sudden rush of water by blowing the dams near Schmidt. Bradley has about come to the conclusion that we must take that area by a very difficult attack from the west and southwest.
>
> There can be no question of the value of our present operations. The German is throwing into the line some divisions with only six weeks training, a fact that contributes materially to his high casualty rate. As explained in my most recent appreciation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, our problem is to continue our attacks as long as the results achieved are so much in our favor, while at the same time preparing for a full-out heavy offensive when weather conditions become favorable,



ARDENNES COUNTEROFFENSIVE

assuming the enemy holds out. Unless some trouble develops from within Germany, a possibility of which there is now no real evidence, he should be able to maintain a strong defensive front for some time, assisted by weather, floods, and muddy ground.

The Wehrmacht's Last Blow

General Eisenhower was determined to give Germany no chance to recoup from the blows already delivered. Despite shortages in troops and supplies, his attitude was offensive, and, consequently, he was compelled to hold some sectors of the front with comparatively weak forces in order to gather strength at his points of attack. To the 75 miles between Monschau and Trier he could assign only four divisions of the First Army, or sacrifice his effort to bring about a decision elsewhere. It was here that the German armies of the west, commanded by Field Marshal von Rundstedt and acting on the direct orders of Hitler, made their last desperate effort to stave off the disaster.

On 16 December von Rundstedt attacked with a force of 24 divisions. He had been able, because of heavy fog which continued for days, to assemble his forces in secrecy in the heavily forested foreground. When the blow came, eight panzer divisions broke through our VIII Corps line on a 40-mile front. Diversionary attacks in other sectors and considerable air and artillery support assisted the main offensive in Luxembourg.

General Eisenhower reacted promptly and decisively and subsequent results have proved the eminent soundness of his plan. All available reserves in the Central Army Group were used to strengthen the northern and southern flanks of the penetration and the XXX British Corps of the Northern Army Group was deployed to hold the line of the Meuse and the vital Liege area. With communications seriously disrupted, Field Marshal Montgomery was charged with the operation of forces north of the penetration, involving temporary operational control over most of the U. S. First and Ninth Armies while General Bradley coordinated the effort from the south. The 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions were brought up from theater reserve to retard the momentum of the enemy thrust, with the 101st, reinforced by armor and artillery, holding the important road center at Bastogne. The shoulders of the penetration at Monschau and Echternach were stubbornly held by infantry divisions moved in from the north and from the south, outstanding among which were the 1st, 2d, 4th, and 99th Divisions.

The Ardennes battle deserves a prominent place in the history of the U. S. Army. The splendid stand of the 7th Armored Division at St. Vith, the tenacity of the 101st Airborne and elements of the 10th Armored Division at Bastogne, and the numerous examples of superb fighting qualities shown by the troops of other units were in the finest American tradition.

The tide of battle began to turn when the U. S. Third Army brought its full weight to bear on the southern flank of the salient, where General Patton stopped the advance of the German columns with available reserves and was attacking on a two-corps front by 22 December with the III and XII Corps. This shift from an offensive across the Saar to a general attack in southern Luxembourg was a brilliant military accomplishment, including corps and army staff work of the highest order. Elements of the 5th Division which were fighting in the Saar bridgehead on the morning of 20 December moved 69 miles, and were in contact with the enemy north of the Sauer River by nightfall.

General Devers' 6th Army Group was required to assume responsibility for the entire front from Saarbrucken south, adding over 25 miles to its already extended front. In order to defend this front adequately, full use was made in the Seventh Army of the infantry regiments of three divisions which were just arriving in the theater from the United States in advance of their division headquarters and supporting troops.

The weather ceased to favor the enemy between 23 and 26 December, permitting our overwhelming tactical air forces to strike terrific blows at the German armor and supply columns. On 26 December the 4th Armored Division relieved encircled Bastogne. The crisis had passed, for by this time the German salient was being assaulted from the north, west, and south. At the points of extreme penetration, the enemy had driven more than 50 miles into the American lines, but he was unable to shake loose our valiant units fighting desperately to hold the critical shoulders of the bulge. The depth of his advance was accordingly limited and it was possible to interdict by artillery fire all the important supply roads for the leading troops at the tip of the salient.

The reduction of the Ardennes salient involved our First and Third Armies in heavy fighting under severe winter conditions, but progress was steady and by the end of January the bulge was eliminated at a cost which later proved fatal to the enemy. In the single day of 22 January, the air force destroyed or damaged more than 4,192 pieces of heavy equipment, including locomotives, rail cars, tanks, and motor and horse-drawn vehicles.

The Germans gained an initial tactical success and imposed a delay of about six weeks on the main Allied offensive in the north, but failed to seize their primary objectives of Liege and Namur. They lost 220,000 men, including 110,000 prisoners, and more than 1,400 tanks and assault guns. The operation was carried out by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies, supported by the Seventh Army, thus stripping the Reich of all strategic reserves and seriously depleting the resources required to meet the powerful Soviet offensive in January.

> "Possibly more serious," reported General Eisenhower, "was the widespread disillusionment ensuing from the failure to seize any really important objective and the realization that this offensive for which every effort had been brought to bear and on which such great hopes were pinned, had in no sense achieved anything decisive."

In mid-January the Second British Army launched an attack in the Sittard area and within a fortnight reached the Roer Valley, 10 miles inside the Reich. Regrouping of the Allied armies for further offensive action proceeded during January.

In an effort to divert the punishing blows from his forces withdrawing from the Ardennes, the enemy attacked in the Bavarian Palatinate. Here there was ground to give, and the U. S. Seventh Army withdrew to the Maginot defenses west of the Rhine, permitting the detachment of divisions for the heavy fighting in the Bulge.

Closing The Rhine

On 20 January the First French Army launched an attack in the southern Alsace to destroy the enemy's forces in the Colmar pocket and clear the west bank of the Rhine. The operation involved a drive through Colmar by the American XXI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. F. W. Milburn, and simultaneous attacks by forces of the First French Army under General de Tassigny from the Mulhouse area. The climax of the battle was a night assault on the bridgehead town of Neuf-Brisach by infantry of the U. S. 3d Division using assault boats and scaling ladders on the moats and walls of the fortified town, very much after the fashion of medieval battles. After this aggressive action, the German position in the Alsace rapidly deteriorated and by 9 February the Allies held a loosely defended line along

CLOSING THE RHINE



the west bank of the Rhine from Strasbourg to the Swiss border, freeing troops for use in other sectors. The offensive in the Alsace cost the Germans more than 25,000 men.

The reduction of the Colmar pocket and the seizure of the Roer River dams to the north in the vicinity of Schmidt were both necessary preludes to clearing the enemy from the west bank of the Rhine and a full-scale drive into the heart of Germany. The U. S. First Army now attacked toward Schmidt while the Third Army threw its weight against the Siegfried Line in the Prüm-Trier area. By 10 February the First Army had obtained control of the Erft and the Schwammenauel dams, and the following day had cleared the entire west bank of the Roer. Although failing to prevent the flooding of the Roer Valley, this action forced the Germans to release the waters at a time when our operations would not be endangered, thus removing the most serious threat to General Eisenhower's plan for the invasion of northern Germany.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff met at Malta in early February preliminary to a meeting with President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin in the ARGONAUT Conference at Yalta a few days later. En route to the Conference, I met General Eisenhower briefly at a secret rendezvous near Marseilles where we discussed his future plans that were later approved at Malta, providing for the closing of the Rhine, the destruction of enemy forces west of the river, the seizure of bridgeheads across the river in the north and south and coordinated drives into the heart of Germany. At Yalta the general plan for the final destruction of Nazi Germany was established.

In executing General Eisenhower's plan, a coordinated drive by the First Canadian Army from the Nijmegen bridgehead along the watershed between the Meuse and the Rhine was necessary and an attack by the U. S. Ninth Army across the Roer toward Dusseldorf was to follow shortly afterward. On 8 February the First Canadian Army began its attack following a heavy air and artillery preparation. Initially, the Canadian advance was rapid, but flooded terrain delayed the start of the Ninth Army attack, permitting the enemy to concentrate against the Canadians.

In preparation for the Ninth Army offensive, the Tactical and Strategic Air Forces flew almost 10,000 sorties on 22 February, covering rail and transportation targets throughout the length and breadth of Germany. These blows from British, French, and Italian bases were designed to paralyze the German rail system and isolate the Western Front. The next day the Ninth Army attack was launched and, although there was some delay in establishing bridgeheads over the flooded Roer, the general progress was quite rapid. By 1 March Roermond and Munchen-Gladbach were captured and the following day the armored columns reached the Rhine north and south of Dusseldorf. Meanwhile, in the Prum-Trier area, the Third Army drove across the Our and Sauer Rivers, capturing Prum on 13 February. Successive bridgeheads were established across the Saar and the Kyll Rivers and on 2 March Trier fell to our troops. From the launching of the operations on 8 February to 1 March more than 66,000 German prisoners were captured by the Northern and Central Army Groups.

The Watch That Failed

Advancing on the right of the Ninth Army, the First Army captured the ruins of Cologne on 7 March against stout resistance. On the same day elements of its 9th Armored Division, probing to the Rhine further south, found the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen intact and immediately crossed to the east bank, developing a small bridgehead. Such a windfall had been hoped for but not expected. The prompt seizure and exploitation of the crossing demonstrated American initative and adaptability at its best, from the daring action of the platoon leader to the Army commander who quickly redirected all his moving columns in a demonstration of brilliant staff management. He established powerful elements across the river immediately in accordance with direct orders from General Eisenhower. The bridgehead provided a serious threat to the heart of Germany, a diversion of incalculable value both to the main effort in the Ruhr and to the reduction of the Saar-Palatinate. It became a springboard for the final offensive to come.

In the meantime, the Third Army was forcing its way through the rugged Eifel hills. By 7 March, constant pressure had crushed the German front north of the Moselle. General Patton's armor broke out and dashed forward to the Rhine near Koblenz on the 9th. Contact was established with General Hodges' First Army units southeast of Remagen, and by 11 March the Allies controlled the west bank of the Rhine from Nijmegen in Holland to its junction with the Moselle at Koblenz.

Once the Eifel sector had been mopped up, General Patton was ready to assist the Seventh Army in reducing the Saar pocket. General Eisenhower wrote me:

> Tomorrow morning the XX Corps of Patton's Army begins a local attack in the Trier area as a preliminary to the general attack by Seventh Army on the 15th. So far as we can determine there is not a single reserve division in this whole area. If we can get a quick break-through, the advance should go very rapidly and success in the region will multiply the advantage we have secured in the bridgehead at Remagen. It will probably be a nasty business breaking through the fortified lines, but once this is accomplished losses should not be great and we should capture another big bag of prisoners. I have given Seventh Army 14 divisions for their part of the job, and XX Corps (Third Army) jumps off with four. Patton will throw in another subsidiary effort from north to south across the Moselle with about four to five divisions.

On 14 March General Patton established a bridgehead across the Moselle, southwest of Koblenz. The following day his troops lunged southward from the Moselle bridgehead, other Third Army forces drove east from Trier, and the Seventh Army attacked northward between Saarbrucken and the Rhine. Despite dense mine fields and the formidable Siegfried Line fortifications, the Seventh gained steadily, pinning down strong enemy formations and leaving the Third Army tanks free to cut to pieces the rear of the German position. On 16 March a spearhead of the 4th Armored Division broke through for a gain of 32 miles and seized two bridges across the Nahe River south of Bad Kreuznach. From this point on, resistance south of the Moselle crumbled. Armored divisions of the Third and Seventh Armies enveloped the Saar, and the Rhine cities of Worms and Mainz fell to our swift columns.

While pocketed German forces in the Saar were still in process of being mopped up, Third Army infantry of the Corps under Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, achieved a brilliant surprise by crossing the Rhine at Oppenheim south of Mainz late on 22 March with decidedly sketchy and improvised means. In two days this bridgehead was expanded to a width of 15 miles, and on the third day the 4th Armored Division broke through the enemy lines to a depth of 27 miles, seizing an undamaged bridge over the Main River. The daring armored thrusts in the Saar had criss-crossed and intermingled elements of the two armies. Under the skillful direction of General Bradley and General Devers, the Army commanders regrouped their mingled corps and divisions without loss to the momentum of the offensive.

The Knockout

In six weeks the combined efforts of the Allied armies had achieved a major objective. The German soil west of the Rhine had been cleared of all hostile forces. The river itself had been forced in two fortuitous crossings, and the freedom of action of the German defense on the east bank was seriously curtailed. General Eisenhower was now ready to launch his offensive beyond the Rhine.

Several considerations governed the selection of the area north of the Ruhr for the main effort. A drive in this sector was the quickest means of denying what vestiges remained of the once rich Ruhr industries to the enemy. That stretch of the Rhine between Emmerich and Wesel was one of the two best sites for a forced crossing, and the Germans had brought up only relatively inferior forces to oppose such an operation. Once across that river the gently rolling terrain north of the Ruhr was most suitable for mobile and tank operations, the type of warfare it was desired to force upon the enemy because of his shortages in tanks, vehicles, and motor fuel.

After a heavy aerial and artillery preparation, the Second British Army began an assault crossing of the Rhine during the evening of 23 March. Next morning, the U. S. 17th and the 6th British Airborne Divisions were dropped north and northeast of Wesel. British troops crossing the river soon established contact with the airborne forces. The U. S. Ninth Army crossed between Wesel and Duisburg early on the 24th, meeting light to moderate resistance. Within two days seven bridges had been built across the river and the British-American bridgehead stretched 25 miles along the Rhine to a maximum depth of 6 miles.

General Eisenhower was with the Ninth when it jumped off. He described the attack in a letter:

> I have just finished a rapid tour of the battle front. Yesterday and the day before I was with the Ninth Army to witness its jump-off and the early stages of the Rhine crossing. Simpson performed in his usual outstanding style. Our losses in killed, during the crossing, were 15 in one assault division and 16 in the other. I stayed up most of one night to witness the preliminary bombardment by 1,250 guns. It was an especially interesting sight because of the fact that all the guns were spread out on a plain so that the flashes from one end of the line to the other were all plainly visible. It was real drumfire.
>
> I have noted so many unusual and outstanding incidents in the forward areas that it would almost weary you to tell you of the fine performances of American and other troops.



BATTLE OF GERMANY


Miles
Prague
Dresden
Chemnitz
Approximate Extent of Advance
Pilsen
Linz
Asch
Danube
Regensburg
Inn
Salzburg
Berchtesgaden
Munich
Nürnberg
Brenn
Pass
Vipite
Innsbruck
Main
Frankfurt
Stuttgart
Lake Constance
Gernsheim
Heidelberg
Mainz
Oppenheim
Mannheim
rg
US THIRD ARMY
PATTON
FRENCH FIRST ARMY
DE TASSIGNY
Germersheim
Karlsruhe
US SEVENTH ARMY
PATCH
Black Forest
Strasbourg
Saarbrücken
Basel
SOUTHERN GROUP OF ARMIES
DEVERS
Luxembourg
Metz
Belfort
Nancy
Miles

For example, the Engineers of VII Corps laid a Treadway bridge across the Rhine in 10 hours and 11 minutes. While not actually under fire, this job was done under battlefield conditions with all the necessary precautions taken to prevent unusual damage by a sudden concentration of enemy artillery fire. It was a brilliant performance.

During the critical week ending 22 March, United States aircraft alone made 14,430 heavy bomber attacks, 7,262 medium bomber attacks, and 29,981 fighter sorties against targets in Europe.

By 25 March hard fighting in the Remagen area had extended the bridgehead to a depth of 10 miles and a length of over 30. The German High Command, expecting an immediate drive on the Ruhr from this direction, had concentrated strong forces of Army Group "B" north of the Sieg River. To their great surprise, General Hodges broke out of the bridgehead to the southeast on 26 March, when his armor drove to Limburg, seized a bridge over the Lahn River, and raced along the superhighway toward Frankfurt. Other armored columns of the First Army, speeding eastward as fast as 40 miles a day, reached Marburg and Giessen by 28 March, and then swung northward through the hill country west of Kassel. Troops of the Third Army crossed the river at Mainz to reduce the German pocket bypassed between Mainz and Frankfurt while, to the east, other Third Army forces drove on toward Kassel and the line of the Fulda River. With solid contact between their advancing corps, the First and Third Armies were now executing a massive thrust to the northeast into the heart of Germany. The complete rout of the German military establishment was now under way.

In the sector of Field Marshal Montgomery's Northern Army Group, the U. S. Ninth Army pressed into the northwest section of the Ruhr. Still further to the north, resistance on the right flank of the British Second Army slackened considerably toward the end of March, and armored troops broke through to Dulmen. Meanwhile, on the left flank of the Second Army, the enemy withdrew, and British units crossed the Dutch border on a 30-mile front.

During the last week of March both of General Devers' armies in the south crossed the Rhine. The Seventh sent the XV Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. W. H. Haislip, across on a 15-mile front between Gernsheim and Mannheim. Our troops took Mannheim and advanced 25 miles east of the Rhine. The II Corps of the First French Army crossed the Rhine near Germersheim and established contact with the Seventh Army south of Heidelberg. By 1 April, French troops had advanced 18 miles.

The magnitude of the offensive smothered resistance all along the Western Front. The shattered condition of the German transport system and the sustained speed of the Allied advance prevented the enemy from coordinating a defensive line in any sector. He did offer bitter resistance at isolated points but these were bypassed by the armored columns, leaving pockets to be mopped up later. During the month of March nearly 350,000 prisoners were taken on the Western Front.

The entrance of the Fifteenth Army, under command of Lt. Gen. L. T. Gerow, into the line of the 12th Army Group on 30 March gave more freedom of action to the First and Ninth Armies, enabling them to increase the weight of the offensive into Germany. Ninth Army tanks immediately broke out of the area north of the Ruhr and swept eastward in a powerful thrust toward Münster. On 1 April the enveloping columns of these armies made contact west of Paderborn, cutting off the Ruhr and a large area to the south, in the largest pocket of envelopment in the history of warfare.

Elements of 18 German divisions from the First Parachute, Fifth Panzer, and Fifteenth Armies were encircled in this skillful maneuver. Leaving strong forces to contain and reduce this giant encirclement, the First and Ninth Armies continued eastward toward the line of the Weser. Spearheading the Allied offensive, they headed for Leipzig and a prearranged junction with the Soviet forces. There was no loss of momentum, no respite for the enemy forces, and by the end of the first week of April both armies had crossed the Weser in the area north of Kassel.

On 6 April, General Eisenhower wrote me:

As you can see from the reports, our plans have been developing almost in exact accordance with original conceptions. You must expect, now, a period in which the lines on your map will not advance as rapidly as they did during the past several weeks because we must pause to digest the big mouthful that we have swallowed in the Ruhr area. It should not take too long and, of course, in the meantime, maintenance will be pushed to the limit to support our next main thrust. My G–2 [Major General Strong of the British Army] figures that there may be 150,000 German soldiers left in the Ruhr but a number of these will change into civilian clothes before we liquidate the whole thing. He is confident, however, that we will capture at least 100,000. [Actually

> 300,000 were captured.] The enemy has been making efforts to break out of the area but our persistent policy of knocking out his communications to the eastward, and his lack of mobility within the pocket, both make it very difficult for him to launch a really concerted attack. I am confident that he can do nothing about it.

The Ninth Army advance from the Weser to the Elbe was featured by armored gains of 20 to 30 miles a day against little or no resistance. By mid-April our troops were along the Elbe near Wittenberge and Magdeburg and had established bridgeheads across the river. In rear of the armored columns, the cities of Hanover and Brunswick fell to Ninth Army infantry. Bypassing Leipzig and strong resistance in the Harz Forest, the First Army drove eastward to the Mulde Valley south of Dessau.

While these extensive operations continued, the battle progressed against the trapped Germans in the Ruhr. With the Fifteenth Army holding the west face of the pocket along the Rhine, and armor and infantry of the Ninth and First Armies driving in from the north, east, and south, the formidable enemy forces were crushed in just 18 days. More than 300,000 prisoners were taken in this unique victory, won far behind our forward positions and squarely astride our lines of communication.

Soon Leipzig and the Harz Mountains were in American hands, and the Ninth and First Armies closed on the line of the Elbe-Mulde, the forward limit, which had been arranged with the Soviets. To establish contact with our Allies from the Eastern Front, First Army patrols pushed east of the Mulde to Torgau, where the long-awaited juncture with the Red Army occurred on 25 April.

In the north, the British Second Army advancing on the Osnabrück-Bremen axis had crossed the Weser on a broad front near Minden early in April and was at the outskirts of Bremen by the middle of the month. From their Weser crossings the British struck northward toward Hamburg, reaching the Elbe southeast of the city. The Canadians forced the Ijssel River and pressed on through the Dutch towns, liberating the remaining sections of eastern and northern Holland.

Far to the south, the Third Army, after capturing Mühlhausen, Gotha, and Erfurt, crossed the Saale River and turned southeast toward the mountains of Czechoslovakia and the Danube Valley. This advance was designed to establish firm contact with the Soviet forces in Austria and to prevent any effective reorganization of the enemy remnants in mountainous regions to the south. On the right, the Seventh Army encountered bitter resistance in Nürnberg, but quickly captured the city and then swung south into the Bavarian plain. On the first of May the Third Army was advancing into Czechoslovakia on a hundred-mile front southeast of Asch; along the Danube other elements had driven 20 miles into Austria. The Seventh Army had taken Munich, birthplace of the Nazi party, and was sweeping southward toward the Inn River. Along the upper Rhine, the First French Army captured Karlsruhe and Stuttgart in turn and proceeded with the reduction of enemy forces caught in the Black Forest. By the first of May the French had cleared the Swiss border west of Lake Constance and were driving into western Austria alongside the Seventh Army.

In northern Germany, the British Second Army, reinforced by the XVIII American Corps under Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, broke out from the Elbe River late in April and reached the Baltic on 2 May. This action established contact with Soviet forces at Wismar and cut off the Danish Peninsula. Further resistance on this front was hopeless. On 5 May, the German commander surrendered all forces in northwest Germany, Holland, and Denmark.

Along the Danube, the Third Army continued the advance into Austria and entered Linz on 5 May. Next day Pilsen fell to our forces in Czechoslovakia. General Patch's Seventh Army swept across the Inn on a wide front and drove 40 miles to capture Salzburg and Hitler's stronghold at Berchtesgaden. Other Seventh Army troops who had taken Innsbruck drove through the Brenner Pass to establish contact with the Fifth Army at Vipiteno. Since its landing on the Riviera, the Seventh Army had advanced an average of more than 3 miles a day against what had been the most formidable army in the world. At noon on 6 May, Army Group "G," comprising all German forces in Austria, surrendered unconditionally to our Sixth Army Group, just 11 months after the landing in Normandy.

The powerful Wehrmacht had disintegrated under the combined Allied blows, and the swift advances into the mountains of Austria and Bohemia had prevented the establishment of an inner fortress. Surrounded on all fronts by chaos and overwhelming defeat, the emissaries of the German government surrendered to the Allies at Reims on 7 May 1945, all land, sea, and air forces of the Reich.

ORDER OF BATTLE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (AS OF 7 MAY 1945)

[The order of battle of our Allies is not shown below Army level, except where American forces are under their operational control.]

Unit	*Commander*	*Location*
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces	General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower	Main Headquarters, Versailles France. Advance Headquarters, Rheims, France
Northern Group of Armies (21st Army Group)	F/M Sir Bernard L. Montgomery	Suchteln, Germany.
First Canadian Army	Gen. H. D. G. Crerar	Holland.
Second British Army	Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey	Germany.
XVIII Corps (Airborne)	Maj. Gen. M. B. Ridgway	Germany.
5th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. L. E. Oliver	Germany.
7th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. R. W. Hasbrouck	Germany.
82d Airborne Division	Maj. Gen. J. M. Gavin	Germany.
8th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. B. E. Moore	Germany.
Central Group of Armies (12th Army Group)	Gen. Omar N. Bradley	Wiesbaden, Germany.
Ninth Army	Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson	Braunschwieg, Germany.
XIII Corps	Maj. Gen. A. C. Gillem, Jr	Germany.
35th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Paul W. Baade	Germany.
84th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. A. R. Bolling	Germany.
102d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. F. A. Keating	Germany.
XVI Corps	Maj. Gen. J. B. Anderson	Germany.
29th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. C. H. Gerhardt	Germany.
75th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. R. E. Porter	Germany.
79th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. I. T. Wyche	Germany.
95th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. H. L. Twaddle	Germany.
XIX Corps	Maj. Gen. R. S. McLain	Germany.
2d Armored Division	Maj. Gen. I. D. White	Germany.
8th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. J. M. Devine	Germany.
30th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. L. S. Hobbs	Germany.
83d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. R. C. Macon	Germany.
First Army	Gen. Courtney H. Hodges	Weimar, Germany.
78th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. E. P. Parker, Jr	Germany.
VII Corps	Lt. Gen. J. L. Collins	Germany.
3d Armored Division	Brig. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey	Germany.
9th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. L. A. Craig	Germany..
69th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Emil F. Reinhardt	Germany.
104th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Terry Allen	Germany.
VIII Corps	Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton	Germany.
6th Armored Division	Brig. Gen. George W. Read, Jr	Germany.
76th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. William R. Schmidt	Germany.
87th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Frank L. Culin, Jr	Germany.
89th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Thomas D. Finley	Germany.
Third Army	Gen. George S. Patton, Jr	Erlangen, Germany.
4th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Harold W. Blakeley	Germany.
70th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. A. J. Barnett	Germany.
III Corps	Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fleet	Germany.
14th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith	Germany.
99th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lauer	Germany.
V Corps	Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner	Germany.
9th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. John W. Leonard	Germany.
16th Armored Division	Brig. Gen. John L. Pierce	Czechoslovakia.
1st Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Clift Andrus	Czechoslovakia.
2d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson	Czechoslovakia.
97th Infantry Division	Brig. Gen. Milton B. Halsey	Czechoslovakia.
XII Corps	Maj. Gen. Stafford Leroy Irwin	Germany.
4th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. William M. Hoge	Czechoslovakia.
11th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. Holmes E. Dager	Austria.
5th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown	Germany.
26th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul	Austria.
90th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Herbert L. Earnest	Czechoslovakia.
XX Corps	Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker	Germany.
13th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. John Milliken	Germany.
65th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Stanley E. Reinhart	Austria.
71st Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Willard G. Wyman	Austria.
80th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride	Austria.

Central Group of Armies—Continued		
Fifteenth Army	Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow	Bad Neunahr, Germany.
66th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Herman F. Kramer	France.
106th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Donald A. Stroh	France.
XXII Corps	Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon	Germany.
17th Airborne Division	Maj. Gen. William M. Miley	Germany.
94th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony	Germany.
XXIII Corps	Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey	Germany.
28th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota	Germany.
Southern Group of Armies (6th Army Group)	Gen. Jacob L. Devers	Heidelberg, Germany.
Seventh Army	Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch	Schwabischgmund, Germany.
12th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. Roderick R. Allen	Germany.
63d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Louis Hibbs	Germany.
45th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Robert T. Frederick	Germany.
100th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. W. A. Burress	Germany.
XXI Corps	Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn	Germany.
101st Airborne Division	Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor	Germany.
36th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist	Austria.
XV Corps	Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip	Germany.
20th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward	Germany.
3d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel	Germany.
42d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Harry J. Collins	Germany.
86th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Harris M. Melasky	Austria.
VI Corps	Maj. Gen. Edward H. Brooks	Germany.
10th Armored Division	Maj. Gen. William H. H. Morris, Jr	Austria.
44th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. William F. Dean	Austria.
103d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe	Austria.
First French Army	Gen. Jean J. de Lattre de Tassigny	Lindau, Germany.
SHAEF Reserve		
First Allied Airborne Army	Lt. Gen. Louis H. Brereton	Maison LaFitte, France.
13th Airborne Division	Maj. Gen. Elbridge G. Chapman, Jr	France.
US Strategic Air Forces in Europe*	Gen. Carl A. Spaatz	Rheims, France.
Eighth Air Force	Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle	High Wycombe, Bucks, England.
1st Air Division	Maj. Gen. Howard McC. Turner	England.
2d Air Division	Maj. Gen. Wm. E. Kepner	England.
3d Air Division	Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge	England.
Ninth Air Force	Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg	Weisbaden, Germany.
IX Bomb Division	Maj. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson	Belgium.
IX Tactical Air Command	Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada	Germany.
XIX Tactical Air Command	Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland	Germany.
XXIX Tactical Air Command	Brig. Gen. Richard E. Nugent	Germany.
First Tactical Air Force (Prov.)	Maj. Gen. Robt. M. Webster	Heidelberg, Germany.
XII Tactical Air Command	Brig. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus	Darmstadt, Germany.
1st French Air Command	Gen. de Brig. Paul Gerardot	Issenheim, France.
IX Troop Carrier Command	Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams	Louvecienne, France.

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*Exercised operational control over Fifteenth Air Force shown under Mediterranean Theater of Operations.



VICTORY OVER JAPAN

VICTORY OVER JAPAN

The Road To China

Of all the battle fronts of the global war, the situation in East Asia two years ago was the bleakest for the United Nations. In seeking to capitalize on the preoccupation of the Western Powers in Europe and the sneak attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had established an immense perimeter of conquest in the Far East. By July 1942 it extended more than halfway across the Pacific, southward almost to Australia, and westward to the mountain barriers of the India-Burma front. The advance eastward of the Japanese had been halted in the critical battles of Midway and the Coral Sea. But Japan still held tremendous areas replete with the natural resources essential to the conduct of modern warfare.

So far, our advance back over these areas taken by the Japanese in their initial stride had been slow and painful. It seemed to many Americans that if we had to repeat again and again the bloody struggles for Guadalcanal and the Papuan Coast of New Guinea by what was popularly termed "island hopping," the decision in the war with Japan was distant many years. Army and Navy commanders were well aware of the difficulties and paucity of means. Nevertheless, we had undertaken offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East with only the small forces then available because it was imperative that the Japanese be halted and placed on the defensive.

Japan's rush into Burma had isolated China except for the thin line of air supply over the 500 miles of the Himalayan Hump between Assam, India, and the Yunnan plateau. The Japanese had attacked China at the most propitious time for carrying out their dreams of conquest of Asia and Oceania. In the face of almost a complete lack of war matériel, China had refused to submit. But her condition by the early summer of 1943 had grown truly desperate.

China's most critical needs were in trucks and rolling stock, artillery, tanks, and other heavy equipment. It was impossible to fly this matériel over the Himalayas in the essential quantities. In fact, except as it supplied the American Fourteenth Air Force commanded by General Chennault with gasoline, bombs, and ammunition, the Hump air route at that time gave China little material assistance. If the armies and government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been finally defeated, Japan would have been left free to exploit the tremendous resources of China without harassment. It might have made it possible when the United States and Britain had finished the job in Europe, and assaulted the Japanese home islands, for the government to flee to China, and continue the war on a great and rich land mass.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognized that Germany had to be defeated first and that the quickest approach to Japan was across the Pacific, spearheaded by our Navy. Nevertheless, they believed that China must be given sufficient support to keep her in the war.

Accordingly, when this critical phase of the global war was discussed at Casablanca in January 1943, the Combined Chiefs directed that preparations be made to reestablish surface communications to China and to step up the flow of supply over the Hump even though at that time Allied resources were being heavily taxed to bring the North African campaign to a successful conclusion and to extend control over the Mediterranean. We knew they would be much more heavily taxed as we gathered our strength for the invasion of France.

At the TRIDENT Conference in Washington four months later the position of the Allies in Asia was reconsidered, and it was agreed that top priority must be given the Air Transport Command to increase the capacity of the aerial route over the Hump to 10,000 tons a month. It was also resolved that vigorous action must be taken to begin a Burma campaign in the fall at the end of the 1943 monsoon.

Three months later in the QUADRANT Conference plans were laid in greater detail to realize the maximum effect that could be obtained in Asia with the resources then available. The penetration into Burma from India was a task of unusual difficulty. Communications between the Port of Calcutta and Assam were limited to one railroad which changes from broad to meter gauge and which must cross the sweeping Brahmaputra River in ferries because the monsoon floods make bridging impossible. Nowhere along the India-Burma frontier is there an easy west-to-east passage. The jungles that cover the barrier of the Himalayan foothills are malaria-ridden, infested with acute dysenteries and endemic typhus.

The United States and Great Britain had insufficient landing vessels even to give assurance of the success to the operations planned for the Mediterranean and Western Europe. It was impossible at that time to mount an amphibious attack on Burma from the south.

Operation CAPITAL

At the QUADRANT Conference the Southeast Asia Command was created under Admiral, the Lord Louis Mountbatten. Lt. Gen. Stilwell, who commanded the China-Burma-India U. S. Theater, was made his deputy. All the resources the United States could make available to him were allocated for the task of reestablishing land communications to China. It was urgently desired to furnish greater Allied resources in the East than were allotted. They simply were not available.

In the new command structure the Combined Chiefs of Staff continued to exercise general jurisdiction over operations in Southeast Asia and over the allocation of American and British resources. Operations in the Chinese theater of war were under the command of the Generalissimo, with Stilwell as his Chief of Staff. All Royal Air Force and Army Air Forces combat strength on the Burma front, including the U. S. Tenth Air Force, was formed into the Eastern Air Command under Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer.

It was decided that an offensive in North Burma should be undertaken in the winter of 1943 and 1944, and that the Ledo Road from Assam, then under construction by American engineers, should be extended to the old Burma Road at Mongyu as rapidly as the offensive operations progressed. It was also decided to build a pipe line from Calcutta to Assam and another one paralleling the Ledo Road. These lines would greatly increase the flow of motor fuels to China.

At the same conference it was decided to enlarge the capacity of the Hump route to 20,000 tons a month. The plan for the bombing of the Japanese Islands by B-29's operating out of China was reviewed and accepted at the QUADRANT Conference. The air plan for the reduction of Japan, adopted at the conference, foresaw the establishment of superfortress bases in the Pacific to subject Japan to the same devastating air attack that was to prepare Germany for assault by our ground forces. The target of the air route and new overland supply route to China established at this first Quebec conference, was 85,000 tons per month of general stores and 54,000 tons of petroleum products, which would move via the pipe line.

These decisions regarding the Ledo Road, the increase of Hump tonnage, the construction of pipe lines, and the campaign in North Burma generally presented a most difficult and trying problem to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Ocean tonnage, transport planes for possible airborne operations to break the stalemate in Italy, an increase in the inflow of troops into the United Kingdom for OVERLORD, assistance for General MacArthur's campaign in the Southwest Pacific, and other urgent requirements all had to be taken into consideration in the light of our limitations in resources. Sacrifices would be required somewhere but if made at the wrong place they would cost the lives of Allied soldiers and delay final victory.

Since the operations in Burma could not begin until the monsoon had ended in Assam and the floods had receded, the Allied staff chiefs with the President and Prime Minister had the opportunity to meet with Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo in November 1943 before our projected offensive began. At the Cairo Conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff made further efforts to find the resources to increase the scope of the Burma campaign by adding amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal. These resources were available nowhere in this world unless we abandoned the great basic decision to close with the German enemy in Western Europe in 1944. The alternative would have permitted the Japanese to exploit their prizes of conquest in the Pacific islands. It was determined, however, that by means of the projected Allied attacks across the India-Burma frontier, it would be possible to drive the Japanese from Northern Burma and achieve the objective of reopening surface communications to China.

The preliminaries to these operations began late in October just prior to the conference at Cairo and Teheran. The Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions moved from their forward positions in front of the advancing Ledo Road into the Hukawng Valley. These troops had been trained in the center established at Ramgarh, India, through the energy and wisdom of General Stilwell and with the approval of the Generalissimo.

In February the Chinese advances down the Hukawng Valley were joined by a specially trained American infantry combat team known as the GALAHAD Force commanded by Brig. Gen. Frank D. Merrill. These troops had been gathered in a call for volunteers that went to all United States jungle trained and veteran infantry units in the Pacific and in the Western Hemisphere. Marching over the most difficult terrain under intolerable weather conditions, the Chinese and American forces virtually destroyed the Japanese 18th Division, which had captured Singapore in the Japanese advance. In May 1944 they fought their way into the airfield at Myitkyina, the key to Northern Burma.

During most of this campaign the Japanese were effectively blocked from reinforcing Northern Burma through the Irrawaddy Valley by columns of seasoned British and Indian jungle troops, commanded by the late Maj. Gen. Orde C. Wingate. These columns were known as long-range penetration groups. Some of them marched from India to establish their strangleholds on Japanese communications; others were taken in by glider in an airborne operation directed by U. S. Col. Philip G. Cochran, who commanded a specially organized composite air group known as Air Commandos. While General Stilwell's forces were advancing on Myitkyina troops of the Generalissimo commanded by Marshal Wei Li Haung crossed the Salween River from the east.

Patrols of the two forces finally met at Tengchung in the summer of 1944, establishing the first thin hold on Northern Burma.

During the fall of 1943 the Japanese, anticipating the attack in Burma, had been building their strength for a counteroffensive to prevent the reestablishment of surface communications with China. Japanese forces attacked eastward across the Salween in the Lungling area and were met and stopped by the Chinese in time to permit completion of the road from Ledo. Another strong Japanese force struck toward India while the Allied operations were in progress in an effort to seize the large British base at Imphal and sever the Bengal-Assam Railroad below the bases on which Hump air transportation and General Stilwell's operations were dependent. By April 1944 Imphal was cut off and the Japanese threatened Dimapur on the railroad. British and Indian troops flown to the sector met the attack, turned it back, and reestablished contact with the Indian divisions in the Imphal plain. After heavy and prolonged fighting, the hostile divisions were dispersed and cut up with heavy losses. At the same time, British and Japanese troops in the Arakan to the south were engaging in see-saw fighting along the coast of the Bay of Bengal.

The reentry into Burma was the most ambitious campaign yet waged on the end of an airborne supply line. From the first advance by the Chinese into the Hukawng Valley in October until after the fall of Myitkyina town the next August there were at all times between 25,000 and 100,000 troops involved in fighting and dependent largely or entirely on food, equipment, and ammunition that could be air-supplied, either by parachute, free drop, or air-landed.

The air supply was maintained by troop carrier squadrons, British and American, commanded by Brig. Gen. William D. Old, under the direction of General Stratemeyer's Eastern Air Command. Night and day troop carrier C–46's and 47's shuttled from numerous bases and air strips in the Brahmaputra Valley to points of rendezvous with the Allied ground columns in the Burma jungles. Each trip had to be flown over one or more of the steep spines which the Himalayas shove southward along the India-Burma frontier to establish one of the most formidable barriers to military operations in the world. The troop carrier squadrons at the height of the campaign averaged 230 hours of flying time for each serviceable plane a month for three months. The normal average monthly flying time is 120 hours.

At two critical stages of the campaign the troop carrier squadrons assisted by Air Transport Command planes made major troop movements in a matter of hours and days that would have required weeks and months by surface transport.

The first was the movement of British and Indian troops to meet the threat on the Bengal-Assam Railroad at Dimapur. The second was the movement of two Chinese divisions, the 14th and 50th, from Yunnan, China, across the Hump to the troop carrier base at Sookerating, in Assam, India. This operation was accomplished in just eight days. The Chinese troops were picked up by Air Transport Command planes in China and landed at the troop carrier field where they were entirely refitted, armed, and flown to a staging area in the Hukawng from where they entered the battle for Myitkyina.

Only by air supply was the Burma campaign at all possible. The jungle covered ridges between India and Burma have effectively resisted the advance of civilizations. They are inhabited by mountain tribes of Kachins, Chins, and the headhunting Nagas. Before United States Engineers accomplished the Herculean job of driving the Ledo Road, now known as the Stilwell Road, across the mountains and through the jungles, a road from the Brahmaputra to the Irrawaddy Valley was considered an impossibility.

Fall of Burma

The mission that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given General Stilwell in Asia was one of the most difficult of the war. He was out at the end of the thinnest supply line of all; the demands of the war in Europe and the Pacific campaign, which were clearly the most vital to final victory, exceeded our resources in many items of matériel and equipment and all but absorbed everything else we had. General Stilwell could have only what was left and that was extremely thin. He had a most difficult physical problem of great distances, almost impassable terrain, widespread disease and unfavorable climate; he faced an extremely difficult political problem and his purely military problem of opposing large numbers of enemy with few resources was unmatched in any theater.

Nevertheless General Stilwell sought with amazing vigor to carry out his mission exactly as it had been stated. His great efforts brought a natural con-



flict of personalities. He stood, as it were, the middleman between two great governments other than his own, with slender resources and problems somewhat overwhelming in their complexity. As a consequence it was deemed necessary in the fall of 1944 to relieve General Stilwell of the burden of his heavy responsibilities in Asia and give him a respite from attempting the impossible.

At the same time it became obvious the mission of reestablishing communications with China would be accomplished, and as the future objectives of the forces in Southeast Asia and China were to grow continually more divergent, it appeared advisable to make a clear division of the two theaters. Accordingly, the American administrative area of China-Burma-India was separated into the India-Burma and the China theaters. Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, who had been General Stilwell's deputy, was given command of the India-Burma theater. Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, formerly Chief of the War Department Strategical Planners and later a member of Admiral Mountbatten's staff, was appointed commander of our forces in China, succeeding General Stilwell as the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff.

No American officer had demonstrated more clearly his knowledge of the strength and weakness of the Japanese forces than General Stilwell and the steps necessary to defeat them in Asia. He was brought back to the United States to reorient the training of the Army Ground Forces for the war against Japan. Then after the death of General Buckner on Okinawa he was returned to the field to command the U. S. Tenth Army.

The Burma campaign continued with intensity during the monsoon season of 1944. Chinese, American, and British troops were then disposed along the Chindwin River north of Kalewa and from the upper Irrawaddy to Lungling. It was planned to drive southward through Central Burma to Mandalay, and Admiral Mountbatten prepared for operation DRACULA to seize Rangoon amphibiously from the south. At the close of the monsoon, Chinese, American, and British troops under the immediate command of General Sultan advanced southward astride the Irrawaddy, captured Shwegu in early November, and by December had cleared the projected trace of the supply road to Bhamo.

The Japanese in Burma had never recovered from General Stilwell's thrusts and from the losses inflicted by British and Indian forces on their 15th, 31st, and 33d Divisions in their abortive effort to sever the Bengal-Assam Railroad. As fast as the combat forces moved ahead, United States Engineers, commanded by Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, shoved the road forward behind them, operating their bulldozers so far forward that they were frequently under fire. On 28 January 1945 a convoy of American trucks and matériel from India crossed the Burma-China frontier. The Stilwell Road was open.

In Western Burma the British broke south through Tiddim across the Chindwin against Japanese delaying actions. Southward in the Arakan, British operations cleared the Kaladan River delta on the Arakan Coast and provided air strips at Akyab and on Ramree Island.

The Japanese retreat in Burma was in full swing by the end of January 1945. General MacArthur's successive landings in the Philippines and United States fleet operations in the China Sea had cut the Japanese supply line to Burma. In mid-February, a British column crossed the Irrawaddy near Pagan and drove to Meiktila. The seizure of this road and rail center with its airfields undermined the whole Japanese position in Central Burma. In the meantime, other British-Indian forces were closing on Mandalay from the north and west. Japanese trapped in Mandalay held out against the British until 21 March. Forty days later British airborne troops descended along the western shore of the Rangoon River south of the port and assault troops came ashore the following day. The Japanese had already fled Rangoon and the British forces entered on 3 May. The port facilities were captured in good condition.

The Burma campaign had all but ended. A few Japanese units were able to withdraw eastward into Thailand and into the Moulmein area of Southern Burma, but thousands of the enemy were cut off in isolated pockets with little hope of escape. Admiral Mountbatten reported the fighting had already cost Japan 300,000 casualties of which 97,000 were counted dead.

The Asiatic operations had been maintained at the end of the most precarious supply lines in history. The efforts of the United States service forces to strengthen them were prodigious. United States port battalions at Calcutta worked in intolerable heat and humidity with native labor weakened by disease, heat, and famine. Despite these handicaps, they established records exceeding those of every other military port in



JAPANESE OPERATIONS AGAINST U. S. AIRFIELDS

Japanese Holdings in July 1944

the world for quick unloading and turn-around of our ships. At the same time, the capacity of the tiny Bengal-Assam Railroad was more than doubled by American railway battalions which refused to let the disease and heat of the steaming Brahmaputra Valley dissipate their energies as they have weakened white men and brown for centuries. During 1943 and 1944 the flow of United States arms and matériel through Calcutta and up the valley had become great enough to support not only the Herculean job of building the Ledo Road and destroying the Japanese forces in its path, but to increase steadily the capacity of the Himalayan air route and the flow of arms to the undernourished armies of China.

Reverse in China

In the latter stages of the Burma campaign, American troops of the MARS force, a brigade of two regiments which succeeded the GALAHAD force, were flown to China together with two of the Chinese divisions that had been fighting in Burma.

By January 1945, Hump cargo had been increased to the amazing rate of 46,000 tons a month. This vital and hazardous traffic stands as one of the great logistical accomplishments of the war against Japan. It alone made possible the indispensable support which General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force was able to give the Chinese armies and the attacks by China-based superfortresses on Japan's home islands. In June of this year when the Marianas bases had been sufficiently developed, the China-based B–29's were sent to the Pacific where they could be more easily supplied.

In May 1944, however, the Japanese had launched a strong drive southward from Tung Ting Lake in Hunan Province. In the late summer they began a complementary drive west from Canton. These salients joined near the American air base at Kweilin severing unoccupied China, and overran seven of the principal bases from which the Fourteenth Air Force had been throwing its weight against shipping in the China Sea. In April 1945, the Japanese drove out of Paoching against our important air base at Chihkiang. Supported by the Fourteenth Air Force, Chinese troops slowed, stopped, then threw back this Japanese column with heavy losses. The offensives in China were the most serious the Japanese were able to mount in 1944 and 1945.

By the spring of this year the impact of the smashing attack across the Pacific islands had been felt deep in Asia. Fearing for the safety of their homeland, the Japanese had begun to withdraw large forces from South and Central China. Behind them Chinese troops were applying every pressure their present strength would permit. Under General Wedemeyer, American officers in increasing numbers were helping speed the retraining and reequipping of Chinese soldiers who had been fighting the Japanese for eight long years. The War Department made available to him two of the Army commanders who had helped defeat the German Wehrmacht, General Truscott of the Fifth Army in Italy and General Simpson of the Ninth Army. At the same time the Air Forces in China were reorganized, the 10th Air Force from India was moved into China and both the 10th and 14th were placed under the general direction of General Stratemeyer. While this reorganization was in progress, General Chennault, who had commanded the original American Volunteer Group of "Flying Tigers" and then became the first commander of the 14th Air Force, asked to be relieved. The War Department granted his request and named Maj. Gen. Charles B. Stone to succeed him.

General Stillwell had been able to provide some training and equipment for 35 Chinese divisions in his training centers in Yunnan. Under the direction of the Generalissimo, General Wedemeyer was continuing this mission with full vigor and greatly increased resources now moving over the road from India. We were determined that when the final battle of Japan was fought the armies of the Emperor would find no comfort anywhere on earth.

ORDER OF BATTLE U. S. FORCES IN CHINA THEATER (AS OF 14 AUGUST 1945)

Unit	*Commander*	*Location*
Headquarters, U. S. Forces, China Theater	Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer	Chungking, China.
U. S. Army Air Forces, China Theater	Lt. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer	Chungking, China.
Tenth Air Force	Maj. Gen. H. C. Davidson	Liuchow, China.
Fourteenth Air Force	Maj. Gen. C. B. Stone, 3d	Kunming, China.

Unremitting Pressure

It had always been the concept of the United States Chiefs of Staff that Japan could best be defeated by a series of amphibious attacks across the far reaches of the Pacific. Oceans are formidable barriers, but for the nation enjoying naval superiority they become highroads of invasion.

Japan's attack on our fleet at Pearl Harbor gave her a tremendous but, nevertheless, temporary advantage. The Japanese had reckoned without the shipyards of America and the fighting tradition of the United States Navy. Even before parity with the Japanese fleet had been regained, the Navy successfully maintained communications with Australia and had undertaken limited offensives in the Solomons to halt the enemy advance. A desperate courage stopped the Japanese before Australia in the now historic battle of the Coral Sea and then shortly afterward utterly smashed the Japanese advance toward the United States itself in the decisive action at Midway.

The broad strategic allocation of resources among the theaters was controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but the actual control of operations in the Pacific had been retained by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. At the Casablanca Conference, the Combined Chiefs agreed that Japan must be prohibited from further expansion and from consolidating and exploiting her current holdings. This resolution was agreed upon even though we were at the very moment having great difficulty in concentrating sufficient resources to defeat the European Axis.

It has been declared axiomatic that a nation cannot successfully wage war on two fronts. With a full appreciation of the difficulties and hazards involved, we felt compelled to wage a war not only on two fronts, but on many fronts. Thus we arrived at the concept of global war in which the vast power of American democracy was to be deployed all over the earth.

At the TRIDENT Conference of May 1943 in Washington when the specific strategy of the global war was conceived, it was determined to step up the pace of the advance on Japan. Then a few months later, in August 1943, at the QUADRANT Conference in Quebec, the specific routes of the advance on Japan were laid out. Gen. Douglas MacArthur was directed to continue his operations up the New Guinea coast to reach the Philippines by the fall of 1944. Operations in the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Marianas were agreed to, and it was forecast that by the spring of 1945 we would be able to secure a lodgment in the Ryukyus on the threshhold of the Japanese homeland.

Admiral King was confident that somewhere during these advances, probably during the Marianas or the Philippine campaigns, the United States fleets would meet and decisively defeat the Japanese Navy. No long-range military forecast could have been more accurate.

At the QUADRANT Conference General Arnold proposed an air plan for the softening of Japan. It was later approved and carried into execution. It called for the establishment of bases in China, in the Marianas, and other Pacific Islands from which would operate the huge B–29 superfortresses then only just going into production.

Pacific Pincers

At the turn of the year 1943 Army forces in the South Pacific area were added to General MacArthur's strategic command. It was the intention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain the initiative, advancing by amphibious flanking actions on the Philippines and the Japanese Islands from the south and from the east. The advance across the tremendous reaches of the Central Pacific was placed under command of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. There were two axes of the operations on the southern flank—one in New Guinea commanded by Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, the other in the Solomons under Admiral William F. Halsey.

It was General MacArthur's intention to proceed by a series of envelopments up the coast of New Guinea and into the Philippines. We now enjoyed superiority both on the sea and in the air. He was therefore able to land his troops where the Japanese were weakest and confine their stronger forces in pockets from which, because of incredibly difficult terrain and our air and sea superiority, they could never break out. As a result there were at the time of surrender hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops isolated in the jungles of the Pacific islands, dying on the vine and of no further

THE GREAT OCEAN

Here are the broadest water distances of Earth. The short route to Japan across the top of the world was blocked by weather. So the Army and Navy were compelled to step their way over the Equator to the down-under lands of Australia and New Guinea and back up to the Philippines and the Ryukyus. Vast as the Pacific Ocean is, it became the broad highway for American invasion forces when the Navy drove the remnants of the defeated Japanese fleet back to their harbors after the battle of the Philippines.




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Pearl Harbor
ISLANDS

use to their Emperor. As General MacArthur reported toward the end of 1944:

> The enemy garrisons which have been bypassed in the Solomons and New Guinea represent no menace to current or future operations. Their capacity for organized offensive effort has passed. The various processes of attrition will eventually account for their final disposition. The actual time of their destruction is of little or no importance and their influence as a contributing factor to the war is already negligible. The actual process of their immediate destruction by assault methods would unquestionably involve heavy loss of life without adequate compensating strategic advantages.

Even with the intense preoccupation in the campaigns in Europe during the past two years, this great nation had been able steadily to increase the resources available in the Pacific until at the moment of German collapse General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were established on the threshold of the Japanese homeland and the industries and cities of Japan were crumbling under our aerial bombardment. The U. S. Navy dominated the Pacific. The Commonwealth Government, under President Osmeña, had been reestablished in power and in residence in the Philippines.

On 1 July 1943, General MacArthur had four American divisions and six Australian divisions under his control. His air force had less than 150 heavy bombers. Admiral Nimitz had nine Army and Marine divisions. Yet in the spring of 1945 these two commanders were ejecting the Japanese from the Philippines and the Ryukyus—already on the home stretch to Japan.

Following the completion of the extremely difficult Buna campaign late in June 1943, difficult because of the paucity of facilities and the character of the terrain, two regimental combat teams landed on Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands off the eastern tip of New Guinea. The operation was small but it was typical of the general method of the offensive in the Southwest Pacific. Deceived by feints, the Japanese were taken by surprise. Airfields were quickly established on these two islands, from which effective support could be provided for the operations which were to follow, and which permitted the rapid transit of fighter aircraft, if necessary, between the Solomons and New Guinea.

The capture of New Georgia Island with its im-



portant Munda airfield was accomplished by Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold's XIV Corps. The first landing in force was made 30 June on nearby Rendova Island. Japanese ground reaction was slight, but in the air the enemy tried hard to disrupt the landing. The next day Marine 155-mm guns on Rendova were shelling Munda airdrome six miles across the water. Elements of 37th and 43d Divisions then landed on New Georgia enveloping the western end of the island. After our forces were reinforced by troops of the 25th Division, Munda was captured on 5 August. Bypassing the strongly held island of Kolombangara, the XIV Corps had captured Vella Lavella by 9 October.

General MacArthur reduced Salamaua with an Australian force which advanced overland from the west and an American regimental combat team which made an amphibious landing south of the town. On 4 September, while the Japanese were still resisting at Salamaua, an Australian force landed a few miles east of Lae. The next day, supported by air and screened by smoke, a U. S. parachute regiment dropped to seize the airdrome at Nadzab, 19 miles northwest of the town. This daring move permitted the airborne movement to Nadzab of an Australian division, which then participated with their forces to the east in a concentric attack on Lae. After difficult fighting the town was occupied on 16 September.

Salamaua had fallen five days previously. General MacArthur then moved quickly toward Finschhafen. Employing mostly Australian forces, he occupied the town on 2 October. By February 1944 the Huon Peninsula was completely in our hands. During these operations and those which followed, extensive air attacks were maintained against the enemy's supply lines, barges, and airfields, contributing materially to the success of the ground operations.

Meantime New Zealand troops occupied two islands in the Treasury Group of the northern Solomons late in October. Preceded by diversionary landings in northwest Choiseul, the 3d Marine Division of Lt. Gen. A. A. Vandegrift's I Marine Amphibious Corps landed on 1 November at Empress Augusta Bay in western Bougainville. This permitted the establishment of a naval base and three airfields within





CENTRAL PACIFIC ADVANCE

fighter range of the enemy concentrations at Rabaul, 235 miles distant. From these airfields the remaining Japanese installations in the Solomons could more extensively be neutralized by Maj. Gen. Nathan F. Twining's Thirteenth Air Force, thus obviating the immediate necessity of conducting a campaign to annihilate the enemy or to complete the capture of the islands. On 11 November elements of the 37th Division entered the line, and on 15 December command of the beachhead passed to our XIV Corps, which had been reinforced by the Americal Division. Meanwhile a naval task force under Admiral Halsey had smothered Japanese air and naval power at Rabaul.

In the Central Pacific Area the primary mission of the Army command under Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., was the training of units en route to the combat zones further south and west. Amphibious and jungle training centers were established under battle-tested instructors in the Hawaiian Islands. The effectiveness of this training was demonstrated in every area of the Pacific Ocean.

In the fall of 1943 a series of operations was initiated which, less than a year later, had given us mastery of the Pacific. Attacks directed against the enemy along several axes forced him to deploy his relatively inferior air strength over a wide area, without sufficient strength at critical points. The vast sea area favored the employment of superior American naval strength. The small islands were not suitable for the employment of large Japanese ground forces.

The first step was the seizure of the Gilbert Islands, designated operation GALVANIC. Preluded by attacks by carrier task forces on Marcus and key islands in the Marshalls, Baker, Nukufetu, and Nanumea Islands were occupied by United States forces at the beginning of September. Early in October, Wake was heavily bombarded. After a preparatory naval and air bombardment by both Marine and Navy planes and Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale's Seventh Air Force, the invasion of the Gilberts began on 21 November. The 2d Marine Division landed on Tarawa. A combat team of the 27th Division landed on Makin. The Jap fought stubbornly on both islands. The larger enemy force on Tarawa made the operation difficult and costly for our troops. Abemama to the south was seized without opposition.

These operations opened a phase of warfare new to most of our troops. The enemy was concentrated within restricted areas, heavily fortified in pillboxes, and protected by mines and beach obstacles. Landing forces faced intense cross-fires. The enemy could be dislodged only by shattering bombardment and powerful hand-to-hand infantry assault. Amphibious tractors proved to be one of the effective assault weapons. They could be floated beyond the range of shore batteries, deployed in normal landing boat formations, and driven over the fringing reefs on to and up the beaches.

From the Gilberts, Admiral Nimitz turned to operation FLINTLOCK—the seizure of several atolls in the Marshall Islands. On 31 January 1944, after two days of intense air and naval bombardment, the 7th Division, veteran of Attu, landed on the southern islands of Kwajalein Atoll, while the 4th Marine Division attacked the northern tip at Namur and Roi. These divisions were part of the V Marine Amphibious Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Holland M. Smith. By 8 February all resistance had ceased. General Richardson wrote me after a flight to the Marshalls:

> As a result of the air, naval, and artillery bombardment, the scene at Kwajalein was one of great devastation. The destruction was complete. Upon approaching it from the lagoon side, it gave the appearance of no-man's land in World War I and was even greater, I think, than that of Betio on Tarawa. With the exception of rubble left by concrete structures, there were no buildings standing. All those which had been made of any other material except concrete had been completely burned or destroyed. The result was that there were practically no stores left except a few packages of rice and a little clothing and ammunition scattered here and there.

Majuro, with its excellent naval anchorage, was also occupied. Then after heavy attacks by carrier planes, a combat team of the 27th Division and a Marine combat team landed on Eniwetok Atoll on 19 February and completed its capture on 22 February. Control of the Marshalls enabled the interdiction by air of the enemy naval base at Truk until the advance into the Carolines could definitely isolate it. Truk also came under attack by Thirteenth Air Force B-24's based in the Admiralties.

Concurrent with these moves were operations in the Southwest against the western end of New Britain, to establish control of Vitiaz and Dampier Straits. On 15 December 1943 a reinforced cavalry regiment landed on three beaches in the Arawe area. The airdrome on Cape Gloucester was a desirable link in the chain of bases necessary to permit the air forces to pave the way for further advances. During a period of weeks the area was subjected to intensive aerial bombardment and on 26 December the 1st Marine Division landed and 4 days later captured the airdrome. By mid-March joint operations of the Marines and the Army's Arawe Force had secured western New Britain. While this fighting was in progress General MacArthur's advance westward continued. On 2 January 1944 a regimental combat team of the 32d Division made a jump of 110 miles to land near Saidor, on the north coast of New Guinea, and by 7 January an airstrip was in use.

The Admiralty Islands, lying west of the Bismarck Archipelago, were strategically important because of their airfields and harbor. An operation was originally scheduled for April 1944, but on 29 February General MacArthur accompanied advance elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, transported on Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet destroyers and high-speed transports to reconnoiter Los Negros Island. He was prepared to follow in force if the situation warranted. Little opposition was found, and the remainder of the division was committed. Momote airdrome was captured, and the beachhead secured after a series of fanatical counterattacks. During the remainder of March and the early part of April, the occupation of Manus and the adjacent islands was completed.

The next move to Hollandia and Aitape on 22 April involved a leapfrog advance westward of more than 400 miles. Since the landings were beyond the effective range of Army fighters, air support was provided by naval carriers. At Hollandia were located three excellent Jap airfields, and Humboldt Bay was suitable as an advanced naval and supply base. The airfields were found to be hard to reach overland, so General MacArthur occupied Aitape and based fighters on the airstrip there. Three main landings were made by troops of the 24th, 32d, and 41st Divisions of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger's I Corps, one just east of Aitape, one in Humboldt Bay, and one in Tanahmerah Bay. The Jap was taken by surprise; fewer than 5,000 of his troops were in the entire Hollandia area. By 30 April airfields there were in our hands. General Krueger's Sixth Army Headquarters moved into Hollandia 6 July 1944; General MacArthur brought his headquarters up from Brisbane on 8 September 1944. On this same date General Eichelberger was assigned to command the newly activated Eighth Army with headquarters also at Hollandia.

The Hollandia-Aitape operation cut off more than 50,000 Japanese troops to the eastward. The advance westward was continued in mid-May when elements of the 41st Division made an unopposed landing near Arara. A few days later a regiment of the same division captured the offshore island of Wakde with its airstrip and extended the beachhead on the mainland to include Maffin Bay.

Later in the month our 41st Division landed 330 miles farther west on Biak Island, strategically located off Geelvink Bay. The 8,000 well-equipped Japanese troops on the island put up fierce resistance, and it was 22 June before Biak's three airfields were in use. In another surprise attack, this time supported by paratroops, a regimental combat team occupied Noemfoor Island in early July. The possession of the airfield at this point gave much needed breadth and depth to the air deployment, permitting the further penetration and dislocation of enemy supply lines in the Southwest Pacific. By this time Japanese air had almost disappeared from the New Guinea area except for an occasional raid on landing craft or over established beachheads.

A landing at Sansapor on 30 July by elements of our 6th Division secured air and naval bases still further west, on the Vogelkop Peninsula. Although 18,000 Japanese garrisoned the Vogelkop Peninsula, General MacArthur again caught the enemy off balance and resistance was slight.

In a little over 12 months American forces in the Southwest Pacific, with the assistance of Australian units, had pushed 1,300 miles closer to the heart of the Japanese Empire, cutting off more than 135,000 enemy troops beyond hope of rescue. The operations had been conducted under adverse weather conditions and over formidable terrain, which lacked roads in almost every area occupied, and made troop movements and supply extraordinarily difficult. Malaria was a serious hazard, but with suppressive treatment and rigid mosquito control, it no longer was a serious limitation to tactical operations.

In the Pacific, men who had engaged in combat for long months had to be withdrawn to rear positions to recuperate. Consequently, the theater commanders endeavored to maintain replacement pools sufficiently large to provide a margin for the lost time of recuperation and transportation to and from the battle area. For every unit engaged in combat operations, more than its equivalent had to be present in the theater to assure this margin.

The prompt "roll up" of the bases, personnel, and matériel in Australia and the islands of the South Pacific permitted the same equipment to be utilized again and again, so that despite the lower priority given Pacific operations they could be continued. Only skeleton organizations remained in Australia, to procure supplies and maintain air transport.

Similar to the preparation of Western Europe for invasion, each advance northward toward Japan was preluded by air attack. Under Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, the Fifth Air Force and later the Far East Air Forces, which included both the Fifth commanded by Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead and the Thirteenth commanded by Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, effectively stopped the flow of supplies to bypassed Japanese units. The Japanese aerial threat to our own operations was swept from the skies, and direct support was provided for the successive amphibious advances. At the same time, General Kenney's forces forayed far to the westward, striking powerful blows at strategic targets in Timor, the Celebes, Java, and Borneo. These attacks seriously impaired the ability of the Japanese to maintain their widely scattered forces and reminded the captive peoples of those islands that Allied strength was rapidly growing and the enemy's hold was becoming more and more insecure.

Operation FORAGER to capture the Marianas was next on Admiral Nimitz's schedule. On 15 June Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith's V Marine Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions, followed by the 27th Infantry Division, landed on Saipan. On 9 July, after 25 days of extremely heavy fighting, the island was in their possession, though mopping-up operations continued for months.

On 21 July the 77th Infantry Division, the 3d Marine Division, and a Marine brigade of the III Marine Amphibious Corps under Maj. Gen. R. S. Geiger landed on Guam. The assault made steady progress. Resistance ceased on 10 August. Shortly after the Saipan operation had ended our XXIV Corps artillery, which had supported that action, began the neutralization of Tinian, assisted by fighter aircraft of the Seventh Air Force. On 24 July elements of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions assaulted that island and secured it in 9 days of heavy fighting.

Bombers of the Seventh Air Force, now operating from Saipan under Maj. Gen. Robert W. Douglass, soon were striking Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima in the Bonins. Even before the capture of the Marianas was complete, airfields were under construction on Saipan and Guam, from which Superfortresses could begin the strategic bombardment of the main Japanese Island of Honshu. The first major strike was delivered 24 November 1944.

With the rapid increase in the size of the Pacific Ocean Command, it became necessary to consolidate the Central and South Pacific Army forces. On 1 August 1944, Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, was established under General Richardson's command. Concurrently, two subordinate administrative commands, the Central Pacific Base Command and the South Pacific Base Command, were organized. All Army Air Forces in the area were placed under Headquarters, U. S. Army Air Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area, commanded by the late Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, who came from the South Pacific Area. In addition, General Harmon was designated Deputy Commander of the Twentieth Air Force to represent General Arnold in the theater. General Harmon after a long record of splendid service was lost in a trans-Pacific flight, on 28 February 1945. He was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Barney McK. Giles who at the time of his appointment was Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces.

Reconquest Of The Philippines

Toward the end of August Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet began a probing operation in the western Carolines and the Philippines. His carrier planes struck at Yap and the Palau Islands on 7 and 8 September, and the next two days bombed Mindanao. On the morning of the 12th, Admiral Halsey struck the central Philippines and arrived at a conclusion which stepped up the schedule by months.

The OCTAGON Conference was then in progress at Quebec. The Joint Chiefs of Staff received a copy of a communication from Admiral Halsey to Admiral Nimitz on 13 September. He recommended that three projected intermediate operations against Yap, Mindanao, and Talaud and Sangihe Islands to the southward be canceled, and that our forces attack Leyte in the central Philippines as soon as possible. The same day Admiral Nimitz offered to place Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson and the 3d Amphibious Force which included the XXIV Army Corps, then loading in Hawaii for the Yap operation, at General MacArthur's disposal for an attack on Leyte. General MacArthur's views were requested and 2 days later he advised us that he was already prepared to shift his plans to land on Leyte 20 October, instead of 20 December as previously intended. It was a remarkable administrative achievement.

The message from MacArthur arrived at Quebec at night, and Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, General Arnold, and I were being entertained at a formal dinner by Canadian officers. It was read by the appropriate staff officers who suggested an immediate affirmative answer. The message, with their recommendations, was rushed to us and we left the table for a conference. Having the utmost confidence in General MacArthur, Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral Halsey, it was not a difficult decision to make. Within 90 minutes after the signal had been received in Quebec, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz had received their instructions to execute the Leyte operation on the target date 20 October, abandoning the three previously approved intermediary landings. General MacArthur's acknowledgement of his new instructions reached me while en route from the dinner to my quarters in Quebec.


BATTLE OF LEYTE
140 Miles
BILIRAN
SAMAR
Bay
Limon
Carigara
S. Juanico Strait
Tacloban
Jaro
LEYTE
Dagami
lompon
Ormoc
Burauen
Dulag
Leyte Gulf
Ormoc Bay
HOMONHON
SULUAN
US X CORPS
US XXIV CORPS
Baybay
US SIXTH ARMY
20 October 1944
CAMOTES SEA
Surigao Strait
21 RCT
DINAGAT
N
OHOL
CAL VIEW
Surigao
140 Miles

That day the 1st Marine Division of General Geiger's III Marine Amphibious Corps, with a combat team of the 81st Infantry Division in reserve, landed in Peleliu in the Palau group. Two days later the 81st Division landed on Angaur, an island south of Peleliu.

The War Department on 16 September relayed to General MacArthur a report from General Stilwell to the effect that the Japanese offensive in central China would soon result in capture of the eastern China airfields from which Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force had planned to support operations in the northern Philippines. MacArthur replied that Admiral Halsey's carrier task force had so severely reduced hostile air capabilities in the Philippines, Formosa, and the Ryukyus that it would be possible to move directly from Leyte to Lingayen Gulf without the support of Chennault's air force. Admiral Halsey's carrier planes had destroyed almost 2,000 Japanese aircraft in the probing attacks during September.

On 22 September another combat team of the 81st Division moved to Peleliu, where heavy resistance was being met. Capture of this island was completed by 30 September except for a few isolated enemy groups which held out in caves for another two months. On 21 September, patrols of the 81st Division landed on Ulithi, meeting no opposition. The main body landed two days later.

The landing on Peleliu coincided with General MacArthur's move to seize Morotai north of Halmahera with the 31st and 32d Divisions. Despite uniformly stubborn resistance the Japanese had lost a series of islands which were important stepping stones for the return to the Philippines and the ultimate conquest of Japan.

The advance of our forces westward across the Pacific had been accompanied by the steadily expanding strategic operations of the Eleventh Army Air Force in Alaska, the Seventh Air Force in the Central Pacific, and the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific. In the operations fleet carriers had played a vital part. During the campaigns through the Southwest Pacific and the western mandated islands, General Kenney's aircraft and those of the Pacific Ocean Areas swung their powerful attacks back and forth in mutual support of the various operations. At the same time the westward advance had resulted in an ability to strike from the air at the foundations of the Japanese war potential—their shipping, petroleum, and aircraft industries.

Battle Of The Visayas

On 19 October two assault forces, the 3d commanded by Admiral Wilkinson and the 7th commanded by Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, approached the east coast of Leyte with the Sixth Army under General Krueger aboard. It was an armada of combat and assault vessels that stretched across the vast Pacific horizon. In the covering naval forces were the battleships *California, Mississippi, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,* and *West Virginia* with their screen of cruisers and destroyers. The troops and matériel with which we were to seize Leyte were loaded in 53 assault transports, 54 assault cargo ships, 151 landing ships (tank), 72 landing craft (infantry), 16 rocket ships, and over 400 other assorted amphibious craft. The air cover was provided by planes from 18 escort carriers.

Out to sea Admiral Halsey's mighty carrier task force, which helped prepare the way for the landings by air bombardment, now stood watch for possible Japanese naval opposition to the landings. That day a Japanese search plane discovered this great amphibious force and reported its presence to Admiral Kurita's Singapore fleet, which then constituted 60 percent of Japan's major naval units. This report precipitated one of the decisive battles of history.

The X and XXIV Corps of the Sixth Army went ashore on schedule the following day after the Navy had paved its way with drum-fire bombardment. Three days later General MacArthur directed the ground forces to secure their beach areas and await the outcome of the naval battle which was now impending. The Japanese made the decision to commit their fleet in the battle to prevent America's return to the Philippines. Admiral King has described the great naval action which followed in his recent report. Every American who reads it must be filled with tremendous pride in the achievements of our fighting Navy.

By the 26th it was apparent that the Third and Seventh Fleets had virtually eliminated Japan as a sea power. Her fleet had suffered a crippling blow.

In April 1944 the defense of the Philippines, the Japanese Empire of conquest in the south and west, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, Thailand, Borneo, French Indo-China, the Moluccas and New Guinea, had been in charge of Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi. From his headquarters at Manila he controlled 17 Japanese armies totaling about 925,000 men.

Terauchi was a typical Japanese jingoist. He had been Minister of War and commanded the armies which set out in 1937 to sack China. In the fall of 1943 he had assumed command of the southern armies with headquarters at Singapore. He moved his headquarters to Manila a half year later when the Philippines were added to his area. The 14th Area Army in the Philippines was then under command of Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda. A month before the forces of General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were at his throat, Terauchi's staff had prepared for him the following estimate of American intentions:

> A two-pronged attack on Luzon is planned. MacArthur's Army, aided by naval cooperation from Nimitz, will advance in the southern Philippine Islands. The other attack will be directed at the northern Philippines from the Pacific Ocean.
>
> Nimitz will provide MacArthur's forces with direct cooperation support with a part of his naval forces. His main forces will be prepared to engage our navy in the northern Philippines and Taiwan area and overcome any air resistance.
>
> The anti-axis Far East Air Army under Kenney will overcome any air resistance over the Philippines and together with the enemy air force stationed in China will operate over the North China Sea to isolate the Philippines.

In the six days of the great naval action the Japanese position in the Philippines had become extremely critical. Most of the serviceable elements of the Japanese Navy had been committed to the battle with disastrous results. The strike had miscarried, and General MacArthur's land wedge was firmly implanted in the vulnerable flank of the enemy. Terauchi no longer had an effective fleet to cover his forces in the Philippines or his communications to the empire of Malaysia so easily conquered two and one-half years before. There were 260,000 Japanese troops scattered over the Philippines but most of them might as well have been on the other side of the world so far as the enemy's ability to shift them to meet the American thrusts was concerned. If General MacArthur succeeded in establishing himself in the Visayas where he could stage, exploit, and spread under cover of overwhelming naval and air superiority, nothing could prevent him from overrunning the Philippines.

Terauchi decided that the battle must be fought in the difficult terrain of the Leyte mountains and rice paddies. He relieved Kuroda as commander of the 14th Area Army and replaced him with General Tomoyoki Yamashita, who had conquered Singapore in 1942 and then moved to the Philippines to wind up the campaign after Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma had been unable to budge the American forces holding out on Bataan. Yamashita was one of Japan's best known generals. For his victories in Singapore and Bataan he had been given the First Area Army in Manchuria, one of the two top field commands in the Kwantung Army.

To General Makina, commander of the 16th Division, then fighting a delaying action against the U. S. Sixth Army under General Krueger, Yamashita relayed this message:

> The Army has received the following order from his Majesty, the Emperor:
>
> "Enemy ground forces will be destroyed."

General MacArthur's advance continued. After securing the high ground overlooking Leyte Gulf, Maj. Gen. J. R. Hodge's XXIV Corps penetrated inland to secure Dagami and Burauen. The X Corps, under Maj. Gen. F. C. Sibert, swept across the San Juanico Strait to seize the south coast of Samar and landed troops in a short amphibious operation on the north coast of Leyte.

By 5 November the American forces had reached the vicinity of Limon at the northern end of the valley road leading to Ormoc, the principal Japanese installation on the island. Bitter fighting for Leyte was now in progress, rendered the more difficult by typhoons which inaugurated the rainy season.

During the naval battle and the weeks following, the Japanese were able to transport reinforcements to Leyte, but by mid-December General Kenney's land-based fighters and Admiral Halsey's carrier planes had strangled this stream of reinforcements. On 1 November United States air patrols located four large transports unloading, escorted by four destroyers and two destroyer escorts.

Army planes struck and sank one, possibly two transports. On 3 November, another three transports were seen unloading at Ormoc, but the Japanese maintained sufficient air patrol overhead and continued striking the United States fields on the east coast so that their unloading operations could not completely be interrupted. On 7 November three large transports and four small transports unloaded, covered by seven destroyers and two destroyer escorts. On 9 November ten destroyers and two heavy cruisers brought in four more large troop transports. Kenney's planes attacked and sank two transports, one destroyer, and six freighters.

On 11 November another convoy started into Ormoc Bay. Carrier planes, now reinforced after the great naval battle, attacked. Two transports were sunk. Four destroyers were also sent to the bottom and the fifth was badly damaged. One destroyer escort was sunk. On 7 December an entire convoy of six transports, four destroyers, and three destroyer escorts were sunk in San Isidra Bay by United States planes. On 11 December three transports and three destroyers were sunk off Palompam, and the following day another destroyer was sunk and one destroyer escort and two transports were badly damaged. By now the Japanese were able to commit no more of their valuable ships to the battle for the central Philippines and attempted to supply their troops already on Leyte by sailboat.

The Japanese took heavy troop losses in these repeated sinkings, but they had at the same time made some formidable reinforcements. By the middle of November troops of the U. S. 24th Division, reaching into the remnants of the Japanese 16th Division west of Jaro, killed a messenger and learned that the Japanese 1st Division was now on the island. Yamashita was therefore committing his best troops. The 1st Division was one of Japan's finest from the Kwantung Army.

When United States forces from the south and across the Pacific began to gather speed, the 1st Japanese Division had been moved to China. After General MacArthur's assault force had been sighted, the 1st Division was rushed from Shanghai to Manila and then on to Leyte.

In the Ormoc valley the Japanese 1st Division fought fiercely and delayed but could not stop Krueger's advance. By the end of November American troops were closing on Limon and another column threatened Ormoc from the south. Violent rain storms and deep mud harassed the supply lines. Forward units were dependent on hand-carry. Casualties were evacuated by native bearers.

But by 1 December seven divisions were well established ashore, five airfields were in operation, and the waters of the Visayas under firm naval control.

The 77th Division landed south of Ormoc on 7 December and captured the town four days later along with great quantities of enemy supplies. Toward the end of December the 7th, 24th, 32d, 77th, and 96th Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 11th Airborne Division closed out organized Japanese resistance on the island.

It was at Kilometer 79 on the Ormoc highway that the Japanese 1st Division command post, defended by 500 exhausted, defeated soldiers made the last stand. This little band, made up of every element General Kataoka had been able to reassemble, quit on the night of 21 December and fled south and west. Men of the 32d Division found this letter, written by an unknown Japanese soldier:

> I am exhausted. We have no food. The enemy are now within 500 meters from us. Mother, my dear wife and son, I am writing this letter to you by dim candle light. Our end is near. What will be the future of Japan if this island should fall into enemy hands? Our air force has not arrived. General Yamashita has not arrived. Hundreds of pale soldiers of Japan are awaiting our glorious end and nothing else. This is a repetition of what occurred in the Solomons, New Georgia, and other islands. How well are the people of Japan prepared to fight the decisive battle with the will to win . . . ?

Marshal Terauchi, realizing that the Philippines were slipping from his grasp fled with his headquarters to Saigon, Indo-China.

Command of the battle of Leyte passed to Eichelberger's Eighth Army on 26 December. For Krueger's Sixth Army there was other business.

While mopping-up continued on Leyte, General MacArthur had sent a landing force of two regiments into southern Mindoro. Within 24 hours American planes and PT boats were operating off the southern coast of Luzon.

Battle of Luzon

In the first week of January a new American assault force gathered east of Leyte, slipped through the Surigao Strait over the sunken wrecks of Japanese warships that had gone down in their attempt to turn aside the invasion more than two months before, and passed into the Mindanao and Sulu Seas. This American force was treading its way through the heart of the Philippine Archipelago and through waters where the Japanese Navy and air forces had for two years maintained unchallenged supremacy, to invade Luzon by effecting a landing in Lingayen Gulf, its classic point of greatest vulnerability.

No opportunity was overlooked to conceal this bold plan from the Japanese. While the assault force was proceeding up the west coast of Luzon, Kenney's planes and the guerillas under MacArthur's direction concentrated on the destruction of roads, bridges, and tunnels to prevent General Yamashita from shifting forces to



THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

The decision to pool the resources of the United States and Great Britain in joint effort to defeat Germany, Italy and Japan was taken in the initial War Conference between the President, the Prime Minister with their Chiefs of Staff held in Washington in December, 1941. To implement this decision and establish this coordinated strategic control, there was created the agency known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was the mission of the Combined Chiefs to propose the operations to be undertaken, allocate the resources of the two nations accordingly, define Theaters of Operations, and recommend the Allied Commanders for these theaters. The map shows the operational areas established. The Combined Chiefs met periodically, usually with their Chiefs of State, in the International Conferences, here shown.


CHINA
THEATER
PACIFIC OCEAN
AREAS
AST
ASIA
AND
SOUTHWEST
PACIFIC AREA

meet the assault. The guerrillas in southern Luzon conducted noisy demonstrations to divert Japanese attention to the south. Navy mine sweepers swept the Balayan, Batangas, and Tayabas Bays on the south coast of Luzon. Landing ships and merchantmen approached the beaches until they drew fire, then slipped out under cover of night. United States transport planes flew over Batangas and Tayabas and dropped dummies to simulate an airborne invasion. The Tokyo radio reported that American troops were trying to land on Luzon but had been driven off. Japanese forces on the island, harassed by guerrillas and by air, drove north, south, east, and west in confusion, became tangled in traffic jams on the roads, and generally dissipated what chance they might have had to repel the landing force. On 9 January the U. S. Sixth Army, now composed of the I and XIV Corps, hit the beaches in Lingayen Gulf. By nightfall, 68,000 troops were ashore and in control of a 15-mile beachhead, 6,000 yards deep.

The landing had caught every major hostile combat unit in motion with the exception of the 23d Infantry Division to the southeast of the beachhead in the central Luzon plain and its supporting 58th independent mixed brigade 25 miles to the north of Lingayen Gulf. Yamashita's inability to cope with General MacArthur's swift moves, his desired reaction to the deception measures, the guerrillas, and General Kenney's aircraft combined to place the Japanese in an impossible situation. The enemy was forced into a piecemeal commitment of his troops. The Japanese 10th and 105th Divisions in the Manila area which were to secure Highway No. 5 on the eastern edge of the central Luzon plain failed to arrive in time. The brunt of defending this withdrawal road to the north fell to the 2d Japanese Armored Division which seemingly should have been defending the road to Clark Field.

General MacArthur had deployed a strong portion of his assault force on his left or eastern flank to provide protection for the beachhead against the strong Japanese forces to the north and east.

In appreciation of the enemy's predicament the Sixth Army immediately launched its advance toward Manila across the bend of the Agno which presumably should have been a strongly held Japanese defense line.

The troops met little resistance until they approached Clark Field. The I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, had heavy fighting on the east flank where the Japanese were strongly entrenched in hill positions. For the time being they were to be held there to keep the supply line for the advance on Manila secure.

On 29 January troops of General Hall's XI Corps under strategic direction of the Eighth Army landed on the west coast of Luzon near Subic Bay, meeting light opposition. They drove eastward to cut off the Bataan peninsula where General MacArthur had made his stand three years before, denying the Japanese the use of Manila harbor for months.

The 11th Airborne Division on 31 January made an unopposed amphibious landing at Nasugbu in Batangas Province south of Manila. Three days later the division's parachute regiment jumped to Tagaytay ridge dominating the Cavite area. That night troops of the 1st Cavalry Division raced through Novaliches and reached Grace Park in the northeastern portion of the city of Manila. On 6 February the airborne troops reached Nichols Field. As the troops of the Sixth Army closed on Manila from the north, northwest, and south, the situation of Japanese forces in the city was rendered hopeless but they fought bitterly from house to house. Organized resistance ceased on 23 February when American infantry penetrated the old walled city.

Preceded by heavy air and naval bombardment, elements of the 38th Division landed on 15 February at Mariveles on the tip of Bataan. Resistance was light and our soldiers rapidly advanced along the perimeter road west of Manila Bay. While the battle for the city still raged, MacArthur moved to open Manila Bay and begin preparation of the Philippines as a major base for the next United States advances in the far Pacific.

Corregidor had gone under Allied bombardment on 23 January, and in less than a month Kenney's airmen dropped 3,128 tons of bombs on the two and three-fourths square-mile island that controls Manila Bay.

On the morning of 16 February, two long trains of Army C–47 transports approached the "Rock," close to the 500-foot sheer cliffs. A sudden 18-mile-an-hour wind swept the air clear of the smoke and dust of the naval and air bombardment that had ceased a few minutes earlier. Then the troop carriers began to sow the sky. 'Chutes spilled out white and troops of the veteran 503d Parachute Regiment drifted downward toward the lighthouse and golf course on the little island, against scattered small arms fire from the Japs on the ground. Simultaneously, troops of the 34th Infantry Regiment hit the shore in assault boats at San José



South Dock. They ran into a heavy mine field covering the entire length of the beach, but little fire from Japs on the island.

Fighting in the tunnels built by Americans in an attempt to make Corregidor impregnable prior to World War II, the Japs continued their suicidal resistance for nearly two weeks. Toward the end there was a series of terrific explosions on the islands as the Japs destroyed the tunnel system and themselves with it. Americans sealed up remaining caves and an estimated 300 Japs. A total of 4,215 Japs were killed on the island, an unknown number blown up. Of the 3,038 Americans who took back Corregidor, 136 were killed, 8 were missing, and 531 wounded.

Manila Bay was open in early March. In less than two months General MacArthur accomplished what the Japanese had needed six to do after Pearl Harbor.

In late February, elements of the Eighth Army's 41st Division effected an unopposed landing at Puerto Princesa, Palawan Island. The force captured the town with its two airstrips and completely occupied Puerto Princesa Peninsula. The airfields gave control of a wide area of the China Sea greatly facilitating the severance of Japanese communication with Malaysia and Burma.

On 10 March other 41st Division troops landed on the western tip of Mindanao, second largest island in the Philippine group. Initial resistance was light and the city of Zamboanga fell the following day, but heavy fighting followed in the foothills and continued for weeks.

Landings were made during March on Panay, Cebu, and Negros. Reconnaissance parties went ashore on Jolo, Tawitawi, and other islands in the Sulu Archipelago, extending our holdings to within 40 miles of Borneo. In each case the landings were effected most skillfully with a minimum of resistance but stubborn and prolonged fighting usually followed in the hills.

Driving north from the central plain of Luzon, the Sixth Army Divisions met a fanatical enemy in the mountain ranges between Baguio and Balete Pass. East of Manila, infantry fought for long weeks across successive, bitterly-contested mountain ridges. Other elements cleared the area south of Laguna de Bay and advanced along the highway toward the Bicol Peninsula. On 1 April, a reinforced combat team landed at Legaspi in southeast Luzon. With the help of guerrillas, this force cleared the southeastern tip of the island and then moved northward toward our other troops advancing from central Luzon.

In mid-April, with the campaign in the Visayas drawing to a close, General Eichelberger sent the X Corps of his Eighth Army ashore on Central Mindanao north of Cotabato. By this time our troops were well established in the Zamboanga area and guerrilla forces were in possession of large areas in Northern Mindanao. Driving eastward to Davao Gulf, infantry of the 24th Division, X Corps, took Davao City on 4 May after house-to-house fighting. A column of the 31st Division drove north up the valley of the Pulangi River to Kibawe. Meanwhile, on Luzon, the important city of Baguio had fallen to the 33d and 37th Divisions.

Allied gains in the Southwest Pacific were extended on 1 May by an amphibious force of Australian and Netherland East Indies troops which landed on oil-rich Tarakan Island, off the northeast coast of Borneo. By the end of the month all important installations on the island were in Allied hands.

In mid-May another landing was made on Mindanao, this time at Agusan on the guerrilla-held north coast. In two days the assault troops had driven 12 miles south and seized the town and airfield of Del Monte.

On 13 May, after months of extremely hard fighting, Balete Pass, gateway to the Cagayan Valley, was captured. East of Manila, on the same day, the 1st Cavalry Division reached the sea at Binangonan Point, thus dividing the last enemy pocket in central Luzon and cutting to the rear of the strong enemy positions in the Marikina watershed.

The Net Closes

The superforts were now blasting the great cities of the Japanese Islands on an ever-increasing scale. Chief targets were aircraft plants. Docks and small manufacturing plants received their share of the punishment.

On 19 February the V Marine Corps supported by Admiral R. A. Spruance's Fifth Fleet landed along the south coast of Iwo Jima, 775 miles from the main Japanese Island of Honshu. The fighting was exceptionally heavy and it was a month before organized resistance terminated. The Japanese defense grew more desperate as our advance moved toward the shores of their homeland.

Iwo Jima was of vital importance to the air assault on Japan. Japanese interceptors which came up to meet the B–29 strike on Tokyo on 7 April 1945 found a strong Mustang escort with our bombers. The Iwo fields saved hundreds of battle-damaged B–29's unable to make the full return flight to their bases in the Marianas, 800 miles further to the south.

Meanwhile Philippine-based aircraft were establishing command over Formosa and the China Coast and our naval carrier planes, as well as the superforts, delivered strikes at the very heart of Japan. It was now possible to drive forward into the Ryukyus along the main Japanese archipelago bordering the East China Sea.

The offensive on the Ryukyus was launched on 26 March when the 77th Division of Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner's Tenth Army landed on Kerama Retto west of Okinawa. In three days the force had secured all islands in the Kerama chain and had emplaced artillery within range of the key island, Okinawa.

Under cover of an intense naval bombardment, the XXIV Army Corps and the III Marine Corps established beachheads on the west coast of long, narrow Okinawa on 1 April. Aided by a realistic feint toward the thickly populated southern tip of the island, our forces



PHILIPPINE LIBERATION



met little resistance in the landing and in consolidating positions ashore. After driving across the island, the Marines swung northward against light to moderate opposition; the Army corps turned south toward Naha, principal city of the island, where it was confronted by the main Japanese force elaborately entrenched.

By the end of the first week, four United States divisions were ashore and Marine fighters were operating from the Yontan airfield. The III Marine Corps had driven 20 miles northward.

General Hodge, commander of the XXIV Army Corps wrote:

> It is going to be really tough. There are 65,000 to 70,000 fighting Japs holed up in the south end of the island, and I see no way to get them out except blast them out yard by yard. Our attack is set to go soon, and I think we are ready.
>
> The Japs have tremendous amounts of artillery and have used it far more intelligently than I have ever seen them use it to date. With best estimate, it shows around 500 or more individual weapons of 75-mm or better, including some 169–175 of caliber 105 or better. The most powerful weapon of long-range we have encountered to date is the 150 rifle with range of 27,000 yards which fires occasionally upon the two airfields from the vicinity of Shuri. They are using quite a few of the Spigot mortars (320-mm), 250-mm mortars, and aerial bombs up to 250 kilograms fitted as rockets. They are also using large sized rockets somewhere in the 5-, 6- to 8-inch class.
>
> The terrain is decidedly rugged and cut up with many cliffs, natural and man-made, limestone and coral caves, and organized over long periods of time, and well-manned.

After mopping-up all of the northern part of the island, the Marines took over a sector in the south to throw their weight into the drive for Naha. Progress continued slow against the bitterest sort of opposition but by the middle of June, our troops had broken through the heavily fortified Naha and Shuri defense lines and had compressed the Japanese into two pockets on southern Okinawa.

The ferocity of the ground fighting was matched by frequent Japanese air assaults on our shipping in the Okinawa area. By the middle of June, 33 U. S. ships had been sunk and 45 damaged, principally by aerial attacks. In the Philippines campaign U. S. forces first met the full fury of the kamikaze or suicide attacks, but at Okinawa the Japanese procedure was better organized and involved larger numbers of planes; also the Baka plane appeared, something quite new and deadly. This small, short range, rocket-accelerated aircraft, carried more than a ton of explosives in its war head. It was designed to be carried to the attack, slung beneath a medium bomber, then directed in a rocket-assisted dive to the target by its suicide pilot. It was in effect, a piloted version of the German V-1.

By mid-June, the Japanese had lost twenty percent of their total combat aircraft strength in the battle for Okinawa; in all, 3,400 Japanese planes were shot down over the Ryukyus and Kyushu and 800 more were destroyed on the ground. During the same period our losses totaled more than a thousand aircraft.

The pattern of fanatical Japanese resistance continued in the southernmost tip of the island. Each successive strong point was cleared only by heroic efforts of our soldiers and marines. By the end of June we had suffered 39,000 casualties in the Okinawa campaign, which included losses of over 10,000 among naval personnel of the supporting fleet. By the same date, 109,629 Japanese had been killed and 7,871 taken prisoner.

With victory just within his grasp, the Tenth Army Commander, General Buckner, was forward with his assault infantry, observing the progress of this final drive to clean up the island on 18 June. An enemy artillery salvo squarely bracketed his observation post, and General Buckner died a soldier's death a few minutes later. This splendid leader was replaced by General Joseph W. Stilwell, then Commander of the Army Ground Forces. The Ground Forces Command was given to General Jacob L. Devers, the veteran commander of the Southern Group of Eisenhower's Armies.

General Buckner had won his battle. Within three days of his death, all organized resistance had ceased on Okinawa, our first strategic base within the shadow of the Japanese homeland.

The 9th Australian Division on 10 June made an unopposed landing at Brunei Bay, in northwest Borneo, seizing the naval anchorage and airfields. By overland and amphibious operations the Australians quickly drove south to important oilfields at Seria and Miri. The establishment of air and naval facilities at Brunei Bay, combined with those in the Philippines, completed a chain of mutually supporting strategic bases from which Allied air and naval forces could cover the Asiatic coast from Singapore to Shanghai, interdicting the enemy's overland communications and escape routes in Indo-China and Malaya.

Meanwhile, General Krueger began the final operations against the Japanese on Luzon when the 37th Division drove northward from Balete Pass into the Cagayan Valley. North of Baguio, our forces met stiff resistance from Japanese remnants who had gathered for a last stand among the precipitous mountains. Further north, Philippine guerrillas cleared large areas of northwest Luzon. On 21 June these forces, assisted by Rangers of the Sixth U. S. Army, captured Aparri, Luzon's northernmost port, and were astride the main road through the valley at Tuguegarao.

On 23 June a paratroop force of the 11th Airborne Division dropped just south of Aparri. This force drove 25 miles southward during the next three days to establish contact with forward elements of the 37th Division.

The seizure of the Cagayan Valley virtually terminated the campaign in Luzon, though sizable pockets of desperate Japanese remained to be eliminated. In the liberation of the Philippine Islands, General MacArthur's armies had killed by that time 317,000 and captured 7,236 Japanese against a U. S. casualty figure of approximately 60,628 killed, wounded, and missing.

On 1 July Australian forces landed at Balikpapan in southeastern Borneo. Preceded by a heavy aerial and naval bombardment, assault troops suffered only light casualties in seizing their beachheads. By the middle of July, Balikpapan Harbor was open to Allied shipping.

From California to the coast of China the vast Pacific abounded with American power. In the Philippines, the Marianas and the Ryukyus, our forces under steadily increasing reinforcements from the European continent massed for the final phase of the Pacific war. The enemy's shipping had been largely sunk or driven from the seas. The few remaining fragments of his once powerful naval force were virtually harbor bound and the industries and communications of Japan were rapidly crumbling under the mounting tempo of our aerial bombardment. Lord Mountbatten's forces in southeastern Asia were closing in on Malaysia and the Netherlands East Indies. Chinese armies, newly equipped, trained, and determinedly led, were gradually assuming the offensive.

The day of final reckoning for a treacherous enemy was at hand.

Final Victory

By direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur assumed command of all United States Army Forces in the Pacific on April 6. Both he and Admiral Nimitz, Commander of Naval Forces in the Pacific, were directed to prepare for the final operations against Japan. By June General MacArthur had created a new command known as the United States Army Forces in the Western Pacific under Lt. Gen. W. D. Styer to replace the old Southwest Pacific Area. General Richardson was redesignated Commander of the Army Forces of the Middle Pacific.

On 10 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered another revision of the Pacific Command.

The formerly China-based 20th and 21st Bomber Commands were deactivated. The 21st became the 20th Air Force and the personnel of the 20th Bomber Command was transferred to the Eighth Air Force, which had been redeployed from Europe. General Twining, who had started in the Pacific war with the 13th Air Force in the Solomons, later moved to command of the 15th Air Force in Italy, was given command of the new 20th Air Force. General Doolittle retained command of the 8th.

Both Air Forces which now controlled the mightiest fleet of superbombers ever assembled, were combined into the U. S. Strategic Air Force, the Command which controlled the American Air assault on Germany. General Spaatz retained command of USSTAF in the Pacific. General Giles became his deputy. General LeMay, who once had commanded the B–29 fleet in China, then built up the superfortress attack in the Pacific, became his Chief of Staff.

Strategic control of the superfortress fleet remained with the Joint Chiefs of Staff with General Arnold as their agent.

During July the superbombers had steadily increased the scale of their attacks on the Japanese homeland. From the Marianas bases, the B–29's averaged 1,200 sorties a week. Okinawa airfields which now occupied almost all suitable space on the island began to fill with heavy bombers, mediums and fighters which united in the aerial assault on the Japanese islands, her positions on the Asiatic mainland and what was left of her shipping. Fighters from Iwo Jima swept the air over the Japanese Islands, strafed Japanese dromes and communications and gave the superbombers freedom of operation. The Third Fleet augmented by British units hammered Japan with its planes and guns sailing boldly into Japanese coastal waters. The warships repeatedly and effectively shelled industries along the coasts.

These mighty attacks met little opposition. Terrific air losses during the fierce battles of Japan's inter-defenses had made the enemy desperate. Knowing that invasion was not long off, he husbanded his now waning resources for the final battle. Defending the homeland the enemy had an army of 2,000,000, a remaining air strength of 8,000 planes of all types, training and combat.

General MacArthur was massing troops and planes in the Philippines and in Okinawa and in bases to the south of the Philippines for the showdown. He, in cooperation with Admiral Nimitz,* was preparing to execute two plans for the invasion of Japan: the first known as operation OLYMPIC, provided for a three-pronged assault on southern Kyushu in the fall of 1945 by the Sixth United States Army, consisting of the I and the XI Army Corps and the V Marine Amphibious Corps. The three groups were to land in the order named at Miyazaki, Ariaka Wan, and on the beaches west of Kagoshima to isolate the southernmost Japanese island and destroy the defending forces there. Preceding the main assault were to be preliminary operations in Koshiki Retto and a diversionary feint off Shikoku by the IX Corps.

The second phase of the Japanese invasion, operation CORONET, was to be carried out in the early spring of 1946. The Eighth and Tenth Armies, consisting of nine infantry divisions, two armored divisions and three Marine divisions were to assault the Kanto or Tokyo plain of eastern Honshu. These two veteran Pacific Armies were to be followed ashore by the First Army, which had spearheaded our victory in Europe and was now to be redeployed for the final battle of the Pacific. In this attack the First Army would have contained 10 infantry divisions. The three

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*Naval aspects of the plans are not discussed here.



PLANNED ASSAULT ON JAPAN

armies had the mission of destroying the Japanese Army on the main home island and to occupy the Tokyo-Yokohoma area. On Kyushu we would have held a one-corps reserve of three infantry divisions and one airborne. From here the plan was to fan out to the north and clean up the remainder of the Japanese islands. Supporting the clean-up would ultimately have been an air garrison equivalent to 50 groups.

These were our plans for final victory in World War II should Japan fight to a last ditch national suicide. But we had other plans which we anticipated might bring a much speedier end to the war. For years the full resources of American and British science had been working on the principle of atomic fission. By the spring of this year we knew that success was at hand. While President Truman was meeting with the British Prime Minister and Generalissimo Stalin at Potsdam, a new and terrible bomb was taken to a deserted area of New Mexico and detonated. The results were even more terrifying than was anticipated. A report was rushed to the Secretary of War and the President at Potsdam, Germany, and it was decided to use this weapon immediately in an effort to shorten the war and save thousands of American lives. From Potsdam General Spaatz received orders to drop the atomic bomb on the industrial installations of one of four selected cities from which he could make his own selection according to weather and target any time after the 3d of August. He chose the military base city of Hiroshima.

On 6 August the bomb was dropped. The results are well known.

Two days later the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and within a few hours the Red Army was again on the march, this time driving with powerful blows into the pride of Japanese military power, the Kwantung Army of Manchuria. The first Red offensives were across the Manchuria borders and southward on the island of Sakhalin. The advance by the Red divisions was swift. They struck first to isolate Manchuria and then Korea. In rapid thrusts from outer Mongolia and Trans Baikal, the Soviet forces drove deep into Manchuria and struck the Khinghan range, captured the communications center and bases at Hailar and crossed the Khinghan barrier into Harbin, key city of central Manchuria. To the south strong mobile forces crossed the desolate Gobi desert toward southern Manchuria.

Then, on 9 August, the Strategic Air Forces loosed a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, which displayed greater destructive blast and fire than the Hiroshima bomb. The smoke of the Nagasaki detonation rose 50,000 feet into the air and was visible for more than 175 miles.

The week of 6 August had been one of swift and sudden disaster to the nation which fired the first shot in the series of conflicts that led to World War II. Japan was being made to pay in full for her treacheries at Mukden and at Shanghai, at Pearl Harbor and at Bataan. The enemy situation was hopeless. On 10 August the Japanese Government sued for peace on the general terms enunciated by the Allied powers at the Potsdam Conference.

ORDER OF BATTLE U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC (AS OF 14 AUGUST 1945)

Unit	*Commander*	*Location*
General Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific.	General of the Army Douglas MacArthur	Manila, Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Sixth Army	Gen. Walter Krueger	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
40th Infantry Division	Brig. Gen. D. J. Myers	Panay, Philippine Islands.
11th Airborne Division	Maj. Gen. J. M. Swing	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
I Corps	Maj. Gen. I. P. Swift	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
25th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. C. L. Mullins	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
33d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. P. W. Clarkson	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
41st Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. J. A. Doe	Mindanao, Philippine Islands.
IX Corps	Maj. Gen. C. W. Ryder	Leyte, Philippine Islands.
77th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. A. D. Bruce	Cebu, Philippine Islands.
81st Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. P. J. Mueller	Leyte, Philippine Islands.
XI Corps	Lt. Gen. C. P. Hall	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
43d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. L. F. Wing	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Americal Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. W. H. Arnold	Cebu, Philippine Islands.
1st Cavalry Division	Maj. Gen. W. C. Chase	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Eighth Army	Lt. Gen. R. L. Eichelberger	Leyte, Philippine Islands.
93d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. H. H. Johnson	Morotai Island, New Guinea, and Philippine Islands.
96th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley	Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands, and Mindanao, Philippine Islands.
X Corps	Maj. Gen. F. C. Sibert	Mindanao, Philippine Islands.
24th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. R. B. Woodruff	Mindanao, Philippine Islands.
31st Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. C. A. Martin	Mindanao, Philippine Islands.
XIV Corps	Lt. Gen. O. W. Griswold	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
6th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. C. E. Hurdis	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
32d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. W. H. Gill	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
37th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. R. S. Beightler	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
38th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. F. A. Irving	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Tenth Army	Gen. J. W. Stilwell	Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands.
XXIV Corps	Lt. Gen. J. R. Hodge	Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands.
7th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold	Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands.
27th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. G. W. Griner, Jr	Ie Shima and Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands.
U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific	Lt. Gen. R. C. Richardson, Jr	Oahu, Hawaiian Islands.
98th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. A. M. Harper	Oahu, Hawaiian Islands.
U. S. Army Forces, Western Pacific	Lt. Gen. W. D. Styer	Luzon, Philippine Islands.
Far East Air Forces	Gen. G. C. Kenney	Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands.
Fifth Air Force	Lt. Gen. E. C. Whitehead	Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands.
Seventh Air Force	Brig. Gen. T. D. White	Saipan, Marianas Islands.
Thirteenth Air Force	Maj. Gen. P. B. Wurtsmith	Leyte, Philippine Islands.

ORDER OF BATTLE U. S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES (AS OF 14 AUGUST 1945)

Headquarters, U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces, Guam, Marianas Islands:

Commanding General	Gen. Carl Spaatz.
Deputy Commander	Lt. Gen. B. McK. Giles.
Chief of Staff	Maj. Gen. C. E. LeMay.

Eighth Air Force, Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands:

Commanding General	Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle.

Twentieth Air Force, Guam, Marianas Islands:

Commanding General	Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining.


M A N C H U R I A
K O R E A
SEA OF JAPAN
HOKKAIDO
H O N S H U
Tokyo
Nagoya
Kure
SHIKOKU
Nagasaki
KYUSHU
ntsin
Tsingtao
From Chengtu 6 Hrs 6 Min By Air
E A S T
C H I N A
S E A
R Y U K Y U R E T T O
5 Hrs 15 Min To Tokyo
OKINAWA
Shanghai
Nanking
Hangchow
Wenchow
C H I N A
Foochow
Taihoku
FORMOSA
Takao
Amoy
Swatow
nton
Hongkong
From Manila To Tokyo
925 Nautical Miles
1768 Nautical Miles
1156 Nautical Miles
545 Nautical Miles
662 Nautical Miles
631 Nautical Miles
Lingayen Gulf
Baguio
LUZON
Manila
SAMAR
S O U T H
C H I N A
S E A



THE ARENA OF VICTORY

This is the arena in which World War II both began and finally ended. With her cities leveled by fire bomb and atomic explosion, her Armies in Asia reeling under the blows of the Red divisions and American power massing for invasion, Japan made final payment on the treacheries of Mukden, Shanghai, Pearl Harbor, and surrendered.

The Japanese islands first came under bombardment of China-based B-29's on 15 June 1944. This assault was joined by Superfortresses based in the Marianas on 24 November 1944. The Navy began its carrier strikes that denied the Japanese fleets the safety of its home harbors on 16 February 1945. In July the coastal cities of Japan came under the guns of our warships and on 6 August the mightiest blow of warfare, the first atomic bomb, was dropped on the military base city of Hiroshima.

Two days later the Soviet Union joined the assault on Japan. A second atomic bomb blasted Nagasaki on 9 August. Within 24 hours the aggressor nation that had fired the first shot of the series of Wars that led up to the greatest of all conflicts sued for the Peace it had so flagrantly broken.

OCCUPATION

Orderly civil administration must be maintained in support of military operations in liberated and occupied territories. In previous wars, the United States had no prepared plan for this purpose. In this war it was necessary to mobilize the full resources of both liberated and occupied countries to aid in defeating the enemy. The security of lines of communication and channels of supply, the prevention of sabotage, the control of epidemics, the restoration of production in order to decrease import needs, the maintenance of good order in general, all were factors involved. It was important to transform the inhabitants of liberated countries into fighting allies.

The Civil Affairs Division was created on 1 March 1943 to establish War Department policies designed to handle these problems. In joint operations, the Division works closely with a similar agency in the Navy Department, as well as with related civilian agencies to determine and to implement United States policies. The Army and Navy are represented on the Joint Civil Affairs Committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff which is charged with planning for civil affairs in both Europe and the Pacific. In combined operations, United States policies are coordinated with those of the British through the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Army officers were trained at the School of Military Government established at the University of Virginia and at Civil Affairs training schools to serve in military government and civil affairs activities in the field. The operation of these schools is a responsibility of The Provost Marshal General, under directives prepared by the Civil Affairs Division.

In French North Africa the civil administration was conducted by the French Government. The British managed civil affairs in the territory east of the Tunis-Tripoli border.

In Sicily for the first time, civil affairs officers, American and British in equal numbers, went ashore with assault troops. For the remainder of the Sicilian campaign these officers accompanied combat troops into towns and areas where their services were necessary. In the initial stages of the Sicilian campaign, military government was a responsibility of combat commanders, and civil affairs officers went with fighting troops to take the burden of dealing with the civil populace off the commander's shoulders. They organized the civil administration so as to secure the cooperation of the Sicilians, and thus relieve tactical commanders from the necessity of diverting detachments from combat troops for security. Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories was extended in Sicily as rapidly as the enemy was cleared from a community.

A similar procedure was followed in the early phases of the invasion of the Italian mainland. Civil affairs officers, attached to the 15th Army Group, were placed under the commanding generals of the Fifth and Eighth Armies. A mobile Allied Military Government headquarters moved with each army.

After Italy capitulated and became a cobelligerent against Germany, the Allied Control Commission for Italy was established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to supervise the activities of the Italian Government and to insure that the terms of the surrender were observed. The Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theater is president of the Commission. Originally, it was a United States-British military agency. Now the percentage of civilian personnel is progressively increasing. Early in 1945 the Allies reestablished diplomatic relations with Italy and since that time diplomatic representatives have dealt with political matters. The major portion of the Italian peninsula has been transferred from the control of AMG to that of the Italian Government.

Experience gained in Sicily and Italy and practices followed there have been utilized in all subsequent operations.

Public safety, health, supply, agricultural, and other experts in the various phases of civil affairs accompanied the invasion forces into Sicily and Italy. The security of the armies and their property, the protection of local resources for the use of the armies, and the keeping of public order were achieved by public safety officers who worked largely through the Royal Carabinieri and other Italian police. Emergency civilian relief supplies, food, medicine, soap, and coal were accumulated in North Africa before and during the Italian campaign. They were supplemented by shipments from the United Kingdom and the United States. In one year more than two million long tons of relief supplies were distributed in Italy. However, scarcity of food remained the most difficult civil affairs problem in that country. This was complicated by the Fascist-born black market, by lack of shipping space for non-military goods, and by partial paralysis of inland transportation facilities which had been crippled by the enemy and by Allied bombings. Yet the bread ration rose from 125 to 200 grams, and finally to 300.

Conditions favorable to epidemics were created by undernourishment, lack of soap and water, broken sewers, dead animals, overcrowding, and refugees. The united efforts of the medical personnel of the armies and the public health experts of AMG, who directed and assisted the Italian medical profession, kept epidemics under control. Outbreaks of typhus were suppressed. The public was informed of the danger from rodents and vermin as plague carriers. Refugees were deloused. Demolished water supply and sewer systems were restored. The services of a few experts prevented malaria from levying a heavy toll on our fighting men.

Many fugitives from Nazi oppression, chiefly Yugoslavs, had escaped into Italy. They have been cared for by the Army, and thousands have been evacuated to the Near East. A camp, capable of housing a group of 40,000 displaced persons, was opened by the Army at Philippeville, Algeria, and approximately 1,000 such refugees have been established in a temporary camp at Oswego, N. Y.

Upon recommendation of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, selected officers were assigned to the Mediterranean and European Theaters to furnish technical advice on the preservation and restoration of art and archives. As a result of a concerted program of education, troops have been able to save many priceless works from destruction.

In France and other liberated countries of Northwestern Europe, the aims and activities of civil affairs personnel were the same as in Italy. However, special conditions required revised methods. In Italy there was a progressive movement from full military government toward looser forms of control, including increased participation by civilians and the Italian Government. In the European Theater of Operations, civil affairs personnel was required to shift abruptly from cooperative management of civil affairs in liberated areas to full blown military government in Germany.

The War Department coordinated negotiations on the United States military level with the French Committee of National Liberation. They drew up agreements for the administration of civil affairs and, after approval by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, these were signed by General Eisenhower for the United States and General Koenig for the French Committee. The British executed a similar agreement on a governmental level.

Under these agreements, civil affairs in Corsica and France were effected through a French Delegate acting in accordance with French law. Later General Eisenhower was represented by a SHAEF Military Mission in France. The French civil administration cooperated effectively and it was unnecessary for General Eisenhower to invoke his paramount powers of control even in forward areas. So well did this understanding work that, as early as 24 October 1944, a zone of interior was proclaimed in France, which had the effect of formally restoring practically complete control over all governmental problems to the French Provisional Government. United States and United Kingdom officials had the aid of French officers in helping the armies keep their lines of communication open and supplies flowing forward. The French Provisional Government furthered the campaign in a variety of ways. During the autumn rains, "duckbill" type tread extensions were needed to give tanks better traction on muddy terrain. The French contributed 600 tons of their sparse steel stocks to make 400,000 "duckbills". They provided storm boats for the spring campaign requiring river crossings. It has been estimated that by the end of February 1945 the French Provisional Government had made available to the Allies supplies, labor, services, installations, transportation, and other facilities valued at approximately 225 million dollars.

Prior to the invasion of Normandy, the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway had military missions attached to the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander in London. As these governments were reestablished on the continent, General Eisenhower designated a SHAEF Military Mission to each nation.

In Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia, the interests of the United States in the administration of civil affairs is limited to the activities concerned with relief and rehabilitation.

Since D-day in Europe, our military authorities have carried out a civilian relief import program for the liberated peoples of Europe in coordination with



the British. The relief supplies have consisted mostly of limited quantities of food, medical supplies, clothing and fuel. The United States share of this program, exclusive of petroleum products, for the northwest Europe and the Mediterranean areas, is approximately 3,900,000 tons for the year ending 30 June 1945.

In addition to imports of specific supplies for the civilian populations, the military authorities have actively assisted the liberated countries in the construction or repair of railroads, highways, and bridges, the reactivation of public utility services, and the construction or repair of port facilities and inland waterways. The Army has also been of assistance to the liberated governments in its efforts to aid in the resumption of essential industries such as coal mining, fishing, and others which would provide supplies to further the military effort and reduce shipping required for relief imports.

Military responsibility for provision of civilian supplies, except coal, for France was terminated 1 May 1945. It is expected that termination of military responsibility for furnishing civilian supplies throughout liberated northwest Europe, including coal for France, will be terminated on or about 1 September 1945.

The American Armies have accumulated so great a crop of prisoners that their handling has been a problem of immense complexity. Following the termination of hostilities in Europe our forces were holding 130,000 Italian prisoners and 3,050,000 German prisoners as well as an additional 3,000,000 German troops who were disarmed after the unconditional surrender. Of these, 370,000 German and 50,000 Italian prisoners are in the United States and Hawaii, and their disposition is a matter of immediate concern. It is the policy of the War Department to return to Europe all prisoners held in the United States as soon as this movement is practicable logistically.

The total capture in combined European operations has been divided equally between the United States and the British Commonwealth Governments. In addition to those prisoners who were the direct responsibility of the United States, this Government agreed to take 175,000 of the British captures with the understanding they would be returned as soon as possible.

The country has benefited from the utilization of the labor of these prisoners of war. Our critical manpower shortage has been relieved by 62,075,800 prisoner working days; the U. S. Treasury has been enriched by $35,196,800 paid by private contractors for this labor. In addition, their use on military installations has an estimated value of $108,825,469. After the capitulation of Italy, 110,000 Italian prisoners volunteered for Italian Service Units which perform noncombatant work helpful to the Allied war effort.

In the utilization of prisoners of war in continental United States, under the direction of The Provost Marshal General, the principle has been followed that such labor will not be permitted to compete with American civilian labor or to impair American wage standards and working conditions. Before a private contractor may employ prisoner of war labor, he must obtain from either the War Manpower Commission or the War Foods Administration a certification that civilian labor is not available for the project.

The policy of the United States with respect to treatment to be accorded to prisoners of war held by this country is in accordance with Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, which was ratified by the United States on 16 January 1932, and thus has the power of law. In following the provisions of the convention, the enemy prisoners have received firm treatment. At the same time a program of reorientation has been instituted to impress upon prisoners the vitality and strength of democratic institutions in the United States.

Prior to the unconditional surrender, military government in Germany was established by General Eisenhower throughout the areas occupied by his forces. Military government detachments followed in the wake of the advancing armed forces and established rigid control over the civil population, taking the first steps necessary to reestablish German administration free from Nazi influence. Some 5,500,000 displaced civilians and liberated United Nations prisoners of war were uncovered in Germany. By the end of June nearly 3,000,000 had been repatriated to their home lands. Suspected war criminals and persons whose freedom might endanger the security of the occupying forces were taken into custody.

The remarkable efficiency of handling both prisoners and displaced persons along the routes of an advancing victorious army was the fruit of an intensive effort to establish a new conception in the organization of military police. Our experience in the old AEF indicated that a highly trained military police force could be of tremendous value to military operations. Up to that time military police were used simply to enforce discipline and the regulations to which troops were subject. A careful study of World War operations coupled with experience in the first maneuvers brought the concept of using military police for helpful control of military traffic moving to and during battle. For this purpose special training schools were established by the Provost Marshal General. Insofar as possible older men were selected for the training. The returns on this effort were especially rich in the drive across France which heavily depended on the forwarding of the troops and supplies which had been put ashore in Normandy. Later in the collapse of German resistance the military police performed miracles in regulating the dense, rather chaotic traffic on the roads, burdened with combat troops and their supplies surging forward and millions of prisoners or displaced persons straggling in the opposite direction.

With the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces on 8 May, rigid military government was established throughout the whole of General Eisenhower's area of responsibility. The redeployment of forces into the national zones of occupation agreed upon by the four powers in the European Advisory Commission began. On 5 June General Eisenhower met in Berlin with Field Marshal Montgomery, Marshal Zhukov, and General De Lattre and on behalf of the United States signed the declaration by which the four governments assumed supreme authority and power in Germany. The Control Council in Germany was set up in accordance with the four-power protocol of the

European Advisory Commission. At the end of June, General Eisenhower's responsibility as a Supreme Allied Commander for military government in Germany terminated and, as Commander in Chief of the United States Occupation Forces in Germany, he became responsible for the military government of the United States zone of occupation. The United States zone of occupation includes the whole of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Hesse and Hesse-Nassau, and the northern portion of Baden, and, in addition, a portion of Berlin and the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. Lieutenant General Lucius DuB. Clay serves as Deputy Military Governor of the United States zone and as General Eisenhower's representative on the Coordinating Committee of the Control Council. He is assisted by a staff of specially chosen civilian and military experts.

In the closing days of the German campaign Allied Military Government was established in Austria. Officers and men, especially trained to deal with the problems of Austria, accompanied the tactical forces into those portions of the country occupied by United States, British, and French forces and took over control of all civil affairs. The military government in Austria differs substantially from that in Germany. Although the program of denazification and demilitarization of Germany is being extended in Austria, the United Nations will endeavor to promote conditions which will lead to the establishment of a free and independent Austria. Allied control in Austria is conducted through quadripartite administration by Soviet, British, French, and United States commanders, each of whom has been made responsible for a zone of occupation. Combined command of United States and British forces in Austria has been terminated. Matters of concern to Austria as a whole are dealt with by the four national commanders sitting in Vienna. General Clark has been designated the Commanding General of United States forces in Austria and, as such, will be the United States representative on the Governing Body of the Allied Administration in Austria. Though Austria has become a part of the European Theater of Operations, General Clark, in his role as the United States representative in the Allied Administration in Austria, is responsible directly to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The liberation of the Philippines would have involved major problems of civil affairs had the Commonwealth Government and local officials of inflexible loyalty not shown from the very first landings immediate competence to reorganize administration and reestablish orderly government. By agreement with the Commonwealth Government it has been understood throughout the whole of the Philippine campaign that military responsibility for civil affairs was limited to the provision of necessary emergency relief to the population. Through military channels 140,000 tons of civil relief supplies were shipped to the Philippines between November 1944 and 1 July 1945.

The first major operation requiring the establishment of military government over large numbers of Japanese people was at Okinawa. In that testing ground of policies, for the main islands of Japan, valuable experience was gained by military government personnel of the Army working with naval personnel.

The capitulation of Japan has been followed by the occupation of various strategic portions of the four main Japanese Islands by Allied Forces under the supreme command of General MacArthur.

An important element of the surrender was the clear statement by the Allied Powers that from the moment of the capitulation, the Emperor and the Japanese Government would be under the absolute authority of the Supreme Commander. Initially, military government has not been established in the same manner as in Italy or Germany. The will of the Allied Powers as exemplified in the surrender instrument is being imposed upon the Japanese through the channel of the Emperor and the Japanese governmental machinery.

OUR WEAPONS

The Nation's state of unpreparedness along with that of the British Empire gave the Axis nations an overwhelming initial advantage in matériel. The Japanese campaigns in China, the Italian compaign in Ethiopia, and the participation of German and Italian troops in the Spanish Civil War afforded these enemies an opportunity to test their new weapons on the battlefield. This is a matter of very great importance, preliminary to decisions for quantity production of any weapon. Since we had some time in which to mobilize our resources, the vastly superior industrial establishment of the United States eventually overcame the initial advantage of the enemy.

During the past two years the United States Army was well armed and well equipped. The fact is we dared to mount operations all over the world with a strategic inferiority in numbers of troops. Were it not for superiority in the air and on the sea, in mobility and in firepower we could not have achieved tactical superiority at the points chosen for attack nor have prevented the enemy from bringing greater forces to bear against us.

From the time of the landing in France to the time the Allies had reached the German frontiers, the German armies of the West exceeded numerically the attacking forces. General MacArthur invaded the Philippines with a lesser force than that with which the Japanese held the islands. In the immediate strategic area Japanese strength far outnumbered us. By no other criterion can the quality and quantity of our weapons better be judged. Yet we were in some instances outdone by both Germany and Japan in the development of specific weapons. It is truly remarkable that our superiority was as general and as decisive as it proved to be.

Overshadowing all other technological advance of the war was the Allied development of the atomic explosive. The tremendous military advantage of this terrifying weapon fell to us through a combination of good luck, good management and prodigious effort. The harnessing of atomic power should give Americans confidence in their destiny but at the same time we must be extremely careful not to fall victim to overconfidence. This tremendous discovery will not be ours exclusively indefinitely. In the years of peace between the two world wars we permitted Germany to far outpace us in the development of instruments which might have military use. As a consequence German development of long-range rockets and pilotless aircraft, stemming from years of peacetime research, was far more advanced than our own, which began in earnest only after the war had already started. The fact that we overtook Germany's head start on the atomic explosive is comforting, but certainly should not lull us again into a state of complacent inertia.

In the development of aircraft and ships U. S. factories and productive "know-how" soon gave the Allies both a qualitative and quantitative advantage over Germany and Japan. By the time the great air battles of Europe and the far Pacific were joined, U. S. planes were superior in numbers and types to the enemy's. Our development of the long-range heavy bomber, now exemplified by the B–29, has been unmatched. The Germans themselves admit they did not even foresee our developments in the long-range fighter. They first introduced the jet engine in combat, but this was not because we had made no progress in this field. By the time their jet fighters were ready to take the air, the only areas in which they could give them operational tests were swept by our fighters. They had either to test them in combat or not at all. The German jet fighters were limited to a maximum endurance of a little over an hour. Ours already had the endurance to fly nonstop from San Francisco to New York.

Another noteworthy example of German superiority was in the heavy tank. From the summer of 1943 to the spring of 1945 the German Tiger and Panther tanks outmatched our Sherman tanks in direct combat. This stemmed largely from different concepts of armored warfare held by us and the Germans, and the radical difference in our approach to the battlefield. Our tanks had to be shipped thousands of miles overseas and landed on hostile shores amphibiously. They had to be able to cross innumerable rivers on temporary bridges, since when we attacked we sought to destroy the permanent bridges behind the enemy lines from the air. Those that our planes missed were destroyed by the enemy when he retreated. Therefore our tanks could not well be of the heavy type. We designed our armor as a weapon of exploitation. In other words, we desired to use our tanks in long-range thrusts deep into the enemy's rear where they could chew up his supply installations and communications. This required great endurance—low consumption of gasoline and ability to move great distances without break-down.

But while that was the most profitable use of the tank, it became unavoidable in stagnant prepared-line fighting to escape tank-to-tank battles. In this combat, our medium tank was at a disadvantage, when forced into a head-on engagement with the German heavies. Early in 1944 it was decided that a heavy American tank, on which our Ordnance experts had been continuously experimenting since before the war, must be put into mass production. As a result the M-26 (Pershing) tank began to reach the battle lines last winter. This tank was equal in direct combat to any the Germans had and still enjoyed a great advantage in lighter weight (43 tons), speed, and endurance. At the same time work was begun on two new models, the T–29 and T–30, which weighed 64 tons, one mounting a high-velocity 105-mm rifle, the other a 155-mm rifle.

Following the fierce fighting in North Africa and in the Papuan campaign in New Guinea, it became clear that our lack of preparedness and research in military instruments during peacetime would have to be overcome by extreme measures. Accordingly, in the late spring of 1943 I selected an expert ordnance officer, Col. William A. Borden, and directed him to work under me independently of normal War Department channels in the development and modification of weapons and improved techniques. His first efforts were devoted to increasing the effectiveness of our weapons against the Japanese in jungle fighting. As a result, the 105-mm and 155-mm mortars, flame throwers, ground rockets, improved launching devices, skid pans for towing heavy artillery in mud, improved bazooka ammunition, and colored smoke grenades were developed and the production and shipment to the theaters were expedited.

Later the Secretary of War decided to establish a division of the War Department Special Staff to be charged with coordinating the experience of our troops in the field with the Nation's scientific developments in order to keep us abreast in the race for newer and more deadly means for waging war. The New Developments Division was organized by Maj. Gen. Stephen G. Henry in October 1943. Officers were sent to the theaters to observe troops in combat to search for ways in which to apply our civilian scientific knowledge to the problems of the battlefield. They then returned and coordinated and expedited experimentation with new types of weapons and equipment by the appropriate Army Service Forces agency. When some item was developed it was taken to the theaters for trial and if successful put into production. Some examples: flame-throwing tanks, air rockets, improved ground rockets, self-propelled heavy artillery and electronic devices for locating enemy mortar and gun positions.

In addition, the New Developments Division studied and interpreted the intelligence available on new enemy weapons, particularly the proposed targets for air bombardment of the V-1 launching sites and supply channels to them. The air reduction for these sites so seriously interfered with the effectiveness of the V-1 that its threat to the invasion of France never materialized.

In August 1944 Brig. Gen. Borden succeeded General Henry as Chief of the New Developments Division when the latter officer was appointed Chief of the Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff. Special emphasis was then placed on the development of guided missiles, heavy tanks, recoilless artillery, rockets, radar, and night viewing devices, as well as expediting the production and shipment overseas of improved types of many of our new weapons or devices.

In most respects, our battle clothing was as good as can be supplied to any soldier of any country. The "layering" principle saves the greatest possible protection, and at the same time the greatest freedom of movement. The rubber-bottomed, leather-topped shoepac, worn with heavy ski socks and a felt inner-sole, overcame the heavy incidence of trench foot among our troops fighting in cold and extremely wet climates. No clothing has ever been invented that will make the exposure men must endure in combat pleasant. It has been possible only to develop sufficient protection to prevent large-scale casualties from such exposure. This we accomplished both in Europe and in the battlefields of the East. The principal difficulty in meeting this problem was control of the wasteful habits of our men in their use and misuse of the clothing and equipment issued.

The American Army was unquestionably better fed than any in history. However, feeding in combat can never be like that in garrison or cantonment, nor remotely like home cooking. Field rations must be nonperishable, compact, and easily carried by the individual soldier. The problem of providing troops with appetizing food has plagued armies down through the centuries. The development of field rations for the United States Army in this war was almost revolutionary. The combat rations "C" and "K" were given a range of variety that combat troops would not have dreamed of a few years ago. The "C" ration, the subject of much amusing criticism, was supplied with 10 different meat components: meat and beans; meat and vegetable stew; meat and spaghetti; ham, eggs, and potatoes; meat and noodles; meat and rice; frankfurters and beans; pork and beans; ham and lima beans; and chicken and vegetables. These were rations that could be made available to men actually under heavy fire. Where there was more time for the preparation of food, troops were given the "10-in-1" ration which contains canned vegetables and fruits, canned desserts, chocolates and other candies, roast beef, roast pork and similar meat components, even canned hamburgers. When troops in the field were not under fire, they were fed the "B" ration which offered a wide selection considering the circumstances. Since under conditions where the "B" ration was fed, there were usually few, if any, facilities for refrigeration and preserving foods, this ration was composed of canned vegetables, meats, fruits, and dehydrated potatoes and eggs and similar items. It certainly did not compare with the fresh eggs and meats and vegetables common to the American family table, but it was a vast improvement over past issues of campaign rations. In the rear areas where food could be shipped quickly and preserved under refrigeration, the "A" ration was fed. This is as good food as can be served large numbers of men. Compared with these American Army rations was the Japanese ration of 1½ pounds of rice and small quantities of meat or fish a day. The Japanese soldier, however, thrived on this diet because he had been accustomed to little more at home.

In major ground campaigns to destroy the enemy's forces and end his resistance, such as we fought in North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany, one of the basic factors in the final decision is the armament and equipment of the infantry divisions and the manner in which they are employed. A nation with the belligerent tradition of Germany, concentrating its resources on a powerful army and enjoying every initial advantage from years of preparation for war, should have the upper hand in many if not all of the basic infantry weapons.

In two of these basic items the German Army held an advantage almost to the end of the war. The first was the triple-threat 88-mm rifle which our troops first encountered in North Africa. Even at that time the U. S. Army had a similar weapon, the 90-mm rifle, with greater penetrating power but the Germans had theirs on the battlefields and in quantity, with the "bugs" worked out in previous battle experience over a period of years. The United States forces did not have the 90-mm in quantity at the time and were compelled to work out its shortcomings in opposition to a proven weapon.

As a result the 88 was a powerful German weapon, ahead of ours in quantity and technique almost to the end of the war. In the Spanish Civil War the Germans were careful to conceal the role of the 88 as an antitank and antipersonnel weapon, revealing it only as an antiaircraft piece. When we first encountered it, it was serving all three purposes with deadly effect. A single 88 could fire several rounds of armor-piercing shells at our tanks, then suddenly begin firing air-bursting fragmentation shells at our infantry following their tanks, and a few minutes later throw up an antiaircraft fire at planes supporting the ground operation. The 90-mm rifle had no such flexibility. It could not be depressed low enough for effective antitank fire. Our technique of handling the gun had not been sufficiently developed so that interchangeable ammunition was available to the gun when it was needed, and we did not have the numbers of the weapons the Germans had.

A second marked German advantage during most of the European war was in powder. German ammunition was charged with smokeless, flashless powder which in both night and day fighting helped the enemy tremendously in concealing his fire positions. United States riflemen, machine gunners, and gunners of all types had to expose their positions with telltale muzzle flashes or puffs of powder smoke. German preparations had given them time to develop this high-grade powder and manufacture tremendous quantities of it. They had it there and they used it. These facts should be considered along with our policy regarding the manufacture of explosives after the last war and the scientific development that should or would have followed in the plants of the great commercial manufacturers had they not been subjected to bitter attack as "Merchants of death."

Careful planning and husbandry of the Army's meager peacetime resources and the nature of this Nation's machine economy gave the American armies in Europe two good advantages over the German enemy. One of ours was the Garand semi-automatic rifle, which the Germans were never able to duplicate. It is interesting to trace the planning and decisions that gave us the Garand rifle and the tremendous small arms fire power that went with it, noting especially that the War Department program for the Garand was strenuously opposed.

The base of fire of a rifle platoon is its automatic weapons. The riflemen concentrate their fire on the impact area blocked out by the automatics. The base of fire of a United States rifle squad in this war has been its Browning automatic rifle. Prior to the war the Army had several hundred thousand of these weapons in war reserve. The developments of the war indicated it might be well to replace the automatic rifle with another type of small automatic weapon, but if we had, we would have jammed production facilities, replacing a type of weapon already in stock. Instead, it was decided to modify the automatic rifle and devote production to the Garand rifle.

The Germans, on the other hand, shifted their rifle squad automatic weapon to a new type of light machine gun developed just before the war. Their standard rifle at the end of the war was still bolt-operated. They had produced a few semi-automatic rifles but they were never effective and did not reach the battlefield in numbers. In their efforts to improve the firepower of their infantry, the Germans then beat us to quantity production of the machine pistol, which we did not have in large numbers on the battlefields until well near the end of the European war. Our superiority in infantry firepower, stemming from the use of the semi-automatic rifle, was never overcome.

The greatest advantage in equipment the United States has enjoyed on the ground in the fighting so far has been in our multiple-drive motor equipment, principally the jeep and the 2½-ton truck. These are the instruments which have moved and supplied United States troops in battle while the German Army, despite the fearful reputation of its "panzer armies" early in the war still depended heavily on animal transport for its regular infantry divisions. The United States, profiting from the mass production achievements of its automotive industry, made all its forces truck-drawn and had enough trucks left over to supply the British armies with large number of motor vehicles and send tremendous quantities to the Red Army.

The advantage of motor vehicle transport did not become strikingly clear until we had reached the beaches of Normandy. The truck had difficulty in the mountains of Tunisia and Italy, but once ashore in France our divisions had mobility that completely outclassed the enemy. The Germans discovered too late the error of the doctrine which a member of their general staff expressed to General Wedemeyer, then in Berlin, in the late thirties: "The truck has no place on the battlefield." He meant by this that an unarmored vehicle was too vulnerable to be brought within immediate fire areas.

The appearance of an unusually effective enemy weapon, or of a particularly attractive item of enemy equipment usually provoked animated public discussion in this country, especially when stimulated by criticism of the Army's supposed failures to provide the best. Such incidents posed a very difficult problem for the War Department. In the first place, the morale of the fighting man is a matter of primary importance. To destroy his confidence in his weapons or in the higher command is the constant and intense desire of the enemy. The American soldier has a very active imagination and usually, at least for the time being, covets anything new and is inclined to endow the death-dealing weapons of the enemy with extraordinary qualities since any weapon seems much more formidable to the man receiving its fire than to the man delivering it. If given slight encouragement, the reaction can be fatal to the success of our forces. Commanders must always make every effort to show their men how to make better, more effective use of what they have. The technique of handling a weapon can often be made more devastating than the power of the weapon itself. This was best illustrated by the correct, the intended, tactical employment of the United States medium tank.

Another factor involved is the advantage given to the enemy by informing him which of his weapons is hurting us most. And along with this goes the similar embarrassment of not wishing to disclose to the enemy the state of the measures you are most certainly taking to correct any demonstrated weakness in a particular weapon or in armament generally. If a machine gun is found to jam after one or two bursts or at high altitudes you don't give the enemy this important information. Nor do you wish to sacrifice surprise by advising him in advance of the improved weapon to come or actually in process of deployment.

In some of the public discussions of such matters, criticism was leveled at the Ordnance Department for not producing better weapons. This Department produced with rare efficiency what it was told to produce, and these instructions came from the General Staff of which I am the responsible head, transmitting the resolved views of the officers with the combat troops or air forces, of the commanders in the field.

In the other categories of weapons and equipment of the infantry divisions, machine guns, mortars, artillery, individual equipment, the United States and the German armies were so nearly equal that neither had any marked advantage. The German infantry rocket, the Panzerfaust, had greater hitting power than the United States bazooka which had been developed first. We believe that our use of massed heavy artillery fire was far more effective than the German techniques and clearly outclassed the Japanese. Though our heavy artillery from the 105-mm up was generally matched by the Germans, our method of employment of these weapons has been one of the decisive factors of our ground campaigns throughout the world.

In the field of aircraft armament, United States matériel was excellent. The .50-caliber aircraft machine gun was one of the most reliable weapons of the war. The latest version of this gun had a cyclic rate of 1,200 rounds a minute. The German 30-mm aircraft cannon had as an American counterpart a 37-mm aircraft cannon. The newest version of this United States weapon had a velocity of 3,000 foot-seconds. The Japanese primarily used a 37-mm gun built on obsolete design principles. The 75-mm aircraft cannon which some United States planes carry was a heavier gun than any other air force has ever mounted.

American bombs and the newest fusing and control devices which guide them to their targets had no counterpart. United States heavy military equipment such as tractors, earth-moving machinery, railroads and rolling stock, bridging equipment, and similar items stood the test of battle splendidly.

Radar equipment developed by the United States and Britain was superior to the electronics devices of either Germany or Japan. Our radar instruments, for example, which tracked aircraft in flight and directed the fire of antiaircraft guns was more accurate than any possessed by the enemy. American radar detection equipment, which picked up planes in the air and ships at sea, had greater range than the German. Japanese radar was greatly inferior.

Great emphasis was placed on airborne radar by the United States and British and the use of this device was a very important factor in the control of the submarine menace. Close personal supervision over this War Department program was exercised by the Secretary of War. Radar bombsights together with radio navigational aids permitted accurate bombing of German and Japanese targets under adverse weather conditions.

In the field of amphibious assault craft, the United States and Great Britain made great progress. This resulted from the fact that in every major campaign we waged in this war, we had to cross water and attack enemy-held positions. There was nothing anywhere which compared or even resembled our big landing ships with ramp prows and the dozens of other type craft which have put our armies ashore from North Africa to Okinawa. The initial development of these special types was stimulated by Lord Louis Mountbatten and the staff of the special British Commando forces under his direction.

Not only did the Nation's industrial establishment equip our Army, but it also contributed heavily to the hitting power of the other United Nations. The allocation of military lend-lease matériel to the Allied Powers exceeded a dollar value of 20 billions. A United States armored division can be fully equipped for 34 millions. The equipment of an infantry division represents a dollar expenditure of 10 millions. Translated into these terms, the dollar value of the arms alone turned over to our Allies would equip 588 armored divisions, or 2,000 infantry divisions.

To the British Empire went enough aircraft to equip four air forces the size of our Ninth as it went into action on D-day in Western Europe. At that time the Ninth was the largest air force in the world. American raw materials made possible a large percentage of Britain's own war production. But in addition fully fabricated equipment shipped to Britain in the last two years included 76,737 jeeps, 98,207 trucks, 12,431 tanks, and 1,031 pieces of heavy artillery.

The Soviet Union received thousands of tons of American raw materials to feed its own factories as well as fully fabricated equipment. In the two years covered by this report we shipped the Soviets 28,356 jeeps, 218,888 trucks, 4,177 tanks, and 252 pieces of heavy artillery. The mobility and supply of the great Red Army was further increased by American locomotives, rails, and rolling stock. Aircraft sufficient to equip two air forces the size of the Ninth were sent to the Soviets.

Almost all of the equipment used by the revitalized French Army, which had 12 fully equipped divisions in action at the time of Germany's surrender, came from the United States. The French tactical air force which largely covered the operations of this army was also American-equipped.

The amount of aid that could be given to China was curtailed by the limitations of the air route over the high altitudes and storms of the Himalayan Mountains. The Chinese divisions and supporting troops which played a major part in the opening of the Stilwell road were American trained and equipped. The Chinese armies which successfully stopped the Japanese advance short of Chungking and Kunming had some American equipment. Total aid to China now exceeds $500,000,000, and to this should be added the tremendous expenditures in war resources, planes, and facilities required in India and Burma in order to transport the material into China.

In return for lend-lease arms and matériel, United States forces fighting over the world received reciprocal aid known as reverse lend-lease from those Allies in a position to give it. By the end of 1944 reciprocal aid had reached a dollar value of 4 billions. It consisted largely of housing facilities, base installations, and foodstuffs. During the period of the build-up for the European invasion, United States forces in the British Isles received the equivalent of one shipload of equipment, food, and matériel for every two shipped them from the United States.

Rations of our troops in the United Kingdom were supplemented by 436,000,000 pounds of foodstuffs, principally fresh fruits and vegetables, grown in Britain, and tea and cocoa and other products imported from the Empire. For our forces in the Pacific and Asia, Australia supplied 1,835,000,000 pounds of foodstuffs; New Zealand, 800,000,000 pounds; and India, 524,000,000. A large percentage of our base construction in Australia, New Zealand, and India was done under reverse lend-lease. From the British refineries at Abadan, in the Persian Gulf, our forces received 259,000,000 gallons of aviation fuel.

THE TROOPS

Manpower Balance

The process of mobilization for this war reached its peak and immediately started to decline with the surrender of Germany. In the summer of 1943 the firm decision was reached to build up the Army to an effective strength of 7,700,000 enlisted men believed necessary to meet our strategic commitments.

At the close of the European war the operating strength of the Army plus ineffectives was approximately 8,300,000. The ineffectives consisted of 500,000 men undergoing hospitalization, including 100,000 in the process of being discharged because they were no longer fit for either active or limited service, and 100,000 en route overseas as replacements, in all totaling approximately 600,000 men.

This spring, as it became evident that victory in Europe was close at hand, a new strength ceiling of 6,968,000 officers and men was set, based on the requirements of war in the Pacific only. It then became possible to proceed immediately with the demobilization of those individuals who were most entitled to discharge.

The technique for the mobilization of American manpower in this war was unique. The special nature of the war introduced many new factors. Perhaps greater than any other single advantage of the United Nations was the productive capacity of American industry. It was therefore necessary not to cut too deeply into the manpower of the Nation in the process of acquiring the men urgently needed by the Army and the Navy. We had the problems of arming both ourselves and the Allied Nations while, at the same time, we created huge armed forces necessary to the successful prosecution of the war. Furthermore, our lines of communication were to be extended entirely around the world, requiring large forces of men to work them and absorbing even larger forces in transit over the thousands of miles to and fro without profit to the military enterprise.

Fighting across the oceans, we needed a very powerful Navy and a large merchant fleet to transport and maintain our armies and to carry munitions to our Allies. At the same time, it was our purpose to exploit every possible scientific device and technique to secure victory at the smallest cost in lives of our men. These various efforts demanded large numbers of men and women, and necessitated their allocation among the various programs with exceeding care, so that the right numbers of men would be doing the most important things at the most important time. The mere statement of this requirement fails to indicate the exceeding difficulty involved in its application to the special claims of each industry and the demands of each theater commander. To resolve the conflicting requirements posed a most difficult problem for a democracy at war.

It was estimated that the absolute ceiling on the number of American men physically fit for active war service lay between 15 and 16 million. The requirements of the naval and merchant shipping program had to be given a high order of priority. The Army decided to establish its strength ceiling at 7,700,000. Before we could bring the enemy to battle we had to secure our lines of communication and build our training and service installations. Within this total strength of the Army the minimum requirements of the Service Forces were set at 1,751,000. It was decided at the outset that the first offensive blows we could deliver upon the enemy would be through the air, and anticipated that the heavier and more effective our air assault, the sooner the enemy's capacity to resist would be destroyed. So the Air Forces were authorized to bring their strength to 2,340,000 men and were given the highest priority for the best qualified both physically and by educational and technical ability of the military manpower pool.

Each theater of operations had requirements for men over and above those allocated for its armies, air forces, and service installations. The troop basis allowed 423,000 men for these troops which would be directly attached to theater headquarters and major command installations throughout the world.

This left the Ground Forces with a maximum of 3,186,000 men within the limitations of the 7,700,000 effective troop strength. Yet when we entered the war it was almost impossible to compute accurately how many ground combat troops we would need to win. The precise results to be attained by modern aerial warfare could only be an educated guess.

It was known that we would take our heaviest casualities both from gunfire and disease on the ground where men must fight on the most intimate terms with the enemy. We had to estimate accurately the strength and the quality of the ground forces with which the enemy nations could oppose us, and we also had to estimate with a reasonable degree of accuracy the forces the Allied Nations could put into the battle. From 7 December 1941, until after Stalingrad and El Alamein, it was almost impossible to forecast what would be the results of the seesawing ground battles raging in Eastern Europe and North Africa. In addition, the decisions as to the relative strength of our various combat arms were limited by the capacity of our training establishment, which was then in process of being expanded.

With all these unknown quantities, in early 1942 we established a troop basis of 3,600,000 men which would permit the organization of 71 divisions: 59 infantry (including 18 National Guard), 10 armored, and two cavalry. This force was the largest we then had the ability to train, equip, and provide a nucleus of trained officers and noncommissioned officers. In mid-1942, when the original build-up in the United Kingdom for the invasion of France and the North African operation began to take shape, we found we needed more and still more service troops. The demand was insatiable. The over-all strength of the Army by the end of the year had increased to 5,397,674 men. Throughout 1942, however, the planners were at work estimating the requirements for 1943 which we believed would carry the Army to its peak of mobilization and would give us the necessary strength to force a victorious decision. The projection was 8,248,000 officers and men. At first it was estimated this would provide the Army with 105 divisions. Later it became evident that the men for only 100 divisions could be found within this strength. By the middle of 1943 we determined that this projected mobilization might impose too great a strain on the Nation's manpower, if all of the ambitious efforts planned for the global war were to remain in balance. Fortunately for our dilemma, Stalingrad was now past history and the great Soviet armies were showing a steadily increasing offensive power. The ceiling was therefore reduced to 7,700,000 shortly after the TRIDENT Conference in Washington, the meeting at which the over-all strategy became sufficiently firm to permit more precise planning. This amounted to a reducion of 548,000 men. The projected number of divisions was reduced to 90, including three special or "light" divisions that were being trained for jungle and mountain warfare. Later the 2d Cavalry Division, then in North Africa, was inactivated to provide urgently required service troops to support the amphibious landing in southern France. At the same time the Air Forces mobilization was fixed at 273 combat groups containing five very heavy bombardment (B-29's and 32's), 96 heavy bombardment (Flying Fortresses and Liberators), 26 medium bombardment, 8 light bombardment, 87 fighter, 27 troop carrier, and 24 reconnaissance groups.

On the face of it this appeared to be a critically small ground force for a nation as large as ours. Germany with a prewar population of 80,000,000 was mobilizing 313 divisions. Japan was putting 120 in the field; Italy 70; Hungary 23; Rumania 17; Bulgaria 18. Among the major Allies, the Soviets had a program for more than 550 divisions; the British for more than 50; the Chinese more than 300, though their divisional strength was often little more than regimental according to our method of computation. We were, however, second of the Allies in the mobilization of men and women for military service, third among all the belligerent nations. The Soviet war effort was putting 22,000,000 men and women into the fight. By the time of their defeat, the Germans had mobilized 17,000,000. Our peak mobilization for the military services was 14,000,000. The British Empire mobilized 12,000,000; China 6,000,000.

This war brought an estimated total of 93,000,000 men and women of the Axis and United Nations into the conflict. And fortunately for us the great weight of numbers was on the side of the United Nations. Total Allied mobilization exceeded 62,000,000; total enemy mobilization, 30,000,000. The figures show how heavily the United States was concentrating on aerial warfare, on the production and movement of arms for its own troops and those of its Allies, and the meaning in terms of manpower of waging war from 3,000 to 9,000 miles from our shores.

Our ground strength was, for the size of our population, proportionately much smaller than that of the other belligerents. On the other hand it was, in effect, greater than a simple comparison of figures would indicate, for we had set up a system of training individual replacements that would maintain 89 divisions of ground troops and 273 combat air groups at full effective strength, enabling these units to continue in combat for protracted periods. In past wars it had been the accepted practice to organize as many divisions as manpower resources would permit, fight those divisions until casualties had reduced them to bare skeletons, then withdraw them from the line and rebuild them in a rear area. In 1918 the AEF was forced to reduce the strength of divisions and finally to disband newly arrived divisions in France in order to maintain the already limited strength of those engaged in battle. The system we adopted for this war involved a flow of individual replacements from training centers to the divisions so they would be constantly at full strength. The Air Forces established a similar flow to replace combat casualties and provide relief crews.

This system enabled us to pursue tremendous naval and shipping programs, the air bombardment programs and unprecedented, almost unbelievable, production and supply programs, and at the same time to gather the strength necessary to deliver the knock-out blows on the ground. There were other advantages. The more divisions an Army commander has under his control, the more supporting troops he must maintain and the greater are his traffic and supply problems. If his divisions are fewer in number but maintained at full strength, the power for attack continues while the logistical problems are greatly simplified.

When we had planned the size of the Army it had been impossible to foresee all of the ways in which the circumstances of waging three-dimensional war over the world would drain our manpower. It was clear that in this, as in all wars, men would fall victim to enemy action and disease; others would become ineffective because of sheer nervous and physical weariness that comes after long months of active participation in battle. But since the nature and technique of war, if not the fundamentals, are ever-changing, it is impossible to forecast casualties in one war from the experience of past ones. Both the intensity and the nature of our casualties have varied from month to month throughout this war, depending on the terrain and climate in which our forces were fighting and the quality of enemy resistance. Once an error was discovered it required months to correct it because of the days and distances between the training camps in the United States and the battle fronts of the world. Yet the necessity of estimating approximately a year in advance the numbers of men that would be needed in the various elements of the Army and the total over-all strength required that both the casualty rates and the requirements for transportation, rest, and rehabilitation be forecast accurately.

Some of the forecasts were accurate; others were not. An exact forecast of the rate of ground force attrition had to be tied directly to the effectiveness of such factors as aerial bombardment, artillery, enemy morale, enemy fighting ability, and a myriad others that defied long-range calculation. As the war progressed we learned, by unceasing study of the experience we were gaining daily, what to expect in specific situations. But even here these calculations could never be made absolute. After the North African campaign, it seemed that we could reasonably expect heavy casualties in our armored units. So in preparation for the Sicilian operation we built up a sizable backlog of tank drivers and crewmen and at the same time geared the training program in the United States to this expectation.

But once ashore in Sicily our armor raced around the island against feeble opposition and received few casualties. Then we moved directly into the battle for Italy's jagged terrain, where armor was difficult to employ, and found ourselves with a surplus of armor personnel and a critical shortage of infantrymen for the job of clearing a clever and stubborn enemy out of positions ideal for defense.

The final manpower crisis occurred during the prolonged and very heavy fighting in the fall of 1944 and the winter of 1944-45, both in Europe and in the Philippines. However, our own tribulations of this nature were much less serious, it is believed, than those of our Allies and certainly of the German enemy, whose divisions at times were reduced below 5,000.

In the Siegfried Line fighting prior to the final advance to the Rhine, the weather was atrocious and most of the troops had been continuously engaged since the landing in Normandy in June. The lack of port facilities prior to the opening of Antwerp to Allied shipping made it impossible to maintain divisions in normal corps reserve and thus permit the rotation of units between the fighting line and comfortable billets in rear areas. Divisions for this purpose were available in England and in northwestern

France, but the state of the railroads and the flow of supplies made it impossible to maintain them at the front. All this resulted in a great strain on the fighting troops, and when a shortage in replacements was added, the situation grew very serious. It was just at this moment that the Germans launched their final offensive effort in the Ardennes.

This shortage in replacements at such a vital moment was the final effect of long-accumulating circumstances. The Army's manpower balance had been disturbed in the fall of 1943 by shortages in deliveries of inductees by the Selective Service System, which amounted during one 3-month period to about 100,000 men. A second factor was the miscalculation after North Africa that resulted in too many men being trained for the armored forces, the artillery and special troops, and too few by far for the infantry. Another factor was our failure in the early phases of the war to compensate in the over-all strength ceiling for the number of men who would be required to fill the long overseas pipelines and the time involved between the completion of the training of the individual in the United States and his final arrival in the division. Still another was the heavy pressure brought to bear on the War Department to hold down or reduce its demands for manpower. It will be recalled that for more than a year a rather vigorous attack was maintained against the War Department's estimates of manpower requirements. This limited our ability to get the men we needed when we needed them.

The Air Forces became involved in their own special type of imponderables. It was found that casualties suffered in the air had a serious reaction on the fighting effectiveness unless they were replaced the same day. Vacant chairs at mess had an unexpectedly depressing effect on the survivors of heavy fighting. The strain of frequent missions produced an unanticipated degree of fatigue which required relief crews in addition to the normal complement. It was finally found necessary during the period of the Eighth Air Force's heaviest fighting and losses to provide three combat crews per operating plane and to return the men to the United States after 25 missions. In the Mediterranean where the losses at this time were much lighter, 50 missions could be flown before the strain demanded the relief of the crews.

For a considerable period in the southwest Pacific and in the Aleutian Islands, the Air Forces carried an almost intolerable burden of fighting and endurance. The climate, the isolation, the insufficiency of numbers in the face of Japanese opposition all combined to make necessary a heavy increase in replacements.

Another unknown factor was discovered in the tropical regions. It was found that the ground service crews had to work all night virtually every night in maintaining their planes, and were consequently exposed to the malarial mosquito during her most active hours. These men suffered so much from over-fatigue and the cumulative effect of heavy doses of atabrine that their replacement for recuperation became necessary long before the estimated period.

To implement the replacement system we had established the Ground and Service Force Replacement Training Centers.[1] It required more than a year to train the many elements of a new division because

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Army Ground Forces

Antiaircraft Artillery	Fort Bliss, Tex.
Armored	Fort Knox, Ky.
Cavalry	Fort Riley, Kans.
Field Artillery	Fort Bragg, N. C.
Field Artillery	Fort Sill, Okla.
Infantry	Camp Blanding, Fla.
Infantry	Camp Croft, S. C.
Infantry	Camp Fannin, Tex.
Infantry	Camp Gordon, Ga.
Infantry	Camp Hood, Tex.
Infantry	Camp Livingston, La.
Infantry	Camp Roberts, Calif.
Infantry	Camp Rucker, Ala.
Infantry	Camp Wheeler, Ga.
Infantry	Camp Wolters, Tex.
Infantry	Fort McClellan, Ala.
Infantry Advanced	Camp Howze, Tex.
Infantry Advanced	Camp Maxey, Tex.
Infantry Advanced	Camp Robinson, Ark.
Tank Destroyer	Camp Hood, Tex.

Army Service Forces:

Adjutant General	Camp Lee, Va.
Chemical Warfare Service	Camp Lee, Va.
Engineers	Fort Belvoir, Va.
Engineers	Camp Claiborne, La.
Engineers	Fort Lewis, Wash.
Engineers	Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.
Finance	Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.
Medical	Camp Crowder, Mo.
Medical	Fort Lewis, Wash.
Ordnance	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.
Ordnance	Flora, Miss.
Quartermaster Corps	Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyo.
Quartermaster Corps	Camp Lee, Va.
Signal	Camp Crowder, Mo.
Special Service	Camp Lee, Va.
Transportation Corps	Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla.
Transportation Corps	Indiantown Gap, Pa.
Transportation Corps	Camp Plauche, La.
Transportation Corps	Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyo.

of the difficulties of teaching men and units the teamwork so essential under the trying conditions of battle. But it was possible and practicable in a much shorter time to train an individual soldier so that he was competent to join a veteran team as a replacement where the battle experienced soldier can quickly fit him into the divisional structure. At the replacement training centers men were made ready to join the divisions and replace casualties in a concentrated training period of 17 weeks. At these training centers they were given six weeks of basic military training and intense physical conditioning. In the remaining period they acquired competence in handling the weapons with which they would fight or the equipment with which they would work and in learning the tactics of squads, platoons, companies, and battalions, the tactical units which actually engaged in combat.

An infantryman, for example, became proficient in his primary weapons and familiarized with the M1 rifle, the carbine, the hand grenade, the rifle grenade, the automatic rifle, the .30 caliber medium machine gun, the 60-mm mortar, and the two-man rocket launcher. These were the weapons that every infantry rifleman might be called upon to use. Not only were men taught to handle their weapons with proficiency in the replacement training centers, but they were taught to take care of themselves personally. There was intensive instruction in personal sanitation, malaria control, processing of contaminated water, cooking, and keeping dry in the open and all the other lore that a good soldier must understand. But most important, our replacements were taught the tricks of survival in battle. As the Army acquired battle veterans, both officers and enlisted men were returned to the United States for duty as instructors in the replacement training centers. These veterans, who learned how to survive in combat, passed on knowledge to new men and thereby increased both their effectiveness and their chances of survival in their first experience in combat. The training of replacements was made as realistic as possible to manage in training. Problems of street fighting, jungle fighting, and close combat were staged in realistic fashion with live ammunition, and men learned to crawl under supporting machine gun fire, to use grenades, and advance under live artillery barrages just as they must in battle. Although this training cost us a few casualties in this country, it is certain that for every casualty we took in this manner, we saved the lives of many men in battle.

After the completion of their replacement training, men received a furlough at home before reporting to oversea replacement depots where their long journey to the fighting fronts began. In the theaters of operations they again staged through replacement depots which were established in the rear of each army group, army, and corps. When division commanders needed new men to replace casualties, they called on corps replacement depots and the men moved forward to the line.

Where it was possible, the replacements were absorbed in the division in its inactive periods, or in regiments in reserve positions, and each new man was teamed up with a veteran so that he could learn to know his squadmates before he saw action. But when the battle was moving at a fast pace, replacements at times had to join units engaged with the enemy.

By the spring of 1944, as most of the shortcomings of the replacement system had become evident, the War Department took vigorous corrective action. A directive was sent to every theater requiring the establishment of retraining centers so that every man in the Army would be put to his most efficient use.

Since the early critical days of the mobilization, the Service Forces, the Ground Force training commands, and particularly the Air Forces had acquired great numbers of the best qualified of our men. The shortage of physically qualified men for infantry and artillery became apparent about midway in the activation of the new divisions. Later we started approaching the bottom of the manpower barrel, and it grew increasingly difficult to get men physically fit for combat out of the remaining civilian manpower pools. The only way in which the battle line could be kept firm was with suitable men already in the Army. To do this we speeded up the training program and stripped the divisions training in this country of nearly 90,000 infantrymen. At this same time the overseas divisions were returning increasing numbers of sick, wounded, and injured men to the hospitals as the intensity of the fighting developed and sickness took its toll. It was our purpose to fill up the service units with these hospitalized men who still could serve their country but no longer could endure the extreme hardships of the fox holes, and to send forward fresh men to take their place, after a necessary period of retraining.

In the United States we resolved to move out all physically fit men from the service and training commands and replace them with men who had been wounded or weakened by disease and the hardships of the front, with men who had been overseas so long that they were entitled to return home under the rotation policy, and where possible with civilians.

To reduce the requirements for military personnel in the United States in order to send the maximum number of physically fit men overseas, expert personnel audit teams under the direction of the War Manpower Board headed by Major General Lorenzo D. Gasser were dispatched to every service and training command. General Gasser's teams achieved remarkable results.

Through the economies effected by the personnel audit teams and the policies established by the War Department Personnel Division, 143,000 combat-fit men in the Ground Forces training installations and units, such as antiaircraft no longer necessary because of our air superiority, were placed in retraining for use as infantry. The Air Forces gave up another 65,000; the Service Forces 25,000. From the defense commands 12,000 men were extracted and at the same time the theaters produced 100,000 from their communication zones for the retraining program.

To assist General Eisenhower in combing out able-bodied men from his Communications Zone and replacing them with battle casualties, Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, who was then commanding the Army Ground Forces, was made Deputy Commander of the European Theater. This gave Eisenhower an outstanding general officer who would devote his entire attention to this critical readjustment of personnel.

To keep the over-all effective strength of the Army within the troop basis of 7,700,000, the call on Selective Service had been reduced from 160,000 a month in early 1944 to 60,000 in the fall. But when the replacement crisis reached its peak in the winter, there was no remaining alternative but again to call on Selective Service for more men. The call was increased to 80,000 in February of this year and 100,000 a month thereafter to the end of June.

No opportunity was overlooked to replace men with personnel of the Women's Army Corps, both in the United States and overseas. The WAC, now in its fourth year, presently has a strength of approximately 100,000, including 6,000 officers. Approximately 17,000 are on duty in the theaters. The Corps also contributed greatly to the critical shortage of hospital personnel by recruiting and training 100 general hospital companies to assist Army doctors and nurses in caring for the sick and wounded. Training of WAC personnel was consolidated at Fort Des Moines in July with the closing of the center at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.

Early in 1944 the Army imposed restrictions on the movement overseas of combat replacements under the age of 19. It was the policy to send no man under this age to the battle lines so long as others were available. A few months later the policy was stiffened to prevent the use of men under 19 in infantry and armored units under any circumstances. By fall the Army had exhausted these resources, yet the need for men in General Eisenhower's armies continued to grow more pressing. The replacement training centers were filled largely with men who had been inducted when they reached the age of 18. It was a clear question of either relinquishing our momentum in the battles of Europe or using troops of this age. Certainly there is no military reason for not doing so. Men of 18, 19, and 20 make our finest soldiers. The excellent Marine divisions are made up largely of men of these age groups. They have stamina and recuperative power far beyond that of older men and this physical superiority often determines the issue in heavy and prolonged fighting. The only reason for not using 18-year olds in combat was the expressed preference of a great many Americans who felt there were moral reasons for not exposing men so young to the great risk of battle. The Army made every effort to accede to these views, but when it became a question of risking the victory or using men who could make it possible, there was no alternative. A new policy was then adopted to supersede the use of men under 19 in combat as soon as Germany surrendered and the terrific pressure on our available manpower was relieved. Congress in extending the Selective Service Act in May 1945 imposed a formal requirement, that 18-year-olds have at least a total of six months of training before they were sent into battle.

It is remarkable how exactly the mobilization plan fitted the requirements for victory. When Admiral Doenitz surrendered the German Government, every American division was in the operational theaters. All but two had seen action; one had the mission of securing the vital installations in the Hawaiian Islands; the other was an airborne division in SHAEF Reserve. To give General Eisenhower the impetus for final destruction of the German armies of the west, two divisions, already earmarked for future operations in the Pacific, the 86th and 97th, were halted on the West Coast in February, rushed across the United

States and onto fast ships for Europe. When these troops left the New York Port of Embarkation there were no combat divisions remaining in the United States. The formed military forces of the nation were completely committed overseas to bring about our victory in Europe and keep sufficient pressure on Japan so that she could not dig in and stave off final defeat.

The significance of these facts should be carefully considered. Even with two-thirds of the German Army engaged by Russia, it took every man the Nation saw fit to mobilize to do our part of the job in Europe and at the same time keep the Japanese enemy under control in the Pacific. What would have been the result had the Red Army been defeated and the British Islands invaded, we can only guess. The possibility is rather terrifying.

Price of Victory

Even with our overwhelming concentration of air power and fire power, this war has been the most costly of any in which the Nation has been engaged. The victory in Europe alone cost us 772,626 battle casualties of which 160,045 are dead. The price of victory in the Pacific was 170,596 including 41,322 dead. Army battle deaths since 7 December 1941 were greater than the combined losses, Union and Confederate, of the Civil War. I present the following comparisons of the battle deaths we have suffered in all our wars so that there can be no misunderstanding of the enormous cost of this conflict, for which we were so completely unprepared:

	Number of months duration	*Total battle deaths*	*Average battle deaths per month*
American Revolution	80	4,044	50
War of 1812	30	1,877	62
Mexican War	20	1,721	86
Civil War (Union Losses)	48	110,070	2,293
Civil War (Confederate Losses)	48	74,524	1,552
Spanish-American	4	345	86
World War I	19	50,510	2,658
World War II	44	201,367	4,576

Army casualties in all theaters from 7 December 1941 until the end of the period of this report total 943,222, including 201,367 killed, 570,783 wounded, 114,205 prisoners, 56,867 missing; of the total wounded, prisoners, or missing more than 633,200 have returned to duty, or have been evacuated to the United States.

The great strategic bombardment strikes on Germany and the inauguration of the Mediterranean campaign pushed our total casualty rate above 5,000 a month in 1943. In the first five months of 1944 the increasing tempo of the air attack and the fighting in Italy drove our losses, killed, wounded, missing and prisoners, to 13,700 men a month. Once ashore in Western Europe, the casualty rate leaped to 48,000 a month and increased to 81,000 by December. The average for the last seven months of the year was 59,000.

Out in the Pacific the advance on Japan cost 3,200 men a month throughout 1944. In the first seven months of this year the rate increased to 12,750 as we closed on the Japanese Islands.

The heaviest losses have been on the ground where the fighting never ceases night or day. Disregarding their heavy losses to disease and exposure, the combat divisions have taken more than 81 percent of all our casualties. However, though the percentage of the total is small, the casualties among the combat air crews have been very severe. By the end of July the Army Air Forces had taken nearly 120,000 casualties. Of this total 36,698 had died. The air raids over enemy territory gave Air Force casualties the heaviest weighting of permanency. The wounded of the Ground Forces drove their total casualties high, but with the exceptional medical care the Army has had in this war, the wounded had good chances to recover.

The following break-down for the European Theater of Operations (which does not include Italy) demonstrates where our casualties were taken:

Assignment	*Number of casualties*	*Percentage of casualties*
Theater troops	1, 094	. 18
Army group, army and corps troops	60, 998	10. 35
Infantry divisions	392, 990	66. 69
Armored divisions	62, 417	10. 60
Airborne divisions	22, 008	3. 73
Total combat divisions	477, 415	81. 02
Total field forces	539, 507	91. 55
Troops under air commanders	1, 699	. 29
Strategic air forces	37, 500	6. 36
Tactical air forces	6, 346	1. 08
Total air forces	45, 545	7. 73
Communications zone troops	4, 217	. 72
Grand total	589, 269	100. 00

In the Army at large, the infantry comprises only 20.5 percent of total strength overseas, yet it has taken 70 percent of the total casualties. Enemy fire is no respecter of rank in this war; 10.2 percent of the casualties have been officers, a rate slightly higher than that for enlisted men.

The improvement of battle surgery and medical care, on the other hand, reduced the rate of death from wounds to less than one-half the rate in World War I, and permitted more than 58.8 percent of men wounded in this war to return to duty in the theaters of operations.

As staggering as our casualties have been, the enemy forces opposing us suffered many times more heavily; 1,592,600 Germans, Italians, and Japanese troops were killed for the 201,367 American soldiers who died. It is estimated that permanently disabled enemy total 303,700. We captured and disarmed 8,150,447 enemy troops.

The break-down of German and Italian losses against American, British, and French forces in the war in Europe follows:

	Battle dead	*Permanently disabled*	*Captured*	*Total*
Tunisia	19, 600	19, 000	130, 000	168, 600
Sicily	5, 000	2, 000	7, 100	14, 100
Italy	86, 000	15, 000	357, 089	458, 089
Western Front	263, 000	49, 000	7, 614, 794 [1]	7, 926, 794
Total	373, 600	85, 000	8, 108, 983 [1]	8, 567, 583

[1] Includes 3,404,949 disarmed enemy forces.

The break-down of Japanese losses in the Eastern battlefronts, including China, since Pearl Harbor is as follows:

	Battle dead	*Permanently disabled*	*Captured*	*Total*
Southern Pacific	684, 000	69, 000	19, 806	772, 806
Central Pacific	273, 000	6, 000	17, 472	296, 472
India-Burma	128, 000	38, 000	3, 097	169, 097
China	126, 000	126, 000	1, 059	253, 059
Aleutians	8, 000	1, 000	30	9, 030
Total	1, 219, 000	240, 000	41, 464	1, 500, 464

Constant efforts were made to ameliorate conditions under which American prisoners of war were held in Germany. The number of Americans taken prisoner by Germany and her satellites in the European war reached a final total of approximately 98,000. Until the final stages of administrative disintegration brought about by the success of our arms, it was possible to make our protests known and to secure some measure of relief for United States personnel in enemy hands. Nevertheless, Germany consistently failed to respect its obligations to provide a proper scale of food and clothing for Allied prisoners. When our forces overran prisoner camps, it was discovered that outrageous brutalities and atrocities had been inflicted upon Allied personnel. Every case is being investigated. The perpetrators will be punished.

Every effort was made to better the situation of American prisoners of war in Japanese hands but they produced only limited results. Though the United States did secure from the Japanese Government an agreement to accept the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, to which Japan is not a party, in treatment of American prisoners and civilian internees, that Government failed to observe its obligations. With the cooperation of the Soviet Government there was inaugurated in 1944 a service for transmission of mail and some supplies to prisoners of war and civilian internees in the Far East. Funds were made available, to the maximum extent permitted by the Japanese Government, for prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan proper, China, Manchuria, and the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese did not agree to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war, and our prisoners taken by the Japanese enemy were recovered only as a result of successful military operations. Nearly 16,000 Americans were taken prisoner in the fighting with Japan.

American troops who have been prisoners of the enemy are returned to the United States, with the highest priority next to that of sick and wounded, and high-point personnel of the forward combat units who are being returned for discharge. Rehabilitation treatment has been given them both overseas and in the United States. Sixty days temporary duty at home is granted each prisoner to permit him to rest and recuperate. Exprisoners from the Philippines have been promoted one grade since their release. Opportunity also is being given to all prisoners recovered in Europe to achieve the rank or grade which they presumably would have acquired but for the fact of capture. Many of these former prisoners of war are being discharged on the point system and other separation procedures.

The remarkable reduction in the percentage of deaths from battle wounds is one of the most direct and startling evidences of the great work of the Army medical service. In the last two years Army hospitals treated 9,000,000 patients; another 2,000,000 were treated in quarters and more than 80,000,000 cases passed through the dispensaries and received outpatient treatment. This tremendous task was accomplished by 45,000 Army doctors assisted by a like number of nurses and by more than one-half million enlisted men, including battalion-aid men, whose courage and devotion to duty under fire has been as great as that of the fighting men they assisted.

One of the great achievements of the Medical Department was the development of penicillin therapy which has already saved the lives of thousands. Two years ago pencillin, because of an extraordinarily complicated manufacturing process, was so scarce the small amounts available were priceless. Since then mass production techniques have been developed and the Army is now using 2,000,000 ampoules a month.

Despite the fact that United States troops lived and fought in some of the most disease-infested areas of the world, the death rate from nonbattle causes in the Army in the last two years was approximately that of the corresponding age group in civil life—about 3 per 1,000 per year. The greater exposure of troops was counterbalanced by the general immunization from such diseases as typhoid, typhus, cholera, tetanus, smallpox, and yellow fever, and, obviously, by the fact that men in the Army were selected for their physical fitness.

The comparison of the nonbattle death rate in this and other wars is impressive. During the Mexican War, 10 percent of officers and enlisted men died each year of disease; the rate was reduced to 7.2 percent of Union troops in the Civil War; to 1.6 percent in the Spanish War and the Philippine Insurrection; to 1.3 percent in World War I; and to 0.6 percent of the troops in this war.

Insect-borne diseases had a great influence on the course of operations throughout military history. Our campaigns on the remote Pacific Islands would have been far more difficult than they were except for the most rigid sanitary discipline and the development of highly effective insecticides and repellents. The most powerful weapon against disease-bearing lice, mosquitoes, flies, fleas, and other insects was a new chemical compound commonly known as DDT. In December 1943 and early 1944, a serious typhus epidemic developed in Naples. The incidence had reached 50 cases a day. DDT dusting stations were set up and by March more than a million and a quarter persons had been processed through them. These measures and an extensive vaccination program brought the epidemic under control within a month. Shortly after the invasion of Saipan an epidemic of dengue fever developed among the troops. After extensive aerial spraying of DDT in mosquito-breeding areas, the number of new cases a day fell more than 80 percent in two weeks. The danger of scrub typhus in the Pacific Islands and in Burma and China was reduced measurably by the impregnation of clothing with dimethyl phthalate.

The treatment of battle neurosis progressed steadily so that between 40 and 60 percent of men who broke down in battle returned to combat and another 20 to 30 percent returned to limited duties. In the early stages of the War less than 10 percent of these men were reclaimed for any duty.

The development of methods of handling whole blood on the battlefield was a great contribution to battle surgery. Though very useful, plasma is not nearly as effective in combating shock and preparing wounded for surgery as whole blood. Blood banks were established in every theater and additional quantities were shipped by air from the United States, as a result of the contribution of thousands of patriotic Americans. An expendable refrigerator was developed to preserve blood in the advanced surgical stations for a period of usefulness of 21 days.

So that no casualty is discharged from the Army until he has received full benefit of the finest hospital care this Nation can provide, the Medical Service has established a reconditioning program. Its purpose is to restore to fullest possible physical and mental health any soldier who has been wounded or fallen ill in the service of his country.

To insure that men are properly prepared for return to civilian life the Army established 25 special convalescent centers. At these centers men receive not only highly specialized medical treatment, but have full opportunity to select any vocational training or recreational activity, or both, they may desire. Men, for example, who have been disabled by loss of arms or legs are fitted with artificial limbs and taught to use them skillfully in their former civilian occupation or any new one they may select. Extreme care is taken to insure that men suffering from mental and nervous disorders resulting from combat are not returned to civil life until they have been given every possible treatment and regained their psychological balance.

Beyond the Call of Duty

It is impossible for the Nation to compensate for the services of a fighting man. There is no pay scale that is high enough to buy the services of a single soldier during even a few minutes of the agony of combat, the physical miseries of the campaign, or of the extreme personal inconvenience of leaving his home to go out to the most unpleasant and dangerous spots on earth to serve his Nation. But so that our troops might know that the Nation realizes this simple truth, the Army made it a determined policy to decorate men promptly for arduous service and for acts of gallantry while they were fighting.

Exclusive of the Purple Heart, which a man receives when he is wounded, often right at the forward dressing station, the Army awarded 1,400,409 decorations for gallantry and meritorious service since we entered the war. The Nation's highest award, the Congressional Medal of Honor, was made to 239 men, more than 40 percent of whom died in their heroic service; 3,178 Distinguished Service Crosses have been awarded; 630 Distinguished Service Medals; 7,192 awards of the Legion of Merit; 52,831 Silver Stars; 103,762 Distinguished Flying Crosses; 8,592 Soldiers Medals; 189,309 Bronze Stars; and 1,034,676 Air Medals. Exclusive of the Air Medal and the Purple Heart, the Infantry received 34.5 percent of all decorations, the Air Corps 34.1 percent, the Field Artillery 10.7 percent, Medical Personnel 6.0 percent, and all other arms and services 14.7 percent.

The War Department has designated 34 specific campaigns during the course of this war. For participation in each of these campaigns a small star of bronze metal is authorized to be worn on the theater service ribbon, a star of silver metal to be worn in lieu of five bronze stars. A small bronze arrowhead is awarded for those who make combat parachute jumps or glider landings or who are in the assault wave of amphibious landings. For example, the men who fought with the 1st, 3d, and 9th Infantry Divisions from the invasion of North Africa to the defeat of Germany are entitled to wear the bronze assault arrowhead and eight bronze battle stars. In addition to the specific campaigns approved by the War Department, a theater commander may authorize additional bronze stars for antisubmarine, air, and ground combat participation not included within these campaigns.

Since my last report, two infantry badges and a medical badge have been authorized. The expert infantry badge was awarded to those who demonstrated proficiency in their specific duties after completion of training. The combat infantry badge was given to those who have shown outstanding skill as infantrymen in combat and the medical badge was presented to recognize the medical personnel who went into combat with infantry troops unarmed to serve the injured.

Battle participation stars had been awarded for the following campaigns up to the time of the Japanese surrender:

European-African-Middle Eastern Theater

Egypt-Libya	11 June 1942 to 12 February 1943
Air Offensive, Europe	4 July 1942 to 5 June 1944
Algeria-French Morocco	8 to 11 November 1942
Tunisia:	
Air	8 November 1942 to 13 May 1943
Ground	17 November 1942 to 13 May 1943
Sicily:	
Air	14 May to 17 August 1943
Ground	9 July to 17 August 1943
Naples-Foggia:	
Air	18 August 1943 to 21 January 1944
Ground	9 September 1943 to 21 January 1944
Rome-Arno	22 January to 9 September 1944
Normandy	6 June to 24 July 1944
Northern France	25 July to 14 September 1944
Southern France	15 August to 14 September 1944
North Apennines	10 September 1944 to 4 April 1945
Rhineland	15 September 1944 to 21 March 1945
Ardennes	16 December 1944 to 25 January 1945
Central Europe	22 March to 11 May 1945
Po Valley	5 April to 8 May 1945

Asiatic-Pacific Theater

Central Pacific	7 December 1941 to 6 December 1943
Burma	7 December 1941 to 26 May 1942
Philippine Islands	7 December 1941 to 10 May 1942
East Indies	1 January to 22 July 1942
India-Burma	2 April 1942 to 28 January 1945
Air Offensive, Japan	17 April 1942 (campaign not yet completed)
Aleutian Islands	3 June 1942 to 24 August 1943
China	4 July 1942 (campaign not yet completed)
Papua	23 July 1942 to 23 January 1943
Guadalcanal	7 August 1942 to 21 February 1943
New Guinea	24 January 1943 to 31 December 1944*
Northern Solomons	22 February 1943 to 21 November 1944*
Eastern Mandates:	
Air	7 December 1943 to 16 April 1944*
Ground	31 January to 14 June 1944*
Bismarck Archipelago	15 December 1943 to 27 November 1944*
Western Pacific:	
Air	17 April 1944 to (campaign not yet completed)
Ground	15 June 1944 to (campaign not yet completed)
Southern Philippines	17 October 1944 to 4 July 1945*
Luzon	9 January 1945 to 4 July 1945*
Central Burma	29 January 1945 to 15 July 1945
Ryukyus	26 March 1945 to 2 July 1945*

*Battle participation credit for the campaigns noted by asterisks may be awarded by the appropriate theater commander to units or individuals who actually engaged the enemy in the combat zone after the closing date.

Information and Recreation

In this war a very special effort was made to care for the minds of men in service as well as their bodies. This is continuing during the occupation and demobilization period. Millions of Americans have now been overseas in many parts of the world for several years. The conditions under which they lived during the war, the exposure to extreme danger, the monotony, the starvation for the comforts of living to which citizens of our Nation are accustomed placed heavy strains on their mental and nervous processes. From the beginning, the Army recognized that this strain must be counteracted by healthy informational and recreational activities.

At first, responsibility for both information and recreation was given to the Special Services Division of the Army Service Forces. Later, to permit greater specialization, this section was relieved of its informational duties and the Information and Education Division was created.

The Special Services Division continues to establish policy and assist the theaters in establishing and operating recreational and entertainment programs. Each month it has shipped to the theaters, for example, more than 4,000,000 copies of books selected by the Council on Books in Wartime, and 10,000,000 magazines to keep troops supplied with reading material. In each theater a Special Service officer directs the distribution of motion pictures, athletic and other recreational equipment, the routing of entertainment groups selected by the United Service Organizations, and the activities of the Red Cross Military Welfare Services Program. In each unit other Special Service officers are asigned to make the fullest use of all facilities offered by the theater command and improvise, wherever possible, additional recreational and entertainment programs.

During the past two years the theaters of operations have done outstanding jobs in organizing shows and athletic programs of their own with soldier talent to supplement that shipped from the United States.

The Information and Education program is designed to keep our troops abreast of developments in their own areas and throughout the world. This division publishes the magazine "Yank," and assists the overseas theaters in publishing their own daily and weekly newspapers. At the present time there are eight editions of the daily newspaper "Stars and Stripes" published in England, France, Germany, Italy, Africa, and Hawaii. In the Asiatic theater there is a weekly newspaper known as the "CBI Roundup," published at New Delhi.

For men still in hospitals who are separated from their units by reason of injury or illness, Information and Education Division also publishes the weekly journal "Outfit" devoted solely to bringing news of combat and service units to their absent members, who otherwise lost all touch with their organizations and suffered a feeling of abandonment or ingratitude. Fifty-five thousand copies of this magazine are distributed each week in 154 hospitals all over the world.

The Information and Education Division also conducts periodic surveys of how our troops are thinking—studies which the War Department utilizes in determining policies which affect troops individually. The point system of discharge was based directly on these expert surveys of soldier opinions.

It operates the Army News Service, an objective digest of United States press association and newspaper reports radioed over the world each day to supply news for Army newspapers and mimeographed or typewritten daily news sheets which are made available to troops by unit Information and Education officers. Information and Education also prepares and distributes radio programs for broadcast to troops throughout the world. During the great Campaign these programs were made available even in the most forward areas by mobile radio transmitters. This is the well-known Armed Forces Radio Service radio which carries a flavor of home to Americans from Germany to the islands of the far Pacific.

Through the Armed Forces Institute, which has established 10 oversea branches, troops have an opportunity to improve their educational or technical background. Prior to the end of the war more than a million members of the Armed Forces had taken advantage of these correspondence courses, self-teaching materials, and off-duty classes.

The information program also includes the small pocket-sized soldier guides to the customs and languages of the countries where our men serve, the weekly news map series published world-wide, and educational posters covering a wide field of subjects from promotion of bond sales among the troops to malaria control. The division also distributes information films such as Colonel Frank Capra's "Why We Fight" series, a series known as "GI Movies" and the Army-Navy Screen Magazine. "GI Movies" is a compilation of existing commercial short subjects and those produced by the Army Pictorial Service, such as comedies, travelogues, and similar educational subjects. The Army-Navy Screen Magazine is a periodic compilation of newsreel and new short subjects of special interest to troops. It includes the "By Request" films. A group of men in New Guinea wanted to see pictures of a snowstorm. Soldiers all over the world asked for pictures of the Statute of Liberty. One enlisted man wanted to hear a quartet sing "Down By the Old Mill Stream." These and similar requests are met in the Army-Navy Screen Magazine.

The big job ahead for both Information and Education and Special Services is the provision of constructive activity for troops in Europe awaiting return to the United States, and serving in our occupation forces.

At the present time, there is in full swing in the European theater a tremendous program of education and recreation to make sure that American soldiers have healthy and profitable activities for their spare time in the months they must wait for shipping space to become available to return them to the United States for discharge.

Three extensive programs offering educational opportunities to all who would take advantage of them have been established. The broadest is the school program for men in the smaller units now operating in both the European and Mediterranean theaters. These schools are conducted on the battalion or regimental level. Prior to V-E Day theaters had been shipped sufficient text books by the Armed Forces Institute to get these schools promptly under way. The courses have been selected from the entire range of secondary and vocational schooling, including subjects at the junior college level—algebra, elementary chemistry, history, languages, etc. Literacy training is also being provided. Individual soldiers may select any course of study they wish and pursue it in their own units while awaiting shipment home.

Opportunity for advanced study and technical refresher courses have also been provided. A centralized technical school has been established at Tidworth, England, with a capacity of 4,000 students for each two-month period. It opened in mid-August to troops and WAC personnel who wish to refresh their vocational skills prior to returning to their civilian jobs. Entrance qualifications require that applicants have three or more years of apprentice training in their craft. A university center has been established at Shrivenham, England, and another in France. These centers conduct a series of five 2-month courses at college level. Each has a capacity of 4,000 students per period. The qualifications for entrance in these courses are at least a high school education. Instruction is by Army personnel chosen for their civilian experience in education and these will be supplemented by eminent United States educators. Men who do not want to enroll in any of the conducted courses will still have the opportunity to take correspondence courses.

Troops on occupational duty now have little leisure, but as Europe stabilizes they will find more and more opportunity for profitable work. It is anticipated that 1,250,000 men and women in the European theater will take advantage of this opportunity to improve their education.

At the same time the recreational programs will be carried on at full pace. An extra allocation of equipment was on hand in Europe the day of German surrender. Baseball, football, golf, swimming, tennis, and other equipment that Americans use in sport is available to the troops. Motion pictures are on hand everywhere since fighting ceased. Numerous post exchanges have been established throughout the occupation zone. The exchanges offer food and refreshment as they do in the United States and sales counters where soldiers can buy Swiss watches, French perfumes, and other authentic European goods at non-inflationary prices.

In the Pacific both the educational and recreational programs will be stepped up to meet the need of troops in occupation there.

Army Management

During the past two years the contributions to the war effort of three major commands and the War Department General Staff have been on a vast scale.

The Air Forces have developed in a remarkable manner. Young commanders and staff officers, catapulted into high rank by reason of the vast expansion, and then seasoned by wide experience, now give the Air arm the most effective form of military leadership—the vigorous direction of young men with the knowledge and judgment of veterans. Theoretical conceptions have been successfully demonstrated in action and modified or elaborated accordingly; new conceptions are welcomed and quickly tested; the young pilots and combat crews daily carry out the dangerous and difficult missions with a minimum of losses and a maximum of destruction for the enemy. In personnel, in planes, technique, and leadership, the Army Air Forces of more than two million men have made an immense contribution to our victories. Through aggressive tactics and the concept of strategical precision bombing they have made these victories possible with a minimum of casualties.

The Army Ground Force Command performed the extremely difficult mission of organizing our largest Army in an amazingly short time and at the same time training another 1,100,000 men to replace casualties. The Ground Forces headquarters has just completed a cycle in its operations. It began with the organization and training of the divisions, then deployment of the Ground Forces overseas and replacement of their casualties. Finally, in June of this year the Ground Forces began receiving the first of these divisions back under its control after the victory in Europe.

The tasks of the Army Service Forces have been difficult and complex beyond description. The efforts of this organization are only vaguely appreciated by the public, or even by the rank and file of the Army itself. The requirements for the support of the Army and the great oversea operations impinge frequently on conditions at home, giving rise to a succession of criticisms, largely unjustified in my opinion, since the critics seldom are aware of the salient facts and basic requirements. With thousands of miles of communications between the United States and the battlefronts, the necessity for reserve stocks here and abroad and the sudden rapid changes of requirements in various theaters have made it necessary for the Service Forces to be prepared for the unexpected. A minute change at the center of the circle usually results in miles of alterations along the circumference.

One consideration in particular is often ignored by the civilian in judging a condition which interferes or restricts with the daily life of America. The burden of supplying the fighting man at the place and at the time of his requirement rests squarely on a responsible officer. Excuses and explanations are not acceptable to the soldier and would not be tolerated by the political leaders, however inconsistent with the previous pressures on the home front which may have been in a measure responsible for the shortcomings.

The Service Forces have accomplished a prodigious task during the past two years in the supply of food, clothing, munitions, transportation, including the operation of a fleet of 1,537 ships; in the handling of pay and allowances amounting to 22.4 billion dollars; in the processing of approximately 75 billion dollars in contracts; in the management of 3,700 post or cantonment installations in continental United States; in the operation of great base port organizations centered in Boston, New York, Hampton Roads, New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle, in handling 7,370,000 men and 101,750,000 measurement tons of cargo; in the administration of the medical service which has treated 9,083,000 hospital cases and operated 791,000 hospital beds; in the direction of post exchanges now doing a monthly business of 90 million dollars and the organization and management of entertainment and educational opportunities; in the conduct of the administration of the Army and finally in the enormous tasks of redeployment and demobilization.

In the midst of handling this problem we have the constantly increasing pressure of families of the men for their release from the service. This has proved particularly vexatious in the case of high-point men on duty in the installations at home which must at this time bear the triple burden of supplying the requirements of the Pacific war, carrying out the regroupment and redeployment of troops in the United States, and accomplishing the demobilization of thousands of men daily. For the actual discharge of men, the required time for the preparation of papers, records, and accounts, and final payments has been reduced from approximately the 12 days of World War I to a minimum of 2 days, but even so the slightest increase over the minimum period produces a storm of protest. These reactions would ordinarily be accepted as normal to America but at this particular time they are bound to have a very disturbing effect on the morale of the forces overseas.

Almost as complex as the administrative management of these tremendous fighting forces has been the strategic direction of our global operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Without the endless effort and the clear thinking of the officers in the various special groups or agencies attached directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist them in planning our operations and allocating our resources correctly, the great victories to which we are becoming accustomed would have been impossible.

I wish to make official acknowledgment of the support given me by the War Department General and Special Staffs, which has been beyond all praise in the understanding and handling of the countless problems of global warfare. Denied both public appreciation of their work and the desired opportunity for command in the field, these officers have made a great and selfless contribution to the war effort. The duration of the war has permitted a number of these officers to be given overseas assignments and at the same time, veterans of the fighting could be recalled to duty in the War Department.

No comment is necessary here to inform the public of the leadership given the American Armies by the Commanders-in-Chief in the theaters of operations. Their work has been, in my opinion, well nigh faultless considering the hazards and unexpected developments of war on the vast scale in which it has been conducted. I am sure that in years to come our people will take constantly increasing pride in the splendid contribution of these officers to the prestige of America and the best interests of the world generally.

To the Members of Congress I wish to express my thanks for the complete support given the Army by their willingness to provide the huge sums of money and the necessary legislative authorizations requested by the War Department for the prosecution of the war.

During the past two years the Secretary of War has supported the Army with a courage and a singular integrity of purpose to a degree rarely evidenced in public officials.

I cherish a feeling of deepest gratitude for the confidence President Roosevelt gave me and for the stern resolution with which he met the critical periods of our operations. It might be considered an interesting historical fact to record that during the landing in Normandy he made no request at any time for information other than that furnished him as a matter of routine and that he did not put a single question to me or General Eisenhower during the critical moments of the Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes. The confidence he gave to the management of the Army was a tremendous source of assurance to the officers of the War Department.

To my new Commander-in-Chief I am indebted for the strong support he gave immediately on assuming office to the efforts of the Army to bring the War in Europe and the Pacific to an early and successful conclusion.

Demobilization

The Army is now involved in the process of demobilizing the tremendous forces it gathered to win the victory. This requires the return of millions of troops to the United States and the processing of their discharge. It means the cessation of the munitions production which has absorbed most of our energies and resources during the last five years.

The demobilization, like the mobilization, affects every phase of national life. Until such time as the authorized governmental agencies determine the policy which will regulate demobilization, the War Department must proceed under existing legislation and policy to carry on this process in an orderly manner. The disturbance to our national economy must be kept to the minimum.

We hole during the twelve months immediately following the cessation of hostilities to have discharged from the Army at least 5,000,000 men and officers. The determining factor throughout this period will be transportation. Soon thereafter, however, legislation must determine the strength of the Army for the immediate future.

The demobilization first got underway with the German surrender. It began simultaneously with the projected full scale redeployment for the final operations in the Pacific, which we had planned in the event the Japanese resisted to a suicidal end. In this period first priority on our available shipping had to go for the redeployment—the scheduled movement of men and materiel to the Pacific directly from Europe or via the United States.

The day Japan capitulated orders were issued from the War Department suspending the redeployment operation throughout the world. Theater commanders were immediately directed to devote all facilities not required for the movement of occupational troops into Japan and elsewhere in the Far East to the demobilization.

The citizen Army had been recruited by selection of men on the basis of individual fitness for military duty and comparative essentiality in the Nation's economy. Accordingly, it was decided to discharge men individually rather than by units. An Army-wide survey was conducted to determine the consensus among the enlisted men as to the basis for determining discharge. The opinion was that those who have served longest, fought the hardest, and who have children should be permitted to leave the Army first. As a result the point system of returning men for discharge wherever they are on duty was established.

This system gives credit for length of Army service, overseas service, certain decorations, battle stars and not to exceed three dependent children under 18. The points are computed from 16 September 1940. Originally a minimum requirement of 85 points was established. Now the point system is revised to keep the demobilization steady and orderly.

The selection of soldiers eligible for discharge was made the responsibility of the various overseas commanders. As troops return they are sent to disposition centers near the embarkation ports and then move on in groups to Army stations near their homes. Here they receive a final screening and the separation center should usually be able to accomplish their discharge within 48 hours. In this final administrative procedure the soldier receives his mustering-out pay, his uniform, his discharge certificate, his lapel button, a separation record which summarizes his military service and qualifications, and his fare home. He also receives a pamphlet on veteran rights and benefits and advice regarding the agencies which can assist him in locating a job. Nothing is overlooked which will help the returning veteran to help himself.

Soldiers whose health or fitness has been impaired in the service of the country will not be discharged until everything possible to modern medical science has been done for their rehabilitation.

The War Department has now projected its demobilization schedules as far as it can under existing legislation and policies. The next moves and the next objectives are political more than military. They require decisions on that level. The War Department can only submit recommendations and await further instructions.

Our present national policies require us to: Maintain occupation forces in Europe and the Pacific; prepare for a possible contribution of forces to a world security organization; maintain national security while the world remains unstable and later on a more permanent or stable basis.

These policies require manpower. Yet at the same time it is the policy of the nation to completely demobilize the wartime army as rapidly as possible. Unless hundreds of thousands of men of the wartime forces are to remain in service at home and overseas, more permanent decisions must be made.

The War Department recommends that the occupation forces and the U. S. complement in the International security force be composed as much as possible of volunteers. This can be accomplished by establishing now a new permanent basis for the regular military establishment. If this recommendation and those which I will now discuss in detail for establishing a peacetime security policy are now adopted by the Congress, demobilization can proceed uninterrupted until all men now in temporary service have returned to their homes.

FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE

To fulfill its responsibility for protecting this Nation against foreign enemies, the Army must project its planning beyond the immediate future. In this connection I feel that I have a duty, a responsibility, to present publicly at this time my conception, from a military point of view, of what is required to prevent another international catastrophe.

For years men have been concerned with individual security. Modern nations have given considerable study and effort to the establishment of social security systems for those unable or unwise enough to provide for themselves. But effective insurance against the disasters which have slaughtered millions of people and leveled their homes is long overdue.

We finish each bloody war with a feeling of acute revulsion against this savage form of human behavior, and yet on each occasion we confuse military preparedness with the causes of war and then drift almost deliberately into another catastrophe. This error of judgment was defined long ago by Washington. He proposed to endow this Nation at the outset with a policy which should have been a reasonable guarantee of our security for centuries. The cost of refusing his guidance is recorded in the sacrifice of life and in the accumulation of mountainous debts. We have continued impractical. We have ignored the hard realities of world affairs. We have been purely idealistic.

We must start, I think, with a correction of the tragic misunderstanding that a security policy is a war policy. War has been defined by a people who have thought a lot about it—the Germans. They have started most of the recent ones. The German soldier-philosopher Clausewitz described war as a special violent form of political action. Frederic of Prussia, who left Germany the belligerent legacy which has now destroyed her, viewed war as a device to enforce his will whether he was right or wrong. He held that with an invincible offensive military force he could win any political argument. This is the doctrine Hitler carried to the verge of complete success. It is the doctrine of Japan. It is a criminal doctrine, and like other forms of crime, it has cropped up again and again since man began to live with his neighbors in communities and nations. There has long been an effort to outlaw war for exactly the same reason that man has outlawed murder. But the law prohibiting murder does not of itself prevent murder. It must be enforced. The enforcing power, however, must be maintained on a strictly democratic basis. There must not be a large standing army subject to the behest of a group of schemers. The citizen-soldier is the guarantee against such a misuse of power.

In order to establish an international system for preventing wars, peace-loving peoples of the world are demonstrating an eagerness to send their representatives to such conferences as those at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco with the fervent hope that they may find a practical solution. Yet, until it is proved that such a solution has been found to prevent wars, a rich nation which lays down its arms as we have done after every war in our history, will court disaster. The existence of the complex and fearful instruments of destruction now available make this a simple truth which is, in my opinion, undebatable.

So far as their ability to defend themselves and their institutions was concerned, the great democracies were sick nations when Hitler openly massed his forces to impose his will on the world. As sick as any was the United States of America. We had no field army. There were the bare skeletons of three and one-half divisions scattered in small pieces over the entire United States. It was impossible to train even these few combat troops as divisions because motor transportation and other facilities were lacking and funds for adequate maneuvers were not appropriated. The Air Forces consisted of a few partially equipped squadrons serving continental United States, Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines; their planes were largely obsolescent and could hardly have survived a single day of modern aerial combat. We lacked modern arms and equipment. When President Roosevelt proclaimed, on 8 September 1939, that a limited emergency existed for the United States we were, in terms of available strength, not even a third-rate military power. Some collegians had been informing the world and evidently convincing the Japanese that the young men of America would refuse to fight in defense of their country.

The German armies swept over Europe at the very moment we sought to avoid war by assuring ourselves that there could be no war. The security of the United

States of America was saved by sea distances, by Allies, and by the errors of a prepared enemy. For probably the last time in the history of warfare those ocean distances were a vital factor in our defense. We may elect again to depend on others and the whim and error of potential enemies, but if we do we will be carrying the treasure and freedom of this great Nation in a paper bag.

Returning from France after the last war, with General Pershing, I participated in his endeavors to persuade the Nation to establish and maintain a sound defense policy. Had his recommendations been accepted, they might have saved this country the hundreds of billions of dollars and the more than a million casualties it has cost us again to restore the peace. We might even have been spared this present world tragedy. General Pershing was asked against whom do we prepare. Obviously that question could not be answered specifically until nearly 20 years later when Adolf Hitler led the replenished armies of defeated Germany back into world conflict. Even as late as 1940 I was asked very much the same question before a committee of Congress. Not even then could I say definitely exactly where we might have to fight, but I did recall that in past wars the United States forces had fought in Latin America, in France, in Belgium, in Germany, in Russia, in Siberia, in Africa, in the Philippines, and in China, but I did not anticipate that in the near future American soldiers would fight in the heart of Burma and in the islands of the vast Pacific, and would be garrisoning areas across the entire land and water masses of the earth. From this lesson there is no alternative but that this Nation must be prepared to defend its interest against any nation or combination of nations which might sometime feel powerful enough to attempt the settlement of political arguments or gain resources or territory by force of arms.

Twice in recent history the factories and farms and people of the United States have foiled aggressor nations; conspirators against the peace would not give us a third opportunity.

Between Germany and America in 1914 and again in 1939 stood Great Britain and the USSR, France, Poland, and the other countries of Europe. Because the technique of destruction had not progressed to its present peak, these nations had to be eliminated and the Atlantic Ocean crossed by ships before our factories could be brought within the range of the enemy guns. At the close of the German war in Europe they were just on the outer fringes of the range of fire from an enemy in Europe. Goering stated after his capture that it was a certainty the eastern American cities would have been under rocket bombardment had Germany remained undefeated for two more years. The first attacks would have started much sooner. The technique of war has brought the United States, its homes and factories into the front line of world conflict. They escaped destructive bombardment in the second World War. They would not in a third.

It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense as a satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world. And the peace can only be maintained by the strong.

What then must we do to remain strong and still not bankrupt ourselves on military expenditures to maintain a prohibitively expensive professional army even if one could be recruited? President Washington answered that question in recommendations to the first Congress to convene under the United States Constitution. He proposed a program for the peacetime training of a citizen army. At that time the conception of a large professional Regular Army was considered dangerous to the liberties of the Nation. It is still so today. But the determining factor in solving this problem will inevitably be the relation between the maintenance of military power and the cost in annual appropriations. No system, even if actually adopted in the near future, can survive the political pressure to reduce the military budget if the costs are high—and professional armies are very costly.

There is now another disadvantage to a large professional standing army. Wars in the twentieth century are fought with the total resources, economic, scientific, and human of entire nations. Every specialized field of human knowledge is employed. Modern war requires the skills and knowledge of the individuals of a nation.

Obviously we cannot all put on uniforms and stand ready to repel invasion. The greatest energy in peacetime of any successful nation must be devoted to productive and gainful labor. But all Americans can, in the next generations, prepare themselves to serve their country in maintaining the peace or against the tragic hour when peace is broken, if such a misfortune again overtakes us. This is what is meant by Universal Military *Training*. It is not universal military *service*—the actual induction of men into the combatant forces.

Such forces would be composed during peacetime of volunteers. The trainees would be in separate organizations maintained for training purposes only. Once trained, young men would be freed from further connection with the Army unless they chose, as they now may, to enroll in the National Guard or an organized reserve unit, or to volunteer for service in the small professional army. When the Nation is in jeopardy they could be called, just as men are now called, by a committee of local neighbors, in an order of priority and under such conditions as directed at that time by the Congress.

The concept of universal military training is not founded, as some may believe, on the principle of a mass Army. The Army has been accused of rigidly holding to this doctrine in the face of modern developments. Nothing, I think, could be farther from the fact, as the record of the mobilization for this war demonstrates. Earlier in this report I explained how we had allocated manpower to exploit American technology. Out of our entire military mobilization of 14,000,000 men, the number of infantry troops was less than 1,500,000 Army and Marine.

The remainder of our armed forces, sea, air, and ground, was largely fighting a war of machinery. Counting those engaged in war production there were probably 75 to 80,000,000 Americans directly involved in prosecution of the war. To technological warfare we devoted 98 percent of our entire effort.

Nor is it proposed now to abandon this formula which has been so amazingly successful. The harnessing of the basic power of the universe will further spur our efforts to use brain for brawn in safeguarding the United States of America.

However, technology does not eliminate the need for men in war. The Air Forces, which were the highest developed technologically of any of our armed forces in this war, required millions of men to do their job. Every B–29 that winged over Japan was dependent on the efforts of 12 officers and 73 men in the immediate combat area alone.

The number of men that were involved in the delivery of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was tremendous. First we had to have the base in the Marianas from which the plane took off. This first required preliminary operations across the vast Pacific, thousands of ships, millions of tons of supply, the heroic efforts of hundreds of thousands of men. Further, we needed the B–20's and their fighter escort which gave us control of the air over Japan. This was the result of thousands of hours of training and preparation in the U. S., and the energies of hundreds of thousands of men.

The effective technology on the military structure is identical to its effect on the national economy. Just as the automobile replaced the horse and made work for millions of Americans, the atomic explosives will require the services of millions of men if we are compelled to employ them in fighting our battles.

This war has made it clear that the security of the Nation, when challenged by an armed enemy, requires the services of virtually all able-bodied male citizens within the effective military age group.

In war the Nation cannot depend on the numbers of men willing to volunteer for active service; nor can our security in peace.

In another national emergency, the existence of a substantial portion of the Nation's young manpower already trained or in process of training, would make it possible to fill out immediately the peacetime ranks of the Navy, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. As a result our Armed Forces would be ready for almost immediate deployment to counter initial hostile moves, ready to prevent an enemy from gaining footholds from which he could launch destructive attacks against our industries and our homes. By this method we would establish, for the generations to come, a national military policy: (1) which is entirely within the financial capabilities of our peacetime economy and is absolutely democratic in its nature, and (2) which places the military world and therefore the political world on notice that this vast power, linked to our tremendous resources, wealth, and production, is immediately available. There can be no question that all the nations of the world will respect our views accordingly, creating at least a probability of peace on earth and of good will among men rather than disaster upon disaster in a tormented world where the very processes of civilization itself are constantly threatened.

The decision in this matter is so grave in consequences that it demands complete frankness on my part. Therefore I must say that many of the objections which have been made to Universal Military Training appear to be influenced by ulterior motives, or to ignore completely the tragedies of the past and present which we are seeking to avoid for the future. They often seem to give undue importance to restrictions on our freedom of life, trivial in comparison with the awful tragedies we are seeking to avoid and the great blessings we hope to secure for succeeding generations.

The timing of our decision on the question of Universal Military Training is urgent. The officials of the State Department have been strongly of the opinion that a decision in this matter prior to the final peace negotiations would greatly strengthen the hand of the United States in securing acceptance of a genuine organization to handle international differences.

The terms of the final peace settlement will provide a basis for determining the strength of the regular or permanent postwar military forces of the United States, air, ground, and naval, but they cannot, in my opinion, alter the necessity for a system of Universal Military Training.

The yardstick by which the size of the permanent force must be measured is maximum security with minimum cost in men, materiel, and maintenance. So far as they can foresee world conditions a decade from now, War Department planners, who have taken every conceivable factor into consideration, believe that our position will be sound if we set up machinery which will permit the mobilization of an Army of 4,000,000 men within a period of 1 year following any international crisis resulting in a national emergency for the United States.

The Regular Army must be comprised largely of a strategic force, heavy in air power, partially deployed in the Pacific and the Caribbean ready to protect the Nation against a sudden hostile thrust and immediately available for emergency action wherever required. It is obvious that another war would start with a lightning attack to take us unaware. The pace of the attack would be at supersonic speeds of rocket weapons closely followed by a striking force which would seek to exploit the initial and critical advantage. We must be sufficiently prepared against such a threat to hold the enemy at a distance until we can rapidly mobilize our strength. The Regular Army, and the National Guard, must be prepared to meet such a crisis.

Another mission of the Regular Army is to provide the security garrisons for the outlying bases. We quickly lost the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Islands at the beginning of this war and are still expending lives and wealth in recovering them.

The third mission of the permanent Army is to furnish the overhead, the higher headquarters which must keep the machine and the plans up to date for whatever national emergency we may face in the future. This overhead includes the War Department, the War College, the service schools, and the headquarters of the military areas into which continental United States is subdivided to facilitate decentralized command and coordination of the peacetime military machine. This was about all we had on the eve of this war, planners and a small number of men who had little to handle in practice but sound ideas on how to employ the wartime hosts that would be gathered in the storm. Had it not been for the time the British Empire and the Soviets bought us, those plans and ideas would have been of little use.

The fourth and probably the most important mission of the Regular Army is to provide the knowledge, the expert personnel, and the installations for training the citizen-soldier upon whom, in my view, the future peace of the world largely depends.

Of the citizen-Army, the National Guard is in the first category of importance. It must be healthy and strong, ready to take its place in the first line of defense in the first weeks of an emergency, and not dependent upon a year or more of training before it can be conditioned to take the field against a trained enemy. It is not feasible under the conditions of peace for the National Guard within itself to provide the basic, the fundamental training which is an imperative requirement for its mission. Therefore, in my opinion, based on a long and intimate experience with the Guard from 1907 until 1941, the essential requirement for such a system under modern conditions is Universal Military Training from which to draw the volunteers for the ranks of the Guard. Without such a firm foundation, I am clearly of the opinion that a sufficiently dependable force for our postwar needs cannot be maintained.

The second important component of the Citizen Army is the Organized Reserve through which full mobilization of the Nation's resources to war footing is accomplished. At the start of the present war, the Reserve was almost entirely an officer corps, the regimental and divisional groups lacking a practical basis for mobilization. The contribution of this component was therefore largely one of individuals, but of wide extent and great importance. The depleted officer ranks of the Regular Army were filled by the Reserve, the countless new staffs and organizations were mainly composed of Reserve officers, the great training camps for men inducted through the Selective Service System drew in the beginning on the officer strength of the

Reserve Corps. The Officer Candidate schools from which our present Army acquired its vital small unit leadership were staffed by Reserve officers. These officers were largely veterans of World War I and graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. Pitifully small appropriations had limited training to a brief period once in every 3 or 4 years and so few numbers of troops that the limited training the Reserve officers received had little relation to actual battle.

This lack of troops with which Reserve officers could acquire practical experience in command and staff work was the most critical limitation. There was no enlisted strength in the Reserve force. There was little connection and understanding between the Officers' Reserve Corps and the National Guard—which had an enlisted strength—and the number of enlisted men in the Regular Army was so small that it was impossible to qualify Reserve officers by training with Regulars. Especially in the dense centers of population there were few Regular troops. Yet here were located the largest groups of Reserve officers. Even had funds for transportation to the areas where Regular troops were stationed been available, and they were not, the few troops on the Regular roles would have been completely submerged under a deluge of Reserve officers. For example, the strength of the Officers' Reserve Corps in 1938 was more than double the number of Regular soldiers in combat units in the continental United States.

Only by universal military training can full vigor and life be instilled into the Reserve system. It creates a pool of well-trained men and officers from which the National Guard and the Organized Reserve can draw volunteers; it provides opportunities for the Guard and Reserve units to participate in corps and Army maneuvers, which are vital preparations to success in military campaigns. Without these trained men and officers, without such opportunities to develop skill through actual practice in realistic maneuvers, neither the Regular Army, the National Guard, nor the Reserve can hope to bring high efficiency to their vital missions.

Though ROTC graduates composed 12 percent of the war officers, its most important contribution was the immediate availability of its product. Just what we could have done in the first phases of our mobilization and training without these men I do not know. I do know that our plans would have had to be greatly curtailed and the cessation of hostilities on the European front would have been delayed accordingly. We must enlarge and strengthen the system. It must be established on a higher level, comparable to the academic levels of college education in which the young men of the ROTC are engaged. All this is made easily possible if the student has participated in universal military training, and at the same time the length of the course can be shortened by 1 year. He would enter the ROTC as far advanced as his predecessors were after 2½ years of the original 3-years' course. He would have completed his elementary training—the military equivalent of his grammar school and high school courses—and would be prepared for college work, that is for training as an officer, a prospective leader of men. The product of such an ROTC would provide the National Guard and the Organized Reserve with an officer corps of exceptional character.

An unbroken period of 1 year's training appears essential to the success of a sound security plan based on the concept of a citizen army.

It is possible to train individual soldiers as replacements for veteran divisions and air groups as we now do in a comparatively short period of time. The training of the unit itself cannot be accomplished at best in less than a year; air units require even more time. The principle is identical to that of coaching a football team. A halfback can learn quickly how to run with the ball, but it takes time and much practice and long hours of team scrimmage before he is proficient at carrying the ball through an opposing team, utilizing the aid of the ten other men on the team. So it is with an army division or combat air group. Men learn to fire a rifle or machine gun quickly, but it takes long hours of scrimmage, which the army calls maneuver, before the firing of the rifle is coordinated with the activities of more than 14,000 other men on the team.

All men who might someday have to fight for their Nation must have this team training. The seasoned soldiers of our present superb divisions will have lived beyond the age of military usefulness. The situation will be similar in the peacetime army to that which obtained when we began to mobilize for this war and all men had to have at least a year of unit training before we had divisions even fit for shipment overseas.

The training program would be according to the standards which have made the American soldier in this war the equal of the finest fighting men. It would be kept abreast of technical developments and the resulting modifications of tactics.

Throughout the training a strenuous program of instruction would have to be followed, but it would not be possible in peace to carry on the work under the tremendous pressure we now follow in wartime. Athletics, recreational opportunities, short weekends, and other vacational opportunities such as at Christmas time, would, of course, be necessary. However, if the Government is to be justified in the expenditure of the funds involved, a vigorous schedule should be enforced; otherwise we would produce a half-baked product which would fail to command the respectful attention of the nations of the world, and therefore negate the primary purpose of the entire system.

To those who fear the Army might militarize our young men and indoctrinate them with dangerous conceptions, to those who express doubts of the Army's capacity to do the job, I submit the evidence of our present armies. The troops have been trained sufficiently to defeat a first-class enemy. Their minds have not been warped—quite the contrary. The American people are satisfied, I am confident, that their Armies are, in fact, armies of democracy. They know that the men composing those Armies are far better physically than they otherwise would have been, that their general health has been better than at home, except for those serving in the tropical jungles. The officers who trained our Armies were largely citizen-soldiers. They did have the initial guidance of Regular officers, but only 2 percent of the entire officer corps was professional. Only slightly more were of the National Guard; 25 percent were products of the Officers' Reserve Corps, 12 percent more were men commissioned direct from civil life because of certain professional qualifications. The great majority of the officers came up from the ranks, 59 percent of the total, which guaranteed the democracy of the Army.

To those who consider the introduction of a system of universal military training an imposition on democracy, I would reply that in my opinion it would be the most democratic expression of our national life. Whatever my limitations may be in judging this matter, I submit the evidence of the proposal of our first President.

Washington's program provided for universal training of all men arriving at the age of 17. The citizen-militia was to be divided into three classes, men from 17 to 21, known as the advance corps, men 21 to 46, known as the main corps, and men from 46 to 61, known as the reserve corps. All of the peacetime training would have been concentrated in the advance corps, but eventually all members of main and reserve corps would have been graduates of the training program. The militia bill was first introduced in the Third Session of the First Congress. It was considered in the House on 5 March 1792, and as finally enacted contained no element of any of Washington's recommendations. It was so emasculated when finally adopted that the representative who introduced the bill himself voted against its passage.

It appears probable that had the bill been approved by Congress, the United States might have avoided much of the war making that has filled its brief history. The impressment of American seamen would not have been regarded as a harmless pastime in the early 1800's, nor would the Kaiser have been so easily disposed to avenge the death of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 with a world war, nor Adolf Hitler have been quite so quick to break the peace, if over these years the United States had been recognized by the war mongers as a Nation immediately to be reckoned with.

The peacetime army must not only be prepared for immediate mobilization of an effective war army, but it must have in reserve the weapons needed for the first months of the fighting and clear-cut plans for immediately producing the tremendous additional quantities of matériel necessary in total war. We must never again face a great national crisis with ammunition lacking to serve our guns, few guns to fire, and no decisive procedures for procuring vital arms in sufficient quantities.

The necessity for continuous research into the military ramifications of man's scientific advance is now clear to all and it should not be too difficult to obtain the necessary appropriations for this purpose during peacetime. There is, however, always much reluctance to expenditure of funds for improvement of war-making instruments, particularly where there is no peacetime usefulness in the product.

The development of combat airplanes is closely allied with development of civil aeronautics; the prototypes of many of our present transport planes and those soon to come were originally bombers. Many of the aeronautical principles that helped give this Nation the greatest air force in the world grew out of commercial development and our production know-how at the start of this war was partially the fruit of peacetime commercial enterprise. Since many vital types of weapons have no commercial counterpart, the peacetime development of these weapons has been grossly neglected. Antiaircraft weapons are a good example. The highly efficient antiaircraft of today did not materialize until long after the fighting began. The consequent cost in time, life, and money of this failure to spend the necessary sums on such activity in peacetime has been appalling.

There is another phase of scientific research which I think has been somewhat ignored—the development of expeditious methods for the mass production of war matériel. This is of great importance since it determines how quickly we can mobilize our resources if war comes and how large and costly our reserve stocks of war matériel must be. Serious thought and planning along this line can save millions of tax dollars.

We can be certain that the next war, if there is one, will be even more total than this one. The nature of war is such that once it now begins it can end only as this one is ending, in the destruction of the vanquished, and it should be assumed that another reconversion from peace to war production will take place initially under enemy distant bombardment. Industrial mobilization plans must be founded on these assumptions and so organized that they will meet them and any other situation that may develop. Yet they must in no way retard or inhibit the course of peacetime production.

If this Nation is to remain great it must bear in mind now and in the future that war is not the choice of those who wish passionately for peace. It is the choice of those who are willing to resort to violence for political advantage. We can fortify ourselves against disaster, I am convinced, by the measures I have here outlined. In these protections we can face the future with a reasonable hope for the best and with quiet assurance that even though the worst may come, we are prepared for it.

As President Washington said in his message to Congress of 3 December 1793:

> I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment of our duties to the rest of the world, without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing ourselves in a position of complete defense, and of exacting from them the fulfillment of the duties towards us. The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion, that contrary to the order of human efforts, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms, with which the history of every other nation abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness—if we desire to avoid insult we must be ready to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful institutions of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.

Marshall

Washington, D. C.
1 September 1945

Chief of Staff

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FOR RELEASE IN A.M. PAPERS, FRIDAY, JANUARY 1, 1943.

COLONEL ZANUCK'S LOG TELLS DIFFICULTIES IN FILMING ARMY'S NORTH AFRICAN INVASION

Difficulties encountered in filming the United Nation's landing operations in North Africa are described in a report to the War Department by Colonel Darryl F. Zanuck, Signal Corps, who was in charge of this phase of the expedition commanded by Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, United States Army.

Colonel Zanuck has returned to the United States to assemble and edit the motion picture record of the African operations, all photographed by his unit.

So intense was the fighting in the early days of the operations that he and his cameramen carried on their mission with a tommy gun in one hand and the crank of a camera in the other, Colonel Zanuck reported. He described one night which he spent in what appeared to be a deserted hotel only to awaken the following morning and find the hotel and surrounding territory had been evacuated by local authorities because two unexploded Nazi bombs lay in the center of the hostelry.

The camera record obtained by Colonel Zanuck and his unit includes films of both air and land combat actions during which some of the Signal Corps officers and men actually participated with Colonel Zanuck doubling in the radio control room of a combat plane while his cameramen ground out the photographic record of the conflict for history.

Notable among the engagements in which he participated was the actual landing at Algiers during which he was aboard a plane carrying Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, General Eisenhower's second in command, and Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Anderson, commanding the British First Army. The engagement was on the afternoon of the day General Eisenhower's expedition put into Algiers harbor.

Colonel Zanuck's description of the action, taken from his log which he included in his report, follows:

MORE

"We are about 20 minutes from Algiers when the first alarm is flashed over our radio---Nazi planes ahead.

"We circle in the clouds. Sometimes it is so foggy we lose sight of our escort. I look frequently at my parachute and my escape kit. I wonder if the letter I have in Arabic, signed by the President, will work in case we have to bail out. I mentally rehearse the directions given in the escape kit.

"Suddenly we come out of the clouds. We are over Algiers.

"We are ready to fight--all the crew at battle stations, portholes open, fingers on triggers. Below all appears calm and peaceful. Then out of a port gun hole I notice peculiar puffs of black smoke in the sky nearby. Then more of the same. Then I see the flash of ack-ack coming upward from the swarm of battleships in the harbor below. Every fifth shell is a colored tracer and they make a beautiful sight.

"Suddenly planes sweep by to our left--followed by more black puffs, some quite close to our ship. Geysers of water rise into the air alongside the transports and battleships below. It dawns on me that our ships are being bombed from the air. We are flying high to avoid the ack-ack. We circle the Maison Blanche airport several times and start down. Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Kirk Buchak, of Omaha, Nebraska, has been asleep through it all. I awaken him. We land with a thud and tumble out of the plane.

"All hell has suddenly broken loose on every side. Anti-aircraft guns are blazing away all around us. Our Spitfires rise to the attack. Dog-fights fill the air. We standing like idiots watching it. A Spit gets on the tail of a Junkers 88 right over us. Black smoke pours from the engine of the Nazi plane. The crowd on the field lets out a spontaneous cheer. We cheer, too.

"Suddenly another Nazi plane lets go its load above us. We actually see and hear the bombs coming down toward us. We throw ourselves flat. Three bombs land 50 yards away. No one is hurt, but I might add Major Buchak is now wide awake. Some one yells a warning. A Nazi plane is diving on the field. I duck under the wing of our Fortress and flatten out alongside the huge rubber wheel. A rather silly gesture. What fools we are--watching an air attack from the very airport that is being attacked.

"Planes now come at us from all directions. It is difficult to tell which is ours and which is the enemy's. A Nazi trailing black smoke with one motor gone dives over our heads, a Spit hot on its tail. We open fire on it.

MORE

"It is suddenly getting dark. The air is filled with tracer bullets. It looks like a Fourth of July fireworks display. A Nazi plane crashes nearby. Another explodes in the air and drifts downward. We finally have enough sense to run off the field and into a slit trench, and one by one the Nazi planes disappear. We have beaten them. We have seized and held the airport."

The day after the landing in Algiers, Colonel Zanuck drew a sideline assignment. He was directed to seize and hold the Algiers radio station. With the aid of a troop detachment he carried out the assignment and reported his greatest difficulty was in assuring its French staff that it would continue to carry on its routine functions and would continue to get its regular meals.

After completing his detail at the radio station, Colonel Zanuck reports he then set out to assemble the films exposed during the landing attacks, climaxing this operation with the filming of American progress between Bougie and Djedeida on November 19, 1942.

"The next day," the log says, "we drove on and reached Bone at sunset. They had just had their tenth air raid in the last two days. I contacted my first group of cameramen which I had sent on by boat. They had been bombed all the way from Algiers but had some excellent material. As we ate and studied the films we were bombed time and again but no one took any notice. It is strange how quickly one becomes accustomed to air raids."

As the American forces proceeded inward, Colonel Zanuck set up field headquarters at Souk el Arba. Here an air raid caught him as he was lending a hand to casualties. Here, too, the filming party joined in an engagement in which 12 Spitfires beat off a terrific attack by 20 German Stuka dive bombers which had an escort of 20 Messerschmitts.

"Here is a sight worth remembering," Colonel Zanuck wrote in his log. "A gigantic battle-royal right over our heads and not more than 3,000 or 4,000 feet up."

"How long it lasted I will never know," the log continues. "It might have been five minutes or an hour. The opposing ships dove at each other--the Messerschmitts engaging the Spits and the Stukas bombing and strafing the airport, the city, the road, the bridges and everything else in sight.

"We had four or five cameras in action all the time. I stood by with a tommy gun expecting a Nazi plane to unload its crew in our laps at any time. The Spits held their own and although badly outnumbered gave a good account of themselves.

MORE

At one time there were at least 10 desperate dogfights in progress. Sometimes the planes would come as low as a few hundred feet.

"A Messerschmitt dove right over our heads not higher than the tree tops, its guns blazing and black smoke pouring out of its tail. I let go with my tommy gun and used up a full clip. I had no sooner reloaded than a Stuka began bombing a bridge across a narrow field from us. The impact of the heavy bombs lifted the earth up in our faces. Another Stuka dived past us so close you could see every detail of the craft. One cameraman was so near to it he could not hold the entire plane in the camera aperture. In rapid succession other planes dove over us.

"I fired three clips in all and while I know some of my lead hit home I probably did no damage--yet there was always the chance that some lucky shot might hit a vital spot.

"Exhileration and a feeling of supreme satisfaction swept over me as the Naxis turned back. I was hoping they'd make another try. It never occurred to me that I might be killed or shot up--for the moment I didn't give a damn."

Shortly after this action, Colonel Zanuck's party filmed scenes showing surrender of numerous German and Italian troops and it was while on his return to Bone that he spent the night in the "deserted" hotel. Describing how he entered the city at night and not seeing any sign of life he tells of entering a hotel and finding an empty room.

"The town was blacked out but in the moonlight we could tell that all of the action had not taken place at the front," Colonel Zanuck wrote. "Building after building had been hit and debris filled the streets.

" I undressed as the air raid siren sounded. For the next half hour the Jerries did everything but dump me out of bed but I felt I hadn't slept in 2,000 years and I made up my mind I wasn't going to budge.

"I awakened the next morning and the hotel seemed strangely quiet. I found the lights out and the water off. Usually the place is alive with people going in and out. Now it was different. On my way downstairs I didn't see a soul or hear a sound. I thought, perhaps, the entire city had been evacuated I went out in front of the hotel and found my old car missing. The street was completely deserted except for a gendarme at a crossing a block away. He gestured frantically for me to join him. When I reached the corner I found that I had been inside a large roped off area. Behind the ropes on side streets stood the population of the city. They looked at me with awe. After the gendarme made up his mind not to arrest me I learned that I had slept in the hotel with a couple of unexploded 500 pound bombs. The entire area had been evacuated the day before

"I had spent the night in an undertaker's paradise."

END

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FOR RELEASE IN A. M. PAPERS, MONDAY, JANUARY 4, 1943

EIGHT MORE PLANTS RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD

Eight more industrial plants have been selected to receive the Army-Navy Production Award for outstanding performance on war work, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal announced today.

The names and addresses of these plants are:

Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, Airplane Division, Hagerstown, Maryland
The Felters Company, Incorporated, Millbury, Massachusetts
International Harvester Company, St. Paul Works, St. Paul, Minnesota
Eli Lilly and Company, Indianapolis, Indiana
W. C. Norris, Manufacturer, Incorporated, Tulsa, Oklahoma
Pitney-Bowes Postage Meter Company, Stamford, Connecticut
Rohm and Haas Company, Bristol, Pennsylvania
Servel, Incorporated, Evansville, Indiana

Each of the selected plants will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award Pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

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ADDRESS BY
HONORABLE JOHN J. MCCLOY,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR,
AT PRESENTATION OF ARMY-NAVY "E" AWARD
FOR PRODUCTION, TO THE ARMY MAP SERVICE,
3:30 P.M., EWT., TUESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1943.

I am delighted to be invited to a place where maps are made. Like many others, I have always been fascinated by and with maps. In my training for the last war I had to make maps myself. Though I am glad no one had to depend on them, I still take some pride in that I made them at all. When we got to France in the last war, our eyes were opened by the splendid maps received and the number of them. We had them 1 to 150,000; 1:80,000; 1:20,000 even 1 to 5,000, and they were rarely inaccurate. We fired by them, we located our guns by them, all our important orders were based on them. Maps were everything, frequently life and death. They got you there and brought you back even when you couldn't speak the language.

Today maps are in greater and wider use than ever. The whole world is the battlefield. There is not an area which today or tomorrow we do not have to know about in detail. In the War Department there is rarely an important decision made without reference to a map. The mere presence of maps about initiates thought and suggests action. They must be deadly accurate, especially in these days of air warfare where the slightest miscalculation may have disastrous consequences. One cannot overestimate the importance of the use of proper maps in the planning and execution of military operations. It has been shown that successful military operations seldom occur in the absence of accurate and complete map information, and military history gives several examples of battles lose through faulty maps. An army without maps is an army without eyes, and as operations are conducted today it is also an army without plans. What, for example, could we do in the Pentagon Building without a map to guide us around?

I could go on talking about the romance and drama of maps, but they are your business and you know their importance as well or better than I.

During the World War, what you know as the Army Map Service was then known as the Central Map Production Plant. It had seventy-five people in it. War maps were also produced at the Base Mapping Unit in France. But only ten million maps were produced in the sixteen to eighteen months of its operation. Then peace came, and your organization, renamed the Engineer Production Plant, suffered as did all other items of military preparedness from lack of funds. However, the plant staff of 1920-1921 laid the foundation for the current expansion, and it had the foresight and fortitude to plan for today's great need. Improvements followed until 1938, when the plant was entirely remodeled, but still demand for your maps increased. Finally, the year 1941 saw the advent of this magnificent new plant, designed solely for map making. In April of 1942 you became the "Army Map Service," and in May you occupied this building.

At the outbreak of world-wide war, this country was no more prepared from a mapping standpoint than it was from a munitions standpoint. You have been equal to the task of overcoming that deficiency yourselves, and have marshalled

MORE

and coordinated the forces of the commercial map makers as well. Turning out two hundred tons of maps for the 1941 Maneuvers prepared you for your current production of three to four million maps a month. I understand that on one occasion alone, you shipped the unprecedented total of one hundred and ten tons of maps to "outside Continental United States!" I did not know until I heard that that the unit of measurement for maps was in tons, but it makes a very good impression. Maps are munitions of war and are subject to the same process of planning and manufacture as bullets. You have had to achieve a huge production without sacrifice of accuracy.

You have performed a masterful job. Moreover, you have kept secret the areas you have mapped so that no advance warning of our strategic and tactical operations overseas has come to the enemy through you. You have surely earned your share of credit for the success of our arms and particularly for the African campaign.

On the varied terrain which your maps represent, our soldiers and sailors are working on a 24 hour shift, as Captain Rickenbacker so dramatically pointed out, doing jobs and enduring hardships that we over here cannot even imagine. When your hours are long and when your eyes and hands are strained, remember that men rely on a piece of paper that you prepare to guide them to the enemy and then home to their base.

In the Army and the Navy respectively, two men are charged with over-all production -- the Honorable Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, and the Honorable James V. Forrestal, Under Secretary of the Navy; both of whom I have the honor to represent here today. Their reports indicate that production in general continues unprecedented and unabated. But among all of our American production facilities, some organizations have done such superior jobs that they have been especially selected for distinctive recognition. Yours is one of those organizations. I am also aware that you are further distinguished by the receipt of our War Bond Award because over 90% of you give 10% or more of your wages for the purchase of war bonds. I have come here to give you another award: the Army-Navy Production Award for services "beyond the call of duty."

I am honored to be able to present to Colonel Johnson, as Commanding Officer, and to Mr. Pistel, who represents the workers, this "E for excellence" banner, from a grateful American people to the men and women of the Army Map Service.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN A.M. PAPERS, FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1943.

48 MEMBERS OF 19th BOMBARDMENT GROUP DECORATED FOR RAIDS ON JAPANESE BASES

The War Department today announced the award of decorations to 20 officers and 28 enlisted men of the 19th Bombardment Group, Army Air Forces, "for gallantry in action" during aerial bombing raids on Japanese bases in Rabaul, New Britain, on August 7, 9, and 12, 1942, which covered the original landings of the United States Marines on Guadalcanal on August 7.

For these actions the 19th Bombardment Group was cited as a unit by the Secretary of War for the third time. Since these actions the bombardment organization has received a fourth such citation, which is more than any unit of the Army has been so cited since the war began. The first 2 unit citations were for actions in Bataan and Corregidor, Philippine Islands. The fourth citation of this Group was for actions, details of which have not yet been announced.

This distinction gives the members of the Group who have participated in 2 or more of the actions for which the unit was cited the right to wear a special insignia as a permanent part of their uniform. This insignia, or citation device, is a blue ribbon framed in gold laurel leaves, and is worn on the left breast, between decorations' bars and service ribbons.

The following officers and enlisted men were awarded SILVER STARS:

First Lieutenant James G. Ellis, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Kathleen Ellis lives at 4500 Normandy Street, Dallas, Texas.

First Lieutenant John S. Hancock, Air Corps, of Haileyville, Oklahoma.

First Lieutenant John A. Crockett, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Sue Crockett, lives at Stephens, Arkansas.

First Lieutenant Robert R. Rankin, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. R. A. Rankin, lives at 383 West Broadway, Eugene, Oregon.

First Lieutenant Ritchie B. Gooch, Air Corps, whose father, Mr. T. H. Gooch, lives at 434 East Court Street, Blackfoot, Idaho.

First Lieutenant Raymond E. Holsey, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. W. M. Holsey, lives at Altus, Oklahoma.

MORE

Second Lieutenant Warren E. Bryant, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Warren E. Bryant, lives at Billerica, Massachusetts.

Second Lieutenant Paul J. Scarboro, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. A. D. Scarboro, lives at Royston, Georgia.

Second Lieutenant Paul R. Tarbutton, Air Corps, of 814 Seventh Avenue, Laurel, Mississippi.

Second Lieutenant William T. Chesser, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. W. T. Chesser, lives at Route #6, Fort Worth, Texas.

Second Lieutenant Leslie W. Neumann, Air Corps, whose brother, Mr. Alvin W. Neumann, lives at Litchville, North Dakota.

Second Lieutenant Robert R. Wilson, Air Corps, of 53 Forest Street, Verona, New Jersey.

Second Lieutenant John M. Dawson, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Mayme Dawson, lives at 632 Navarre Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida.

Technical Sergeant Charles C. Schierholz, Air Corps, whose father, Mr. C. C. Schierholz, lives at 5148 Southeast Milwaukee Avenue, Portland, Oregon.

Technical Sergeant John F. Clark, Air Corps, of Box 226, Remington, Indiana.

Staff Sergeant Lorenzo H. Snow, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Grace H. Snow, lives at 633 North 1st Street, Brigham, Utah.

Staff Sergeant Edward K. Bentz, Air Corps, of Schmecksville, Pennsylvania.

Staff Sergeant Albert J. Kennedy, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Ruth Kennedy, lives at 6085 Reinhart Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Sergeant William J. Law, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. W. J. Law, lives at Cottonwood, Route No. 3, Tahama County, California.

Sergeant Clarence R. Olson, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Elizabeth Olson, lives at Box 504, Terry, Montana.

Sergeant Lloyd D. Whipp, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Nellie M. Whipp, lives at Gobles Auto Camp, Pottersville, California.

Sergeant James H. Andrews, Air Corps, whose brother, Mr. Leon W. Andrews, lives at Farmville, North Carolina.

Sergeant Glenn C. Keclik, Air Corps, whose wife, Mrs. Glenn C. Keclik, lives at Farmington, Utah, c/o Oliver Pierce.

Sergeant James L. Hickey, Air Corps, of 311 Park Street, Turlock, California.

Sergeant Leo H. Ferraguto, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Anna H. Ferraguto, lives at 82 North Street, Middleboro, Massachusetts.

Sergeant Joseph M. Hines, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Thomas Hines, lives at 13 James Street, Pittston, Pennsylvania.

Corporal Gary C. Hollister, Air Corps, of Newport, Nebraska.

Corporal Joseph Bayles, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Blanche May Bayles, lives at Itta Bena, Mississippi.

Corporal Hilario L. Hernandez, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Libarda Hernandez, lives at Beeville, Texas.

MORE

Corporal Mikel D. White, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. C. C. Hoots, lives at RFD No. 4, Box 119, Mexia, Texas.

Corporal Joseph E. Wrenn, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. J. Cleve Wrenn, lives at RFD No. 1, Yanceyville, North Carolina.

Private First Class Michael R. Andrade, Air Corps, 207 Georgia Street, Buffalo, New York.

Private First Class Robert P. Elmerick, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Henry P. Elmerick, lives at Suffield, Ohio.

Private First Class George R. Lynch, Air Corps, whose father, Mr. Thomas A. Lynch, lives at 513 North Sixth Street, Madison, Wisconsin.

OAK LEAF CLUSTERS were awarded to the following officers and men in addition to decorations previously awarded to them:

Captain John W. Carpenter, III, Air Corps, whose wife, Mrs. Dorothy Carpenter, lives at 143 Leroy Street, Binghampton, New York.

Captain Charles H. Hillhouse, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Floy Hillhouse, lives at LaFayette, Georgia.

First Lieutenant Edward M. Jacquet, Air Corps, whose father, Mr. E. M. Jacquet, lives at 1132 Mason Street, Kalamazoo, Michigan.

First Lieutenant Merle C. Woods, Air Corps, whose father, Mr. Harry Woods, lives at 524 Arch Street, Sunbury, Pennsylvania.

First Lieutenant Walter E. Seamon, Jr., Air Corps, of West Jefferson, Ohio.

Second Lieutenant Donald C. Miller, Air Corps, of 2203 O'Neal Street, Greenville, Texas.

Second Lieutenant Maxwell D. Stone, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Dobney Stone, lives at 8 North First Street, Richmond, Virginia.

Master Sergeant Durward W. Fesmire, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Virginia Fesmire, lives at Portales, New Mexico.

Master Sergeant John M. Geckler, Air Corps, whose wife, Mrs. John M. Geckler, lives at Middletown, Pennsylvania.

Master Sergeant Carl W. Thrasher, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. T. M. Thrasher, lives at Philomath, Oregon.

Technical Sergeant W. E. Bostwick, Air Corps, of 87 Congress Street, Pasadena, California.

Technical Sergeant John A. Wallach, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Susie Wallach, lives at Manchaug, Massachusetts.

Staff Sergeant Raymond P. LeGault, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Phillip LeGault, lives at 247 Monroe Street, Brooklyn, New York.

Sergeant Ignatius E. Berran, Air Corps, whose mother, Mrs. Ignatius E. Berran, lives at 35 North Franklin Street, Shamokin, Pennsylvania.

Nine of the officers and nine of the enlisted men were cited for gallantry in action over the Vunakanau Airdrome, Rabaul, New Britain, on August 7, 1942, which are in addition to numerous awards already announced for this

MORE

action. During this raid, described by Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, Commanding General of the Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific area, as the most important single aerial operation of the war, more than 50 Japanese heavy bombers were destroyed on the ground. Before its successful bombing run, the formation was attacked by more than 20 Zeros, 7 of which were shot down in a fight lasting 25 minutes.

Following are extracts from the citations singling out these officers and men for individual acts of courage and heroism:

"Lieutenant Tarbutton was navigator of a B-17 type aircraft which took part in the mass daylight attack on Vunakanau Airdrome.....The courage and leadership demonstrated by this officer on this mission did much to make it a complete success."

"The plane in which Sergeant Olson was a crew member had one engine disabled and the oxygen supply damaged during the first attack. Despite these handicaps the crew managed to keep the plane in its position in the formation and was able to ward off every attack made by the enemy......It was only through the efforts of Sergeant Olson and the other members of the crew that this mission was such a success."

"Lieutenant Crockett with cool courage and grim determination remained at his post, continued his navigation, and aided the gunners by manning the forward gun with great skill."

"It was only through the skill and courage of Lieutenant Rankin and others in the formation, that 7 Zeros were shot down."

"Lieutenant Chesser's expert navigation contributed greatly to the success of the mission and made it possible for his plane to complete the mission and return safely to its home base."

"Lieutenant Neumann, with cool courage and grim determination remained at his post directing the fire of his gunners and aided the pilot with great skill."

"Sergeant Whipp's expert aim and coolness under fire aided materially in the plane's safe return to its base."

"Captain Carpenter was Squadron Leader of a flight of planes which participated in the mass daylight attack on Vunakanau Airdrome at Rabaul....... Captain Carpenter displayed skilful leadership in retaining complete control of the squadron planes throughout the bombing run and in the subsequent withdrawal from the target. His example of daring courage in the face of heavy fire was an

inspiration to his pilots and crews."

"Lieutenant Jacquet was the pilot of a B-17 type aircraft......One supercharger was out of commission while the plane was enroute to the target, and during the first attack by the enemy, the other supercharger on the same side went out of order. By skilfully piloting the plane, Lieutenant Jacquet managed to stay in formation during the flight, which lasted 25 minutes."

"Lieutenant Miller not only skilfully performed his duties as bombardier, but also manned the forward guns and helped destroy the planes shot down."

"Master Sergeant Fesmire was the lead bombardier of a squadron. All bombs of the squadron were placed on the target as the result of Sergeant Fesmire's accurate bombing."

"Sergeant Geckler displayed outstanding marksmanship in completely severing the wing of a Zero, and in addition placed many bursts into other enemy planes which attacked the formation."

"Sergeant Thrasher was alert at his position and fired his guns with such unerring accuracy as to almost entirely disrupt the fighter attack."

"Sergeant Bostwick's expert aim and coolness in the face of heavy cannon and machine gun fire aided materially in the plane's safe return to its base."

"In addition to his duties as bombardier, Sergeant Wallach skilfully manned the forward guns and fired them with such unerring accuracy as to almost entirely disrupt the fighter attack."

Staff Sergeant LeGault and Sergeant Berran were cited for acts similar to that performed by Sergeant Wallach.

"Despite the lack of sufficient oxygen and power, Lieutenant Woods continued to stay in the formation and the bombing run was completed."

Eight citations were for participation in a bombing mission over Lakanai Airdrome, Rabaul, New Britain, on August 9, 1942. Lieutenants Ellis and Hancock, Technical Sergeant Schierholz, and Sergeant Law, all members of B-17 Flying Fortress crews, were intercepted by 15 Zero fighters, and in an aerial battle lasting 35 minutes, 7 of the enemy planes were destroyed and the others driven off. The airdrome was successfully bombed, and among other damage a 10,000-ton enemy vessel was hit.

MORE

Second Lieutenants Scarboro and Bryant, Sergeant Snow, and Private First Class Andrade were cited for gallantry in action on the same mission as the above. Their formation also was intercepted by numerous Zeros, of which 5 were shot down. Private Andrade is credited with several hits on enemy planes.

Sergeant Bentz was radio operator-gunner on a B-17 mission to attack an airdrome at Rabaul, New Britain, on August 9. Due to poor visibility, the bomber could not continue with the formation. Instead of wasting its bomb load, the Flying Fortress proceeded alone to Gasmata, where the bombs were dropped squarely on enemy installations, starting one large fire and causing 7 explosio

The August 12 raid was against Japanese shipping in Rabaul Harbor, during which 4 enemy ships were sunk or damaged severely, and 3 Zero fighters shot down. One flight of this raid, for which 7 officers and 14 enlisted men were decorated, was led by Captain Hillhouse, whose citation reads as follows:

"Charles H. Hillhouse, Captain, Air Corps, United States Army. For gallantry in action over Rabaul, New Britain, on August 12, 1942. This officer led a flight of 8 planes that raided enemy shipping in Rabaul Harbor. The formation was attacked by 8 Zeros before, during and after the bombing run, but Captain Hillhouse displayed great skill and bravery by leading his flight in such a manner that it was able to remain with the formation and drop bombs on enemy shipping. Four ships were either sunk or badly damaged and 3 enemy fighters were shot down in the engagement. Several other missions were completed during the period from the 11th to the 14th of August, 1942, all of which aided considerably in the successful offensive made by the Allies in the Southwest Pacific area."

The other officers and men who were similarly cited for the August 12 raid are:

First Lieutenants Gooch and Holsey; Second Lieutenants Wilson, Dawson, Seamon, and Stone; Technical Sergeant Clark; Staff Sergeant Kennedy; Sergeants Andrews, Keclik, Hickey, Ferraguto, and Hines; Corporals Hollister, Bayles, Hernandez, White, and Wrenn; Privates, First Class Elmerick and Lynch.

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FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE IN A.M. PAPERS, MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1943

SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION.

Talks on security are given periodically by Army commanders during the training periods of units. The War Department publishes herewith material from one of these talks in the belief that the subject of security is of vital concern to the public as well as to the Army.

> On the day that we donned the uniform of the United States Army we began to learn things about the Army, things that Hitler and Hirohito would like to know to aid them in attacking our country, our families, our cities, our homes, our farms, and ourselves. Every day since then we have been entrusted with information, and we will continue to be entrusted with more and more information so long as we are privileged to wear the uniform. And the more we learn, the more the agents of Hitler and Hirohito can get out of us; that is, only if they are smarter than we are. Every bit of military information is of value to the enemy, no matter how small.
>
> These truths appear to be self-evident. Even so, every day on buses, on trains, in bars, and in the living rooms of our finest homes, seemingly unimportant bits of information reach enemy agents by some of us who don't mean to tell.
>
> There are three methods of stopping this leakage of information: retribution, punishment, and security education. The man who was drowned with his buddies, because he revealed the sailing date of his ship and convoy, certainly paid the price of talking too much. That was retribution. Punishing him for his talking would not have stopped the torpedoing of his ship, because the harm had been done. Security education appears to be the best means of stopping leaks.
>
> What then are the causes of indiscretion? Why is it that so much information is being given away all over the country at this very minute? There are four causes. They are:
>
> Conceit.
> Faith.
> Enthusiasm.
> Ignorance.
>
> You will notice that treachery has been left out. That is because the number of traitors is fortunately very small. This is not intended for those who are betraying their country willfully; it is for those who are betraying it unwittingly, but are betraying it just the same. If enemy agents had to depend solely on traitors for their information, they would probably have a lean time, for it is a tragic fact that the majority of what they learn is given to them by those people whose patriotism is beyond question.

MORE

CONCEIT

Conceit is the most common cause of leakage. Ninety percent of indiscretions are the result of it, and 99 percent of us are vulnerable to it.

Why do we boast? Most of us to impress a woman. That is understandable enough. Everyone tends to "hand out a line" when out with a girl. There is little harm in it, and providing you leave the service out of it, you can go ahead. The Army really isn't too much concerned about the fact that a corporal is able to persuade his girl that he gave up $50,000 a year when he joined the Army or that he would have been a senator if it hadn't been for the war, as long as his "line" doesn't include service matters.

We may be on secret duties. If that is so, we must remember that these are the Army's secrets, and that we have no right to share them with anyone.

There will always be a temptation to boast when you know a lot more than the other people you are with. It is admittedly very hard to pretend you know nothing when in point of fact you know everything; and in order to try to satisfy your conceit without giving much away, you may find yourself just hinting at all you know. That is fatal. If a thing is secret, you must not even hint at its existence.

The trouble about this boasting is that it is so contagious. A man boasts to his girl friend of what he is doing just to impress her, and she in her turn boasts to all of her friends about the importance of her boy friend just to impress them. It becomes a vicious circle with everybody trying to outdo everybody else in the magnitude of the secret information which they can impart.

No one is easier to "pump" than the man who is "handing out a line." It is only necessary to pretend not to believe him, and he will get so indignant that he spills a lot more; or to pretend to be lost in admiration of him, and he will get so pleased with himself that he will keep right on talking.

A lot of people today are worried about their war effort. They feel they are not pulling their weight, or else they worry because they believe that other people may think them slackers. And so they talk a lot about their work in order to convince people that they really are doing their bit, and if they are on anything secret they talk about it all the more.

FAITH

As a nation we are too ready to trust our fellowmen, and to believe too implicitly in the safety of such national institutions as the United States mail and the telephone and telegraph services, all of which can be utilized to advantage by enemy agents.

Most of us consider that we are pretty good judges of character and not easily fooled. We forget that an enemy agent, if he is to be successful and avoid a firing squad, must be such a plausible and convincing person that no one suspects him, least of all those who pride themselves in being good judges of character. In other words, he will look exactly like what he isn't: a typical American with an honest face, who knows as much about the Yankees and the Brooklyn Dodgers as we do.

We should always put ourselves in the place of an enemy agent. Consider how one of the Axis agents would do his job. First,

MORE

we should ask ourselves what we could learn from the conversation that is going on in the bar, club, or railroad station, or the information that is given in a letter. When we learn to adopt this outlook, we will not only be careful to keep our mouths shut, we will also want to make other people shut theirs.

But what about the faith you have in your friends and relatives; in your mother and father, and the girl you are going to marry?

Of all security lessons, this is the hardest to learn: That military information must be shared with no one, not even with those you love.

That is not to say that you must no longer put your trust in these people in whom you have confided all your life. But you must not share with them secrets that are not yours to share, secrets that belong to the Army.

Remember that the first person an enemy agent contacts when he wants to know anything secret is the wife or girl friend of the man who knows that secret.

You may feel that your wife or mother has a right to know when you are in danger, a right to be told if you know that on a certain date you are sailing in convoy, or are going on a raid from which you may never return. And you may also feel that they have a right to know if this raid is canceled, so that their minds may be set at rest.

But this must not happen. The more people who know a secret, the less chance there is of its being kept. This is the first rule of security. Once you realize this, you will see that it is not only careless talk that costs lives. Too many people are of the opinion that careless talk is loud-mouthed conversation in public bars to perfect strangers, and that its opposite, careful talk, is a confidential whisper to your wife or sweetheart. But it is talk of any sort that must be stopped no matter what the precautions that are taken.

Mothers and sisters and wives, with the best intentions in the world, can give away information without even knowing that they have done so. If they are worried about your safety, they will tend to confide in those who are sympathetic. In wartime we do not always choose our friends wisely, but turn instinctively to anyone who shows kindness and understanding, especially if they seem to be suffering like ourselves. An enemy agent will not only be a good listener, he will also be a sympathetic one.

If the people who love you are wise, they will not try to learn your secrets. It is your duty to keep them to yourself.

ENTHUSIASM

Enthusiasm is a common cause of indiscretion. Anyone who is really interested in his job finds it hard not to talk and write about it. Your first impulse when your outfit has done particularly well will be to talk about its achievements. As the time approaches nearer and nearer to when your buddies and you will be going overseas, excitement increases and it gets increasingly harder to keep the news of events important to you under your hat.

But note how easy it would be for a clever person to get this information out of you. Maybe he would flatly refuse to believe you, until you got so angry with him that you blurted out facts and

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figures which would prove your story conclusively. Or he would be so impressed by everything you told him that you would tell more and more; or perhaps he would adopt the line of being a technical expert himself, pretending to know all about it already, and enticing you into a highly technical discussion in which you would be anxious to show off your knowledge.

Remember, never add to a newspaper account, no matter how proud you may be of the fact that you know the whole story.

IGNORANCE

A vast number of people are going about the country today giving away vital information simply because they have no knowledge whatsoever of the way enemy intelligence service works. They just cannot understand that it is all a matter of putting two and two together, of going around and collecting bits and pieces of information from a thousand different sources, and then cleverly evaluating them into a dangerous report.

Get it firmly fixed in your head that the enemy agents are not all parading about in Washington and our military establishments, preparing to waylay a general and steal the plans of a forthcoming attack. They are quiet, hardworking investigators who go about using their eyes and ears, and picking up a little item here and another one there by encouraging people to say more than they should. Oddments of news which tell of troop movements and concentrations of supplies, of strengths and weaknesses at certain points; of the destination of convoys and the position of battleships, aircrafts, tanks, and guns. A scrap of conversation picked up by an agent may at first seem to be of little value until another report from some other source continues the story and links it up with something else. The intelligence officer's job is to look for clues no matter how small, and to see what he can deduce from them.

Get quite clear in your minds the difference between an offense against ordinary discipline and an offense against security. People who break rules are sometimes thought to be very daring. The soldier who gives away military information is hitting his country below the belt and is no hero to anyone except Hitler and Hirohito.

No matter how wonderful a soldier's record may be, he is still of no value to his country if he undoes his good work by careless talk which results in more loss to us than he inflicts on the enemy.

GOAL OF SECURITY

The goal of security education is the instinctive security-mindedness of all in the military service. When discretion on all military matters becomes second nature to everyone so that we automatically shut up like an oyster whenever strangers try to get us to discuss our work, then the battle of security will have been won. It should not require an effort to be discreet. On the contrary, you should feel an acute sense of guilt whenever you find yourself referring to anything that is secret.

Remember that it is not only a crime to commit a breach of security, but also to conceal one. Surprise is a vital factor in war. If the enemy finds out our plans, it is essential that we should know that he has done so. Therefore if a leakage exists those in authority must be notified at once.

MORE

You must see security as an additional weapon in your hands, a weapon which, if developed and perfected, can become as valuable to the United States Army as the tank, the airplane, or the antiaircraft gun. That may sound like an exaggeration, but it is not. Our technical experts are working night and day to reduce our losses by faster aircraft, by greater hitting power, and through the development of better equipment, but those losses would be reduced in a far more sensational way if all leakage of information to the enemy could suddenly be stopped.

If you see security as a weapon, you will realize that it is as vital to the safety of a man as cannon and ammunition; more so, because guns can run out of ammunition or jam, but security need never break down if only all military personnel will give it the attention it deserves.

It is not only the security of the Army which is your concern. It is just as much your duty to protect the security of the Navy by giving away nothing about them which could be of help to the enemy, and by silencing anyone you meet who is talking about their secrets.

It is your duty not only to keep your mouth shut, but also to see that others do the same. If you know any secret information, keep it to yourself; and if a friend of yours knows something secret, do not try to find out what it is.

It must be your duty to acquire security-mindedness in yourself, and then spread the gospel of security among others so that they can learn the wisdom you have already learned.

In wartime no one is ever fully off duty, and no one must ever be momentarily off guard.

DON'T TALK

1. ABOUT TROOPS:
   Location, except for troops in training and on police duty.
   Where, when, or how troop movements will be made.
   Characteristics and limitations of equipment or weapons.
   Concentration or special training of units.

2. ABOUT HARBORS, SHIPS, AND CARGOES:
   Location, destination or cargo of United States, allied, or neutral vessels.
   Any information about a transport, convoy, harbor defense, or mine field.
   Construction or proposed launchings.
   Condition and set-up of shipyards.
   Sinking or damage until officially announced.

3. ABOUT DAMAGE:
   Generally speaking, do not disclose any information in your possession as to damage done to our side by any action of the enemy.

4. ABOUT AIRPLANES:
   Production of any plant or number in any military unit.
   Location, destination, or time of departure of air units.
   Troop movements or war material shipment by air.
   Characteristics and limitations.
   Development or experiment.
   Name, plans, or orders of members of Air Transport Command.

MORE

5. ABOUT FORTIFICATIONS AND ANTIAIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS:
   - Location and description.
   - Location of bomb shelters or camouflaged objects or other defense precautions.
   - Any information of United States installations outside the United States.

6. ABOUT PRODUCTION:
   - Don't give out any information on production known to you. Let the other fellow get what he's supposed to know out of the newspapers.

7. ABOUT WEATHER:
   - Don't pass on information of weather conditions other than that which appears in your local newspaper.

8. ABOUT RUMORS AND HARMFUL STORIES:
   - Don't repeat stories--
     - Which stir up racial discussion.
     - Inimical to our friendship with or in criticism of our allies.
     - Of the enemy's prowess.
     - Of our inefficiencies or shortcomings.
     - About a shortage of or poor quality of our equipment.
   - Challenge all rumors.

END

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FOR RELEASE MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1943

EDUCATORS TO OBSERVE ARMY'S ORDNANCE TRAINING METHODS AT PROVING GROUND

At the invitation of the Commanding General, Services of Supply, a group of presidents and deans of engineering colleges and universities will visit the Aberdeen Proving Ground of the Army Ordnance Department, Aberdeen, Maryland, on January 12, 13 and 14 to observe the Army's methods of training Ordnance personnel, the War Department announced today.

As members of the Association of Land Grant Colleges, the educators are making the trip at their own request and expense to see how the Ordnance Department has solved the problem of teaching the difficult technical aspects of maintenance to soldiers whose job is to keep equipment firing and moving at the fighting fronts. Ordnance troops have the job of repairing all types of guns and all kinds of mobile fighting equipment in overseas theaters of operation as well as in the continental United States.

Colonel Harold J. Conway, Chief of Military Training, and Colonel Grosvenor Powell, Chief of the Doctrines Branch, Military Training Division, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, will accompany the educators at the Proving Ground.

Major General C. T. Harris, Commanding General of the Aberdeen Proving Ground, will be host to the visitors.

The following college presidents and deans have notified the Chief of Ordnance that they will attend the study:

Dr. J. E. Hannum, Assistant Dean of Engineering, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Alabama.

Dr. G. P. Stocker, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas.

Dr. M. P. O'Brien, Chairman, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, California.

Dr. Robert C. Gowdy, Dean, College of Engineering and Commerce, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Dr. S. B. Earle, Dean, School of Engineering, Clemson Agricultural College, Agriculture and Mechanical College of South Carolina, Clemson, South Carolina.

MORE

Dr. N. A. Christensen, Dean, School of Engineering, Colorado State College, Fort Collins, Colorado.

Dr. S. C. Hollister, Dean, College of Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

Dr. R. L. Spencer, Dean, School of Engineering, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware.

Dr. Joseph Weil, College of Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida.

Dr. H. T. Heald, President, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois.

Dr. M. L. Enger, Dean and Director, College of Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.

Dr. C. C. Williams, President, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

Dr. L. J. Lassalle, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Dr. Paul Cloke, Dean, College of Technology, University of Maine, Orono, Maine.

Dr. S. S. Steinberg, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.

Dr. Karl T. Compton, President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Dr. H. B. Dirks, Dean, Division of Engineering, Michigan State College, East Lansing, Michigan.

Mr. A. R. Cullimore, President, or Dr. H. E. Walter, Professor in Mechanical Engineering, Newark College of Engineering, Newark, New Jersey.

Dr. Thorndike Saville, Dean, College of Engineering, New York University, University Heights, New York.

Dr. L. L. Vaughan, Acting Dean of Engineering, North Carolina State College, University of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina.

Lieutenant Colonel E. C. MacQuigg, Ordnance Reserve, Dean, College of Engineering, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

Dr. E. A. Holbrook, Dean, School of Engineering, and Dr. F. L. Bishop, Secretary, Society for the Promotion of Engineering Education, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Dr. W. H. Carson, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.

Dr. P. H. Daggett, Dean, College of Engineering, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Dr. S. B. Morris, Dean, School of Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford University, California.

Dr. N. W. Dougherty, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee.

Dr. E. B. Morris, Dean, of Engineering, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Virginia.

Dr. R. D. Goodrich, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN P.M. PAPERS, MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1943

FORTY-NINE PLANTS RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD

Selection of forty-nine additional industrial plants to receive the Army-Navy Production Award in recognition of outstanding performance on war work was announced today by Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal.

The names and addresses of these plants are:

Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, Frankford Plant, The Barrett Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
American Seating Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan.
Anderson Brass Works, Incorporated, Shell Plant, Birmingham, Alabama.
Arter Grinding Machine Company, Worcester, Massachusetts.
Atlantic Products Corporation, Trenton, New Jersey.
The Bamberger Reinthal Company, Cleveland, Ohio.
The Bethlehem Silk Company, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
The Black & Decker Manufacturing Company, Towson, Maryland.
Boston Gear Works, North Quincy, Massachusetts.
The Brewster Company, Shreveport, Louisiana.
Bridgeport Fabrics, Incorporated, Hollis Avenue Plant, Bridgeport, Connecticut.
Bridgeport Fabrics, Incorporated, Wood Avenue Plant, Bridgeport, Connecticut.
Butler Manufacturing Company, Kansas City, Missouri.
Continental Roll and Steel Foundry Company, Duquesne Division Plant, Coraopolis, Pennsylvania.
Corning Glass Works, Corning, New York.
Ehrhardt Tool and Machine Company, St. Louis, Missouri.
The Joseph N. Eisendrath Company, Marinette, Wisconsin.
Electronic Laboratories, Incorporated, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Equinox Mills, Anderson, South Carolina.
Ford, Bacon and Davis, Incorporated, Arkansas Ordnance Plant, Jacksonville, Arkansas.
Ford Motor Company, Aircraft Engine Division, Dearborn, Michigan.
Formica Insulation Company, Cincinnati, Ohio.
General Motors Corporation, Rochester Products Division, Rochester, New York.
General Power, Incorporated, Quapaw, Oklahoma.
Goddard and Goddard Company, Incorporated, Detroit, Michigan.
George Gorton Machine Company, Racine, Wisconsin.

MORE

Hercules Powder Company, Kenvil Plant, Kenvil, New Jersey.
Hercules Powder Company, Parlin Plant, Parlin, New Jersey.
The Hoover Company, North Canton, Ohio.
The Hunkin-Conkey Construction Company and Holabird and Root, Scioto Ordnance Plant, Marion, Ohio.
International Register Company, Chicago, Illinois.
Merck and Company, Incorporated, Rahway Plant, Rahway, New Jersey.
Michigan Seamless Tube Company, South Lyon, Michigan.
The Morley Company, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
National Carbon Company, Incorporated, Krene Division, Bennington, Vermont.
National Machine Products Company, Detroit, Michigan.
Pacolet Manufacturing Company, Mill #4, New Holland, Georgia.
The Perfection Steel Body Company, Galion, Ohio.
Portland Forge and Foundry Company, Portland, Indiana.
Powers and Company, Chicago, Illinois.
Powers and Company, River Forest, Illinois.
Revere Copper and Brass, Incorporated, Michigan Division, Detroit, Michigan.
Sanderson and Porter, Elwood Ordnance Plant, Joliet, Illinois.
Schwitzer and Cummins Company, Plant #1, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Sharp and Dohme, Incorporated, Biological Laboratory, Glenolden, Pennsylvania.
Sharp and Dohme, Incorporated, Pharmaceutical Plant, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Tokheim Oil Tank and Pump Company, Fort Wayne, Indiana.
West Construction Company, Kenai Peninsula, Alaska.
Andrew Weston Company, Incorporated, Montauk Point, New York.

Each of the selected plants will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award Pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN PAPERS OF SUNDAY, JANUARY 17, 1943

FIRST COMPLETE WAR HISTORY OF AIR FORCES GROUP COMPILED FROM RECORDS OF 27th BOMBARDMENT UNIT

The story of the Army Air Forces 27th Bombardment Group, most of whose members are now held prisoners of war by the Japanese in the Philippines, as revealed in the diaries of the score of survivors who escaped to carry on the fight from Australia, was made public by the War Department today.

The 27th, a light bombardment group, was unable to fight back when the Japanese attacked the Philippines from the air on December 8, 1941, as their only weapons, A-24 dive bombers, en route from the United States, never reached them. They were diverted, subsequently, to Australia.

Less than 30 officers and men escaped from the Philippines, most of them early on the morning of December 18, 1941, in a C-39 cargo plane and two dilapidated B-18's, the only planes available. Their intention was to pick up their dive bombers in Australia and return to the Philippines. Events, however, delayed that mission, and in the meantime the small group dedicated itself "to repay the Japanese 10,000 times over for every one of our men lost."

A compilation of the diaries of his men was brought to Washington, D. C., by Colonel John H. Davies, Commanding Officer of the 27th Group, who recently returned to the United States after having led his men in dozens of battles against the Japanese over Java, New Guinea, New Britain, and in several air attacks on Japanese shipping in the Philippines. Before leaving Australia, Colonel Davies paid tribute "to the surviving officers and men of the 27th Bombardment Group"in the following words:

"To those of you who were able to carry on the fight from this theater of activity (Australia), you have my highest praise. Your determination to get something to fight with and your struggle to get it where it could

MORE

be used regardless of the tremendous handicaps confronting you proved your loyalty to your country. You exemplified the spirit of getting the job done regardless of hardships and heartaches. That spirit is the stuff that our country depends on to accomplish the task facing us today. You are worthy of every praise I can possibly give you, and I take this opportunity to salute you."

The diaries of the 27th Bombardment group survivors were compiled by Captain James B. McAfee, Air Corps, Intelligence Officer of the group. The preface, which is a personal challenge from the survivors to the Japanese, states in part:

"For the want of airplanes the 27th Group lost its life . . . however, Tojo, there might not have been enough airplanes in the Philippines for the 27th Group, but don't you wish you had captured us all? God give us strength!"

The following officers and men of the 27th Bombardment Group besides Colonel Davies, escaped from the Philippines, some of whom later were killed in action, wounded or listed as missing in action:

Major Herman F. Lowery, Air Corps, (Distinguished Flying Cross and Distinguished Service Cross), whose father, Mr. Herman G. Lowery, lives at 1119 Main Street, Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Reported missing in action.

Major Floyd W. Rogers, Air Corps, (Distinguished Flying Cross), whose father Mr. George H. Rogers, lives at Route #4, Sheridan, Arkansas. Reported missing in action.

First Lieutenant Ralph L. L. Schmidt, Air Corps, (Silver Star), whose Father, Mr. Oliver J. Schmidt, lives at 212 East College Avenue, Greenville, Illinois. Reported missing in action.

Captain Gustave M. Heiss, Air Corps, (Silver Star), whose father, Mr. Gustave M. Heiss, lives at 2325 Wroxton Road, Houston, Texas. Reported missing in action.

Captain Glenwood G. Stephenson, Air Corps, (Purple Heart), whose wife, Mrs. Ann Grace Stephenson, lives at 412 East Duffy Street, Savannah, Georgia. Reported killed.

First Lieutenant Richard R. Birnn, Air Corps, (Distinguished Flying Cross), whose parents, Colonel and Mrs. Roland Birnn, live at 3162 Westover Drive, S. E., Washington, D. C. Reported killed.

Second Lieutenant Douglas B. Tubb, Air Corps, (Silver Star), whose mother, Mrs. Delie B. Tubb, lives at Smithville, Mississippi. Killed in action.

Second Lieutenant Edwin C. Townsend, Air Corps, (Silver Star), whose mother, Mrs. R. G. Townsend, lives at 625 9th Avenue, Brookings, South Dakota. Reported killed.

MORE

SURVIVORS:

Major Ronald D. Hubbard, Air Corps, (Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star), 966 Dana Street, Northeast, Warren, Ohio.

Major Thomas P. Gerrity, Air Corps, 7838 Escanaba Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

Major Harry J. Galusha, Air Corps, (Distinguished Flying Cross), 1316 College, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Captain Frank P. Bender, Air Corps, (Silver Star), whose wife, Mrs. Joan Carter Bender, lives at 716 East 54 Street, Savannah, Georgia.

Captain James B. McAffee, Air Corps, (Silver Star), 301 Hermitage Road, Charlotte, North Carolina.

Captain James R. Smith, Air Corps, (Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star), 1701 3rd Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana.

Captain Robert G. Ruegg, Air Corps, (Distinguished Service Cross), Route #1, Boring, Oregon.

Captain Julius B. Summers, Jr., Air Corps, (Distinguished Flying Cross), Somerville, Tennessee.

Captain Henry J. Rose, Air Corps, (Silver Star), 4224 Arcady, Dallas, Texas.

Captain Leland A. Walker, Jr., Air Corps, (Distinguished Service Cross), 839 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Captain James H. Mangan, Air Corps, (Silver Star), 3135 East Laurelhurst Drive, Seattle, Washington.

Captain Francis E. Timlin, Air Corps, (Silver Star), Scranton, North Dakota.

Captain Oliver C. Doan, Air Corps, 528 4th Street, La Salle, Illinois.

Captain Robert F. M. Hambaugh, Air Corps, 904 Highland Street, Homewood, Alabama.

Captain Howard B. West, Air Corps, (Silver Star), Excelsior, Minnesota.

Captain Thomas P. Talley, Air Corps, (Distinguished Flying Cross), R. F. D. #1, Smyrna, Georgia.

Captain (then Master Sergeant) William A. Wesley, Air Corps, at 407 Avenue "A", East Barksdale Field, Louisiana. He was born at Folkestone, England.

First Lieutenant Alexander R. Salvatore, Air Corps, 329 West Magnolia Avenue, Glendale, California.

Master Sergeant William H. Hewitt, Air Corps, Joaquin, Texas.

Following is a summary of the brief history of the 27th Light Bombardment Group as gleaned from the diaries of the pilots who got out of the Philippines:

MORE

The 27th Bombardment Group came into being in February, 1940, at Barksdale Field, Louisiana. Major General (then Colonel) Clarence L. Tinker, who was lost in action during the Midway Battle, was its first Commanding Officer. The Group moved to Savannah, Georgia, in October of that year, and trained in B-18's, A-20's, and A-24's in dive bombing and ground strafing. At that time Colonel (then Major) Davies was its Operations Officer.

After participating in the large-scale Louisiana maneuvers of 1941, the 27th sailed from San Francisco, bound for the Philippines, on the U. S. S. Coolidge. Arriving at Manila in late November, the young pilots soon had their first taste of war.

As their airplanes had not been shipped with them on the same boat, the Group spent their time getting settled while awaiting their arrival.

An entry in one of the diaries notes that most of the Group attended the big Army and Navy game at Manila on November 29, at which Captain Colin Kelly was supposed to have been fourth cheer leader, but was absent as he was on "alert" at Clark Field.

December 7, 1941, was a day of peace for the 27th Group, due to the difference in time between Hawaii and the Philippines. On that day they were challenged to a soft ball game at the Manila Polo Club. A dinner climaxed the day. And then came dawn...and war.

At 4:30 A.M. (Manila time), on December 8, 1941, Colonel Davies received a telephone call that Pearl Harbor had been bombed. Then, at 8:00 A.M. more calls started to come in, reporting other raids, mostly in the Philippines. Clark Field and Iba were hardest hit. When the raids started the 27th Group was in quarters No. 4 at Fort McKinley. Headquarters was moved to a tent in a ravine back of the Fort, where Second Lieutenant George Kane, Group Adjutant, kept the paper work going.

Without their planes, the only weapons they had were a few pistols. From somewhere they got 450 rifles and started training. Among other tasks, they furnished crews for three B-18's being used as transports, operated Neilson Field for the Interceptor Command, manned machine guns at Nichols Field, and sent a detail of 10 officers to Clark Field to fly P-40's,

MORE

which they never did get to fly because there were not enough of them.

"As we had no planes," writes one of the pilots, "our main action was getting mad at the ack-ack. The guns covering the triangle of Nichols Field, Neilson Field, and Fort McKinley, got so hot from constant use they had to cease firing in the middle of the raids to cool off.

"Then a telephone call came that our A-24's had arrived and were waiting at the dock. A frantic rush to the docks revealed nothing except that there were probably a 5th columnist or two in Luzon...and that they had our telephone number!"

Another entry:

"The officers ordered to report to Clark Field to fly P-40's headed for Neilson Field, grabbing parachutes and Mae Wests, to fly Major General Lewis H. Brereton's C-49 to their destination. While waiting, the Nips came. We all headed for a ditch when the Zeros hit the plane, which burned. As the Japs strafed us, Second Lieutenant John C. Wienert tried to hit them with his .45........We did get to Clark Field later, but we didn't get to fly any P-40's."

On December 10, the officers and men of the 27th Group assigned to Clark Field were already in their foxholes at 8:00 A.M. The Japs buzzed overhead, strafing and bombing, hour after hour. Around 11:30 A.M., a Negro mess sergeant remarked, "Well, boss, guess they'll be going home for lunch soon." When the Zeros were still overhead at 1:15 P.M., he stuck his head up and cried out, "Lordy me! they done brung their lunch with them!"

They looked forward to relief from raids on December 11th. It was raining and the ceiling was less than 2500 feet but..."then 1[illegible] Jap bombers came through a hole in the clouds. They were so low we could see their bomb bays open, and the eggs drop. Some of the bombs fell on a sign that read: 'To Whom It May Concern'....and brother, they were all of us!"

During an early raid one morning, Captains (then Lieutenants) Summers and Walker grew bold. They filled their plates with eggs and settled behind a house to eat their breakfast. A hissing noise caused them to raise their heads without missing a bite. Later investigation showed that a dud

bomb dropped 50 feet from them. "This destroyed their appetites for the next few hours."

One day Lieutenant Summers and some other officers passed a house bearing the name of an officer with whom he had roomed at West Point. Their curiosity aroused, they entered, and were surprised to see a dining room table set for 7, and a half-eaten meal. Closer inspection showed that the salad was congealed and ants crawling over the food...and a newspaper dated December 8, 1941...Remarked Lieutenant Summers, "Looked as if the boys had been disturbed and rushed to battle stations...But they had left 2 cases of Coca Cola. Life was OK until the Nips bombed the ice house."

When the Clark Field contingent was recalled to Manila on December 17, 1941, they estimated that they had undergone 35 air raids in 5 days.

December 17, 1941, was an important day in the history of the 27th Bombardment Group. On that day some officers were called to headquarters and told to collect 30 pounds of personal baggage and report to Nichols Field.

At the field were a C-39 cargo plane and 2 dilapidated B-18 bombers. The officers were summoned for their "briefing" (instructions) before the take-off, and it was only then that they learned that their destination was Australia.

"Came 3:00A.M. The band moved as one for the field, talking quietly and trying not to notice the stench of dead horses, and people buried in the wreckage of the native dwellings. A broken gas main lent its own odor. The shattered hangars cast a weird framework in the glow of fires on their floors."

They took off from a blacked-out field, from a 2500-foot bomb-torn runway, overloaded, and with a mechanic at the end of the strip with a flashlight. Gaining altitude, they ran into cold weather. The pilot of the C-39 tried to close a ventilator in the cockpit, only to find that it was a 6-inch shrapnel gash. Thirty such holes were later discovered in the plane.

On Christmas Eve, December 24, 1941, the contingent arrived in Brisbane, Australia, by flyingboat from Darwin, where they had landed in their planes.

MORE

"A sadder looking bunch has never been seen walking up the sidewalk to Lennons' Hotel. And we were stared at from every angle. Two days of living on the floor of a seaplane had made our clean borrowed Aussie uniforms mere filthy rags. Unceremoniously unloaded from 6 cabs, the boys piled everything they owned on the sidewalk. Each had a gas mask, tin helmet, pistol...and to the Brisbanites, who realized for the first time that war was really on, it was quite a shock.

"The refugees were now in civilization again: a wonderful hotel, and it was Christmas Eve...but we were hardly in a Christmas mood."

What was probably on the minds of these pilots who had made their escape from the Philippines is expressed in the following words...which were not written until later, when it was obvious that they would not be able to rejoin the main body of the Group with their planes:

"What happened to the 27th we won't know until Tokio gives up. Never before in U. S. history has the Air Force been reduced to fighting on its feet, and never did any group of men fight more bravely or heroically. Those of us who left you during the early stages of the war are proud to have been a part of that gallant band!"

Contrasted to this is the hopeful notation of an officer of the 27th, who was left behind in the Philippines, but later managed to rejoin his squadron in Australia: "The 27th Group Commander, Colonel Davies, and a number of pilots left early this morning, December 18, 1941, by plane for Australia. Plan is for them to pick up our A-24 dive bombers and return to us here in the Philippine Islands."

In Australia, the remnant of the 27th Group picked up their A-24's and managed to assemble them despite lack of facilities. Then they opened an operational training school, which was named "Little Randolph," to train pilots fresh from the United States bound for the Philippines but unable to get there because of the Japanese attack on the islands. Captain (then Second Lieutenant) Ruegg flew the first of the assembled A-24's, which was "probably the first American warplane assembled on foreign shores by American crews."

MORE

"Time ran out for us to return to the Philippine Islands, but we did manage to fly some needed drugs to Americans in Mindanao. All the way back we flew on 7 cylinders or less, with one hand on the rip cord and one eye on the oil pressure."

On February 5, 1942, the first flight of the 27th Bombardment Group's A-24's left for Java, flying with a ceiling at times as low as 50 feet. They landed on improvised airfields made from rice paddies covered with bamboo mats and 4 inches of dirt. Several planes stuck in the mud and had to be lifted out by main strength. A few days later Major Galusha and Captain Summers flew to Bali and gave the Japs their first taste of the 27th's dive bombing, sinking a cruiser and a destroyer.

Toward the end of February, the 27th Group took part in an aerial action off the coast of Java against a Japanese invasion fleet of 33 warships and 43 transports. To the astonishment of his comrades, Major Galusha flew over the whole enemy invasion fleet, as if looking for something. Later he explained that he "was looking for an aircraft carrier to bomb!"

The records of the Group contain several such instances, in which the pilots completely disregarded overwhelming odds in their campaign to make the Japanese pay heavily for their attack on the Philippines. While on his way back to Port Moresby on a reconnaissance mission, Captain Rose, dodging through a thunderstorm, suddenly came upon a Japanese submarine, fully surfaced a mile ahead. Although his B-25 medium bomber was without bombs, Captain Rose tried to sink the submarine with machine gun fire! Another case is that of a pilot of a light dive bomber who single-handed attacked and tried to shoot down a huge and heavily-armed Japanese flying boat.

Summoned to a northeastern Australian base toward the end of March, the 27th Group personnel were attached to another Light Bombardment Group, in which they became the leading element. Early in April Colonel Davies was ordered to pick up some B-25 medium bombers at Brisbane. Their first mission in the new planes was a bombing mission to Gasmata, New Britain, A Japanese landing strip. There was little interception, light ack-ack, and their bombs went right up the Japanese runway, destroying planes on the ground.

MORE

The Gasmata raid was a prelude to bigger things...bombing of the Japanese in the Philippine Islands!

Under the leadership of Colonel Davies, 10 B-25's raided the Philippines 4 times on two days, April 12 and 13. Fifteen of the pilots were members of the old 27th Group. Their targets were shipping at Cebu and Davao. Results: 3 enemy transports sunk, 4 damaged, and 3 seaplanes destroyed. Colonel Davies, who shot down a Japanese seaplane, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for this action.

Evidence of the satisfaction felt by the 27th Group pilots after this raid is contained in the following entry in one of the diaries:

"The Empire of Japan bought the 27th Bombardment Group. On April 10, 1942, they, the exchequers of the Japanese war machine, closed the account of the 27th Group, and marked it 'Paid in Bataan.' Strictly speaking, that was a very essential view...a slant-eyed view, you might say...for on April 11 (the date they were ordered to bomb the Philippines) the survivors of the 27th Group re-opened the account, and this time it was marked 'Bought on Bataan.' The account at this writing is still open and many installments have been paid, but the final installment will be paid by Tokio."

After the Philippine Islands raid, the 27th, as a part of the new Group, participated in patrols, reconnaissance flights and bombing missions over Japanese bases and shipping. To their A-24's and B-25's, were added A-20 light bombers. It was in these latter planes that they struck at Lae, the principal base from which the Japanese Zeros were operating in the area. Following is a brief account of one such raid on August 30, 1942:

"Our A-20's, flying on the treetops, flashed over the crest of a hill, and before the startled and confused Japs could make a move, swept across the airdromes and camp at 300 miles per hour, spraying lead from all guns. Planes on the ground were riddled and the ack-ack guns of the enemy, making a vain attempt to hit our planes, were blasted into silence....A group of Jap officers and men, trapped on a porch, fled in wild confusion as the planes poured lead into them. The A-20's, untouched, raced away at zero altitude....the Japs had felt the baptism of fire of the new A-20's."

MORE

From that time on the members of the old 27th did most of their damage against the Japanese in their A-20's, attacking jungle troops along the peaks and gorges of the Owen Stanley range, at Salamaua...at Buna Bay. But even though they had become part of a new Group, the members of the 27th never forgot their loyalty to the old organization, as the following words from one of the diaries make clear:

"No officers or enlisted men from the 27th Bombardment Group ever forgot he was from the 27th. The work they did was done with the 27th in mind, always!"

END

NOTE: Photographs available in Press Branch, Bureau of Public Relations.

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FOR RELEASE IN A.M. PAPERS, MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1943

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Blueridge Company, Incorporated, Glasgow, Rockbridge County, Virginia
Broad Brook Company, Broad Brook, Connecticut
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company, Cleveland Plant, Cleveland, Ohio
Ciba Pharmaceutical Products, Incorporated, Summit, New Jersey
E. I. duPont deNemours & Company, Dye Works, Deepwater Point, New Jersey
A. B. Farquhar Company, Limited, York, Pennsylvania
Fidelity Machine Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Fleetwings, Incorporated, Plant #1, Bristol, Pennsylvania
Hussman-Ligonier Company, St. Louis, Missouri
Illinois Tool Works, Chicago, Illinois
C. O. Jelliff Manufacturing Corporation, Southport, Connecticut
Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Company, Jackson Plant, Jackson, Michigan
Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Company, McGraw Plant, Detroit, Michigan
Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Company, Military Plant, Detroit, Michigan
Martin Dyeing & Finishing Company, Bridgeton, New Jersey
Michigan Maple Block Company, Petoskey, Michigan
Midwest Manufacturing Company, Galesburg, Illinois
The Pipe Machinery Company, Cleveland, Ohio
Pratt and Letchworth Company, Incorporated, Buffalo, New York
Ripon Knitting Works, Ripon, Wisconsin
Simonds Saw & Steel Company, Intervale Plant, Fitchburg, Massachusetts
Simonds Saw & Steel Company, North Street Plant, Fitchburg, Massachusetts
Specialty Manufacturing Company, Houston, Texas
Stoner Manufacturing Corporation, Aurora, Illinois
Texas Washer Company, Houston, Texas
Tools & Gages, Incorporated, Cleveland, Ohio
Triangle Package Machinery Company, Chicago, Illinois
Trailer Company of America, Cincinnati, Ohio
Vermont Tap & Die Corporation, Lyndonville, Vermont
Vinco Corporation, Detroit, Michigan
Wannamaker Chemical Company, Orangeburg, South Carolina
Wittek Manufacturing Company, Chicago, Illinois

Each of the selected plants will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award Pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

END

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FOR MORNING PAPERS OF JANUARY 21, 1943

AAF TO SPEED UP PILOT TRAINING BY INCREASED USE OF CAA FACILITIES

The Army Air Forces announced today an important expansion of their use of Civil Aeronautics Administration facilities in connection with their program for the training of combat and service pilots. The new plans, which have been under discussion for several weeks, have the complete approval of the Department of Commerce.

Under the expanded program the name "CPT" (Civilian Pilot Training) has been changed to "CAA War Training Service." The revised training schedule will be separated into two divisions.

In the first division training will be given, by a continuation of the series of courses now in operation, to men who will eventually qualify as transport pilots and instructors. Sufficient candidates are either now already in training, or are enrolled and awaiting call, to meet the requirements of this division for approximately the next year. Generally speaking these men are not eligible, for physical or other reasons, to serve as combat pilots. They will receive without charge tuition, subsistence and quarters.

In the second division new special qualification courses will be conducted for a certain proportion of prospective aviation cadets prior to their entry into the regular AAF schools. The number will depend on the amount of equipment available. At the present time a large number of these men are in the Army Enlisted Reserve, awaiting call to active duty. It is expected that these men will be called in the near future and assigned to approximately 100 colleges

MORE

selected throughout the country in localities where flying fields are conveniently available. The colleges selected will be announced as soon as the list is completed. At these colleges the men will receive a course of study and training under the direction of AAF officers. This course will be supplemented in its latter part by not to exceed 10 hours flying instruction by the CAA War Training Service to the extent that facilities permit. Men who are found unqualified for additional flying training will be eliminated as pilot trainees and will be used in other capacities by the Army Air Forces. In this way the percentage of cadets eliminated in the regular AAF schools should be reduced, and the work at these schools benefited.

The college courses in the second division are scheduled to commence in April. A large number of the schools and colleges now giving CAA training will participate in the program.

The entire arrangement will provide for a maximum utilization of existing CAA facilities, and will assist in meeting the demands for pilots both by direct training and by increasing the output of the regular AAF schools.

END

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January 23, 1943

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

12th GENERAL STAFF AND 4th S.O.S. STAFF COURSES BEGIN ON FEBRUARY 8

The Twelfth General Staff Course and Fourth Services of Supply Staff Course of the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, running concurrently and each of nine weeks' duration, will begin on February 8, 1943, the War Department announced today.

The Twelfth General Staff Course will provide instruction in military organization, the function of commanders, staffs, and services of large units (primarily divisions), and the operation thereof to include air-ground cooperation and task forces in combined operations, with the objective of developing general, air, and special staff officers for duty with divisions and similar units.

All students will receive comprehensive instruction in all general staff sections and in the special staffs. Then the students will be given specific applicatory training in the staff work of the type division or air command from which they are detailed. Students from non-divisional sources will receive appropriate related training.

Officers selected will not be below the grade of captain and should be suitable material for assignment to staff sections or for assignment as instructors at special service schools. Preference will be given to officers under 40 years of age who are graduates of a special service school.

MORE

The Fourth Services of Supply Staff Course will train selected officers in military organization, basic staff principles, and staff functions peculiar to zone of interior and theater of operations, installations and operations, including service commands, ports of embarkation, and Services of Supply in general.

Officers selected will not be below the grade of captain and should be assigned or considered suitable material for assignment to staffs of Services of Supply installations.

It is emphasized that the responsibilities of staff officers are so great and the success of combat is so dependent upon efficient operation that only outstanding officers are to be sent to the Command and General Staff School, even if allotted quotas are not filled. Quotas for 842 vacancies in the General Staff Course and for 320 vacancies in the Services of Supply Staff Course have been allotted to the Army Ground Forces, Air Forces, Services of Supply, and the major Defense Commands.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN PAPERS OF SATURDAY, JANUARY 23, 1943

ARMY NOW GIVING ADDITIONAL COURSES IN ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

Additional courses in the operation and maintenance of electrical generating equipment in electrical plants now are being given to enlisted men, it was announced today by Lieutenant-General Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces.

This instruction is a part of the Army's program for the training of enlisted men in skilled trades for military purposes, and incidentally to better equip them for civilian life following the war. The courses in electrical generating equipment maintenance just announced will be conducted at the factory of the D. W. Onan and Sons and Company, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

END

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FOR RELEASE AFTER DELIVERY

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR,
BEFORE THE 6TH BIENNIAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS IN
THE EMERSON HOTEL, BALTIMORE, MD.,
8:30 P.M., E.W.T., SUNDAY, JANUARY 24, 1943.

Tonight the war news is good.

In Africa, in the South Pacific and in Russia, the Axis is in retreat. All over the world, forces of the United Nations, joined in their common cause, are driving the enemy before them.

The most heartening news continues to come from Russia. From the Baltic to the Caucasus the Russians are driving the invaders back. In war it is essential to seize the offensive, and the Nazis themselves admit that the Russians have seized the offensive. Last week they raised the 17-month siege of Leningrad. That is an event that will go down in history. Nazi strength around Stalingrad is fading fast. The divisions encircled there face extinction. The fate of the Nazi forces in the Caucasus depends on whether they can withdraw before the Russians can cut off their line of supply around Rostov.

The Nazis have lost heavily in men and in munitions, and they are getting no rest. Already they have lost thousands of square miles of the land they gave so much in blood to win last summer. It appears now that the Russians may force them back to the Dnieper River.

So Hitler has his hands full in Russia.

He has his hands full in Africa, too.

Rommel is setting records in running backwards. He digs in, fortifies himself and then runs away. The Nazis call it "disengagement according to plan." Now he has "disengaged" himself from Tripoli. The last of Italy's African empire is in our hands, and the once supreme Afrika Korps is on the run again. The credit for this great victory is due to the heroic British Eighth Army. I am glad to say that the American Army Air Forces serving with that army did their share.

In Tunisia, the bitter fighting is still to come. Americans, British and French are today pressing against the Nazis and the mud. The delay in large-scale offensive fighting has been due to the weather and to problems of supply. Overhead, our planes are holding the skies in bitter combat, knocking down two Axis planes for every one of ours lost.

On the other side of the world, General MacArthur's men, Australians and Americans, have smashed a tough task force in New Guinea. They have wiped out a Japanese force of 15,000 men. In the Solomons, we are pushing them back, too. Unless the Japanese can do more than they have been able to do so far in getting in reinforcements and supplies, their force on Guadalcanal will be extinguished in the same way that their force in New Guinea was extinguished.

The American people are fighting mad. The men they have sent to the front are even madder. They have a healthy hatred for the Nazis and the Japanese, and they are showing it every day. They are showing it by outpunching, outshooting, outbayonetting, outflying and outsailing the Axis.

MORE

You have heard stories about how good the Nazis are as soldiers. You have heard other stories about how tough the Japs are as soldiers.

The stories may be true, but what is more important is that our soldiers, the men from your home towns, are better than any Nazi and tougher than any Jap. And our fighting men on the oceans, the sailors in the Navy, have shown their superior fighting qualities, too.

We know that; we know what those men in action have done. We know it from the simple story of a sergeant, a Rhode Island man, who now is back at the Aberdeen Proving Ground giving us the benefit of his combat experience. This sergeant was in the thick of things at Hickam Field when the Japs came over on December 7th. He was shot, but he did not go to the hospital. He Didn't have time, he said. He was too busy working a machine gun. Again last June, he was busy...at Midway where he was servicing the guns on the Flying Fortresses which helped rout the Japanese Fleet.

This same sergeant found his time well occupied, too, when he was assigned to our Air Force detachment at Guadalcanal. He met the Japs again there and found them tough. He said that they were so tough that they would run onto his bayonet. What did you do about it, he was asked. "I let them run," he said.

That's the kind of rugged fighting man who makes up our Army today. He has quickly adapted himself to hardships and privations, to the suffering and pain of war, and to the trickiness and wiles of the enemy. He is able to "take it" and to "dish it out." He has become the best soldier on the face of the earth. And the men in the Navy are just as good.

In the United States Army, you hear the accents of men from all the 48 states. There are men from the Deep South and from the prairies of the midwest; men from textile towns of New England, the big cities of the Atlantic seaboard, men from the mountains, and men reared on the rolling slopes of the Pacific coast.

Some of these men volunteered. Some came through Selective Service. The first large group came in 1940 as your states' contribution to the defense of your nation. They were the 300,000 National Guardsmen.

The calling out of the National Guard units from the states was the first move toward building one great army of the United States.

This meeting is a proper place to pay tribute to the splendid fighting record of the National Guard units.

Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, some of them had gone to far-flung outposts to protect their country.

When the test came, out in the Philippines, National Guardsmen from New Mexico, who made up the 200th Coast Artillery anti-aircraft regiment, were ready. That outfit was cited for outstanding performance of duty in action, the first National Guardsmen to win such distinction in this war.

National Guardsmen from Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio and Kentucky fought on Bataan in the 192nd Tank Battalion. National Guardsmen from Minnesota, Missouri and California fought there, too, in the 194th Tank Battalion.

These men with their companions of the Regular Army and the Philippine Scouts knew what it meant to face overpowering odds.

Recently, General MacArthur cited certain troops for their distinguished service at New Guinea. Among the troops cited were elements of two former National Guard Divisions, the 32nd from Michigan and Wisconsin, and the 41st from Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.

To these soldiers and to the handful of other trained soldiers in our Army two and a half years ago was entrusted the task of protecting our nation

MORE

and our way of life against the forces of aggression. For many an anxious month they stood almost alone. But as the emergency grew more acute, the ranks fil up. From a few hundred thousand men, our Army grew, passed its first million and then its second. Today it stands at over five and a half million, far along on the road toward our vital objective of seven and a half million men by January 1, 1944.

I want to say a few words about the size of our Army. The size of the armed forces necessary to win the war is a military problem to be decided by the military leaders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The people who contend that our Army is too large seem to overlook two important factors. The first of these is that it is as essential to obtain superiority over our enemies in number of soldiers as it is in training and in number and quality of weapons Today it is estimated that the Axis powers and their satellites have under arm 569 divisions. This is considerably more divisions than we and our British and Russian Allies have.

The second point that is also often overlooked is that we are training men in 1943 to fight in 1944. Our training program must contemplate a long w and unfortunately there are no sound reasons to believe that the war will be finished in 1943. Our men must be well trained before they are sent overseas, and that takes time. Today about 20 percent of our forces are overseas. The remainder is here at home training, serving as protective forces, or performing essential supply functions.

The War Department is resolved that no man will be sent onto the battlefield until he has had every single opportunity to learn all there is to know about the business of soldiering. No American soldier, if we can help it, i going to become a casualty through lack of schooling for combat. Every one our men is going to have the best possible chance for survival.

We are building a big army, but we are building it carefully. Your sons and your brothers are going to be the best trained, best equipped soldiers in military history. It is an Army new in weapons, new in ideas.

The Nazis developed the use of tank warfare. We were quick to learn, and our Armored Forces today are the match of any in the world. But that was not enough. We decided that a tank offense could be stopped and must be stopped. We, therefore, went to work on the tank destroyer unit. It has worked out so well, both in tactics and in battle, that it will have a powerful effect on the outcome of the war.

Because this is a war that must be fought under a variety of conditi we are training men to fight on mountains and in deserts, in temperatures from sixty below zero to 130 degrees above, against weapons ranging from huge cannon to little jungle knives.

Our soldiers are undergoing stiff training in Amphibious operations in the South. Others are training on snowshoes and skiis in the extreme cold of 10,000-foot altitudes--at the mountain training posts in the Northwest. Still more soldiers are learning the lessons of desert warfare in sections of the Southwest where the climate closely approaches that of Africa and the conditions for realistic training are unsurpassed.

We are giving certain troops training in the same tactics which characterized the Indian wars of 200 years ago. They are learning what it i to slip noiselessly through wooded areas, to stalk their prey, to guard against ambush. It is training which has stood our men in good stead on Guadalcanal and in New Guinea.

MORE

The Nazis were the first to give wartime usage to the idea of parachute troops, but we intend to be the ones who use it best and most. Our Airborne Command is now training paratroopers and airborne divisions who will be second to none in courage, versatility and aggressiveness. Flying in huge transports, the paratroopers can bail out, parachute to the ground and advance against their objective. A battalion of paratroopers were the first Americans to meet the Nazis in ground combat in Tunisia.

A well-trained American soldier, well-equipped, with good leaders, can prevail against any other soldier in the world. We are giving him the training. To give him the leadership, our officer candidate schools are turning out thousands of splendid junior officers every month.

We are giving him the weapons, too. The strides which were made during the year 1942 in producing planes and guns and tanks for our soldiers have never been equalled. You have heard much, and rightly, of the achievements we have made in manufacturing vast quantities of munitions. But I want you to know that not only is our record in quantity unsurpassed, but so is our record in quality.

Rommels' troops never knew what hit them when they encountered the General Sherman tanks at the Battle of El Alamein. British officers and ranking German officers who were captured said that this tank was the best tank in the desert.

One report to the War Department on these tanks said this: "There is every evidence that, although the enemy knew we had a new type of tank, they grossly underestimated its performance, ability to withstand fire and the number available."

But it was not only tanks; our tank destroyer weapons stopped their panzer divisions short.

That weapon was a 105 mm. howitzer on a self-propelled mount. Last September, an artillery regiment in the British Eighth Army was completely equipped with it. We call it the M-7.

Officers and men of this regiment, after using the M-7 at El Alamein, said it performed splendidly, suffered no technical trouble, and was responsible for the low rate of British casualties in the offensive. The M-7 is heavily protected with armor. Not one of them was knocked out in that battle by Nazi artillery or Nazi bombs.

You have heard much of the performance of our planes in Europe, in Africa and in the Pacific. Our bombers, and our pursuit ships have met the best the enemy has had to offer and they have come off first best. From February 1 to December 31st, 1942, the Army Air Forces destroyed 987 enemy planes in aerial combat and lost but 157, a ratio of 6 to 1.

Smashed railroad centers, shipyards and war factories in Axis territory bear witness to the precision bombing of American airmen.

How well our planes perform, can best be illustrated by reading to you now a report by the Army squadron leader of a joint Army-Navy attack upon the Japanese at Rekata Bay. The mission was carried out by 16 P-39 Army Bell Airacobra fighter planes, and 8 Navy Douglass dive bombers.

"The SBD's started their dive-bombing runs just as dusk was falling. Evidently the attack came as a complete surprise to the 3000 Japs reported on Suavanso Point because they put up very little anti-aircraft fire.

"The P-39s started their dive-bombing runs as soon as the last SBD started down, and then the anti-aircraft really opened up. The tracer bullets coming from the ground at a dozen points stood out like solid streaks of flame. But the P-39s, coming down at 400 miles per hour plus, presented difficult targets.

MORE

"After the 24 planes had dropped their bombs on the target area with only two misses, which were close, the P-39s wheeled in to do their strafing. That was the most beautiful part of the whole show. The Nips didn't have a chance.

"As soon as one P-39 drew anti-aircraft fire from the ground, at least three of his buddies would be all over the gun position like a swarm of hornets, blasting away with machine gun and cannon. That gun position would be silenced in short order.

"At the end of the attack all anti-aircraft guns were silent, the gasoline dump was ablaze and small fires were started in the building areas and supply dumps.

"Seeing that their job was completed, the P-39s pulled off and headed for their Guadalcanal base 158 miles away."

This talk has been a report of progress made, of faith fulfilled. But we have just begun. For us, the battle has only started.

The submarine menace is critical. The sinkings make a sharp cut into the munitions delivered abroad. We have yet to conquer the threat of the German submarines.

We do not forget that the Japanese still control the greater part of the Pacific; the Nazis control practically the whole of Western Europe.

We have only now commenced the long task of driving them back, inch by inch. It will be a task that will cost us dear in lives. Many men will not come back.

We must press forward with all our energy to the winning of the war. Here at home we must produce the munitions essential to victory. We must push on with the building of escort vessels to protect our convoys. We must win our objectives on production of airplanes for the Army and the Navy and for our Allies, for no victory will be won without overwhelming superiority in the air.

The way of battle is uncertain; the tide may turn for the worse for a time. We will encounter the strongest of opposition from countries that are fanatical in their determination to rule the world. Their armies are not yet broken, and they are putting their entire resources into the fight.

The war news, as I said, is good. It does not and it must not give rise to complacency. However, it does lead to the settled conviction that we will be able, no matter how long it takes, to end once and for all the Nazi-Japanese threat to American liberty and to our existence as a free nation.

END

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FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE IN SUNDAY PAPERS, JANUARY 24, 1943

NOTE TO EDITORS:

The following release is sent to you by the War Department for use as a Sunday Column, or in part as short feature stories. Although it is marked for release in Sunday papers, January 24, 1943, the material in it may be used later at your discretion. The suggested heading "ARMY ADDENDA" may be replaced by one selected by you.

ARMY ADDENDA

PATRIOTIC CITIZEN'S DONATION BUYS RIFLE FOR U.S. SOLDIER

A citizen's offer to provide funds for the purchase of a Garand rifle for the use by an American soldier has been accepted by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, it was announced today by the War Department.

The offer was made by Mr. E. E. Cunningham, 173 Riverside Drive, St. Albans, West Virginia, a life member of the National Rifle Association. Regretting his inability to finance a tank, a bomber, or a 75 mm gun, Mr. Cunningham specified the American-invented semi-automatic weapon which has made good in action. In his letter to the War Department he wrote:

"I am sure that many, likely thousands, would take up the idea and follow suit, for many with whom I am in contact are puzzling themselves as to how they can best do more.

"I cannot get out there to knock off a few Japs and others myself, so it would be a lot of satisfaction to know that I personally had a rifle out there doing the job."

Mr. Stimson, expressing his deep appreciation of Mr. Cunningham's desire to purchase a Garand rifle for use by the Army, as a contribution to our war effort, replied:

MORE

"The War Department will be glad to avail itself of your patriotic and generous offer to furnish such a rifle, the cost of which is $80.00. While I regret that it is impracticable to comply fully with your request by having the serial number specified on the bill, and a card attached to the rifle indicating the name of the donor, the Department will be glad to furnish you the serial number of a gun upon receipt of your donation. It will not, of course, be possible to furnish you the name of the soldier to whom the gun is issued or the area in which it will be used."

Under an Act of Congress, approved March 27, 1942, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to accept, on behalf of the United States, gifts of money which are made on condition that they are to be used for a particular war purpose. Citizens who wish to follow Mr. Cunningham's example should make a check payable to the Treasurer of the United States and send it to the War Department, together with a letter stating the purpose of the gift. The check will be forwarded to the Treasury Department with request that the funds be utilized for the purpose expressed. Upon acceptance of the gift, the Secretary of the Treasury will issue a citation certificate in recognition of the patriotic donation made to the United States, and the donor will be informed of the rifle's serial number. A block of serial numbers of Garand rifles has been set aside for such assignment by the Office of The Adjutant General.

Although the name of the rifleman cannot be revealed, a soldier usually memorizes the serial number of his rifle, and it is possible that after the war the man behind the gun and the patriot who provided the funds for it may meet and identify each other.

* * * * * * * * *

ARMY'S NEW JUNGLE BOOTS UNAFFECTED BY MOISTURE

Because leather shoes last only a few weeks under jungle warfare conditions, the Army Quartermaster Corps has developed a rubber and canvas boot to replace standard issue service footgear for tropical wear.

The rubber sole of the new boot contains both crude and reclaimed rubber and is not affected by jungle moisture or soil chemicals. The cloth top, dyed olive drab, provides a cool, porous covering 12 inches high, and prevents leeches and thorns from reaching the skin. It can be cleaned and washed easily.

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MORE

ARMY PIGEON SHOT THREE TIMES DELIVERING MESSAGE IN MOROCCO

According to a report to the War Department from French Morocco, there is somewhere in Long Island City, New York, a fancier who can be proud of a blue check pigeon, "Lady Astor," which he contributed to the Army Signal Corps. Shot twice through the craw and once through a wing, the pigeon dropped exhausted at her home loft at a French Morocco headquarters with an important message from a unit ninety miles away. She was hurt too badly to get to her feet. "Lady Astor," one year old, was given to the Army by a member of the Steinway Club of New York, according to the report from Africa.

The bird's trainer, Sergeant Adam Samson of 42 Washington Place, Totowa, Passaic County, New Jersey, carefully sewed up the wound made by birdshot from a hunter's gun and is confident the bird will live. "She'll never have to work again if I have anything to say about it," he said. "'Lady Astor' has done her bit. I want to thank the person who gave her to us."

The flight was "Lady's" fourteenth since she arrived in French Morocco, Lieutenant Milton T. Prader of Phoenix, Arizona, commanding the pigeon unit, said.

* * * * * * * * *

U.S. SOLDIERS LEARN TO LEAVE SHIP IN TRAINING COURSE IN WESTERN DESERT

In a desert more than 1,000 miles from the ocean soldiers at the Quartermaster Replacement Training Center at Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming, are learning to leave a ship hurriedly and go over to the side into landing barges, the War Department announces.

With the aid of rope ladders strung down the side of a building and platforms that pitch and rock to simulate the movement of a landing barge in a choppy sea, the men are being instructed in going down the ladders with full equipment and into the landing barges below.

The training equipment is the newest addition to the "Cicarelli Circus," the obstacle course named for the Post's director of basic training.

* * * * * * * * *

MORE

CLIPPERS FOR FROZEN WHISKERS INCLUDED IN ARMY BARBER KIT

A barber kit to be issued to units in overseas areas where professional barbers are not available has been developed by the Army Quartermaster Corps.

Kits going to troops in regions where it is too cold to shave will include beard clippers to prevent formation of ice on the whiskers.

Kits going to men in warmer countries will contain two pairs each of clippers and scissors, two shaving brushes, two razors, a strop, hone, and shaving soap, wrapped in a water-repellent canvas roll.

* * * * * * * * *

ARMY REGULATIONS GOVERN TAKING OF AERIAL PHOTOS

New Army instructions governing the taking of aerial photographs stipulate that restricted areas can be photographed from the air only by authorized military units or their civilian employees, and for military purposes only, the War Department announced today. Unrestricted areas can not be photographed from the air by civilians except with permission of military authorities. Such permission will be given only with the understanding that negatives and prints will be submitted to the granting authority prior to use.

* * * * * * * * *

ARMY-NAVY FLYERS PLAY ON SAME TEAM

A report of Army-Navy teamwork in the fighting at Guadalcanal has been received in the War Department from Captain Ray C. Williams, Air Corps, of Waynesburg, Ohio, a member of an Airacobra (P-39) squadron stationed there.

During a recent Japanese dive bombing raid on shipping in the harbor at Guadalcanal, a group of Navy Wildcats (F4F's) attacked the enemy bombing planes. Suddenly three Zeros dove down on the Navy planes, whose pilots were unaware of their presence. The Army Air Forces P-39's immediately went into action and drove the Zeros away.

When the action was over, the Navy pilots, who landed first, waited for the Army flyers. According to Captain Williams, they shook hands warmly as the Navy pilots thanked them.

"Thanks, boys," the latter said, "you can play on our team any time."

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END

2:00 P.M., 1-21-43

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FOR RELEASE IN PAPERS OF SUNDAY, JANUARY 24, 1943

ARMY SOLVES PROBLEM OF FEEDING 5,000,000 U.S. SOLDIERS DAILY THROUGHOUT WORLD

When some 5,000,000 Americans are shifted from civilian life into the Army of the United States, feeding them is not simply a matter of shifting from home markets and dinner tables to the commissaries of the Quartermaster Corps and Army mess halls. The problem is complicated by a variety of requirements and conditions.

The soldier eats nearly twice as much as the civilian.

A scientifically balanced diet is provided by the Army.

Reserves of food, sufficient for large demands and long periods, must be accumulated at strategic points.

Greater consumption, procurement of the foods necessary to balance a diet, massing and moving reserve supplies -- all these and other difficulties are being met and overcome so successfully that our Army is rated the best fed in the world. Yet that reputation is no more a source of pride than the circumstances under which and in spite of which it has been gained.

Mass buying and all other features of the Army Quartermaster Corps program are directed toward maintenance of American standards of living both in our homes and in our Army. Regulation, economies, and conservation required of the civilian have their counterparts in our armed forces.

Nor was that reputation gained at the expense of foreign countries in which our troops are based or which they have invaded. In lands where food is short we ship the supplies needed by our men. We do not follow the practice of the Axis in occupied territory by living off the country and starving the inhabitants.

Finally, the Army's procurement of food is being accomplished in the face of, yet without prejudice to, the demands of Lease-Lend for food to be shipped abroad.

MORE

Food procurement for the Army is a task which the Army itself, with its knowledge of military needs and military procedure and its information on the overall tactical and strategical situation, is best equipped to handle.

Normally, the average soldier eats approximately 5½ pounds of food daily, with a calorie value of 4,500. It follows that an army of 5,000,000 men will eat about 27,500,000 pounds of food every day. These figures represent daily consumption only and do not cover the great quantities which must be stored in this country and at bases overseas for future use.

To fill current and future requirements the Army purchases approximately 15,000 tons of food a day. Its daily food bill is approximately $2,800,000, but it breaks down into a cost of only 56 cents a day, or $204.40 a year, to feed the average enlisted man. Even discounting the saving by mass buying, this is an achievement in economy that any housewife would envy.

A ration is the allowance of food provided by the government for the subsistence of one soldier for one day. (Officers are not entitled to rations but must pay for their own food.) The field ration, which has superseded the garrison ration, consists of the following types and quantities of food:

Meat, poultry, fish or meat substitute--16 oz; eggs--1; butter and other fats--2½ oz; grain products and cereals--12 oz; milk--1 pint; Irish potatoes--12 oz; tomatoes and citrus fruits--4 oz; leafy, green and yellow vegatables--7 oz; other fruits and vegetables--12 oz; sugar--slightly less than 3 ounces. Breads, deserts, and salads make up the remainder of the 5½ lb. allowance. A soldier receives coffee 40 times every 30 days.

Coffee is brewed on the basis of 3 lbs. per 100 men. Eight pounds of butter are allowed for 100 men per day.

The Army's Quartermaster General, buying trainloads of food every day, sometimes takes an entire season's output of a certain item of food to assure the Army of an adequate supply for immediate or near-future needs. He can, in fact, buy unlimited amounts of any food product in the country and he is as discriminating about his purchases as any housewife, but unlike her he must keep a weather eye eternally on supply and demand.

MORE

If his tremendous buying powers were used without regard to the national situation, every housewife, every war worker, and every soldier, too, would suffer. It is to his own as well as to the national advantage that food producers and processers, big and little, be kept in business by avoiding stripping their barns and warehouses to fill his own stocks of food, and that the shelves of the corner grocery store do not stand empty.

Procurement of food for the Army is a job of such proportions that nearly thirty men and women, all recognized experts in processing, buying, packaging, transporting, warehousing, and distributing food have been called in civilian or military capacity in the Subsistence Branch of the Office of The Quartermaster General. Except in emergencies, such as when a quantity of a given food is an immediate, imperative, need for a task force or military expedition, Quartermaster purchases are distributed through more than thirty buying centers scattered throughout the United States and not concentrated in any one area. While meat purchases are for the most part made in the great meat packing center of Chicago, the Quartermaster buying organization operates in food markets throughout the country. There are now thirty-six Army market centers, near large civilian marketing and producing areas where car-load lots can be bought. Those for perishable foods are located convenient to Army posts, camps, and stations. Greater efficiency has been attained by concentration and consolidation. For instance, the Quartermaster Corps now is buying increasingly large quantities of food for the Navy and Marine Corps.

An all-time high in food buying was reached in November, 1942, when the Quartermaster Corps's purchases ran into millions of pounds and cases of perishable and dehydrated foods, canned fruits, fruit juices, canned and dried vegetables, beverages, cereals, canned and preserved meats, fats in oils, and miscellaneous items. To the growing regular demand is sometimes added an unexpected call for which the Quartermaster must be ready. Recently the commanding general in one of the combat areas where our troops now are in action cabled for food to meet emergency needs of the civilian population. From a supply depot to the nearest American port fifty staple items of food, totalling 20,000 tons were drawn. They were loaded and shipped in thirty-six hours.

MORE

Consequently, forward-looking provision for all types of provisions must constantly be made. Already the Army has asked the frosted food industry to produce approximately 50 million pounds of quick-frozen vegetables from the 1943 crop for consumption by our troops within the continental United States. Among other frozen foods, these requirements would include 6,000,000 pounds of snap beans, 10,000,000 pounds of lima beans, 4,000,000 pounds of cut corn, 23,000,000 pounds of green beans, and 10,000,000 pounds of spinach. Quick-frozen vegetables will release large quantities of canned goods for overseas shipment and save considerable tin and steel used in canning.

Vital shipping space is saved by boned meats and the increasing list of dehydrated foods which range literally from soup to nuts and include pre-cooked cereals, that Army staple--beans, rice pudding, and fruit powders which make jams and jellies. "Army spread" is a combination of creamery butter, fresh cheese curd, and skim milk powder, with a butter-fat content of not less than 56%. Intended for soldiers at tropical stations, it will not melt when in containers below a temperature of 120 degrees Fahrenheit. It is also supplied without the cheese.

Whether processed, packaged or perishable, the Army's food is subject to a rigid inspection by Quartermaster Corps officers plus inspection by the Department of Agriculture and the Veterinary Corps which examines meat, fish, and poultry. Quick-frozen and perishable foods are shipped and stored with the proper refrigeration.

It is essential that food in sufficient quantities and of types to make up a balanced diet be stored where they are instantly transferable with troops changing station, going on marches or maneuvers or overseas. It must be ready for immediate shipment abroad. The keynote of the entire program is that everything the individual soldier needs to eat must be available where it can go out with him or ahead of him. Under military necessities and frequently shifting demands, such stores reach mountainous proportions, yet they can no more be allowed to become depleted than can supplies of arms and ammunition.

MORE

Supplies must be on hand not only where troops are stationed but where they may be stationed. Suppose that a division is sent to Base X. Food for that division for an indefinite period -- may be 2 months or maybe 6 -- must be on hand at that base. However, due to the exigencies of war, that division may in the near future be transferred to Base A. Neither the War Department nor the enemy knows whether that transfer actually may take place, yet supplies must be ready at the possible new base. As a result, food is available at two different bases, although the division is at only one. Putting it another way, the Army has furnished food for 2 divisions when there is only one to eat it. That isn't overbuying nor is it wasting food. It simply is good, hard military common sense. Time, like food, is vital in warfare. The food stocks at bases not required in this assumed situation will serve in some other emergency.

Transfer of troops from garrison to theaters of operations increases food requirements. In the main, the bulk of the food for the American soldier though he may be stationed 10,000 miles away, must come from the United States. This poses a shipping problem. Dehydration is one of the answers, and how effective a one it is may be judged from the fact that food may lose as much as three-fourths of its bulk by dehydration so that 100 pounds of food shipped overseas may really mean 400 pounds of farm produce. Another answer is local purchase, with care exercised that it be done without detriment to the local civilian population. Yet while large purchases may be made in Australia, a large country with a small population, England, a small country with a large population, has little to spare; and virtually nothing is available locally in such bases as Iceland. Abroad, as at home, reserves of food must be accumulated against losses in transit or for emergencies, and they cannot be allowed to sink below safe levels.

A soldier in action eats more concentrated food than he did in garrison. But considerable numbers of our troops abroad, not yet in contact with the enemy, eat much as they did at home. Usually troops on foreign service get the same food they got in camp in the United States. It may or may not contain a larger proportion of canned, frozen or dried food rather than fresh, depending on local procurement and shipping conditions.

MORE

For emergency use in the combat zone the soldier relies on packaged field rations. A "K" ration of three meals (one day's food supply) weighs only a fraction more than 2 pounds, but it is heavily fortified. It totals approximately 3,700 calories and consists of concentrated meat pemmican, cheese spread, canned ham and eggs, fortified biscuits, dextrose tablets, soluble beverages such as coffee, lemon juice powder, and cocoa; candy, chewing gum, and a fruit bar. Tens of millions of these rations are being procured and, since they are as good six months from now as today, in hot or cold climates, they are being accumulated in quantities. Again, this is not waste nor hoarding but sound military foresight.

Other field rations are issued on the basis of a ration per man or in special boxes containing sufficient rations for one day for four or five men. This form is handy both for use on campaign and for feeding starving civilian populations.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN P.M. PAPERS, MONDAY, JANUARY 25, 1943

TWENTY-SIX PLANTS RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD

Selection of twenty-six additional industrial plants to receive the Army-Navy Production Award in recognition of outstanding performance on war work was announced today by Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal.

The names and addresses of these plants are:

Borg-Warner Corporation, Long Manufacturing Division, Detroit, Michigan.
Borg-Warner Corporation, Pump Engineering Service Corporation Division, Cleveland, Ohio.
Burroughs Wellcome & Company (U.S.A), Incorporated, Tuckahoe, New York.
Clark Equipment Company, Clark Tructractor Division, Battle Creek, Michigan.
Columbian Steel Tank Company, Kansas City, Missouri.
Crouse-Hinds Company, Syracuse, New York.
Eclipse Counterbore Company, Detroit, Michigan.
General Electric X-Ray Corporation, Chicago, Illinois.
General Motors Corporation, Inland Manufacturing Division, Dayton, Ohio.
General Motors Corporation, Moraine Products Division, Dayton, Ohio.
Illinois Gear and Machine Company, Chicago, Illinois.
Mathieson Alkali Works, Incorporated, Niagara Falls, New York.
Mid-State Manufacturing Company, Waupun Plant, Waupun, Wisconsin.
Miller-Parrott Baking Company, Terre Haute, Indiana.
Oil Well Supply Company, Imperial Works, Oil City, Pennsylvania.
Herman D. Oritsky Company, Reading, Pennsylvania.
Otis Elevator Company, Buffalo Works, Buffalo, New York.
Phillips-Jones Corporation, Barnesboro, Pennsylvania.
Rex Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, South Eastern Avenue Plant, Connersville, Indiana.
Rex Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, Western Avenue Plant, Connersville, Indiana.
Solomon, Goldstein & Portnoy Company, Brooklyn, New York.
Talon, Incorporated, Plant Number 4, Meadville, Pennsylvania.
Thibodaux Boiler Works, Incorporated, Thibodaux, Louisiana.
The Wadsworth Watch Case Company, Dayton, Kentucky.
Ware Shoals Manufacturing Company, Ware Shoals, South Carolina.
The Weatherhead Company, Cleveland, Ohio.

Each of the selected plants will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award Pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

END

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ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR,
BEFORE THE DINNER MEETING
OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE
OF NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
UNION LEAGUE CLUB, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
MONDAY, JANUARY 25, 1943, 9:30 P.M., C.W.T.

Through the Army, the War Department is the biggest employer in the country, and we want to make it the best.

We pay our soldiers the most money for the job, though no money can ever recompense them for their services in the cause of their country; we feed them well; we supply good clothing; the housing is warm and dry. They are armed with the best weapons. These things are no more than their right, for they are partners in a vast, cooperative enterprise and they are risking life and limb for us.

I say "we" employ them. That's wrong--they employ themselves; they fight for themselves and their children. The country they have sworn to support is not a thing apart from them--they are part of it. So it is elementary justice that conditions should be shaped to help them.

But it is not justice if the consideration we civilians give the soldiers should stop when they are no longer fighting.

This country has a deep obligation to the soon-to-be 10,000,000 men under arms.

We took them out of jobs, and we should restore them to jobs.

The War Department will help develop a method of reversing the action of Selective Service. Through that, they were brought to this job. When peace comes, it should bring a job to them. The Army should look after its own while the transition swings into action.

That's the way to keep a firm social and economic system. That's the way to discharge the obligation this nation is under.

But before I go on, I pause for a bow to my hosts and my fellow guests.

Our armed forces are making history, and you men of industry of the Midwest are playing a vital role in the program. Without the guns, the planes, the tanks, and other military necessaries that you produce here, our progress would be slow. Thanks to you, we are able not only to meet our own battle needs but also to contribute great stores of munitions to our fighting Allies, the British, the Russians, the Chinese and the others who are out to beat Hitler, Hirohito and Company.

I am grateful to the Technological Institute of Northwestern University for this opportunity to tell you that. You and your fellow-workers in our industrial plants have done an extraordinary job.

On behalf of our soldiers everywhere I express to you our appreciation.

MORE

But we have only begun. Our soldiers have only begun to fight. You have only begun to produce. Compared to what you will be called upon to deliver in 1943, your work in 1942 was only what Churchill refers to as the end of the beginning.

A nation that can show the progress that we made in 1942, in field and factory, need have no doubts as to our ability to meet the objectives for 1943. The schedules will be stiffer, but our experience has been broader. The display of more energy here and there, more patience with rationings and restrictions, more efficient production per man and machine, better teamwork between management and labor, between government and business and among the government agencies themselves, and the job will be made easier.

America is aroused. It is determined to win the war and to win it as soon as possible. Above the petty misunderstandings that arise from time to time, there is a unity of purpose and a powerful will to win. And America has the vigor of a young nation.

The War Department has the responsibility not only to get the arms and equipment for our fighting men to achieve victory as soon as possible, but also to pay them, feed them, clothe them, house them, transport them, and, above all, train them. The Army is tremendously interested in the welfare of its men, their present status and the future that lies ahead for them when the job of winning the war is done. They are fighting to make a decent future, and we must help them.

Our Army is the best paid army in the world. With the taxes you pay and with the bonds you buy, we are meeting a payroll of 5,500,000 men right now and before the year is over it will be a payroll of 7,500,000 men.

At the present time, the Army's annual payroll runs to more than six billion dollars per year or $500,000,000 a month. This does not include allowances to the families of men in uniform, nor does it include the pay to some 1,200,000 civilian employes. The War Department is the greatest employer this nation has ever seen. Those 1,200,000 civilian employes, by the way, are manual workers for the greater part. They include the men and women working in the manufacturing arsenals, the men and women in the great Quartermaster depots, the men and women in the aircraft maintenance shops, the men and women who do the maintenance work and upkeep at the camps.

During the current fiscal year, the Army will spend twelve billion dollars for both military and civilian pay, together with subsistence and travel. In the next fiscal year, this figure will grow to eighteen billions.

That is where some of your money is going, where some of the money of every American taxpayer is going.

Our soldiers are not mercenaries in any sense of the word. Their loyalty to country and devotion to duty are above price. There is not enough money anywhere to give an American soldier in return for his patriotism. Their pay merely represents the desire of the American people to show some appreciation to the fighting man for his gallant service and to give him enough to enable him to enjoy his hours of leisure. The Army makes every effort to carry out this wish of the American people, and the welcome call of the U. S. Army paymaster is heard not only at all our many camps in the continental United States but at more than sixty-five fighting fronts and bases scattered over the globe.

Those dollars come to rest in the pocket of an anti-aircraft gunner in Iceland, a fighter pilot at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, an infantryman edging closer through mud and sand to the Nazi strongholds of Bizerte and Tunis.

To keep the average soldier in fighting trim for his first year in the Army, the Quartermaster Corps spends $440. Of this, $200 is for his food, the remainder for clothing and individual and barracks equipment. That $440 does not cover his arms--his Garand rifle, his other weapons or his ammunition or his pay.

MORE

You men of industry have been long familiar with the cost of equipping a plant for peacetime production. You are experts in the job of retooling for war production. Let us look for a moment at the cost of equipping the Army to win battles.

In his message to the new Congress, President Roosevelt disclosed that we produced 670,000 machine guns during the first year of the war. A .50 caliber machine gun costs $580 and the .30 caliber variety $150.

A heavy bomber runs to $250,000, a medium bomber $110,000 and a fighter plane $50,000.

One 155 mm. howitzer costs $23,000 and a 4-gun mount of Bofors 40 mm. anti-aircraft guns costs about $49,000.

The smallest type of self-propelled "crocodile boat" used to transport artillery and supplies from ship to beachhead in the Solomons costs $18,500 and the biggest model costs $27,000.

Those are items that run into money. And they are only a few, picked at random. Our North African expedition under General Eisenhower carried more than 700,000 different items of equipment and supply. Always remember this:

An Army's fighting efficiency and its military equipment are indivisible. They cannot be separated. No soldier, however brave, can be effective without arms. No army, however large, can win without equipment. Therefore, the production lines are the projectors of victory. The tools placed in the hands of brave Americans and our Allies mean peace. Without arms we are a rabble. Well equipped we become an irresistible force. In working toward that end every delay is a grave danger.

When Pearl Harbor thrust us into this war amidst a thunder of exploding bombs, the Army did not know precisely what each of these items used in General Eisenhower's landing was going to cost. Neither did industry.

That is the reason why there has been renegotiation of many contracts.

The Army and industry both knew, for instance, that we needed a certain kind of gun, needed it in a hurry. There was no way to figure out the cost to the last penny or even the last dollar. There was not sufficient experience in the production of the gun on a quantity basis on which to compute a fair price--fair to the producer and fair to the government.

After enough of these guns had been built, the cost became more readily apparent. So, with a reasonable profit needed, we now can come to a fair cost for these guns.

Let me give an illustration of the change in costs that comes from quantity production of munitions. When we were first ordering one of our large bombers, it was estimated that 110,000 man hours would be required to build each bomber. When a contract for quantity production was being placed, it was found that 93,000 man hours were required. Today that plane is being produced with 27,000 man hours.

I believe that both sides, the seller and the buyer, are satisfied with results of our renegotiation system.

We have been talking at some length on the ledger side of this war. Ledgers are important. The Army has to keep them just as you have to keep them in industry.

But there is the human side, too. The Army is deeply interested in the health and welfare of the men and women on its payroll.

Let us take food. Food is the subject of intensive and constant study by the Army. The United States Army is the best fed army in the world

MORE

today, and we are bent on keeping it so. The American people, I am sure, feel that the men in the armed forces have a preferred claim on our food supply. If there are shortages of some kinds of food, the rations of the Army and Navy will not be affected by them.

On the fighting fronts in Africa, the Solomons and New Guinea, and at lonely posts in Alaska, Iceland, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the one pleasure that the soldiers look forward to is the coming up of the rations. Everyone of you who served in the last war will remember that. There is more speculation of what will be in the rations than on any other topic, and the Army must make sure that the rations get there, no matter what else happens.

The Army food is the best that the Quartermaster can buy. A great deal of it is purchased here in Chicago, and anyone who sells food to the Army can tell you that the standards are exacting. There will be no embalmed beef incident in this war.

The Quartermaster has made surveys of what the soldiers like best in the food line. This survey reveals their likes and dislikes by what they leave on their plates and the menus are then adjusted accordingly. Their favorite is hot dogs, and the item they feel that they can get along without is spinach.

The Army has other responsibilities which it takes seriously, and religion and recreation are among the foremost. The Army is proud of its chaplains. They go where the combat troops go. A chaplain, aiding the wounded, was one of the first Americans killed on the beach in our North African landing.

I don't know whether you have noticed it or not, but in interview after interview which I have read in the newspapers, American fighting men who have seen action tell how they have prayed as well as fought. Some of them admitted they hadn't prayed much in the past, hadn't given much thought to Divine Providence; but they discovered that prayer helped them in the pinches.

Certain citizens have expressed fear that the Army left its men wide open to the temptations of liquor and of vice. It would be incorrect if I told you that liquor and vice are of no concern in the United States Army.

Liquor and vice are a concern in American civilian life, otherwise we would not have State Liquor Boards and laws touching on morality. Similarly, we must exercise certain controls in military life. Inducting a broker or a farmer, a clerk or an elevator operator, into the Army and putting him into uniform does not change his inclinations overnight.

Yes, soldiers do drink and soldiers submit to other temptations--but certainly no more than civilians, and, if I might hazard a guess, not as much.

The recent survey announced by the Office of War Information should put at rest the fears of those who think that soldiers drink too much. Intoxication was shown to be extremely limited.

No Volstead Act is needed to keep American soldiers temperate and fit to fight.

As far as drinking alcoholic beverages is concerned, the soldier has the same freedom of choice that you have. He can drink, or he can abstain. We do not attempt to enforce abstinence--we do insist upon temperance. Wet or dry, it's up to him, but he must keep himself fit for the arduous task of battle. Of one thing you may be certain--indulgences that interfere with the proper and efficient performance of military duties are never tolerated.

The Army is proud of its men. We take them as Americans. We treat them as Americans want to be treated. We do not coddle, but we deal fairly. We do not reform, but we keep temptations under control. We are

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concentrating on making soldiers who will win the war. We know that ultimately victory will be ours, and that after our soldiers have picked up souvenirs on the streets of Berlin and Tokyo, they will be ready to go home to enjoy the rights they fought to maintain. The subject of demobilization, therefore, already is a matter of serious study by the War Department.

There will be millions of soldiers to demobilize. The Army alone cannot definitely guarantee every one of these demobilized soldiers a job, but it certainly is going to do its best to see no man is mustered out of military ranks into a breadline.

We may be a war-weary people by the time we have shattered the Axis. There will be an urge to let-down after the fast pace we maintained to win this war; to dump men willy-nilly back into civilian life; to let them find a job as best they can and where they can. But the Army will not take that easy way. Its responsibility is too great. As I say, we will try to maintain a selective service system in reverse. It worked well in mobilization. It should work equally well when we select men for return to civil life.

War Department records catalogue each man as to occupation or profession. If, after the victory, 100 steamfitters are needed on a job here in Chicago, 100 soldier-steamfitters about to be mustered out could be advised of the opportunity. It would be up to them, of course, whether they cared to take advantage of it.

If a baking company in New Jersey should require 40 bakers, it would not be difficult to bring this information to 40 soldier-bakers, about to lay aside their uniforms.

Every effort would be made to see that available jobs in a certain locality would be offered to returning soldiers from that locality.

Last November the President appointed a five-man committee to make a study under the auspices of the War and Navy Departments of post-war educational possibilities. The purpose is to make certain that young men whose education was interrupted by the war will have a chance to take up where they left off, and that other young ex-soldiers will have equal opportunity for schooling.

Now the Army is just as interested in seeing that a soldier-truckdriver gets back behind the wheel of a truck after he takes off his uniform as it is in seeing that a college sophomore gets back to his campus.

You industrial leaders will be doing the hiring after the victory is won. If the Army can help put you in touch with the right men, it will be glad to do it. And the Army will be glad to do it, not because the Army wants to go into the employment agency business, but because it feels that such service is due the man who carried a gun. And you, too, will be--must be--glad to cooperate, for after all the debt we owe our fighters is a heavy one. You will find in the returned soldier a loyal and efficient worker. Modern combat calls for skill, devotion and teamwork. Our American soldier has what it takes. Give him the opportunity after this war is over, and you will find that the strength and power that he displayed in the field, which made him the world's finest soldier, can be used to advantage in the shop and factory to make him the best of industrial workers.

Today, in time of war, the fighting front and the industrial front are merged into a great American front for battle. Their efficient and united mobilization for war will hasten victory. Their cooperation in demobilization after victory is won, will hasten peace and the realization of the ideals for which we fight today.

Bear this in mind. All of us are in this thing. None of us is going to be let off. We, away from the fighting fronts, are not spectators at a game; we are participants in a bitter war--in a fight for life and for those things that make life worth living. But remember: We cannot coast to Victory.

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FOR RELEASE IN SUNDAY PAPERS, JANUARY 31, 1943

BEST SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BY U. S. ARMY

The United States Army is rapidly being equipped with the best self-propelled artillery in action, the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, recently announced.

Back of that statement lies a story which begins at least a quarter of a century ago and extends to a critical moment last December when American-made artillery of this type went into action in the Egyptian desert.

Over the sands up toward the front that day rolled a regiment of British artillery, an old regiment whose proud traditions extend back into the horse-drawn days. Now it was entirely motorized. Its guns were not wheeled field artillery coupled to trucks but self-propelled 105 mm. howitzers mounted on a medium tank chassis, shipped from the United States only a short time before. Swift-moving, with a tank's armor sacrificed to speed, they lacked overhead protection. But forward and to the right of the howitzer tube was a 50 calibre anti-aircraft machine gun, its mount resembling a pulpit. It was that mount which caused the Tommies the regiment passed to call out, christening the guns; "There go the Priests!"

A fast light tank carrying the forward observer left the column and darted ahead. Behind a crest the regiment deployed and went into position. No time was lost. Every vehicle contained its gun crew and ammunition. From each, telephone wire was unreeled and connected to the switchboard in the executive officer's armored car. Should the wire be shot out, there was a radio beside the gunner.

Back from the observer came a radio report of a target: an enemy tank concentration at a point several thousand yards beyond the crest. That it could not be seen from the gun position did not matter. These were howitzers whose high-angle fire is especially adapted to indirect laying.

MORE

Data was figured, phoned to the guns, and set. Fire! Shells soared over the crest and burst. Again the observer's voice over the radio -- so many yards left, so many short. Corrections were made. The howitzers spoke again, recoiled and slid back into battery. This time there were target hits. Now, all the regiment's twenty-four guns blasted away with volleys that crashed into the mass of German tanks and put them out of action. Before enemy counter-batteries could control them, the swift self-propelleds sped away to a new position.

That day and the days that followed the "Priests" played a notable part in the smashing attack of the British Eighth Army that drove Rommel back from the approaches to Alexandria and sent him reeling in retreat through Libya.

Such was the effective debut of a weapon which has been called new and secret. Actually it is neither. The shipment of these guns to Egypt had been announced by Prime Minister Churchill. They are novel only in the sense that they are an improvisation. Yet this was no spur-of-the-moment accomplishment. The call never could have been answered but for the years of experimentation that preceded it.

Self-propelled artillery (any cannon mounted on a motor vehicle -- truck, half- or full-track -- is so classed) dates back to the last war, an outgrowth of the motorized artillery which then began to supplement horse-drawn artillery, though by no means to replace it. From guns drawn by tractors came the idea of mounting the gun on the tractor itself. Into the realization of that idea have gone vast effort by our own and foreign military establishments and by private automotive firms and considerable sums of money.

In 1916 two commercial companies in the United States and one in France went to work on gun motor carriages. From one of the American designs 200 self-propelled 75 mm. anti-aircraft guns were built, primarily for service around coast defenses; they continued in use until eight years ago. Also gun motor carriages for heavier calibres were under construction, and one for the 8-inch howitzer was completed. While we tested self-propelled artillery during the war, none was issued.

MORE

After the armistice, mounts for various calibres were completed and tested. What the Ordnance Department did in effect was to take a cannon and build a tractor around it. Some were too heavy, others too difficult to repair. Some were too slow; one type developed sufficient speed to race and beat a horse, but did not long stand up under the pace. Yet development continued. It was foreseen that self-propelled artillery could fill vital needs in modern warfare. As the tank had proved to be the answer to the machine gun so might this new mobile artillery counteract the tank.

Experiments continued. They are expensive, these experiments. The cost of one model was $850,000, and it failed in its test. Yet there is no other method of successful development, and funds so spent mean lives saved in battle. When appropriations dwindled, Army men in a number of cases dug down in their own pockets for the money needed to finish a project.

But the day came when the shortage of available funds was such that they could be devoted only to the most important uses. No self-propelled artillery satisfying the requirements of the arms to which it was submitted for test had yet been produced. As a result, development was brought to a full stop in 1925 and not resumed until 1939.

Then the painstaking process of designing, making pilot models and testing them started again. No project which gave any promise of success was neglected. Even models which did not work meant progress -- by process of elimination and supplying new ideas. The triumphs of the German panzer divisions in Poland, France, lent decided impetus. So did our own maneuvers in North Carolina in October and November, 1941, when the First Army threw back the onslaught of the tanks of two armored divisions by attacking them first with improvised self-propelled artillery - 75's mounted on 2½-ton trucks.

Just about that time Ordnance finished a rush, stop-gap job; a 75 mm. mounted on a half-track. Fifty of them had reached the Philippines before the Japanese attacked. Their effective work against landing parties and on the retreat to Bataan shoved the self-propelled program into high gear.

Interspersed by stop-gap jobs, the Ordnance Department now has produced the following standardized gun motor carriages: 37 mm., 75 mm., and the 105 mm. howitzer. Heavier calibres are in prospect. As soon as a design is approved, and before it even goes into production, technicians begin work on a better one, continuing improvement as tests show the way.

MORE

Now the self-propelleds are going into action in increasing numbers. They are late because the people of the United States for a period of fourteen years were unwilling to approve the spending of money on the experiments which ultimately perfected the weapon, but they are coming through in time.

How they arrived in time that day is one of the little-known dramas of the war. When the British foresaw the need of them and sent their hurry call, no such quantity self-propelled artillery of that particular type existed. However, the 105 mm. howitzer and the medium tank were in production. Ordnance took the two and, in the poetic phrase which technical men occasionally permit themselves, "married" them. Factories turned out the combination at top speed. Transport rushed them over thousands of miles of land and sea. En route on the last stage of their journey desert modifications were made. They reached their destination with just enough margin for British gun crews to be trained on them. Then they rolled up to the front. You know the rest. So does Rommel.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN SUNDAY PAPERS, JANUARY 31, 1943

NOTE TO EDITORS:

The following release is sent to you by the War Department for use as a Sunday column, or in part as short feature stories. Although it is marked for release in Sunday papers, January 31, 1943, the material in it may be used later at your discretion. The suggested heading "ARMY ADDENDA" may be replaced by one selected by you.

ARMY ADDENDA

SECRETARY OF WAR WRITES PARENTS WHO HAVE 7 SONS IN ARMED FORCES

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, has sent a letter to Mr. and Mrs. Andrew H. Holloman, of 421 North 12th Street, Frederick, Oklahoma, expressing the appreciation of the War Department for the fact that they have seven sons serving with the armed forces of the United States.

"Such patriotic devotion must reflect the loyalty and patriotism which they have learned at home," the Secretary wrote.

The seven sons of Mr. and Mrs. Holloman are:

Major Delmar W. Holloman, Field Artillery, stationed at Miami Beach, Florida.

Captain Robert H. Holloman, Field Artillery, stationed at the Reclassification Center, Omaha, Nebraska.

First Lieutenant James H. Holloman, Dental Corps, serving with an Engineer Medical Detachment at Camp Swift, Texas.

First Lieutenant Ira J. Holloman, Quartermaster Corps, with a Flying Training Detachment, Vernon, Texas.

Assistant Surgeon Alfred L. Holloman, United States Public Health Service, Washington, D. C.

Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Haskell A. Holloman, United States Navy.

Private Jeff J. Holloman, inducted for basic training at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, Nevember 7, 1942.

* * *

MORE

DURABILITY OF AIRACOBRA DEMONSTRATED IN UNUSUAL TRAINING FLIGHT ACCIDENT

The ability of a P-39 Airacobra to take heavy punishment was demonstrated recently in an unusual accident in California, the War Department has been informed. The plane hit a telephone pole while flying at great speed. The pilot managed to reach an altitude of 1,000 feet before bailing out to safety.

The pilot, Staff Sergeant Paul H. Wilkins, 20 years old, of Kalispell, Montana, took off from Hamilton Field, California, on a high altitude training flight. While flying upside down at 17,000 feet, he went into an inverted spin. When he had fallen to 8,000 feet, he got his ship into a normal spin and broke out of it at 6,500 feet. Going into a recovery dive, he suffered a partial blackout and hit a telephone pole 20 feet above the ground, without even seeing the pole. His propeller chewed off the cross bar, and his left wing snapped the pole. His speed was approximately 400 miles an hour at the time.

Still retaining some control of the ship, he saw a deep gash in the left wing extending to less than a foot from the fuselage. Splinters of the telephone pole and wire still stuck to the wing, and the collision had closed its radiator air inlets. The propeller was bent like a pretzel, the bay doors covering the nose wheel landing strut had been ripped off, and all engine controls had been knocked out.

Managing to fly at about 1,000 feet, Sergeant Wilkins unsuccessfully looked for a crash landing area. At 800 feet he pulled the emergency release on the left door and jumped, landing in a prune orchard between two trees, without touching the trees or snarling his chute. The prune orchard, he later discovered, was seven miles away from the telephone pole.

Sergeant Wilkins joined the Army as an aviation mechanic in 1940. When only 19, a sergeant, he was already assistant Post Technical Inspector at Victorville Twin Engine Flying School. He is the son of Paul H. Wilkins and Mrs. Mable Cooley Wilkins, of Billings, Montana. His home is 694 First Avenue, East North, Kalispell, Montana.

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MORE

U.S. SOLDIERS' RATIONS IN 1775 AND IN THIS WAR ARE COMPARED

On November 4, 1775, the day after George Washington was made Commander in Chief of the American Army, the Continental Congress dealt with another highly important matter. It fixed the soldier's food allowance as follows:

1 pound of beef, or 3/4 pound of pork, or 1 pound salt fish per day.
1 pound bread or flour per day.
3 pints peas or beans per week or vegetables equivalent.
1 pint milk per day.
½ pint rice or 1 pint Indian meal per week.
1 quart spruce beer of cider per day, or 9 gallons of molasses per 100 men per week.
3 pounds candles per 100 men per week, for guards.
24 pounds of soft soap or 8 pounds hard soap per 100 men per week.

In the War of 1812, the beef allowance went up to 1¼ pounds daily. It was the same in the World War. Today the American soldier again receives 1 pound of meat and these other items in his ration:

Eggs - 1
Butter and other fats - 2½ oz.
Grain products and cereals - 12 oz.
Milk - 1 pint
Irish potatoes - 12 oz.
Tomatoes and citrus fruits - 4 oz.
Leafy, green, and other vegetables - 7 oz.
Other fruits and vegetables - 12 oz.
Sugar - slightly less than 3 oz.

Breads, desserts, and salads make up the rest of a total allowance of 5½ pounds of food per man per day.

In meat and in milk the American soldier's ration has made a full circle and returned to 1775, with this notable difference. Today he receives and eats those amounts. In 1775 he ate them--when he got them.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ARMY IS HOUSING SOME WAR DOGS IN DISCARDED LIQUOR BARRELS

The Army Quartermaster Corps is using discarded liquor barrels for kennels for the Army's war dogs, the War Department announces.

Some 350 of the barrels have been converted into kennels at a cost of $3.50 each. The average cost of a standard type kennel is $30. The barrels are cleaned carefully and lined with paraffin to insure sanitation. They are mounted on wooden cradles and may be removed from these cradles for cleaning. Because of its tight construction the barrel offers 100 per cent protection from the elements.

One end of the barrel is sealed and the other shielded with a blanket. A few of the barrels are being equipped with a "front porch." These will be shaded to permit the dogs to snooze on warm days.

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MORE

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1 pound bread or flour per day.
3 pints peas or beans per week or vegetables equivalent.
1 pint milk per day.
½ pint rice or 1 pint Indian meal per week.
1 quart spruce beer of cider per day, or 9 gallons of molasses per 100 men per week.
3 pounds candles per 100 men per week, for guards.
24 pounds of soft soap or 8 pounds hard soap per 100 men per week.

In the War of 1812, the beef allowance went up to 1¼ pounds daily. It was the same in the World War. Today the American soldier again receives 1 pound of meat and these other items in his ration:

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Some 250 of the barrels have been converted into kennels at a cost of $3.50 each. The average cost of a standard type kennel is $30. The barrels are cleaned carefully and lined with paraffin to insure sanitation. They are mounted on wooden cradles and may be removed from these cradles for cleaning. Because of its tight construction the barrel offers 100 per cent protection from the elements.

One end of the barrel is sealed and the other shielded with a blanket. A few of the barrels are being equipped with a "front porch." These will be shaded to permit the dogs to snooze on warm days.

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MORE

CHURCH ATTENDANCE BY U.S. SOLDIERS TOTALED 9,345,197 IN THREE MONTHS

Church attendance in the Army for the three months' period ending September 30, 1942, totaled 9,345,197, the War Department announces.

This figure does not include attendance at 507 outlying garrisons whose reports were not received by the Office, Chief of Chaplains, in time. No numerical compensations have been made for the missing reports.

There were 180,759 services held, a large proportion of which were outdoors. This is the result of the Army chaplains taking the services to the men when duties or other factors prevented them from attending a centralized service.

Sacraments were administered on 114,717 occasions to 1,086,498 participants. Chaplains have officiated at 10,414 marriages and have baptized 2,006 persons, including infants.

Hospital and guardhouse visits numbered 135,597. Chaplains also visited 14,082 services, civilian and military, other than those conducted by themselves. They distributed 493,917 Bibles and Testaments including those furnished by the government and smaller portions furnished by civilian organizations; 560,274 Religious Tracts; and guided soldiers' reading by distributing 244,688 newspapers and magazines. There was a total of 8,660 professions of religion. These men united, in most cases, with a nearby civilian church or with their own home church.

In their pastoral activity on military reservations the chaplains were in contact with 9,767,698 persons while in civilian communities they reached 3,131,243 persons.

To sum up the entire period, the chaplains had 1,464,506 contact occasions making 25,653,663 contacts.

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TYNDALL FIELD SOLDIERS 100 PER CENT IN PLEDGES FOR PURCHASE OF WAR BONDS

Soldiers of the Army Air Forces Flexible Gunnery School, the Air Base Squadron and Base Headquarters at Tyndall Field, Florida, have pledged 100 per cent cooperation in purchase of War Bonds, the War Department has been informed.

At a War Bond rally, called by Major Harold M. Clarvoe, Air Corps, commanding officer of the field, the soldiers pledged a portion of their monthly pay to the purchase of bonds.

The majority of the men are privates with a base pay of $50 a month, and many of them are making allotments to dependents, as well as carrying insurance, leaving them only about $20 a month for themselves, yet all agreed that they devote a part of this balance to the purchase of bonds.

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MORE

MORE MAIL HANDLED BY OFFICE OF DEPENDENCY BENEFITS THAN IN POST OFFICE OF AVERAGE U.S. TOWN OF 70,000

The mail room of the War Department Office of Dependency Benefits in Newark, New Jersey, handles a larger volume of mail each day than the post office department of an average American city of 70,000, the War Department announces.

A daily average of 62,000 pieces of incoming mail and 63,500 pieces of outgoing mail passes through the Office of Dependency Benefits mail rooms and that is exclusive of checks which are mailed out by the millions to dependents of men in the Army in the form of monthly allotment and family allowance payments.

During the first week of January, 1943, 1,700,000 checks went out from the Office of Dependency Benefits to the families of our fighting men. If averaged over the month, these 1,700,000 additional pieces of mail would bring the Office of Dependency Benefits' total up to 130,000 pieces handled each 24 hours.

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ARMY USES MICROFILM TO SPEED TRANSMISSION OF MILITARY LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS OVERSEAS

The Army is making extensive use of its microfilm reproduction facilities for the quick transmission overseas of military letters and documents, the War Department announced today. The use of this photomail system has been extended also to all branches of the Government, for the dispatch of official papers.

Official photomail is processed and dispatched in the same manner as V-mail sent to soldiers.

Recent reports from foreign bases indicate that V-mail letters are being received eagerly. The microfilm strips on which these letters are transmitted are sent overseas by airplane whenever weather conditions permit, and speedy receipt of V-mail gives the soldier abroad a sense of closeness to his family and friends at home.

V-mail installations are now available in the British Isles, Iceland, Greenland, Australia, the Near East, the Southwest Pacific, the Hawaiian Islands, and India. Because of the great saving in cargo space achieved by the use of V-mail, ordinary air mail may no longer be sent to military personnel in these regions. The same rule will apply as reproduction facilities are established in other areas.

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FOR RELEASE IN SUNDAY PAPERS, JANUARY 31, 1943

U.S. ARMY SAVES VAST AMOUNT OF FOOD THROUGH RIGID CONSERVATION PROGRAM

An Army kitchen and mess hall at any average post, camp or station may at any time be inspected by the regimental commander or his executive or both. The battalion commander and his executive or adjutant may drop in. So may an inspector from camp headquarters and a medical officer. The company commander is likely to be making rounds. Invariably the battalion officer of the day will turn up with critical eye and a rating sheet. Several times that day the company mess officer will walk in. One of the company officers will eat one or all of the meals with the men.

Although the mess will not have to stand eight or nine inspections every day, the mess sergeant, his cooks and kitchen police, must be prepared for them. These inspecting officers assure themselves that the mess hall, kitchen, and all equipment is clean and in order; that all utensils have been washed in hot water. They are fulfilling their duty to see that good food, well cooked, served hot, and plenty of it -- a chief factor in morale -- is available. Not least, they are making certain that no food is wasted.

What's going to be done with those left-over carrots? an inspecting officer asks. The mess sergeant has the answer. They'll bob up at supper as pumpkin pie, and he bets nobody can tell the difference. There will not often be any left-overs. The mess sergeant has drawn as many rations as careful computation indicates there will be men present. He and his cooks have consulted that closely figured recipe book entitled The Army Cook to determine how much of each ingredient is needed for a desired dish. There's no cooking by-guess-and-by-gracious in the Army.

MORE

A glance at the menu shows that dinner today is a non-meat meal. Instead the company is having poultry, fish, eggs, beans, or some other meat substitute. The soldier, along with civilians, has a "meatless" day every week, except that the Army spreads it over three days by serving three non-meat meals on different days each week. That is how, on the basis of a 5,000,000-man Army, approximately 5,000,000 pounds of meat a week are saved.

It looks as if there is lots of milk in the big icebox, but there's none squandered. The average soldier gets one pint a day, and that includes what he drinks or uses on cereals plus the milk content of the butter, cheese, ice cream, etc., served him. His butter, by the way, has been systematically reduced, and greater use is made of cheese, preserves, and peanut butter as a spread, knowing that the butter he saves has been shipped to troops overseas.

The sharp eye of a non-com -- there's one presiding over each mess table -- sights a film of sugar in the bottom of a coffee cup. He makes a pointed remark to the wasteful soldier who took more than he needed and more than his share. Each soldier's daily allowance is a little less than 3 ounces, and that includes sugar used in desserts, puddings, pastries. Another non-com spots a lad, with food uneaten on his plate, heading back to the mess line for a second. "Soldier," he sounds off, "come back here and eat what you got on that plate, or no seconds. You gotta learn in this man's Army to eat the chow they put out and not to take any more than you're gonna eat."

Follow one of the inspecting officers out of the mess hall toward the company street where stands the neat-kept garbage rack. Besides receptacles for tin cans flattened for salvage, for waste paper, and so on, plainly labeled cans contain pig food, and rendering, which will be sold to contractors. The inspector, peers in the cans to see each is filled only with what it is supposed to hold and that none of that is obvious waste.

Pig food consists of those unavoidable food scraps with which every household is familiar. It goes to support farms of porkers. They'll help to make bacon less scarce at Army messes and on civilian dinner tables.

MORE

Raw bones from Army kitchens yield about 18 per cent glue. Once the glue is extracted, the residue, mixed with meat trimmings, stale bread or cereal, makes excellent poultry food. Fertilizer is a secondary product. Those pay later dividends in grains and vegetables.

Large quantities of grease, saved in Army kitchens from cooking and in grease traps, are collected daily by the Salvage Branch of the Office of the Quartermaster General and after being rendered are sold to soap manufacturers, who extract all the glycerine content and in turn sell it to makers of high explosive. The supply of glycerine from Army camps is sufficient to manufacture about 1,500,000 pounds of dynamite monthly, or 18,000,000 pounds annually. It may also be used for cordite, or smokeless powder. Soap stock from the residue of the rendered grease amounts to 5,000,000 pounds monthly.

Army mess sergeants and cooks know their job. These men, whether or not they have had previous culinary experience, receive thorough instruction in training schools. Waste not, want not is a proverb which has been brought home to them. Hell hath no fury like that of a mess line when the chow runs short and it's the mess sergeant's fault.

Ingenuity and economy are long suits of the mess sergeant. He will fill tea bags half full only, so that the surface of every leaf will be exposed to yield a maximum of flavor and strength. Sometimes he will use a mixture of tea and maté, a South American leaf known also as Paraguayan tea. He will alternately fry, hash, cream, bake or make salad of salmon. He is now supplied with such variety that he can ring the changes on that old army stand-by -- beans. He will serve up pea, kidney, navy, dried lima, and black-eyed beans, simmered with salt pork or ham scraps and garnished with onions. After he has saved meat by using such substitutes as salmon or beans, he will accomplish more of the same by supplementing meat balls with spaghetti or tossing off a mess of stuffed peppers which contain a small ground meat content.

MORE

Every housewife knows the problem that arises from preparing food for 8 persons, say, and then having only 5 or 6 present at mealtimes. In an Army of millions this could mount up to millions of pounds of excess food, but it doesn't because meals are planned to prevent it. Meals are provided on the basis of the average number of men who are present in each mess hall for the three daily meals. These averages are carefully computed from day to day, making it possible to give the mess sergeant each morning an accurate estimate of the number of men he will have to feed that day.

Economies and regulations in Army mess halls and kitchens are duplicated in the officers' messes and in the restaurants and cafeterias for enlisted men at Service Clubs on military posts and elsewhere. These are subject, under Army policy, to the same food rationing regulations as similar establishments in civilian communities.

Coffee, sugar, butter, and other food products have been systematically reduced in Master Menus over a period of many months to conserve these materials for the civilian public without working a hardship on the individual soldier. Purchasing centers for perishable foods are located near the camps to be served. Scientific refrigeration and other types of storage insures against spoilage. So do frequent and rigid inspections. The entire program from procurement to consumption is geared to the proposition that when the United States is feeding its civilian population plus millions of soldiers who eat nearly twice as much as they did before they entered the Army plus millions of soldiers and civilians in foreign countries, food cannot be wasted.

Conservation of food as practiced in the Army, can give pointers to many a home, hotel, boarding house, and restaurant.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN A. M. PAPERS, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1943

EIGHT PLANTS RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD

Selection of eight additional industrial plants to receive the Army-Navy Production Award in recognition of outstanding performance on war work was announced today by Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal.

The names and addresses of these plants are:

Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Company, Oakland, California
Field and Flint Company, Brockton, Massachusetts
Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Company, Lynchburg, Virginia
Parke, Davis & Company, Pharmaceutical Plant, Joseph Campau at River, Detroit, Michigan
The Scholl Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, War Production Department, Chicago, Illinois
United States Machine Corporation, Plant #2, Lebanon, Indiana
Webber Gage Company, Cleveland, Ohio
A. B. Zukert Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Each of the selected plants will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award Pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

END

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FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE IN P. M. PAPERS, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1943

JAPANESE-AMERICANS IN U. S. BATTALIONS ARE PRAISED BY BATTALION COMMANDER

"I have never had more wholehearted, serious-minded cooperation from any troops than I receive from my present command," was the statement received by the War Department today from Lieutenant Colonel Farrant L. Turner, Commanding Officer of an Infantry Battalion.

This statement was considered worthy of official release not because it differs from the feeling that most commanding officers have about their present outfits, but because it doesn't. The outfit in question is the 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate) G. H. Q. Reserve, composed of men of Japanese ancestry.

All the soldiers of the 100th are American citizens, born in the Hawaiian Islands and members of the Hawaiian National Guard. All of their officers of Japanese ancestry are graduates of the University of Hawaii.

The members of the 100th Battalion were not stationed at Pearl Harbor on December 7, but many of them lost relatives and friends. They are grimly determined to prove in action some day that their memory of Pearl Harbor is a vivid one.

Born on American soil and educated in American schools, the men of the 100th are citizens of unquestioned loyalty and patriotism. They don't mind being called "J. A. 's" (for Japanese-Americans) or "nisei" (for American-born citizens of Japanese ancestry) but the term "Japs," the label of America's enemies, is naturally resented by them.

Six soldiers of the 100th caused quite a furore in Washington one weekend when they registered at one of the hotels. A hotel clerk became suspicious and called Army Intelligence, reporting "some Japs dressed as American soldiers." The War Department points out, for such contingencies, that all soldiers away from their posts are provided with passes or furlough papers which they are instructed to produce cheerfully in response to any reasonable request. Officers have credential cards, bearing their photographs, and will show them on such request. Officers and soldiers wear identification discs.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN A.M. PAPERS OF FEBRUARY 2, 1943

NEW UNIFORMS AND SERVICE CLOTHING DESIGNED BY EXPERTS FOR ARMY NURSES

An entirely new wardrobe of uniforms and service clothing for the Army Nurse Corps has been designed by clothing experts of the Quartermaster Corps, assisted by prominent women's wear designers, the War Department announced today. The traditional nurses' navy blue will now give way to olive drab in the street and general service uniform. The starched white uniform will be replaced for service in overseas theaters of operations by a brown and white, pin-striped seersucker, with the white uniform of the same design as the brown but of a poplin material being retained for service in the United States.

The most noticeable change in the uniforms is in the shift from blue to olive drab in the street uniform, which will be of the same basic pattern as that now being made the standard for all women of the Army. It will, however, have the distinguishing feature of a newly designed cap different in appearance from other caps now worn by women in other military and semi-military organizations.

Upon requests of overseas commanders for suitable nurses' uniforms to meet special needs in combat areas, the Quartermaster Corps undertook to design uniforms and service clothing with the greatest usefulness under all conditions and climates, with minimum duplications and the simplest handling requirements. Consideration was given to recommendations from the field with respect to the design of the new uniforms.

Starched white uniforms have always been a problem to nurses on duty outside this country, and recognizing this condition, the designers developed a field hospital uniform of brown and white pin striped seersucker which looks fresh and crisp close up, but which fades into the background at a distance.

MORE

It has a tailored jacket of the same material which converts it into a suit for wear when off duty. It also has important functional features of a deep wrap-around for ease of movement, is made without buttons to be lost or slide fasteners to get out of alignment, and fastens securely with one hook and a long tailored tie at the side. It requires no starch or ironing. A cap, designed of one piece of matching material laced at the back, goes with this uniform. The cap spreads out flat to wash and dry and likewise requires no starch or ironing.

To save packing space and bulk, a single overcoat has been devised for comfort in all climates. It is a roomy trench coat of two layers of wind-resistant and water-repellent material in olive drab, with a buttoned-in lining of lamb's wool. The lining differs from conventional button or zipper coat linings by having full length sleeves, and can be removed to do double duty as a bathrobe, fastening close up around the throat.

Another new addition to the nurses' wardrobe is a two-piece slack suit of olive drab herringbone twill similar to that worn by soldiers. These will become standard advanced field operations uniform to be worn in active theaters of operations. Ankle-high field service shoes and laced canvas leggings for protection in mosquito infested areas accompany this outfit.

Special arctic field service equipment also is included in the new wardrobe, to be issued to nurses in cold climates. This includes a ski suit of olive drab similar to that worn by ski troops and consists of a parka, olive drab on the outside and white on the other, and edged with fur. It is worn over ski pants of the same wind-resistant, water-repellent and reversible material. Beneath both parka and trousers go pile fabric liners of soft, fur-like alpaca and mohair fabrics to insulate the body from cold.

The traditional nurses' cape has been retained as the most serviceable quick-covering garment for hospital duty in this country or abroad. It, too, has been changed from blue to olive drab with a self lining.

An olive drab hooded raincoat with moisture-proof seams and vinyl resin waterproofing similar to those furnished to enlisted men, shoes, gloves and a newly designed leather utility bag with ample compartment space complete the equipment.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN P.M. PAPERS, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1943.

DEHYDRATED FOODS COOKBOOK IS PUBLISHED FOR ARMY COOKS

An American cookbook which deals exclusively with the preparation and cooking of dehydrated foods, "The Dehydrated Foods Cooking Manual," has been compiled and published recently by the Subsistence Branch of the Quartermaster Corps, the War Department announced today. It is intended for the use of Army cooks only, and will not be available to the public at the present time.

The Office of The Quartermaster General, the Quartermaster Corps Subsistence Research Laboratory in Chicago and commercial food organizations which have pioneered in the dehydration of foods, collaborated in producing the manual.

A large part of the manual is devoted to the proper methods of rehydrating the various foods. These methods vary. It is pointed out that certain vegetable salts, sugars, minerals and vitamins may be dissolved in the water in which the foods are reconstituted. These elements can be saved, of course, by cooking the foods in the same water in which they are soaked. Too high temperatures in the rehydration process also affect the palatability of the foods. Prolonged soaking likewise may produce souring or other spoilage. After the addition of water to the foods, it is important to complete the preparation without delay.

The manual contains recipes for preparing and cooking dehydrated apples, beets, cabbage, carrots, white potatoes, sweet potatoes, rutabagas and eggs, and also gives recipes for desserts such as pies, cakes and puddings, using dehydrated foods as ingredients. It is illustrated and gives tables of the rehydration ratios, comparative weights and measures and exact directions for the handling of the many foods which can now be dehydrated successfully.

Quartermaster Corps subsistence experts state that dishes prepared according to directions from satisfactory dehydrated foods usually cannot be distinguished from those prepared from fresh materials. Dehydrated foods have decided advantages in that shipping weight of dried products is only a fraction of that of the original food. New methods of compressing them permit substantial saving of cargo space. This is of particular advantage now when shipping tonnage and space must be conserved. Also, because they have been trimmed and otherwise cleaned before dehydrating, they permit an additional saving of time and labor during final preparation for the table.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN MORNING PAPERS, FEBRUARY 5, 1943

ARMY AND NAVY TO TEST EDUCATIONAL GROWTH OF PERSONNEL.

The War and Navy Departments announced today that they are preparing tests to assess the educational growth of military and naval personnel during the period of service in the armed forces. Results will be certified upon request to schools and colleges for their evaluation of the educational achievement represented by the test scores.

Proposed by the United States Armed Forces Institute Advisory Committee and indorsed by the American Council on Education, the plan has been approved by numbers of regional and national accrediting associations. It is expected that this testing program will help the servicemen, upon return to civil life, to obtain academic credit for educational growth in service. This applies also to the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, the Women's Reserve Units of the United States Naval Reserve, the United States Coast Guard Reserve, and the United States Marine Corps Reserve.

Formal courses of instruction are offered by the United States Armed Forces Institute for use by service personnel during off-duty, spare time. Over 500 high school, technical, and college correspondence courses are available from 79 cooperating colleges and universities under contract with the Government. The Navy Department is establishing educational service centers on major shore establishments all over the world where formal class instruction will be offered to officer and enlisted personnel on a voluntary basis. In addition to voluntary study, hundreds of thousands of men and women are given training courses in specialist schools, courses varying from a few weeks concentrated instruction in radio communication to a several months course in meteorology.

Large numbers will see service in foreign countries. Thousands will receive and apply instruction in foreign languages. A comprehensive educational film program, forums, discussion groups, lectures, and exhibits are offered service personnel. Each of the armed forces provides a library service, the Army alone operating 2,000 libraries equipped with books totalling more than 7,500,000.

MORE

All of these contribute to educational growth. The tests to measure this educational growth will be administered upon request and the results placed on record. The tests for use at the high school level will consist of comprehensive objective examinations in each of five major fields of educational development: correctness and effectiveness of expression, ability to interpret reading materials in the social studies, or in the natural sciences, or in literature, and general mathematical ability. A similar but more difficult range of tests will be provided for the college level. Standards for the tests will be established by their try-out with groups of high school seniors and college freshmen. Separate standards will be fixed for schools in different geographical regions and for schools of different types and sizes.

The Examinations Staff for the United States Armed Forces Institute prepares the examinations. This staff is under the general direction of Ralph W. Tyler, University Examiner, University of Chicago. E. F. Lindquist, Professor of Education, State University of Iowa, is in direct charge of a special group preparing the tests to determine general educational development.

Administration of this phase of the educational program for personnel of the armed forces will be in the hands of the United States Armed Forces Institute. General supervision of the Institute is through the offices of Brigadier General Frederick H. Osborn, Director of the Special Service Division of the War Department and Captain C. C. Bauchman, U.S.N., Director of Special Activities, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department. The Institute is directed by Colonel Francis T. Spaulding, Chief, Education Branch, Special Service Division, War Department. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard participation in the Institute program is directed by Lt. Commander Ralph A. Sentman, U.S.N. (Retired), officer-in-charge of the Educational Services Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Colonel Spaulding is Dean of the School of Education, Harvard University, on leave.

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Young, formerly Supervisor of Correspondence Study at Pennsylvania State College, is Commandant of the Institute. Lieutenant (junior grade) Preston S. Cutler, U.S.N.R., is Navy Registrar of the Institute.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN A. M. PAPERS, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1943

THIRTY-SEVEN ESTABLISHMENTS WIN ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD

Thirty-six additional industrial establishments and one construction project were selected to receive the Army-Navy Production Award in recognition of outstanding performance on war work, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal announced today.

Their names and addresses are:

The Aircraft Accessories Corporation, Burbank, California.
Airesearch Manufacturing Company, Los Angeles, California.
Allenport Plant, Pittsburgh Steel Company, Allenport, Pennsylvania.
American Sterilizer Company, Erie, Pennsylvania.
American Tube and Stamping Division, The Stanley Works, Bridgeport, Connecticut.
Ames Street Plant, United-Carr Fastener Corporation, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Arlington Mills, William Whitman Company, Lawrence, Massachusetts.
The F. H. Bickford Company, Dayton, Ohio.
Bridgeport Plant, Dictaphone Corporation, Bridgeport, Connecticut.
The Brookside Mills, Knoxville, Tennessee.
Carnegie Works, Columbia Steel & Shafting Company, Carnegie, Pennsylvania.
Clark Brothers Company, Incorporated, Olean, New York.
Cleveland Plant, The Lucas Machine Tool Company, Cleveland, Ohio.
Colonial Radio Company, Buffalo, New York.
Coosa River Ordnance Plant, The Brecon Loading Company, Talladega, Alabama.
East Peoria Plant, Caterpillar Tractor Company, East Peoria, Illinois.
Faichney Instrument Corporation, Watertown, New York.
Farnsworth Television & Radio Corporation, Marion, Indiana.
LaPlant Choate Company, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
Lone Star Ordnance Plant, Lone Star Defense Corporation, Texarkana, Texas.
Mahoney-Troast Construction Company and Associated Sub-contractors, Plant #7 Project, Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Wood-Ridge, New Jersey.
Maumelle Ordnance Plant, Cities Service Defense Corporation, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Metlab Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Mohawk Carpet Mills, Incorporated, Amsterdam, New York.
Monessen Plant, Pittsburgh Steel Company, Monessen, Pennsylvania.
The National Tool Company, Cleveland, Ohio.
New York City Plant, National Biscuit Company, New York, New York.
Packard Manufacturing Corporation, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Philadelphia Textile Finishers, Incorporated, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Plants #1 and #2, Magna Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, Haskell, New Jersey.
Saco Lowell Shops, Biddeford, Maine.
St. Croix Garment Company, Stillwater, Minnesota.
Stanley Tools Division, The Stanley Works, New Britain, Connecticut.
Tractor Works, International Harvester Company, Chicago, Illinois.
Universal Camera Corporation, New York, New York.
West Pullman Works, International Harvester Company, Chicago, Illinois.
Edward Weck & Company, Incorporated, Brooklyn, New York.

Each of the selected plants will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award Pennant and all of their civilian employees will be given Army-Navy "E" pins.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN MORNING PAPERS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1943

ADDRESS BY
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOE N. DALTON
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
BEFORE ANNUAL CONGRESS ON
MEDICAL EDUCATION AND LICENSURE OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1943.

PRE-MEDICAL AND MEDICAL EDUCATION AS RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY

An invitation to address the Annual Congress on Medical Education and Licensure is a privilege laymen do not ordinarily receive. Consequently, as I reviewed the program and noted the qualifications of those speakers you have already heard and those you will hear later, the thought occurred that perhaps I was invited as an antidote. I accepted the invitation with the belief that I can help you understand some of the Army's educational problems and the hope that the Army may thus receive still further aid from you and your profession.

My father practiced medicine and surgery in Winston-Salem, North Carolina for many years and if you will accept my deep respect--my affection--for your profession as a substitute for medical training, we can perhaps find more common ground and more mutual interests than might first be supposed.

Our goals are similar, although the fields in which we work are different Doctors were the original trained personnel managers, and a doctor's interest in his patient transcends the specific treatment he administers. As Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Services of Supply, my responsibilities as well as my interests are primarily with respect to people--how they can best be used in the Army--people as individuals--groups of people. What is best for the man at any given moment, and what fits best into the long range picture.

We have yet another common ground in that doctors were among the first to realize that education is a continuous process. It does not stop at any age, nor does it end on the receipt of any academic degree. You, therefore, possibly to a greater extent than any other professional group, are vitally interested in Army specialized training plans to provide trained, skilled men to meet Army needs

I followed customary educational lines of a man interested in the Army as a career. I thought my formal contacts with education had ended on receipt of a degree from Virginia Military Institute, and after additional work at the University of the South and the various Army schools which I attended. Within the past few months, however, I found myself in the center of as interesting and as important a series of educational problems as have ever developed in this country.

It became possible to develop a long-range, sound program for the utilization of educational facilities when Congress lowered the draft age to eighteen. It became apparent, also, that the Army would have to assure itself of an uninterrupted flow of the kinds of specialists which had been provided by colleges and universities. The Secretary of War assigned the responsibility for the development and operation of Army plans for maintaining the flow of these specialists to General Somervell, Commanding General of the Services of Supply, and my immediate superior. As a result, an Army Specialized Training Division has been created under my supervision, and I have appointed Colonel Herman Beukema formerly head of the Department of Economics, Government and History at the United States Military Academy, Director of the new Division.

MORE

The Secretary of War stated the objective as follows:

> "The objective of the plan is to meet the need of the Army for specialized, technical training of soldiers on active duty for certain Army tasks for which its own training facilities are insufficient in extent or character. To that end, the Army will contract with selected colleges and universities for the use of their facilities and faculties in effecting such training of selected soldiers in courses prescribed by the Army. This plan will enable the Army to make selections for this training of qualified young men on a broad democratic basis without regard to financial resources."

Army needs include soldiers trained in such capacities as doctors, dentists and veterinarians, engineers and physicists, mathematicians and experts in rare languages.

In every field with which the Army is concerned we have called upon civilian educational experts for counsel as to curricula and as to methods of selecting men to be assigned to this Program. In the case of the medical profession, General Magee and his staff are guiding our work and selecting civilians with whom consultations are held. We recognize that in the case of medicine you--the doctors--must be satisfied with the training the men in medicine receive, and I assure you that there is no thought in our minds of shortcutting any of the essentials of medical education. We do expect, of course, that every possible means will be used to compress the periods of time involved in training.

The Army Specialized Training Program must provide men trained in two broad fields--medical, including dental and veterinary, and technical, including engineering, physics, chemistry, psychology, and other specific areas.

In the medical Program, the training is for a degree, as there is no such thing as a partially trained doctor. The high standards required by your profession must be maintained.

In the Technical Program, the training is not for a degree, but is pointed to what might be called Army requirement standards. The technical program has been compressed by increasing the work load and by eliminating work in subjects not required to perform the Army tasks for which the men are being trained.

Soldiers assigned to the Army Specialized Training Program will be on active duty as members of a unit located at a college or university. They will be under the direction of a commandant who will be responsible for discipline and control. They will be in uniform and they will receive the pay and allowances of enlisted men as provided by Army regulations. Housing, feeding, instruction and other services will be provided by contract between the institution and the Army.

These soldiers will rise at 6:30 and from then until taps at 10:30 that night, their day will be as rigorous as it was during the basic military training period. A typical week will include twenty-four hours of academic classroom work, including laboratory periods, and twenty-four hours of supervised study time. In addition, there will be six hours a week of supervised physical conditioning and about five hours a week of military instruction which will consist of lectures, orientation work, morning formations and some drill. Neither the physical nor military instruction will require outside preparation. Their purposes are to maintain the physical condition of the men and to refresh their minds on military subjects and information. There will be sufficient free time provided each day for personal affairs, and the men will be off duty from late afternoon on Saturday until the Sunday evening meal.

The Army Program is based on a series of twelve-week terms. This decision as reached after study and consultation with civilian educators because it is the hortest time period in which satisfactory curricula can be prescribed, and thereore the most flexible time period which the Army can use.

MORE

In addition to the Army need for a flexible program from the standpoint of variations in curricula, there is an even greater Army need with respect to starting dates of the various Specialized Training Programs. To be specific, some colleges will be asked to initiate programs on March 1st, others on April 1st, still others on May 1st, and so on. Only in this way can men be assigned to colleges for Army Specialized Training as they become available through replacement training centers and induction centers. The alternative is the loss of valuable men who should be working under this Program, but who, if they cannot be assigned promptly to an institution, are then assigned to troop duty or overseas service. This does not mean, of course, that any one institution will be expected to take new units for training more frequently than quarterly, although some institutions have already demonstrated the practicability of taking more frequent assignments of soldiers.

The twelve-week terms are combined into a basic program and a series of advanced programs.

The basic program consists of three twelve-week terms, or a total of approximately nine calendar months. For the most part, all men entering at the basic level will undergo the same instruction during the first of the basic terms. In the second and third terms, variations begin to occur, depending on the interests and abilities of the respective men. A typical curriculum will require about two-thirds of the contact academic hours in mathematics, physics, chemistry and other sciences, and the remaining one-third will be devoted to history, English and geography.

Men who qualify for advanced work will, at the conclusion of the basic program, be routed into specialized fields.

Here again the work is in twelve-week terms, but the number of such terms is dependent on the field in which the soldier is working and varies accordingly.

The problems of selecting the institution which will provide this academic training are most important, and a joint board consisting of three representatives of the Army, three of the Navy, and three of the War Manpower Commission is working on them. The board's problems are to determine the best possible use of educational facilities and to minimize overlapping and overconcentration in any one institution or in any one area. Wherever possible, only one of the services will be located at an institution, in order to avoid administrative difficulties. We do not know at this time how many institutions will be used, but we do expect to start with the best institutions in each field and work outward from that nucleus, with due consideration to geographical questions.

How, then, does this program differ in the case of medicine?

The pre-medical program runs five terms, or sixty-four weeks of elapsed time, compared with the three-term basic technical program. The curriculum calls for the following work which has been translated into semester hours for your convenience:

Mathematics	8
Physics	8
Chemistry	18
Zoology	12
History, English and Geography	15
Other selected subjects such as languages, sociology and psychology	25

This is a total of 86 semester hours.

Pre-medical students will be housed in the same manner as other soldiers in the Basic Training Program, will be subject to the same discipline and will undergo the same amount of military training and physical conditioning.

MORE

The medical program calls for the same number of semesters of work as your standards now require. The compression here is one of eliminating long vacations and limiting furlough time to about four weeks in each calendar year.

Medical curricula are unchanged. Each school will continue to establish its own curricula.

Medical men assigned to this Program will be selected in about the same manner as you have been selecting your medical students all along--from the pre-medical group. School authorities will be requested to do this selection job under the general supervision of the Army, inasmuch as these men are, after all, soldiers.

Military training will be reduced to one hour per week and physical conditioning will be largely left to the men to work out for themselves. Wherever possible, the men will be housed and messed similarly to other men assigned to the Army Specialized Training Program. When this is not possible, commutation allowances will be granted and the men will make their own arrangements for board and room.

It is planned that upon graduation, men will be commissioned as first lieutenants and then placed on inactive status so they may complete a year of interneship or residency.

One of the most important questions is obviously the one of selection of men. Where are they coming from? How will they be selected and assigned?

Let us assume that we will be able to meet the problems of the transition period in a satisfactory manner, and confine the discussion at this time to the long-range picture, beginning with a young man graduating from high school and being inducted in the Army shortly after his eighteenth birthday.

While this soldier is undergoing his basic military training, he will be under close observation by his superiors and in addition will be given tests to indicate his capacities and potentialities. These tests will be devised according to customary testing practices which, of course, involve aid and assistance from people of such specialized fields as your own.

Military training records, academic records and testing scores of all men who attain a score of 110 or higher on the Army General Classification Test will be coordinated by screening and selection boards. These boards will review the various records and, after a personal interview with each candidate, will recommend appropriate action. Men of sufficient maturity who meet all other qualifications will be directed to officer candidate schools. Those who are potentially good officer material but who need maturity and those who also need further academic training will be assigned to the Army Specialized Training Program.

Throughout the Program there will be constant screening of all soldiers working under it. Screening boards will be established at each institution where an Army Specialized Training Unit is located, and at the end of each term men who are qualified will be continued in the next highest level of the Program until their work has been completed. At that time they will be recommended to officer candidate schools.

Some men will be qualified for officer candidate schools at the conclusion of the basic program. Some men, unfortunately, will fail to attain required minimum standards and will be returned to troop duty. Some men will qualify academically, but will fail to meet other Army standards. They will be returned to troops as enlisted men.

It is obvious that we will need not only counsel but also active assistance from members of the medical profession in all screening and selection processes of the medical program. We also need the help of your profession in the screening and selection processes in the other phases of the Army Specialized Training Program. Some of you will be asked to become members of the selection and screening boards at replacement training centers, others will have the same request made with respect to units at specific institutions. The Army knows what it needs, and among those needs are the whole-hearted support and assistance of the members of the medical profession throughout. This we know we will receive.

MORE

We earlier touched upon the point that education is a continuous process, and in these few minutes I have tried to start your education with respect to the Army Specialized Training Program. Now you must educate us so your profession and the Army can together fill the Army's medical needs.

I appreciate this opportunity to talk to you, and look forward to subsequent opportunities to talk with you.

END

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS: February 20, 1943

No contracts have been signed with colleges so far in connection with the Army Specialized Training Program. The fact that any particular college is on the list of institutions previously announced as eligible for consideration does not warrant the conclusion that that college will necessarily participate in the Army program.

The War Department has made no commitment beyond the assurance that the listed schools will be surveyed with a view to their possible inclusion in the program. If inspection of an institution shows that its facilities, teaching staff, etc., are suitable for the training contemplated, a contract will be offered, and negotiations to that end will be undertaken by War Department representatives.

Contracts will be announced individually by the War Department when negotiations have been completed.

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FOR P.M. PAPERS, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1943

WOMEN'S ARMY AUXILIARY CORPS REPRESENTED AT 9 SERVICE SCHOOLS

Officers of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps will have attended by the end of February, nine Service schools of the United States Army. These WAAC officers are completing courses in Service schools, receiving special training that they may release Army officers on staffs and faculties of WAAC training centers. They attend the same classes at which Army officers are trained.

Schools attended by officers of the Corps are the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the Adjutant General's School at Fort Washington, Maryland; the Special Services School at Washington and Lee University Lexington, Virginia; and the Inspector General's School, Washington, D. C., the Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, Virginia; Ordnance Automotive School, Camp Holabird, Maryland; Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and Army Exchange School, Princeton, New Jersey.

For the Command and General Staff School, Special Services School, and Army Exchange School, these are the first WAAC officers attending, but at the other schools, previous groups have completed courses. Officers of the Corps also have attended the Bakers and Cooks School at Fort Riley, Kansas.

In addition, enrolled members of the Corps are taking instruction as specialists at Army schools. Enrolled members are now attending the Army Band School, Fort Myer, Virginia, and are studying radio at Kansas City, Missouri, under Signal Corps supervision, and to be photographic laboratory techncians at Fort Lowry, Colorado, to obtain additional training along technical Army lines.

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FOR P.M. PAPERS FRIDAY, MARCH 5, 1943

MEN IN BATTLE LINES ARE RELIGIOUS, CHAPLAIN, WOUNDED IN ACTION, REPORTS

Army chaplains duck Jap bullets and bombs on the South Pacific fronts just as combat soldiers do. They slip in and out of fox holes and trenches, talk religion and about the folks back home. They go armed with nothing more than a Bible and hymn book. And the rank and file of the soldiers welcome the chaplains.

Chaplain Lennie S. Dubberly, in Buna, said in a report made public by the War Department today that the men on the battle lines are much more religious than might be supposed. "They've told me they pray very often," he added, "especially in the thick of a fight."

Chaplain Dubberly himself was wounded by a Jap bullet the day after Christmas. In his report he merely mentioned the fact and hastened to say, "I'm more proud than ever that I'm a chaplain in the United States Army."

Chaplain Dubberly, a Methodist, from Prosper, Texas, left Port Moresby with his outfit by plane on November 8 and landed on the other side of the Owen Stanley Range. "From there we started walking," he said, "carrying everything that we needed. One Bible, one New Testament, one song book that had various services and a ritual in it, one fountain pen, twenty sheets of paper, 50 altar breads and one small bottle of wine was all the professional equipment I had. We marched for ten days through a most difficult jungle trail. I marched at the end of the line with a portable hospital unit. When possible we stayed in a native village at night but many times we were unable to make it. The mosquitoes, flies, ants, and other jungle pests made life miserable day and night. Our most difficult trail was where we had to cut back into the mountains. We climbed with packs on our backs and it rained almost constantly.

"My troops went into action November 21. I stayed with the battalion aid station, helping with the wounded, quieting as much as possible those who were shell shocked. Cigarettes and a drink of water seemed to help them.

"I visited the men in fox holes and slit trenches and talked with them. Many of the men said they missed the services we used to have back in camp. Often I would stop and talk to one man and it would not be very long before we'd have a group around, talking about religion and the folks back home. The men always thanked me for coming around and said I should come back whenever I could."

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FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY MONDAY, MARCH 8, 1943, AT 5:15 TO 5:30 P.M., E.W.T.

ARMY SIFTS 200,000 SOLDIERS FOR SPECIALIZED TRAINING

Colonel Herman Beukema, Director of the Army Specialized Training Division, in a radio talk this afternoon announced that more than 200,000 soldiers, scattered throughout the camps of the continental United States, have been examined by screening boards which have selected the first contingent of a few thousand for participation in the specialized training program.

Speaking in New York over a nationwide hook-up of the Columbia Broadcasting System, Colonel Beukema said that the examinations of soldiers for participation in the program produced not only the March group but also the April contingent, which he said will be about ten times larger.

"Later tests will provide the trainees whose college work is scheduled to begin in May and succeeding months until the quotas reach the authorized peak of 150,000," he said.

"Thereafter the input and out-flow will be balanced, assuring the Army of an unbroken supply of superior material for its Officer Candidate Schools.

"Behind this revolutionary step in Army training, this unprecedented interlock of the college classroom with the battlefield, lie many reasons. To understand the principal one, a backward glance into America's history will be useful.

"The years which separate young America's fight for independence and mature America's struggle to hold it secure have witnessed startling changes in the definition of a soldier. In 1775 raw courage, a musket and the ability to use it were considered enough to qualify a man as a defender of his country. Washington soon discovered that the Minute Man, however brave, was no soldier. Long and hard months of training, ending on the battlefield, were needed to convert him into a dependable fighter.

"Today's soldier needs everything that Washington's veterans of Yorktown could boast---and vastly more. Every advance in the mechanization of armies has multiplied the demands we make on a finished soldier, the standards

MORE

we set for him. When a single infantry battalion uses three times as much equipment and delivers at least ten times as much fire power as Washington's entire army, we get some notion of the demands made on our 1943 infantrymen. For the artillery, the armored and mechanized units and the Air Forces the demand is vastly greater.

"There is but one way to meet the problem imposed by modern strategy and technology. That is training--carefully planned, closely supervised, endlessly continued training. It is one phase of our task as testified by the reaction of our enemies, in which success has been demonstrated.

"Now, however, we are coming to a bottleneck which for some time past has threatened increasingly the speed and success of our training program. We face a serious shortage in the out-put of certain types of specialists, men who not only can perform difficult and delicate tasks demanding knowledge and skill, but who can teach others to perform them. Some months ago Lieutenant General Somervell, Commanding General of the Services of Supply, told the country that nearly two-thirds of the personnel in a modern Army consists of specialists. He added that the draft was producing nothing like that number. Some of the gap is being filled by instruction in the camps, some by sending soldiers to factory schools.

"Neither of these methods is adequate to fill the most important single need, the men who combine high intelligence, developed skill, and the quality of leadership--in other words the officer type in the technical fields.

If we could move the colleges bodily into our camps, our problem would be simplified. That being impossible, the War Department is reversing the flow--by placing selected soldiers in selected institutions for varying periods of intensive training.

"Four major classes of trainees are provided for. First, in point of numbers are engineers of various types. The second largest group is to study medicine and the allied fields. A third and relatively small group will be developed in psychology for future use in junior classification and placement personnel. Last, and highly important, is a group of medium size, to be trained for liaison work in the foreign areas where the American flag has been planted or will be planted. They are necessarily divided into separate units, each of which will be carefully instructed as to the geography, historical background, economy, social conditions and language of the area in which they may expect future assignment."

MORE

Colonel Beukema emphasized that the program "has purposely been left flexible in every major respect."

"One feature alone is rigid--the objective," he said. "The Army, with the cooperation of the colleges, seeks to produce in the shortest possible time the numbers and types of officer candidates needed to speed us to military victory."

Colonel Beukema, prior to becoming Director of the Army Specialized Training Division, was head of the Department of Economics, Government and History at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

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ADDRESS, "THE SIZE OF THE ARMY,"
BY THE HONORABLE HENRY L. STIMSON,
SECRETARY OF WAR,
OVER NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY NETWORK,
TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1943, AT 9 P.M., E.W.T.

Tonight I wish to speak to you about the subtle danger which, unless guarded against, may destroy our present bright hopes for a decisive victory. It arises out of a mental attitude which is quite prevalent among our people, including many of the best of them, and has danger of which most of them are quite unconscious.

We are raising and training a magnificent army. We are constructing and manning a superb navy. The fine young men of both these forces are now just beginning to meet the enemy and have already shown their mettle. They are equal to their tasks. Man for man they have proved themselves superior in skill, initiative and resourcefulness to the men of the Axis nations which we are fighting. There is no trouble with that section of the American people who are in uniform either on the land, on the sea or in the air.

Nor does the trouble exist among millions of patriotic citizens at home, who have given up their dearest to the dangers of this war and who are cheerfully devoting themselves to patriotic tasks and sacrifices here and are thus trying in every way to hasten and push forward the war effort.

It is hard to analyze the attitude to which I refer. It doubtless arises from various causes and it manifests itself in many ways. Some call it the spirit of "business as usual" but that definition is not broad enough. Very often it appears in patriotic people who do not realize what we are up against and who honestly do not understand the purpose and necessity of some of the war measures which their government is taking. But the attitude is just as dangerous even when it is innocent. I think it can accurately be called the attitude of trying to win the war -- the most fierce and dangerous war which has ever confronted the United States -- in some easy manner and without too much trouble and sacrifice.

Abraham Lincoln met it in the Civil War even after that war had been going on for over a year and many bloody battles had been fought. He said to a caller at the White House in September, 1862 "The fact is the people have not made up their minds that we are at war with the South. They have not buckled down to the determination to fight this war through; or they have got the idea into their heads that we are going to get out of this fix somehow by strategy.... They have no idea that this war is to be carried on and put through by hard, tough fighting; that it will hurt somebody; and no headway is going to be made while this delusion lasts."

Today this attitude which Lincoln described, manifests itself when we say:

> The Russians have destroyed so many Germans that Germany will not be able to carry on any more offensives;

Or when we say:

> The German people are cracking;

MORE

Or when we say:

> The best way to win the war is to give our Allies plenty of weapons to fight for us;

Or when we say:

> If we make too big a military effort we shall so dislocate our economy that we shall never recover; we shall create a permanent dictatorship and lose our historic freedom;

Or when we say other things which at bottom represent merely wishful thinking or the dread of personal sacrifices and the desire to find a better way out.

I believe that this attitude towards hard fighting on our part really underlies much of the criticism which is being directed today against the proposed size of our Army. On the other hand, I also realize that the Army plans involve many factors of great complexity and that the doubt in many minds is perfectly honest and patriotic. Such minds are entitled to all the light which we can give them. It is my purpose tonight to try to explain to you how the size of the army was fixed; the kind of army we are training and the purposes for which it is designed; and why it is impossible to reduce its size or interrupt its training without the gravest danger to our ultimate victory.

I.

The Numerical Size of the Army

We are planning to have raised by the end of this year 1943 an army of 8,200,000 men composed of 7,500,000 enlisted men and 700,000 officers. This number will include an air force of about two-and-a-half million. It also will include the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps of upwards of 150,000.

These figures were not arrived at by guess work; they were the product of months of study by the General Staff and the War College. They were also the product of joint planning with the Navy over the future work of both these services. The proposed size of the Army, the Navy, the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps were all determined at the same time, and all of these forces were balanced within themselves and against each other, and also in connection with the available manpower, the estimated capacity of production of equipment, and the estimated availability of shipping for their transport. These figures have received the approval of the joint chiefs of staff of the Army and the Navy and finally of the President. They have thus had the benefit of all the brains, accumulated research, and judgment which our governmental machinery provides for that purpose. They have not been worked out in disregard of but in full reference to our program of shipbuilding and production of equipment.

When we look at the estimated size of the forces of our enemies which are in the field against us, our numbers certainly do not look relatively too large. I realize that the figures of the hostile forces are estimates only but they are based upon the best information available to those whose business it is to make such estimates. In Europe the estimated forces of the Germans and their allies show about 14,000,000 men under arms. Russia and Britain together have a much smaller number. In Asia the Japanese have more then 3,000,000 men. These figures represent the aggregate of individuals in the various forces.

When we compare the combat units of the various forces the disparity between us is even greater. Our plans are to produce about one hundred American divisions of ground forces, together with their auxiliary troops. Germany is estimated to have approximately three hundred divisions, Italy 80 divisions, Germany's European satellites another 80 divisions, and Japan about 86 more. This makes an aggregate of about 546. Making all allowances for error these figures certainly make our ground forces seem of very modest size in comparison.

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II.

The Character and Objective of the Army

It is not the purpose of our military leaders to create a huge defensive army, awaiting in the United States such unknown and uncertain opportunities for its use as may hereafter occur. Their plans are much more wise than that. The Army is being raised on the fundamental and correct theory that we shall at once take the offensive and seize a number of priceless opportunities which are already opening up for us to end the war as quickly as possible.

III.

The nature of the training necessary to meet these objectives of the Army

To successfully meet these priceless opportunities we have put into effect the most carefully planned and coordinated program of military training which has ever existed in the United States.

The training contemplated by this program for the individuals is a process covering a long time. The Germans think two years necessary for such training of their men. We believe that our men can do it in one year but that is a minimum. Furthermore, the recruits are not all taken into the Army at the same time and all graduated at the same time. Such a method would be impossible for any country, even one as rich and powerful as the United States. And furthermore it would not meet the changing requirements of war. It would be too rigid and inflexible. Each of the reception centers and training schools takes in a succession of new classes and these groups are passed along the steps of the course until the final product in the shape of army divisions is produced at the end. During each group's training the men are first instructed in the schooling of the individual soldier, are then crystallized into small and later large units for training in cooperative team action in modern warfare, and finally large divisional combat forces emerge from the other end of the system, each highly trained for its specific task. Every month the requisite number of men to form a certain number of divisions is taken into the reception centers at the entrance to the machine and every month at the other end that number of divisions is emerging highly trained for the various objectives to which they are to be assigned.

Anyone who studies this system as it is now running will be astounded at the careful planning which has been required as well as at the smooth continuity of the process of training which it has produced. It is now proceeding under the highest pressure of perfected action. Nothing like it has ever existed in this country before. It represents a great stream of training towards a carefully thought out goal. It has taken over two years to develop and construct this system; to train the instructors of its schools and to develop the immense overhead necessary for its smooth operation; and to construct the cantonments and other buildings for its use. Almost every unit in it has been devised and fitted into its place in accordance with the program of the size of the army to be completed by December, 1943, which I described a few minutes ago.

The first point to be borne in mind about this system of training is that the whole structure is complex and interrelated. Men are taught in a large number of different kinds of schools for different purposes of warfare. For example, in the ground forces there are special schools for infantry, artillery, tank warfare, anti-aircraft gunnery, anti-tank gunnery, Signal Corps work with all its ramifications of scientific specialties, mechanics' schools, Quartermasters' schools and many more. In the Air Corps exists a similar large group of different schools for different purposes and specialties. The number of the graduates of these several schools must conform to the number required in the final produce of combat forces and all must be taught to work with each other in carrying out the war task of the final division or combat force to which each belongs.

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The second point to be remembered is that the whole process takes at least a year. If you interrupt the steady flow of entrants to the schools in March 1943, the effect of this break will be produced a year later and then, if it proves a mistake, cannot be corrected for at least another year.

IV.

The disastrous results of interrupting this process

In the light of the foregoing description of the purpose and process of our Army's training, I think one can see more easily the danger of meddling with that process. Plan and process are tied together. The plan contemplates a succession of carefully directed blows at our enemies. The size and character of these blows and the aggregate forces which are necessary have been carefully thought out. Just as our present offensives are being carried out by men who have been through a year's training, the men now being brought into the Army are to be trained for campaigns a year ahead. Our main object is to continuously build up a force which will strike without interruption and with cumulative effect. That purpose can be thwarted by a mistake made now.

The various critics who today are asking that we should slow up or interrupt our work fail to realize the far reaching effect of interruption. Furthermore they do not understand the psychology of combat. They do not realize that battles are won by continuous rapid blows upon an enemy and that when an enemy begins to show signs of demoralization these blows must be continued and, if possible, redoubled in order that he may not have time to reform his forces. Once the enemy is checked or shaken on the field of battle, he must be constantly pursued and hammered until he is completely beaten or surrenders. The very fact that it is known that we have trained forces ready to do this tends towards his demoralization.

On the other hand, the commander who after an initial success stops and gives his broken opponent time to reform and reorganize only finds that he must fight his battle over again. If after the battle of Gettysburg, the Federal commander had been able to pursue and destroy his defeated enemy, the length of the Civil War might have been shortened by more than a year. On the other hand, the fact that in 1918 Foch was ready to remorselessly follow up and shatter the German enemy who had been shaken at Soissons on July 18th and again at St. Quentin on August 8th, permitted the last great war to be finished in November 1918 instead of lasting over into 1919 as had been expected.

I speak with careful consideration when I say that if we should halt this great training establishment which we have now built and timed according to the present timetable of the war, we should deal a heavier blow to our hopes of a complete final victory than by any loss which we are likely to sustain on the field of battle.

V.

Another argument of our critics is that by constructing too large an Army we are making undue inroads into our limited manpower; that we are taking necessary workers from the factories which are providing Army equipment and machines; and that we are similarly slowing down the construction of merchant shipping which is necessary to carry the Army and its supplies across the ocean. As I have already said, this argument ignores the careful study which has been given to this subject by our President and his military advisers. As between them and their critics I think it is the safer bet to trust the former. But there is this further answer to this argument which I think is conclusive. The argument depends upon the assumption that there is no elasticity in the efficiency of the civilian industries which are producing weapons and ships; that every man-hour taken away from industry and put into the Army must result in exactly the same ultimate loss in rapidity of production.

Every thoughtful citizen who will give any real consideration to the problem will know that such an assumption is not true. Only those who believe

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that our industry and our farming and our general civilian activity are really keyed to an all-out war are entitled to make this argument. It is the duty of every citizen to examine into his own life and his own community and see whether production in industry and on the farm cannot be increased enormously in efficiency; whether absenteeism, threatened strikes, general complacency, insistence of "business as usual," or even insistence on hoped-for standards of living, are not going a long way to prevent what could be accomplished by an all-out war effort. If you are content with the present situation and with the present results in industry, in agriculture, and in our civilian life, then I suggest that you go to one of our great camps and see our boys in uniform working. I suggest that you read the detailed dispatches from Tunisia and the Southwest Pacific about the fighting efforts of our soldiers. I suggest that you compare your comforts of life with theirs, and then ask yourself again -- are you content? I hope and pray that it will not require tragic disaster to bring our people to a realization of the facts. The great wave of patriotic ardor which was shown so dramatically in the weeks after Pearl Harbor must not fall away into arguments of rights, wages, profits, and relative advantage of one man over another.

The Armed Forces, the men who are going into actual combat, have placed their house in order. Their spirit and their program are all that patriotism and careful planning can effect. I now ask whether industry and agriculture should not likewise be put on a more efficient wartime basis. When you are driving a team of horses and one of them goes lame, you do not lame the other horse to equalize the team. You try to get two sound horses.

I fully understand that we must have essential food and necessary goods for civilian consumption. I am well aware of the difficulties in getting machinery and employees which our farmers and manufacturers are now experiencing, but I am convinced that with the initiative, resourcefulness and willingness to sacrifice of the American people, these problems can be solved without crippling their Armed Forces.

For myself I have reached the conclusion that one of the reasons why industry and agriculture and the whole civilian population have not moved more rapidly towards an all-out effort is that we have relied almost entirely on voluntary cooperation. This voluntary cooperation would work with a large part of our population as soon as they clearly understood the need for it. But the effect of the recalcitrant or thoughtless few is so great upon the minds and efforts of others that I am convinced that the only way to accomplish the result which we must all reach, is through a General Service Act. This has proved true in England and I believe it is now true here.

The issue between the proponents of the Army program and its critics in my opinion largely narrows down to this difference: the leaders of the Army are trying, by shortening the war, to save the lives of thousands of young Americans -- lives vital to the future of this country. The opponents of the Army program are trying to avoid present trouble -- the inconveniences and relatively minor sacrifices which would be involved in a more thorough and drastic reorganization of our industrial and civilian life for the remaining period of this war. I firmly believe that when the true situation is understood by the American people, there will be no doubt as to their decision. Even if, as Lincoln said in 1862, they have not yet truly realized what it means to be at war, they will soon do so. And when they have done so, they will be ready to make any sacrifice for victory.

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FOR RELEASE IN P. M. PAPERS, MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1943

THIRTY-EIGHT PLANTS RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD

A list of thirty-eight industrial establishemnts selected to receive the Army-Navy Production Award for outstanding performance on war work was announced today by the Under Secretary of War, the Honorable Robert P. Patterson, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable James V. Forrestal.

Their names and addresses are:

American Lens Company, Incorporated, New York, New York
The Bossert Company, Utica, New York
The Broderick Company, Muncie, Indiana
Campbell Soup Company, Central Division, Chicago, Illinois
Carpenter Container Corporation, Brooklyn, New York
Century Ribbon Mills, Incorporated, York, Pennsylvania
Chicago Extruded Metals Company, Cicero, Illinois
The Columbus Bolt Works Company, Columbus, Ohio
Crucible Steel Company of America, Park Works, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
The Dann Clothing Company, Incorporated, Long Island City, New York
Donner Hanna Coke Corporation, Buffalo, New York
Eagle Tool and Machine Company, Springfield, Ohio
General American Transportation Corporation, Ordnance Division, East Chicago, Indiana
Holley Carburetor Company, Detroit, Michigan
Houdaille-Hershey Corporation, Oakes Products Division, North Chicago, Illinois
Kensington Steel Company, Chicago, Illinois
Lederle Laboratories, Incorporated, Pearl River, New York
Machlett Laboratories, Incorporated, Springdale, Connecticut
The Mosler Safe Company, Hamilton, Ohio
Motor Products Corporation, Detroit, Michigan
Mt. Vernon Woodberry Mills, Incorporated, Tallassee Mills, Tallassee, Alabama
Mullins Manufacturing Corporation, Salem, Ohio
Mullins Manufacturing Company, Youngstown Pressed Steel Division, Warren, Ohio
The Murray Company, Atlanta, Georgia
Pangborn Corporation, Hagerstown, Maryland
Pine Bluff Arsenal, Chemical Warfare Service, Pine Bluff, Arkansas
Potash Company of America, Carlsbad, New Mexico
Safety Car Heating and Lighting Company, New Haven, Connecticut
Seiberling Rubber Company, Barberton, Ohio

MORE

The Singer Manufacturing Company, Bridgeport Plant, Bridgeport, Connecticut
Steel Cooperage & Coating Company, Detroit, Michigan
Stokely Brothers and Company, Incorporated, Stokely-Van Camp, Indianapolis, Indiana
Taft-Peirce Manufacturing Company, Woonsocket, Rhode Island
Tennessee Valley Authority, Nitrate Plant No. 2, Wilson Dam, Alabama
The Union Metal Manufacturing Company, Canton, Ohio
The Waterbury Farrel Foundry and Machine Company, Waterbury, Connecticut
War Department Searchlight Mirror Plant, Cincinnati, Ohio
Youngstown Metal Products Company, Girard, Ohio

Each of the selected plants will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

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FOR RELEASE IN A. M. PAPERS, MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1943

FORTY-NINE PLANTS RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD

Forty-nine additional industrial establishments have been granted the Army-Navy Production Award for excellent performance of war work, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal announced today.

Their names and addresses are:

Allied Products Corporation, Plant #1, Victor Peninsular Division, Detroit, Michigan
Allied Products Corporation, Plant #2, R. B. Division, Detroit, Michigan
Allied Products Corporation, Plant #3, Hillsdale, Michigan
Allied Products Corporation, Plant #4, Hillsdale, Michigan
Alloy Steel Gear and Pinion Company, Chicago, Illinois
American Aluminum Ware Company, Newark, New Jersey
American Cyanamid and Chemical Corporation, American Powder Division, Maynard, Massachusetts
American Foundry Equipment Company, Mishawaka, Indiana
American Key Can Company, Chicago, Illinois
American Laundry Machinery Company, Cincinnati, Ohio
Androscoggin Mills, Lewiston, Maine
Animal Trap Company of America, Lititz, Pennsylvania
Armour Laboratories, Division of Armour and Company, Chicago, Illinois
Arnold Engineering Company, Marengo, Illinois
Baldwin Locomotive Works, Eddystone, Pennsylvania
Borg-Warner Corporation, Mechanics Universal Joint Division, Rockford, Illinois
The Columbian Vise and Manufacturing Company, Cleveland, Ohio
Continental Mills, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
C. B. Cottrell and Sons Company, Westerly, Rhode Island
The Couch-Uthe Company, Elyria, Ohio
Drayton Mill, Spartanburg, South Carolina
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Incorporated, Morgantown Ordnance Works, Morgantown, West Virginia
Eclipse Lawn Mower Company, Prophetstown, Illinois
The Fisher Company, Charles City, Iowa

MORE

The Gent Machine Company, South Euclid, Ohio
Golden State Company, Limited, Tulare, California
Harrison Radiator Company, Division of General Motors Corporation, Lockport, New York
Hercules Powder Company, Virginia Cellulose Division, Hopewell, Virginia
Hercules Powder Company, Port Ewen Plant, Port Ewen, New York
Holcomb and Hoke Manufacturing Company, Indianapolis, Indiana
The A. F. Holden Company, New Haven, Connecticut
The A. F. Holden Company, West Haven, Connecticut
Hynson, Westcott and Dunning, Incorporated, Baltimore, Maryland
Irwin Augur Bit Company, Wilmington, Ohio
The Kelley-Koett Manufacturing Company, Covington, Kentucky
Mason City Tent, Awning and Canvas Company, Mason City, Iowa
Ladish Drop Forge Company, Cudahy, Wisconsin
Lalance & Grosjean Manufacturing Company, Woodhaven, New York
Lowell Wrench Company, Worcester, Massachusetts
The Lufkin Rule Company, Saginaw, Michigan
Midwest Piping and Supply Company, Incorporated, St. Louis, Missouri
Morey Machinery Company, Incorporated, Astoria, Long Island, New York
Norquist Products, Incorporated, Jamestown, New York
Ogden Arsenal, Ogden, Utah
Press Wireless, Incorporated, Hicksville, Long Island, New York
Shure Brothers, Chicago, Illinois
The F. W. Sickles Company, Chicopee, Massachusetts
The L. S. Starrett Company, Athol, Massachusetts
Wilson Mechanical Instrument Company, New York, New York

Each of the selected plants will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

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FOR RELEASE IN P.M. PAPERS, MONDAY, MARCH 29, 1943

TWENTY-SIX PLANTS RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD

The Army-Navy Production Award has been granted to twenty-six additional industrial establishments for outstanding performance on war work, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal announced today.

Their names and addresses are:

American Silk Mills, Incorporated, Orange, Virginia.
Armour and Company, Union Stock Yards, Chicago, Illinois.
Carpenter and Paterson, Incorporated, Medford, Massachusetts.
Chicago Flexible Shaft Company, Chicago, Illinois.
Crawford Manufacturing Company, Kansas City Branch, Kansas City, Missouri.
The Fyr-Fyter Company, Dayton, Ohio.
Gear Grinding Machine Company, Detroit, Michigan.
C. L. Gougler Machine Company, Kent, Ohio.
The Herman Machine and Tool Company, Tallmadge, Ohio.
Horst Manufacturing Company, Detroit, Michigan.
International Telephone and Radio Laboratories, Broad Street Plant, New York, New York.
International Telephone and Radio Laboratories, Great River Plant, Great River, Long Island, New York.
International Telephone and Radio Laboratories, Telegraph Hill Plant, Telegraph Hill, Keyport, New Jersey.
Loose-Wiles Biscuit Company, Long Island City, New York.
National Rubber Machinery Company, Clifton Plant, Clifton, New Jersey.
The Oilgear Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Ray-O-Vac Company, Madison, Wisconsin.
George D. Roper Corporation, Rockford, Illinois.
Sanderson and Porter, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas.
Shefford Cheese Company, Incorporated, Green Bay, Wisconsin.
Sivyer Steel Castings Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Thordarson Electric Manufacturing Company, Chicago, Illinois.
Tennessee Enamel Manufacturing Company, Nashville, Tennessee.
The Wheland Company, Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Whiting Corporation, Harvey, Illinois.
Wollaston Brass and Aluminum Foundry, North Quincy, Massachusetts.

Each of the selected plants will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

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FOR RELEASE IN A.M. PAPERS, MONDAY, APRIL 5, 1943

THIRTY FACILITIES RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD

Twenty-seven additional industrial plants and three construction projects have been granted the Army-Navy Production Award for excellence in performance of war work, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal announced today.

The construction projects and addresses are:

Fred Howland, Incorporated, Florida Army Air Base, Orlando, Florida.
John McShain, Incorporated, and Hamilton Wilson, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia.
C. G. Kershaw Contracting Company, Swinerton and Walberg Company, H. K. Ferguson Company, Whitman, Requardt and Smith, H. A. Kuljian and Company and E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company, Incorporated, Rocky Mountain Arsenal Construction Project, Denver, Colorado.

The names and addresses of the plants are:

Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, Supercharger Plant, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
American Gear and Manufacturing Company, Chicago, Illinois.
American Hydraulics, Incorporated, Sheboygan, Wisconsin.
American Screw Machine Products, Incorporated, Chicago, Illinois.
Bernhardt Manufacturing Company, Charlotte, North Carolina.
The Cincinnati Planer Company, Oakley, Cincinnati, Ohio.
General Ceramics and Steatite Corporation, Plant #3, Keasbey, New Jersey.
The B. F. Goodrich Company, The Clarksville Division, Clarksville, Tennessee.
Henry Heide, Incorporated, New York, New York.
The Hughes-Keenan Company, Mansfield, Ohio.
Ben Hur Manufacturing Company, Main Plant, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
William F. Jobbins, Incorporated, Aurora, Illinois.
Lehigh Foundries, Incorporated, Easton, Pennsylvania.
Life Savers Corporation, Port Chester, New York.
Louisville Tin and Stove Company, Louisville, Kentucky.
The Mason Silk Company, Winsted, Connecticut.
Merchant and Evans Company, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Monsanto Chemical Company, Longhorn Ordnance Works, Marshall, Texas.
National Union Radio Corporation, Power Tube Division, Newark, New Jersey
Reynolds Research Corporation, Container Division, Louisville, Kentucky.
Rodney Milling Company, Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri.
Rust Proofing and Metal Finishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Spencer Thermostat Company, Attleboro, Massachusetts.
Stearns Manufacturing Company, Adrian, Michigan.
The Thresher Varnish Company, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, Dayton, Ohio.
Trojan Powder Company, Plum Brook Ordnance Works, Sandusky, Ohio.
United Steel and Wire Company, Battle Creek, Michigan.

Each of the selected facilities will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN P. M. PAPERS, TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 1943

APR 1
UNIVERSITY

FORTY INDUSTRIAL PLANTS RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY "E"

Forty additional industrial plants have been granted the Army-Navy Production Award for outstanding performance on war work, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal announced today.

The names and addresses of the plants are:

Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation, West Leechburg Plant, West Leechburg, Pennsylvania.
The Alvey-Ferguson Company, Oakley, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Autoyre Company, Oakville, Connecticut.
Don Baxter, Incorporated, Glendale, California.
Boonton Radio Corporation, Boonton, New Jersey.
Century Engineering Corporation, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
Chicago Roller Skate Company, Ware Brothers Division, Chicago, Illinois.
Climax Engineering Company, Clinton, Iowa.
The Cracker Jack Company, Chicago, Illinois.
Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Propeller Division, Caldwell-Clifton, New Jersey.
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Company, Jamestown, New York.
Eaton Engravers Machinery Corporation, Sag Harbor, Long Island, New York.
Firth Sterling Steel Company, McKeesport, Pennsylvania.
General Electric Company, Lynn River Works, Everett Supercharger Department, Everett, Massachusetts.
General Motors Corporation, Buick Motor Division, Flint Plant, Flint, Michigan.
General Motors Corporation, Buick Motor Division, Melrose Park Plant, Melrose Park, Illinois.
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, Chevrolet Motor & Axle, Tonowanda, New York.
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, Plant #1, Tonowanda, New York.
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, Plant #2, Buffalo, New York.
General Motors Corporation, Delco-Remy Division, Anderson, Indiana.
Gillette Machine and Tool Company, Hollywood, California.
The Goodman Manufacturing Company, Chicago, Illinois.
Gossett Mills, LadLassie Plant, Anderson, South Carolina.
Gossett Mills, Pendleton Plant, Pendleton, South Carolina.
Gossett Mills, Riverside Plant, Anderson, South Carolina.
Gossett Mills, Toxaway Plant, Anderson, South Carolina.
M & R Dietetic Laboratory, Incorporated, Columbus, Ohio.

MORE

McQuay Norris Manufacturing Company, St. Louis Ordnance Plant, Forest Park Core Division, St. Louis, Missouri.

McQuay Norris Manufacturing Company, St. Louis Ordnance Plant, Siemers Lane Core Division, St. Louis, Missouri.

Northwest Metal Products, Incorporated, Kent, Washington.

Ohio Ferro-Alloys Corporation, Philo, Ohio.

Parke, Davis & Company, The Bay Division, Bridgeport, Connecticut.

Parke, Davis & Company, The Bay Division, Versailles, Connecticut.

Plomb Tool Company, Los Angeles, California.

Rau Fastener Company, Providence, Rhode Island.

Rohr Aircraft Corporation, Chula Vista, California.

Studebaker Corporation, Aviation Division, Chicago, Illinois.

Studebaker Corporation, Aviation Division, Fort Wayne, Indiana.

Studebaker Corporation, Aviation Division, South Bend, Indiana.

Traylor Engineering & Manufacturing Company, Allentown, Pennsylvania.

Each of the selected facilities will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

END

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FOR RELEASE SUNDAY, APRIL 18, 1943

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PRAISES SECRETARY OF WAR'S "SAVE-MANPOWER" ORDER

Emphatic endorsement of the War Department's recent "save-manpower" order to employees has been received from the Civil Service Commission, The Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, announced today.

The endorsement, with an offer of complete cooperation, was voiced in a letter from Civil Service Commissioner Arthur S. Flemming praising the order as "an admirable statement . . . which should be placed before all government administrators."

The War Department order was transmitted March 22 to all administrative officials in the Department and commanding officers in field establishments. It directed them to examine their functions and personnel with a view to reducing wherever possible the personnel, time and materials required for the job.

Personal assistance in obtaining compliance from Civil Service employees in the War Department was offered to Secretary Stimson by Commissioner Flemming. "If at any time it is alleged that this objective can not be attained because of the administration of the Classification Act," the letter said, "I sincerely hope you will get in touch with me personally regarding the matter."

One paragraph of the War Department administrative memorandum struck at possible misgivings by supervisors and executives that staff reduction might lower their salaries. Mr. Flemming selected this paragraph for special approbation.

"We were particularly interested in the following sentence in your memorandum: 'It is the policy not to determine the salary of a supervisor by the number of persons supervised, but, rather, by the degree and nature of the responsibility'."

"We want you to know that the Civil Service Commission is prepared to assist you in the carrying out of this policy."

"I can assure you that as far as we are concerned there will be no lowering of the grades of supervisors who succeed in discharging, with fewer employees than they now have, the same duties and responsibilities that they are now discharging."

MORE

Commissioner Flemming's letter to Mr. Stimson follows in full:

> "Dear Secretary Stimson:
>
> "My attention was recently called to your Administrative Memorandum No. W-17 entitled, 'Program to save manpower in the War Department.'
>
> "We feel that this is an admirable statement of the objectives which should be placed before all government administrators in these days.
>
> "We were particularly interested in the following sentence in your memorandum: 'It is the policy not to determine the salary of a supervisor by the number of persons supervised, but, rather, by the degree and nature of the responsibility.'
>
> "We want you to know that the Civil Service Commission is prepared to assist you in the carrying out of this policy. If at any time it is alleged that this objective can not be attained because of the administration of the Classification Act of 1923 by the Civil Service Commission, I sincerely hope that you will get in touch with me personally regarding the matter. We will take immediate steps to clear up the situation.
>
> "I can assure you that as far as we are concerned there will be no lowering of the grades of supervisors who succeed in discharging, with fewer employees than they now have, the same duties and responsibilities that they are now discharging."

War Department Administrative Memorandum No. W-17 (March 22, 1943) calls attention to a Presidential memorandum calling for an agressive program for the efficient utilization of employees, so that the manpower needs of the Nation may best be served for the successful prosecution of the war. It adds:

> "The Department has already taken constructive steps toward achieving these purposes by: -- the establishment of control agencies, setting of employing ceilings, and by intensifying placement and training programs.
>
> "I am reaffirming these principles of administrative responsibility in order that all levels of our supervision and management can measure their present activities and the numbers engaged 'by the grim standards of total war.'
>
> "1. It is the policy to eliminate work which does not directly further the war effort.
>
> "a. Work considered non-essential which is required by statute or by other Federal departments and agencies should be referred through channels to the War Department Budget Officer for study as to possible suspension for the duration.
>
> "2. It is the policy to eliminate from within the War Department any duplication of essential activities.
>
> "a. It is the responsibility of the various control and administrative management groups to correct such duplications within their respective jurisdictions, and where duplications exist beyond their jurisdiction the situation should be referred through channels to the War Department Budget Officer for prompt action.
>
> "3. It is the policy to perform essential work with a minimum of personnel, time, and materials.
>
> "a. A continuing examination of organization structure, procedures, and performance of personnel will be made to insure that there will be maximum economy in our operations.

MORE

"b. Excess staffing in anticipation of peak loads or of future work scheduled or for any other reason will cease.

"4. It is the policy not to determine the salary of a supervisor by the number of persons supervised but rather by the degree and nature of the responsibility.

"I am asking that effectuation of these policies be vigorously pursued by all operating executives, control staffs, and personnel administrators so that there may be quickly developed:

1. Sound and clearly defined organization structure;
2. Simplified and streamlined procedures;
3. Industrious and competent personnel;
4. Capable and alert supervision.

"It is required that specific plans be formulated in each of the Commands for the fullest and best use of our working force and that such plans be submitted to me personally. In formulating these plans I urge that the suggestions of employees be given full consideration to the end that all available thinking is brought to bear on the vital necessity for conserving manpower.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN A. M. PAPERS, MONDAY, APRIL 19, 1943

THIRTY-NINE MORE PLANTS RECEIVE ARMY-NAVY "E"

Thirty-nine additional industrial plants have been granted the Army-Navy Production Award for outstanding performance on war work, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal announced today.

The names and addresses of the plants are:

William Ainsworth and Sons, Incorporated, Denver, Colorado
American Electric Furnace Company, Boston, Massachusetts
American Electric Furnace Company, Plant #2, Dorchester, Massachusetts
Ampco Metals, Incorporated, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Atlas Powder Company, Ravenna Ordnance Plant, Apco, Ohio
Bardwell and McAlister, Incorporated, Hollywood, California
Bronson Reel Company, Bronson, Michigan
Cleaver-Brooks Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
The Cleveland Dental Manufacturing Company, Cleveland, Ohio
Cole of California, Incorporated, Vernon, California
Consolidated Packaging Machinery Corporation, Buffalo, New York
Defiance Machine Works, Defiance, Ohio
Dow Chemical Company, Bay City Plant, Bay City, Michigan
The John Douglas Company, Cincinnati, Ohio
Driver-Harris Company, Harrison, New Jersey
General Motors Corporation, Fisher Memphis Aircraft Division, Memphis, Tennessee
The B. F. Goodrich Company, Los Angeles, California
Harley-Davidson Motor Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Hawley Products Company, St. Charles, Illinois
Hunter Illuminated Sign Company, Incorporated, Flushing, New York
Frank Ix and Sons, Incorporated, Charlottesville, Virginia
Frank Ix and Sons, Incorporated, New Holland, Pennsylvania
R. A. Jones and Company, Incorporated, Covington, Kentucky
A. D. Julliard and Company, Incorporated, Aragon Mills Division, Aragon, Georgia
Lindberg Steel Treating Company, Incorporated, Chicago, Illinois
The Mahoning Valley Steel Company, Niles, Ohio
Malleable Iron Range Company, Beaver Dam, Wisconsin
National Pressure Cooker Company, Eau Claire, Wisconsin
The Norwich Pharmacal Company, Norwich, New York
Peerless Woolen Mills, Rossville, Georgia
Charles Pfizer and Company, Incorporated, Brooklyn, New York
Proximity Manufacturing Company, Greensboro, North Carolina

MORE

Republic Drill and Tool Company, Chicago, Illinois
Revolution Cotton Mills, Greensboro, North Carolina
Rheem Manufacturing Company, No. 1 Chicago Plant, Chicago, Illinois
Standard Steel Spring Company, Plant #1, #2 and #3, Coraopolis, Pennsylvania
Stupakoff Ceramic and Manufacturing Company, Latrobe, Pennsylvania
United States Catheter and Instrument Corporation, Glens Falls, New York
Michael Yundt Company, Waukesha, Wisconsin

Each of the selected facilities will be privileged to fly the Army-Navy Production Award pennant and all of their civilian employees will be awarded Army-Navy "E" pins.

END

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FOR RELEASE IN AFTERNOON PAPERS, SATURDAY, MAY 29, 1943

For Release to Radio Commentators after
8:30 a. m., E.W.T., May 29, 1943

ADDITIONAL LIST OF U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION

CORRECTION

Please delete the following:

NORTH AFRICAN AREA

ALABAMA
Page, Pvt. Hubert A. - Mrs. Josephine Page, Mother, 1452 Mountain Dr., Tarrant.

GEORGIA
Freeland, Pvt. Jack M. - Mr. Hathan H. Freeland, Father, 1207 Westview Dr., S.W., Atlanta.

MINNESOTA
Roeder, Pvt. Michael L. - Mr. Joseph Roeder, Father, Saint Joseph.

NEW YORK
Ray, Major John - Mr. Martin H. Ray, Father, 60 East 42nd St., New York.
Sweeney, Cpl. Archie J. - Mr. Howard Sweeney, Brother, 68 Algonquin Ave., Saranac Lake.

PENNSYLVANIA
Sellers, Pfc Earl - Mrs. Mary K. Sellers, Wife, Pequea.

PACIFIC AREA

ILLINOIS
Weckel, 2nd Lt. Allan L. - Mr. Walter H. Weckel, Father, 3219 7th St., Moline.

-END-

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FOR RELEASE IN MORNING PAPERS, SUNDAY, MAY 30, 1943

For Release to Radio Commentators after
8:30 p. m., E.W.T., May 29, 1943

ADDITIONAL LIST OF U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION

CORRECTION

Please delete the following;

ASIATIC AREA

IOWA
Lyman, 1st Lt. John B. - Mrs. Esther Meek Lyman, Mother, 2510 1st Ave., N.E., Cedar Rapids.

NORTH AFRICAN AREA

ALABAMA
Eaton, Sgt. Carlton - Mrs. Pearl Van, Sister, Route 1, New Hope.
ARIZONA
Clark, 2nd Lt. Vern R. - Mrs. Marie L. Clark, Wife, 723 East Adams, Phoenix.
OHIO
Evans, Pvt. Stanley - Mrs. Agnes E. Evans, Mother, 3646 East 113th St., Cleveland.
Mutchler, Pfc Frank J. - Mrs. Elizabeth Mutchler, Mother, Route 1, Perrysburg.
WEST VIRGINIA
King, Pvt. Grover C., Jr. - Mrs. Irma King, Mother, Widen.

-END-

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FOR RELEASE SUNDAY, MAY 30, 1943

103 ADDITIONAL COLLEGES SELECTED FOR ARMY SPECIALIZED TRAINING

Commanding Generals of the Army Service Commands throughout the nation have been authorized to negotiate contracts immediately with 103 additional colleges and universities for participation in the Army Specialized Training Program, the War Department announced today.

This will bring to 145 the total number of colleges and universities in the Army Specialized Training Program, with the opening term at most of the new units scheduled for June, and the balance in July. The list is expected to continue to grow in subsequent months. At the present time there are 28 Army Specialized Training Units and 22 STAR (Specialized Training and Reassignment) Units. Eight of the STAR Units are located at universities where Army Specialized Training Units are established. The Program has been in operation at college campuses since late March.

At STAR Units, selected soldiers are housed, classified, instructed and finally are assigned to specific courses of study in the Army Specialized Training Program in the highest term for which they are qualified. Soldiers remain at STAR Units for a period of from five to thirty days and are then sent to Army Specialized Training Units. There, qualified trainees receive prescribed instruction in specific curricula for one or more twelve-week terms.

More than 30,000 trainees will be in the Army Specialized Training Program by the end of June and nearly 60,000 will be in the Program by the end of July. As of May 21 there were 21,068 soldiers at colleges and universities under the Program. This includes 4,668 who recently were ordered to new Army Specialized Training Units at which they are receiving work preparatory to the opening term at those units on June 14.

The speed with which the ASTP has moved into high gear has earned the favorable comment of a number of leading educators, including Dr. Felix Morley, President of Haverford College, who, in a recent letter to Brigadier General Joe N.

MORE

Dalton, Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, stated in part:

"May I take this opportunity to express my deep admiration at the astonishing skill with which the Army has so quickly laid the foundation of a specialized training program which must command the respect of every competent professional educator. Frankly, I would not have believed it possible that you would have been able to accomplish as much as you have done in so brief a period."

By the end of July, there will be 74 units at which medical instruction will be provided, 38 units for dental training, 10 units for veterinary medical training, 82 for Basic Phase instruction, 25 for Advanced Engineering, 17 for Foreign Area and Language Study, 9 for Advanced Personnel Psychology, 6 for Preprofessional training, and 23 STAR Units. (In many cases, a college will have units in more than one field of study.)

Following is a complete list of colleges and universities already participating in the Army Specialized Training Program and those with which the service commands have been authorized to negotiate contracts for new units at which terms will open in June and July. Units already activated are denoted by an asterisk.

STAR Units:

* University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire.
* City College of New York, New York, New York.
* Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Alabama.
* Agricultural and Technical College of North Carolina, Greensboro, North Carolina.
* North Carolina State College of Agriculture & Engineering, Raleigh, North Carolina.
* The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina.
* Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
* University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.
* Michigan State College of Agriculture & Applied Science, East Lansing, Michigan.
* University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska.
* University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming.
* Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
* Oklahoma Agricultural & Mechanical College, Stillwater, Oklahoma.
* Agricultural & Mechanical College of Texas, College Station, Texas.
* Stanford University, Stanford University, California.
* University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho.
* Utah University, Salt Lake City, Utah.
* Georgetown University, Washington, District of Columbia.
* Pasadena Junior College, Pasadena, California.
* University of Alabama, University, Alabama.
* Colorado State College of Agriculture & Mechanic Arts, Fort Collins, Colorado.
* Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Virginia.
Chaffee Junior College, Ontario, California.

For Basic Phase:

Michigan State College of Arts and Sciences, East Lansing, Michigan.
Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Alabama.

MORE

Georgia School of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia.
The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina.
Mississippi State College, State College, Mississippi.
Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana.
West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia.
University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
University of Alabama, University, Alabama.
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
* Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.
* Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York.
* Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
* Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia.
Pennsylvania Military College, Chester, Pennsylvania.
* Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pennsylvania.
* Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
* Clemson Agricultural College, Clemson, South Carolina.
North Georgia College, Dahlonega, Georgia.
* University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.
St. Bonaventure College, St. Bonaventure, New York.
Niagara University, Niagara University, New York.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Virginia.
Drexel Institute of Technology, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania.
New York University, New York City.
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
Rhode Island State College, Kingston, Rhode Island.
University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut.
University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire.
* University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
* Iowa University, Iowa City, Iowa.
* Baylor University, Waco, Texas.
* New Mexico Agricultural & Mechanical College, State College, New Mexico.
University of Arkansas, Little Rock, Arkansas.
* University of California, Los Angeles, California.
Fordham University, New York City.
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.
Ripon College, Ripon, Wisconsin.
University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.
State College of Washington, Pullman, Washington.
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.
University of Maine, Orono, Maine.
Clarkson School of Technology, Potsdam, New York.
University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.
University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi.
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee.
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
South Dakota State College of Agriculture & Mechanical Arts, Brookings, South Dakota.
University of South Dakota, Vermillion, South Dakota.
Kansas State College of Agriculture & Applied Science, Manhattan, Kansas.
Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
Oklahoma Agricultural & Mechanical College, Stillwater, Oklahoma.
University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.
Pomona College, Claremont, California.
University of Santa Clara, Santa Clara, California.
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Western Maryland College, Westminister, Maryland.
University of Delaware, Newark, Delware.
Howard University, Washington, District of Columbia.

MORE

Utah State Agricultural College, Logan, Utah.
University of San Francisco, San Francisco, California.
University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.
Oregon State College, Corvallis, Oregon.
University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho.
Stanford University, Stanford University, California.
University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma
St. Norbert College, West DePere, Wisconsin.
University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska.
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming.
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Colorado School of Mines, Golden, Colorado.
Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa.
University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.
Missouri School of Mines, Rolla, Missouri.
Rose Polytechnic Institute, Terre Haute, Indiana.

For Advanced Engineering:

* Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
* Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
* New York University, New York City.
* University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
* Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, Virginia.
* Georgia School of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia.
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
* Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.
* West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia.
* University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.
* University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
* University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
* Agricultural & Mechanical College of Texas, College Station, Texas.
University of Santa Clara, Santa Clara, California.
* Stanford University, Stanford University, California.
* Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pennsylvania.
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming.
Texas Technological College, Lubbock, Texas.
* Oregon State College, Corvallis, Oregon.
University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida
University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.
State College of Washington, Pullman, Washington.
Rose Polytechnic Institute, Terre Haute, Indiana.

For Foreign Area and Language Study:

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
* Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
* University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
* University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
* Stanford University, Stanford, California.
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
Pomona College, Claremont, California.
University of California, Berkeley, California.
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.

For Advanced Personnel Psychology:

* University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
* University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

MORE

* Stanford University, Stanford, California.
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
University of California, Berkeley, California.
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

For Medical Training:

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, Massachusetts.
Harvard University School of Medicine, Boston, Massachusetts.
Tufts College School of Medicine, Boston, Massachusetts.
Dartmouth Medical School, Hanover, New Hampshire.
University of Vermont School of Medicine, Burlington, Vermont.
Columbia University School of Medicine, New York City.
Albany Medical College, Albany, New York.
Long Island College of Medicine, Brooklyn, New York.
University of Rochester School of Medicine, Rochester, New York.
Cornell University School of Medicine, New York City.
New York University School of Medicine, New York City.
New York Medical College, New York City.
University of Buffalo School of Medicine, Buffalo, New York.
Syracuse University College of Medicine, Syracuse, New York.
George Washington University School of Medicine, Washington, District of Columbia.
Howard University School of Medicine, Washington, District of Columbia.
University of Virginia School of Medicine, Charlottesville, Virginia.
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland.
Temple University School of Medicine, Philadelphia.
Hahnemann Medical College & Hospital of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Medical College of Virginia School of Medicine, Richmond, Virginia.
University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland.
Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
University of Mississippi School of Medicine, University, Mississippi.
University of Alabama School of Medicine, University (Tuscaloosa), Alabama.
Emory University School of Medicine, Atlanta, Georgia.
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, Tennessee.
Bowman Gray School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
University of North Carolina School of Medicine, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
Medical College of the State of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina.
Duke University School of Medicine, Durham, North Carolina.
University of Georgia School of Medicine, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Tennessee School of Medicine, Memphis, Tennessee.
Meharry Medical College, Department of Medicine, Nashville, Tennessee.
Indiana University School of Medicine, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Western Reserve University School of Medicine, Cleveland, Ohio.
University of Cincinnati School of Medicine, Cincinnati, Ohio.
University of West Virginia School of Medicine, Morgantown, West Virginia.
Ohio State University School of Medicine, Columbus, Ohio.
University of Louisville School of Medicine, Louisville, Kentucky.
Marquette University School of Medicine, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Northwestern University School of Medicine, Chicago, Illinois.
University of Chicago School of Medicine, Chicago, Illinois.
Wayne University School of Medicine, Detroit, Michigan.
Loyola University School of Medicine, Chicago, Illinois.
University of Wisconsin School of Medicine, Madison, Wisconsin.
University of Illinois School of Medicine, Chicago, Illinois.
University of Michigan School of Medicine, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

MORE

University of South Dakota School of Medicine, Vermillion, South Dakota.
State University of Iowa College of Medicine, Iowa City, Iowa.
St. Louis University School of Medicine, St. Louis, Missouri.
Creighton University School of Medicine, Omaha, Nebraska.
University of Missouri School of Medicine, Columbia, Missouri.
University of Nebraska School of Medicine, Omaha, Nebraska.
University of Colorado School of Medicine, Denver, Colorado.
University of Minnesota School of Medicine, Misseapolis, Minnesota.
Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, Missouri.
University of North Dakota School of Medicine, Grand Forks, North Dakota.
Louisiana State University School of Medicine, New Orleans, Louisiana.
University of Texas School of Medicine, Galveston, Texas.
Tulane University of Louisiana School of Medicine, New Orleans, Louisiana.
University of Arkansas School of Medicine, Little Rock, Arkansas.
University of California School of Medicine, Berkeley-San Francisco, California.
University of Utah School of Medicine, Salt Lake City, Utah.
University of Oregon School of Medicine, Portland, Oregon.
University of Southern California School of Medicine, Los Angeles, California.
Stanford University School of Medicine, San Francisco, California.
College of Medical Evangelists, Loma Linda-Los Angeles, California.
Georgetown University School of Medicine, Washington, District of Columbia.
* University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.
* University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

For Dental Training:

Tufts College School of Dentistry, Boston, Massachusetts..
Harvard Dental School, Boston, Massachusetts.
Columbia University School of Dentistry, New York City.
New York University College of Dentistry, New York, New York.
University of Buffalo School of Dentistry, Buffalo, New York.
University of Maryland, School of Dentistry, Baltimore, Maryland.
Temple University School of Dentistry, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
University of Pennsylvania.School of Dentistry, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
University of Pittsburgh School of Dentistry, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Medical College of Virginia School of Dentistry, Richmond, Virginia.
Atlanta Southern Dental College, Atlanta, Georgia.
Meharry Medical College Department of Dentistry, Nashville, Tennessee.
University of Tennessee College of Dentistry, Memphis, Tennessee.
Indiana University School of Dentistry, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Ohio State University College of Dentistry, Columbus, Ohio.
Western Reserve University School of Dentistry, Cleveland, Ohio.
University of Louisville School of Dentistry, Louisville, Kentucky.
Chicago College of Dental Surgery, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois.
Northwestern University School of Dentistry, Chicago, Illinois.
University of Illinois College of Dentistry, Chicago, Illinois.
University of Detroit School of Dentistry, Detroit, Illinois.
University of Michigan School of Dentristry, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Marquette University School of Dentistry, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
University of Iowa College of Dentistry, Iowa City, Iowa.
University of Minnesota School of Dentistry, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
University of Kansas City School of Dentistry, Kansas City, Missouri.
St. Louis University School of Dentistry, St. Louis, Missouri.
Washington University School of Dentistry, St. Louis, Missouri.
Creighton University School of Dentistry, Omaha, Nebraska.
University of Nebraska College of Dentistry, Lincoln, Nebraska.
Loyola University School of Dentistry, New Orleans, Louisiana.
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College of Physicians & Surgeons School of Dentistry, San Francisco, California.
University of California School of Dentistry, San Francisco, California.

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University of Southern California School of Dentistry, Los Angeles, California.

For Veterinary Medical Training:

New York State Veterinary College, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
University of Pennsylvania School of Veterinary Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Alabama.
Ohio State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Columbus, Ohio.
Michigan State College of Agriculture & Applied Sciences, East Lansing, Michigan.
Colorado State College of Agriculture & Mechanics, Fort Collins, Colorado.
Iowa State College of Agriculture & Mechanical Arts, Ames, Iowa.
Kansas State College of Agriculture & Applied Science, Manhattan, Kansas.
Agricultural & Mechanical College of Texas, College Station, Texas.
State College of Washington College of Veterinary Medicine, Pullman, Washington.

For Premedical Training:

Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
University of California, Berkeley, California.
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.
Stanford University, Stanford University, California.

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FOR RELEASE IN MORNING PAPERS, MONDAY, MAY 31, 1943

For Release to Radio Commentators after
8:30 p. m., E.W.T., May 30, 1943

ADDITIONAL LIST OF U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL WOUNDED IN ACTION

CORRECTION

Please delete the following:

NEW YORK
Visit, Pfc Vincent S. - Mrs. Mary Gadomski, Mother, 640 East 12th St., New York.

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FOR RELEASE IN AFTERNOON PAPERS, SATURDAY, JUNE 5, 1943

For Release to Radio Commentators after
8:30 a. m., E.W.T., June 5, 1943

ADDITIONAL LIST OF U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION

The War Department made public today the names of 80 United States soldiers missing in action. The announcement includes casualties in the Asiatic, European, Middle East, North African, North American and Pacific areas.

The War Department has no objection to the publication of this list in whole or in part. The list is based upon prior notifications sent to the next of kin.

NOTE TO EDITORS

Because of the time involved in preparing these public lists and allowing for their distribution before publication, occasional changes of status may have occurred, even though a check to report corrections is maintained.

In case of divergence between this list and information sent to the next of kin, the last War Department telegram or letter to the next of kin is always the appropriate final authority on the status of a soldier.

U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION IN THE ASIATIC AREA

CALIFORNIA
DeLapp, Capt. Louis A. - Mrs. R. D. Campbell, Aunt, c/o California Christian Home, San Gabriel.
KANSAS
Humphrey, 2nd Lt. Donald M. - Mrs. W. A. Barber, Sister, 245 North 30th, Kansas City.
PENNSYLVANIA
Walsh, 2nd Lt. Robert A. - Mr. John J. Walsh, Father, 97 Maffett St., Plains.
WEST VIRGINIA
Richardson, Staff Sgt. Harold C. - Mrs. Versha A. Richardson, Mother, 1622 A Crescent Rd., Charleston.
WISCONSIN
Everall, 2nd Lt. Francis B. - Mrs. Charles A. Bouchard, Sister, 3616 East 3rd St., Superior.

U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION IN THE EUROPEAN AREA

ALABAMA
Brummal, Sgt. Edward M. - Mrs. Ila M. Brummal, Mother, 1216 South 21st Pl., Birmingham.
CALIFORNIA
Adamina, Capt. Robert E. - Mrs. Juanita D. Adamina, Wife, 904 1st St., Woodland.

MORE

CALIFORNIA (Cont'd)

Brooks, Staff Sgt. Kenneth E. - Mrs. Violet V. Brooks, Mother, 1452 Engracia Ave., Torrance.

Hayes, 2nd Lt. Theodore O. - Mr. Percy Olin Hayes, Father, 204 Bonita Ave., Baldwin Park.

Kissinger, 1st Lt. Louis L. - Miss Adeline L. Swanson, Friend, Box 1425, Route 1, Rio Linda.

McTaggart, Capt. Elmer E. - Mrs. Ethel I. McTaggart, Wife, 5644 Santa Cruz Ave., Richmond.

Olbert, Tech. Sgt. Ralph E. - Mrs. Norman Olbert, Mother, 1333 Union Ave., San Diego.

CONNECTICUT

Vertefeuille, Sgt. Robert J. - Mr. Simon A. Vertefeuille, Father, 225 Main St., Willimantic.

ILLINOIS

Martinek, Flight Officer Samuel R. - Mrs. Samuel R. Martinek, Mother, Route 1, Box 323A, Norwood Park.

Wirt, Sgt. Richard K. - Mrs. May Hartman, Mother, 1500 Maple Ave., Evanston.

Wygonik, Tech. Sgt. Adam C. - Mrs. Catherine Wygonik, Mother, 5242 West 31st St., Cicero.

IOWA

Hubbard, Sgt. Gaylord F. - Mr. Lester M. Hubbard, Father, Blockton.

Mooney, Tech. Sgt. Wallace L. - Mr. Lyle L. Mooney, Father, Nevada.

KANSAS

Howell, 1st Lt. Malcolm C. - Mrs. Betty G. Howell, Wife, 1444 Campbell Ave., Topeka.

MASSACHUSETTS

O'Brien, Tech. Sgt. Paul L. - Mrs. Grace H. O'Brien, Mother, 71 Ranney St., Springfield.

NEBRASKA

Glaubitz, Staff Sgt. Dale A. - Mrs. Charles G. Glaubitz, Mother, 728 Maple St., Sidney.

Van Oyen, Staff Sgt. Harold D. - Mr. Dennis Van Oyen, Father, Madison.

NEW JERSEY

Brandt, Tech. Sgt. Albert J. - Mr. Walter E. Brandt, Father, 4337 Willis Ave., Merchantville.

Ullrich, Staff Sgt. August - Mr. Conrad Ullrich, Brother, 141 Harrison Ave., Westfield.

NEW YORK

Valerio, Staff Sgt. Enio J. - Mrs. Dina Valerio, Mother, 111 Pleasant Ave., Tuckahoe.

NORTH CAROLINA

Hobbs, Staff Sgt. Herbert J., Jr. - Mrs. Laura M. Hobbs, Wife, 219 West 11th St., Salisbury.

NORTH DAKOTA

Christensen, Staff Sgt. George E. - Mrs. Anna Christensen, Mother, Bisbee.

OHIO

Castillo, Staff Sgt. Richard M. - Mrs. Alice Mae Castillo, Mother, 1314 South Limestone St., Springfield.

TENNESSEE

Forehand, Staff Sgt. Charles C.,Jr. - Mr. Charles C. Forehand, Father, 1317 Greenfield Ave., Nashville.

TEXAS

Roden, Sgt. James B. - Mrs. Mattie A. Bailey, Mother, 707 Hanover St., Weatherford.

VIRGINIA

Cate, Sgt. Richard E. - Mrs. Hazel E. Cate, Mother, Route 2, Box 222, Hampton.

WASHINGTON

Graham, Tech. Sgt. Sidney W. - Mrs. Clara Graham, Mother, 605 Campus Ave., Pullman.

WISCONSIN

Wandtke, Tech. Sgt. Gilbert A. - Mrs. Lena Wandtke, Mother, Manawa.

Wolf, Tech. Sgt. Frederick T. - Mrs. Rose Wolf, Mother, 3557 South Taylor Ave., Milwaukee.

MORE.

U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA

IOWA

Quinlan, Staff Sgt. William A. - Mr. Harold E. Quinlan, Father, 520 East 6th, Davenport.

PENNSYLVANIA

Schaffer, Staff Sgt. Herbert J. - Mrs. Daisy Schaffer, Mother, Orefield.

U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION IN THE NORTH AFRICAN AREA

ARKANSAS

Kennedy, Pvt. George E. - Mrs. Francis V. Kennedy, Mother, Jennie.

CALIFORNIA

Guier, Sgt. James R. - Mrs. Emma Aerila Guier, Mother, 160 South Bonnie Ave., Pasadena.

ILLINOIS

Bost, 2nd Lt. Murray O. - Mr. & Mrs. Dwight Bost, Parents, Route 1, Raymond.
Harrison, 1st Lt. Burl D. - Mr. Marvin D. Harrison, Father, 7015 East End Ave., Chicago.
Hughes, Pvt. Loren D. - Mr. Jimmie Hughes, Father, 1305 East Oak St., West Frankfort.
Moreland, Pfc Paul D. - Mrs. Mary Moreland, Mother, Bingham.
Kaur, Pvt. James - Mrs. Mary Kaur, Mother, 15206 Marshfield, Harvey.

INDIANA

Metzger, Pvt. Beecher L. - Mrs. Lloyd E. Metzger, Mother, Route 1, Rossville.

KENTUCKY

Hacker, Pfc Pleas B. - Mrs. Susie Abner, Mother, Bowlingtown.
Hamilton, Sgt. Thomas A. - Mr. T. C. Hamilton, Father, Route 2, Springfield.
Honeycutt, Pvt. Everett - Mrs. Vernie Honeycutt, Mother, Flat Lick.

LOUISIANA

Davis, Pvt. Harles - Mr. William Davis, Father, Hineston.
Morgan, Pvt. Charles E. - Mrs. Cecil Morgan, Mother, 715 6th St., Lake Charles.

MARYLAND

Ford, Major William R. C. - Mrs. Elise C. Ford, Wife, 6 North Main St., Bel Air.

MASSACHUSETTS

Dolan, Pvt. William B. - Mr. William H. Dolan, Father, 7 Round Hill St., Roxbury.

MINNESOTA

Clancy, Pvt. Vincent P. - Mrs. Mary J. Clancy, Mother, Route 1, Olivia.
Klauser, Pvt. Henry C. - Mrs. Marvel Vuein, Mother, Route 4, Crookston.
Norris, Pfc Marvin H. - Mrs. Lottie Norris, Mother, Aitkin.

MISSISSIPPI

Cook, Pvt. Earl W. - Mrs. Abson M. Cook, Mother, Star Route, Houston.

MISSOURI

Orchard, Pfc Russell T. - Mr. Jack A. Orchard, Father, Route 1, Fulton.

NEW JERSEY

Gulick, 1st Lt. Spencer H. - Mrs. Mabel D. Mead, Mother, 110 Claremont Pl., Cranford.

NEW YORK

McMahon, Cpl. John J. - Mr. Terrance McMahon, Father, 57 Adrian Ave., New York.
Olds, Pvt. Lawrence B. - Mrs. Charlotte Olds, Mother, 188-27 115th Ave., St. Albans.
Quigley, Sgt. John J. - Mrs. Catherine Quigley, Mother, 1216 Boston Rd., Bronx.
Tompkins, 2nd Lt. William A. - Mrs. Meta F. Tompkins, Mother, 107 7th St., Garden City.
Tortorici, Pvt. Benjamin - Mrs. Anna Tortorici, Mother, 311 East 78th St., New York.

NORTH CAROLINA

Connor, Pvt. William T. - Mrs. Pearl P. Connor, Mother, Route 1, Orrum.
Thomas, Pvt. Brooks F. - Mrs. Daisy Thomas, Mother, Route 1, Wingate.

OHIO
Bechtol, Major Lauren L. - Mrs. Ann M. Bechtol, Wife, 222 South Main St., Bryan.
Robinson, Pvt. Finley O. - Mr. Andy T. Robinson, Brother, 336 Kilgoer St., Cincinnati.
PENNSYLVANIA
Glass, Pfc Francis C. - Mrs. Helen Glass, Mother, Route 2, Elverson.
Pohranechne, Pvt. Alex - Mrs. Katherine Prozantic, Sister, 183 Stone Ave., Coplay.
VIRGINIA
Cornett, Pvt. Paul F. - Mr. Sam J. Cornett, Father, Route 1, Damascus.
WEST VIRGINIA
McClung, Pvt. Clyde - Mrs. Susie McClung, Mother, Canvas.

U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION IN THE NORTH AMERICAN AREA

CALIFORNIA
Danek, 2nd Lt. Albert F. - Mr. Frank Danek, Father, 9309 Avalon Blvd., Los Angeles.
Moyen, 2nd Lt. George W. - Mrs. Anna R. Moyen, Wife, 618 North La Jolla, Los Angeles.
Ronning, Staff Sgt. Cleo A. - Mrs. Ruth L. Ronning, Wife, 4640 9th St., Riverside.
ILLINOIS
Watson, Cpl. Jack J. - Mrs. Mable J. Watson, Mother, 512 20th Ave., Moline.
NEW YORK
Crandall, Staff Sgt. Albert David - Mr. Joseph Crandall, Father, Route 2, Waverly.

U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION IN THE PACIFIC AREA

KANSAS
Bryant, 1st Lt. Clifford B. - Mr. Morton Dillard Bryant, Father, 1110 North Broadway, Leavenworth.
NEW YORK
Stecz, Tech. Sgt. Joseph M. - Mrs. Elizabeth Stecz, Mother, Post Road, Sloatsburg.

U. S. ARMY PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

OREGON
Orange, 1st Lt. Rodney W. - Mrs. June R. Orange, Wife, 918 North Killingsworth, Portland.
PENNSYLVANIA
Clifford, Staff Sgt. Walter F. - Mr. Walter A. Clifford, Father, Rodgers Ave., Upper Darby.
UTAH
Rose, 1st Lt. George M. - Mrs. Clara S. Rose, Mother, Farmington.

END

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ADDRESS BY
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
BEFORE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNORS
AT COLUMBUS, OHIO, MONDAY NIGHT, JUNE 21, 1943

CORRECTION

The release time of the address by General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, before the Conference of Governors at Columbus, Ohio, is after delivery, Monday night, June 21, 1943.

On Page 2 of the text of General Marshall's address, third paragraph, seventh line, make total number of Japanese planes destroyed 94 instead of 77. Sentence containing this figure will read "In the recent air battle in the Solomons we destroyed 94 out of 120 planes and lost but 6."

END

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ADDRESS BY
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
BEFORE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNORS
AT COLUMBUS, OHIO, MONDAY NIGHT, JUNE 21, 1943

It has seemed advisable as the war develops that public statements by the Chief of Staff of the Army should be restricted to a few special occasions. A conference of the Governors, the leaders of the various States, is such an occasion. Furthermore, this is a most critical summer both for us and in the history of the world. We have passed through the period of military adolescence, our initial deployments have been completed and lines of communications solidly established. Quantity production of both men and materiel, the former in as exact a pattern as the latter, is now in full blast, the enemy's initial advantage in men and guns, and in ships and planes, has been overcome. We have seized the initiative, the most vital factor in war.

The past two years of preparation have been a trying period, especially the prolonged strain of German and Japanese successes during which we struggled to meet the surge of power which they had carefully accumulated during the past decade. The change in the attitude of the public essential to the furtherance of the necessary legislation and appropriations presented many complications. The establishment of our industries on a full war basis had its multiplicity of troubles, and the building of the full war military machine entailed a stupendous task of a wide variety of problems, invariably arousing pronounced individual reactions of our people.

Today we stand squarely on our feet in all these respects. Initial strategic problems involving hectic application of piecemeal tactical actions -- anathema to a soldier -- are things of the past.

Furthermore, and probably most important of all, we have secured a basis for unity of action as to strategy, operations, shipping, materiel, and virtually every phase of this warfare, in a manner without precedent in history.

The pattern for victory is clear. If we had set the stage we could not have provided a more sharply defined picture than that offered by the battle of Tunisia. There we had:

A perfect example of coordinated leadership for Allied action.

An assemblage of overwhelming military power, air, land and sea.

The explosive effect of the skillful application of that power.

Incidentally, the psychological by-products of that battle are proving of immense importance. There has been a rebirth of the French Army with a splendid example of courageous and aggressive fighting power. The observing nations have seen selected German troops humbled by an extension and improvement of the technique that brought about the downfall of France. The Allies have gained great confidence in each other, and in the Allied fighting men, and the scales have so tipped that those nations who have been maneuvering merely to be on the winning side can no longer escape the conclusion that there is no victory in prospect for Germany. The superman has had his day. The democracies have called his bluff.

Tunisia gave us an invaluable pattern for the future. But the tasks will be increasingly difficult, usually with the great hazard of an overwater approach and a heavy battle to be maintained beyond the beaches. The way will be far from easy, the losses heavy, but the victory certain.

MORE

The recent battle in Attu has special significance. There we encountered probably the most difficult of fighting conditions. An amphibious operation in uncharted waters over a stormy sea, deep snow and high mountains, with a complete absence of roads and trails; an enemy dug in with complete cover and communications and our own troops transferred through necessity directly from the pleasant climate of California to a battle with the elements over extremely difficult terrain, against a desperate enemy. It was a severe test of the American soldier, but today we hold Attu, with more than 1900 Japanese graves as a memento of their previous occupation. More than three Japs were killed for each American soldier lost.

The fighting in the tropics of the South and Southwest Pacific has also presented great difficulties of climate and terrain. It has been vicious throughout but we have been successful in each operation since the initial offensive move into the Solomons.

One of our great puzzles is how the Japanese can stand the beating they are taking in the air - no other word adequately describes the situation in this respect. Judging from our own reactions, particularly those of the press when we have a moderately heavy loss in planes, it is hard to visualize the state of mind of the Japanese command when their ordinary air losses run from 30% to 75%, with very moderate losses on the part of the American pilots. In the recent air battle in the Solomons we destroyed 77 out of 120 planes and lost but 6. Furthermore, the Japanese suffer continuous losses of planes on the ground. We find the usual average is one destroyed on the ground for every one lost in the air, and in addition probably a training or operational loss outside of combat at the same rate. Evidently our equipment is excellent, and our pilots, gunners, bombardiers and navigators are superb.

The daylight precision bombing out of England has had a tremendous effect on the air operations of the German Army. The losses inflicted on German fighter planes during these daylight bombing expeditions had a direct and important bearing on the victory in Tunisia and a similar bearing on the German air power on the Russian front. The fact of the matter is, the Germans must check this precision bombing and they have assembled their best pilots in large numbers in an endeavor to halt these staggering blows at vital installations, delivered with constantly increasing frequency and mass.

Measured by the losses in planes and installations suffered by the enemy our own losses have been surprisingly small.

While on this subject I think it proper to express a word of caution against hasty conclusions or impromptu conceptions regarding the utilization of air power or any special weapon in the conduct of this war. I am convinced more and more each day that only by a proper combination of war-making means can we achieve victory in the shortest possible time and with the greatest economy in life. Pantelleria was an experiment, for which there appeared to be, and proved to be, a sound logical basis. However, the situation there was unique as to the character of the Island, the quality of the garrison, the complete naval control of the surrounding waters and the proximity of Allied airfields. The victory of Tunisia was favored by overwhelming air power, but the result would have been a stalemate without aggressive ground and naval action.

Your adversary may be hammered to his knees by bombing but he will recover unless the knockout blow is delivered by the ground Army, with infantry and artillery as important as tanks and antiaircraft, and engineer and signal troops vital to the whole.

The encouraging aspect of the situation today is the fact that we have the men trained, the guns and tanks, the ships and planes in constantly increasing numbers; that the Russian forces grow steadily more formidable and present a constant and terrible threat to the bulk of the German Army; and that there is a steady improvement in the equipment and training of the Chinese forces to sustain them in their fixed determination to expel the Japs from China. There can be but one result unless the enemy succeeds in creating internal frictions among the Allies, divisions of one against the other and misrepresentations leading to public loss of confidence in our war effort.

MORE

We are engaged in this war to maintain the democratic form of government. We fight to destroy dictatorships, to guarantee freedom of speech and of the press. Yet sometimes I am discouraged by the democratic processes in a great and critical emergency like that of today.

For example, I returned from Africa two weeks ago to find the most atrocious, if not subversive, attack being directed against an organization of the Army, one of the finest we have ever created. I refer to the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. There was no foundation for the vicious slander, though it was given wide publicity. Some seem to be intent on the suicide of our own war effort, not to mention the defamation of as fine an organization of women as I have ever seen assembled. Such a procedure to me appears inexcusable. If we can't be decent in such matters we at least should not be naive enough to destroy ourselves. I very much hope you gentlemen will take the lead in building up a public opinion which will suppress actions of individuals who abuse our liberties by propagating such outrages.

There is another phase of the present situation for which I would solicit your strong support, and that is a check against sudden waves of optimism leading the public to feel that we have made our great effort and the end is in sight. This is far from the case. We are just getting well started. The great battles lie ahead. We have yet to be proven in the agony of enduring heavy casualties, as well as the reverses which are inevitable in war. What we need now is a stoic determination to do everything in our power to overwhelm the enemy, cost what it may, to reduce him to a supplicant under the impact of aroused and determined democracies.

The failure today to surge forward with every ounce of power and effort we possess would be to write a tragic page for history. The temptation to ease up after initial and relatively minor successes seems difficult to resist. The Axis nations probably count on this as a weak element of Allied psychology. Their opinion has been contemptuous of our soft way of living, of our toughness and our military stamina. The most forbidding prospect with which we can now confront the enemy is the continuation in full measure of methodical, ruthless preparations to overwhelm them in the same manner that the Army of von Arnim was eliminated in Tunisia. The Allies have unified their military effort. We must all do the same at home.

Two things we must guard against:

There must be no divisions among the Allies.

There must be no let-up in our preparations.

END

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FOR RELEASE TUESDAY A. M., AUGUST 10, 1943

ARMY-NAVY PRODUCTION AWARD GRANTED TO TOTAL OF 1910 PLANTS AND PROJECTS

A total of 1910 plants and projects have been granted the Army-Navy "E" for excellence in production of war materials, it was announced today (August 10) by Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal on the first anniversary of the presentation of the Army-Navy Production Awards. This is the first time since the joint award was inaugurated a year ago that the total number of awards has been made public.

No official compilation has been made of the total number of plants in this country, both prime and subcontractors, producing war materials for the United States and other Allied Nations. On the basis of several statistical reports, however, it is estimated that less than 2½ per cent of the eligible plants have received the award to date. Stringent eligibility requirements account for the relatively small number of plants receiving the honor in comparison with the great number working on war contracts.

Of the 1910 plants which have received the "E," 1188 were nominated by the Army and 722 by the Navy. A total of 1598 companies were represented, 1042 manufacturing products primarily for the Army and 556 for the Navy. The Army awards cover a period of approximately one year. The Navy awards extend over a two-year period and include the Navy "E" which was superseded a year ago by the joint Army-Navy Production Award.

The coveted pennants have gone to establishments having from a single employee to a total of over 126,000 workers for a group of plants under one management. Of the plants which have received the award, approximately 7 per cent have less than 100 employees, 38 per cent have less than 500 employees, and 58 per cent have less than 1,000 employees. Thirty per cent of the total have between 1,000 and 5,000 workers, 7 per cent have between 5,000 and 10,000 employees, and only 5 per cent have over 10,000 employees.

MORE

Excellence in production and quality and not the size of the plant are determining factors in winning the award. The case of a Brooklyn, New York, man is cited as an illustration. This man, an inventor, is the sole owner and operator of a small machine shop in the basement of his home, turning out precision parts for Navy machine guns on a subcontract. The Navy awarded him his original "E" in December 1941 and his production record has entitled him to a renewal of the award every six months since that time.

All awards are made initially for a six-months period by the Navy and Army Boards for Production Awards, headed respectively by Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN (Ret.) and Lieutenant General William S. Knudsen, U.S.A. The record of winning plants is then reviewed every six months to determine whether a service star is to be added to the flag or the award withdrawn. To obtain the star, the plant must equal or exceed the record made in winning the original flag or a previous renewal star. A decrease in quality or quantity in production due to circumstances within control of labor or management may result in withdrawal of the pennant. Avoidable absenteeism of workers serves as a bar both to awards and to renewals. Plants losing the pennant may win the award again if they comply with the rigid requirements set down by the Award Boards, as has happened in one instance.

The Army-Navy "E" came into existence a year ago when the Navy "E," the Army "A," and the Machine Tool Star Award were merged into the joint Army-Navy Production Award. The "E" for excellence, with its long background of tradition, was selected as the symbol by which the armed services would confer their highest recognition for outstanding production of war materials. Since 1906 the Navy has given the award to those units of the fleet surpassing all others in the performance of duty in gunnery, engineering or communications. Even before Pearl Harbor, with the approval of the President, the Secretary of the Navy inaugurated the system of awarding the Navy's symbol of excellence afloat, the Navy "E," to plants showing marked superiority in the production of naval equipment.

END

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FOR RELEASE SUNDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1943

NEXT ARMY-NAVY COLLEGE TEST SET FOR NOVEMBER 9, 1943

The next qualifying test for the Army Specialized Training Program and the Navy College Program will take place in high schools and colleges throughout the nation on Tuesday, November 9, 1943, the War Department announced today. The Army-Navy College Qualifying Test (A-12, V-12) is open to male high school seniors in their last semester and graduates, who will reach their 17th birthday but not their 22nd birthday by March 1, 1944.

The test will provide an opportunity for these men to qualify for training at the college level in fields of study for which the Army and Navy have vital needs. Graduates of the program will serve as specialists, technicians and officers in the armed forces.

Seventeen-year-olds who designate Army preference and qualify on the test are offered military scholarships in the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program. They receive training at a selected college on inactive duty until the end of the term in which they reach their 18th birthday. At that time they are placed on active duty, uniformed, and sent to an Army installation for basic military training after which, if still qualified, they are placed in the Army Specialized Training Program.

Those who are over 17 years of age, but will not become 22 before March 1, 1944, and who qualify on the November 9 test and designate Army preference are earmarked for special consideration for the Army Specialized Training Program after induction. In this program they serve as soldiers on active duty in uniform with pay under military discipline. They are assigned to colleges in the Army Specialized Training Program and the Army pays all expenses including tuition, fees, housing, food.

Those who will be between 17 and 19 years old inclusive by March 1, 1944, may express a preference for the Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard. If they qualify on the November 9 test they will be asked to report to offices of Naval Officer Procurement for a physical examination and personal interview. On the basis of the

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test, the physical examination, the personal interview and the student's scholastic record a committee composed of an educator, a representative civilian and a Naval officer attached to each procurement office will select individuals for the Navy College Program.

Those selected for the Navy Program may express a preference for colleges on the Navy list of contract institutions and the course of study they would like to pursue. Assignment to college and course of study, however, ultimately will be determined by the needs of the service. All students in the Navy College Program will be on active duty in uniform with pay under military discipline. The Navy pays all expenses, including tuition, housing, food--everything but personal items.

All students may obtain full information on the tests from their school or college administrative officers who have received copies of the pamphlet, "Qualifying Test for Civilians," prepared by the War and Navy Departments and distributed by the United States Office of Education. School and college officials have been requested to distribute copies of this pamphlet to interested students who will find an outline of both services' programs, requirements and procedures. The back cover of this pamphlet is in the form of a detachable application which candidates for the tests will fill in and hand to the administrative official of the school or college in charge of the tests. Students may express a choice of either Army or Navy on this form.

In a joint letter to all high schools, preparatory schools, colleges and universities, Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, U.S.N., The Chief of Naval Personnel; Brig. General Joe N. Dalton, Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, and Dr. John W. Studebaker, United States Commissioner of Education, outlined the procedure for students desiring to take the test on November 9 and the procedure to be followed by the school officials who will administer the tests. Male students at present enrolled in the last term of their senior year of high school or preparatory school will form the largest group of prospective candidates for the Army and Navy programs. Male graduates of high school or preparatory school also are eligible, as are male students attending accredited colleges and universities who are not now enrolled in any service program. All candidates must be between the ages of 17 and 22 years.

In their letter, Rear Admiral Jacobs, Brig. General Dalton and Commissioner Studebaker expressed their appreciation to school and college officials for their

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cooperation in the administration of the first Army-Navy test given last April 2 to more than 300,000 young men.

"The success of the first Qualifying Test," they wrote, "is evidence of the wholehearted support and conscientious effort of school and college officials. We are confident that we can continue to count on you to give this program your complete support and to maintain the same high standards in administering it."

END

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FOR RELEASE SUNDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1943

ARMY AND NAVY GIVE HINTS FOR COLLEGE QUALIFYING TESTS

The War and Navy Departments today released a series of hints for young men planning to take the Army-Navy College Qualifying Test to be held at 9 A.M., Tuesday, November 9, at most schools in the Nation. The hints were compiled by Mr. John M. Stalnaker, General Director of the Test.

Those who qualify on the test, which will be given at any high school or college having eligible candidates, will receive special consideration for the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program or the Navy College Program, depending on the candidate's designated preference of branch of service. Candidates must be civilian high school graduates or in their final term, and must have reached their 17th but not their 22nd birthday by March 1, 1944.

All who are selected for the Navy must be between 17 and 20 years of age on that date. They will serve on active duty in the Navy, in uniform, under military discipline with the pay of the lowest enlisted grade.

Seventeen-year-olds who designate Army preference and qualify in the test are offered military scholarships in the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program. They receive training at a selected college on inactive duty until the end of the term in which they reach their 18th birthday. At that time they are placed on active duty and sent to an Army installation for basic military training and further assignment.

The test takes two hours and is designed to measure the aptitude and general knowledge required for success in the college programs. All questions are of the "best answer" type in which the candidate is to select the best or correct answer from several choices.

The following hints for those planning to take the test were offered by Mr. Stalnaker:

"1. Study carefully the eligibility requirements. The test is open only to

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high school graduates or high school seniors who will complete their graduation requirements before March 1. Those who graduate in June are not eligible for the test at this time but should take it when it is offered in the spring. Other eligibility requirements are outlined in a pamphlet, "Qualifying Test For Civilians," which contains detailed information about the test and is available to interested candidates through high school principals.

"2. Fill out the admission-identification form which is the detachable back cover of the information pamphlet. Answer each question carefully. After you have had your school official sign it, keep the form until the day of the test. You will need it then as evidence of your right to attend the test.

"3. Notify the school, well in advance, that you plan to take the test so that an adequate supply of tests will be sent.

"4. Find out in advance in what building and in what room the test is to be given. Be at that room by 8:45 A.M. on Tuesday, November 9.

"5. At the time of the test be sure to write your name and address clearly and correctly on the test blank. It is necessary to give your name once on the test booklet and three times on the answer sheet. The answer sheet will subsequently be divided into three parts and it is necessary for your name to be on each part. One part will be used in a window type envelope to notify you of the results. Clarity of writing and correctness of the address are of great importance.

"6. In advance of the test study the types of questions to be asked so you will be sure to understand the form. Sample problems are given in the pamphlet, "Qualifying Test for Civilians." The samples are easy and should be regarded only as illustrating the types of questions which will be asked in the test itself.

"7. When taking the test, answer all questions about which you have any knowledge. If you are undecided between two possible answers, pick the one which you think is correct even if you are not certain. Make a decision and go ahead. Do not waste time trying to decide between difficult alternatives.

"8. Work rapidly. Although the test does not stress speed it is important not to dawdle. Work steadily and as rapidly as you can without becoming strained. Take each question in order. You will only waste time if you skip around. Do

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not, however, spend too much time on any one question. If you finish before time is called, then go back over the answers to the questions about which you were in doubt.

"9. The test will not require advanced mathematics but it will test the candidate's knowledge of arithmetic and elementary algebra.

"10. Each student will receive a report indicating success or failure on the test, but not all students will receive their reports at the same time. Some reports may not be received until about January 1."

END

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FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE TUESDAY A.M., NOVEMBER 30, 1943

TRAINING OF SOLDIERS OVERSEAS CONTINUING PROCESS UNTIL VICTORY WON

To prepare for and meet ever-changing battle tactics and conditions, the training of American soldiers overseas is a continuing process and will be right up to the day of the unconditional surrender of the Axis, the War Department announced today.

This training includes the battle-hardened veteran just out of the lines as well as the soldier just off a transport and assigned to a replacement depot. Naturally, it is not the same for the veteran as for the new arrival, but it has been designed to integrate and coordinate both to produce the teamwork essential to success in combat.

As a rule, large replacement training depots are set up in each theater. Here troops fresh from this country are given the final polish and become acquainted with the climatic and terrain conditions under which they will be called to go into action. Schools have been established overseas where the individual is given additional or post-graduate instruction in the particular specialty for which he was trained in the United States.

In reality, these are finishing schools. In the United States the soldier's instruction was largely in the fundamentals of his specialty, since it was not known at the time he started his training to which theater he would be sent. Consequently, his instruction had to be such as would meet the basic requirements for any or all theaters.

However, on his arrival in the theater, he is given additional specialized training in his specialty. Necessarily, the time available for this type of training is determined by the tactical situation in the theater and the need for personnel with particular qualifications. All men are assigned to replacement depots upon arrival, and their period of training there continues until

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they are requisitioned to fill vacancies in units or installations. During this training period instruction is based on battle experience in that particular locality and on the tactics used there by Allies as well as the enemy.

For example, a Signal Corps man is sent to a North African replacement depot. When he leaves the United States on a transport he has completed his basic military training and his training in Signal Corps procedures. He is entirely competent to send and receive all kinds of messages under all kinds of conditions except those of actual battle.

On arrival, he is first given a rigorous physical conditioning course. During the week or so on shipboard he has had little opportunity to exercise and has become soft and possibly put on some excess weight. Hikes serve the dual purpose of getting him into battle trim and accustoming him to the climate and terrain.

At the same time, he begins a refresher course in Signal Corps procedures, reviewing briefly what he has learned in the United States. He is given courses to familiarize him with the British terms and nomenclature used in their military communications.

The same procedure is followed with the infantryman, the artilleryman and the score of other specialists who go to make up the modern army.

At length the soldier is ordered to join a unit. It may be a base section, a unit in reserve or a unit actually in battle. If the latter, he receives his baptism of fire and puts the theories he has learned in the long months of training to the ultimate test. Under such conditions he quickly becomes integrated and with the help of the veterans on either side of him learns the technique of teamwork.

Should he be assigned to a base section or a unit in reserve, he is given more instruction in the particular niche in the unit he is to fill. Here his teammates drill him in his duties until he is an integral cog in the smooth functioning machine. He soon realizes that the more smoothly the machine functions, the greater the chances of victory and his own survival.

Even the battle-hardened veteran is not done with training. New tactics and new techniques are being developed constantly and put into practice and he must be instructed in them. Time always is a vital factor in a combat zone

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and sometimes he will be given his instructions while under fire and at others, more leisurely, while his unit is in reserve. But still the training goes on.

For example, a field artillery battery may have a position at the front from which it has been firing constantly at the enemy lines without moving. The crews load and fire their guns with perfect coordination. There isn't a lost motion, a hitch or a second's delay.

Eventually the battery is relieved and moves back into the more or less peace and security of the reserves. While the crew has become letter perfect in firing, it is rusty in the technique of moving quickly and going into action with the utmost speed. So it is trained and drilled in these essentials during the rest period.

Similarly an infantry company may have a station on a static front which calls for little or no movement. When it is relieved, it must be given hiking practice so that its members again are in shape for what the future holds. Conversely, a company which has been advancing rapidly may require training in the art of static warfare.

And so the training program goes forward in the four quarters of the globe and will continue until the day of ultimate victory.

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FOR RELEASE MONDAY A.M., APRIL 3, 1944

U. S. STRATEGY IN PACIFIC LEAVES 100,000 JAPS IN HOPELESS STATE

Continuous aerial and artillery bombardment of enemy installations in a "softening up" process, seizure of strategic points by our ground forces, and a naval blockade which, coupled with aerial attack, has paralyzed Japanese communications lines constitute the key strategy marking our campaign in the Marshalls, Bismarcks and Northern Solomons, the War Department disclosed today.

So effective has been this plan that today some 100,000 Japanese soldiers in the once strongly-defended enemy bases now face a "hopeless" future, according to reports from the field.

On land, the American Infantryman has beaten the Jap at his own game--jungle fighting. Where they have clashed, American forces have inflicted casualties at a rate that runs as high as 30 to 1.

On the sea and in the air our forces have met with equally high success. The blockade around the islands has been drawn so tight that nine out of ten enemy vessels that attempt to bring in supplies are destroyed.

More than 50 per cent of the small enemy barges that hide along the jungle-fringed shores by day and attempt to run the blockade by night have been destroyed. For recent weeks, with the exception of small amounts brought in by submarine or barge, no substantial aid has reached the Japs.

Today the remaining Japs are faced with the alternative of standing and giving combat until their dwindling and unreplenishable supply of ammunition is exhausted, or of fleeing deeper into the jungles, to await death by starvation or disease as their supplies of food and medicine decrease.

Evidence that disease is already taking its toll is seen in intelligence reports received by the War Department. In February, near Saidor, 80 dead Japs were found at the bottom of a deep gorge, and there was evidence that they had fallen, through weakness, from a rope ladder used for entering the gorge.

MORE

East of Gali, on February 10 and 11, the bodies of 209 Japs, victims of hunger and disease, were found, and it was estimated that there were at least 800 dead in that area.

At Yoga-Yoga, west of Saidor, a patrol found 200 Japs dead of malnutrition and disease on March 19, while along the jungle trails many enemy dead and considerable abandoned equipment were found.

Since last October, on the Huon Peninsula of New Guinea, in the area between Finschhafen and Saidor, 2,685 Japs have been found dead of wounds, disease and starvation.

So serious is the Japanese food situation that they have attempted to start truck farms, but the difficulties of clearing the jungle, the inroads of insects and the damage done by aerial bombardment have netted them little result.

The myth that the Japanese soldier is a "superman" has been exploded in the jungle fighting. He is a good soldier, it is conceded, but man for man the American soldier far surpasses him.

The Jap is a master of camouflage. He is meticulous in his tast, whether it be concealing a supply dump from planes or emplacing a machine gun along a narrow jungle trail. He will obey orders blindly, sticking to his post until death.

But while he is supposed to excel in judo and bayonet work, his inferior physique handicaps him in hand-to-hand combat with the American. He is a poor shot, compared with the American Infantryman, and at ranges of more than 100 yards the Jap sniper misses more often than he hits.

Contrasted with the Jap soldier, the American makes the best material in the world from which to mold a fighting man. While he is highly individualistic, he is highly adaptable to teamwork.

Where the Jap depends on orders from his officers--and there is evidence to show that the Jap is losing his implicit trust in his officers--the American soldier is self reliant, thinks for himself.

Where the Jap is slow, the American is quick to learn, and is able to develop a new line of action if the one he is following fails. If there is any criticism of the American soldier in jungle warfare, it is that he is so anxious to get to grips with the enemy that he may at times tend to become careless.

MORE

Jungle fighting is mainly a test of individual skill, and before the American soldier goes into action, before he even sets foot in the jungle battle zone, he receives intensive training in a jungle training center.

During this training he receives at first hand the experience of returned front line fighters, as well as the lessons learned from intelligence reports.

In addition, he goes into action with the world's best weapons and the world's best equipment. The problem of equipment is under constant study.

With this careful training and constant study, the American soldier has taken the measure of the Jap. Last month on Bougainville a crack Jap division, wearing the special red sleeve emblem indicating their part in the 1937 campaign in China, attacked our forces seven times. Each time they attacked with ferocity, but each time they were sent reeling back, and their losses were at a ratio of 12 to 1.

Our Seventh Division, which first met and defeated the Japs on Attu, attacked them again on Kwajalein, and here the ratio mounted to 30 dead Japs to 1 American. American soldiers have scored an even higher ratio in the fighting in the dense Burmese jungles.

Relentlessly, the bombardment of the Jap strongholds continues, and relentlessly, the American Infantryman presses forward, making the plight of the Jap one of hopelessness, forecasting an eventual complete victory.

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FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE MONDAY A.M., MAY 15, 1944

OPERATIONS OF FOUR DIVISIONS IN WORLD WAR ARE SUMMARIZED

Publication of summaries of World War operations of four more divisions, the 7th, 79th, 81st and 93rd, is announced by the General of the Armies, John J. Pershing, in his capacity as Chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commission. These four volumes are a part of a set of 28 which will cover the operations of all combat divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces. The first of this series, the history of the 26th Division, was published last month.

The Seventh (Hourglass) Division was organized from Regular Army units in December, 1917, with headquarters at Camp Wheeler, Georgia. It arrived in France in late summer of 1918. Heavy losses overseas were replaced with selective service men from Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Michigan and Pennsylvania. It took over the Puvenelle sector in October and participated in November in the Woevre Plain operation, capturing strong enemy positions on the Moselle heights.

The 7th was reactivated on July 1, 1940, at Camp Ord, California. Leaving the United States in the spring of 1943, it constituted the main body of the force that took Attu from the Japs. In February, 1944, it took part in the Kwajalein operation in the Marshall Islands. A number of regiments of the old 7th are now serving elsewhere.

The 79th (Lorraine) Division was organized at Camp Meade, Maryland, in August, 1917. Original personnel were from Maryland, Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia. Later it received men from Rhode Island, Ohio and West Virginia. Arriving in France in mid-summer of 1918, it participated in the opening phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, and, after a rest period, covered the right of the First Army in the final drive on Sedan. It was reactivated on July 15, 1942, at Camp Pickett, Virginia.

Men from Florida, the Carolinas, Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee made up the 81st (Wildcat) Division, which was formed at Camp Jackson, South Carolina,

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in August, 1917. Arriving in France in August, 1918, it saw active service in the St. Die Sector, and in the closing days of the Meuse-Argonne fighting. On June 15, 1942, it was reactivated at Camp Rucker, Alabama.

The 93rd Division, a provisional one, organized at Camp Stuart, Virginia, was made up of Negroes from National Guard units of New York, Illinois, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Tennessee, District of Columbia and selective service men from South Carolina. Because of the acute shortage of troops, the four Infantry regiments of this division--369th, 370th, 371st and 372nd--were placed on duty with the French Army. All took part in battle. All regiments of this division, except the 371st, are now in service.

The 23 volumes of the series that remain to be printed will follow the same general form of the first five. Because all editions will be limited in number, it is advised that orders be filed as soon as possible with the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. The prices: 7th, $0.75; 26th, $1.25; 79th and 81st, $0.75; 93rd, $1. Discount of 25 per cent is allowed on orders of 100 or more copies of any one divisional history.

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FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE SUNDAY, MAY 28, 1944

WINNERS ANNOUNCED IN ANNUAL NATIONAL INTERCOLLEGIATE RIFLE MATCHES

Top places in their respective classes in the National Intercollegiate Rifle Team Matches for 1944 have been won by the Culver Military Academy of Culver, Indiana; Bordentown Military Institute of Bordentown, New Jersey, and Xavier High School of New York City, it was announced today by the War Department.

Both preliminary and final scores were made on the home ranges of the respective teams. Each series of the preliminaries was fired at the schools and the targets sent for scoring to the respective Service Command headquarters. Those teams eligible to compete in the finals again sent their targets to Service Command headquarters and the scores were forwarded to Washington.

The matches, fired under the supervision of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice in accordance with Army Regulations, are arranged among educational institutions maintaining units of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps and other schools and colleges conducting military training under the supervision of the War Department. The teams are grouped as (1) senior units in universities and colleges, (2) junior units in essentially military schools, and (3) all other junior units.

Top place among senior units went to Culver Military Academy, which will receive a Team Certificate, awarded for the duration in place of the traditional trophy. Each of the ten highest scoring members of the team will be given individual certificate awards. Runners-up in this class were the University of

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Illinois, at Champaign, Illinois, followed by the University of Maryland, at College Park, Maryland. Each of the ten highest on the Illinois team also received certificates.

Among schools essentially military, Bordentown Military Institute won first place, and won individual certificates in addition to a team award. Staunton Military Academy at Staunton, Virginia, placed second, followed by Texas Military Institute of San Antonio, Texas.

In the third class, Xavier High School of New York City finished with top honors, for the sixth time a winner. Second place was taken by the San Antonio High Schools of San Antonio, Texas. The Fort Worth, Texas, High Schools team was third.

Considered an integral part of the National training program, the rules governing the matches are prescribed by the Secretary of War. Colonel Gilbert E. Parker, Infantry, of Army Ground Forces Headquarters in Washington, D.C., supervises the matches. Colonel Parker is Executive Officer of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, which encourages marksmanship training programs carried out by various groups in this country.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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FOR RELEASE FRIDAY A.M., MAY 4, 1945

CHARLES P. ROCKWOOD, OWI, AWARDED AIR MEDAL

Charles P. Rockwood who was assigned to outpost duty with the Office of War Information in July 1943, has been awarded the Air Medal, the War Department announced today.

The citation for the award reads as follows:

"For meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flights during the period 1 September to 20 November 1944. Flying over rugged terrain, in all types of weather to drop propaganda leaflets on Japanese troops and the inhabitants of enemy-occupied Burma, Mr. Rockwood voluntarily participated in twenty-five combat missions, without fighter escort. Mr. Rockwood's service reflects great credit upon himself and upon the civilian employees of the United States Government."

Presentation of the medal will be made overseas.

Mr. Rockwood, a pioneer in air liaison for the OWI in the Far East has been entrusted with the training of all OWI liaison personnel in that area in the techniques and procedures developed through his understanding of technical flying problems as well as those involving production and use of leaflets. Mr. Rockwood has invented a device for dropping leaflets, which will soon be widely used in other areas.

Under orders from AAF Air Transport Command, from September 1942 to July 1943, Mr. Rockwood was employed as air navigator for th United Air Lines flying the Pacific to Australia. He has spent much time in the Far East.

Mr. Rockwood was born in Indianapolis, Indiana. His family now resides at 814 South Street, Geneva, Ill. When with the United Air Lines his address was 1041 Green Street, San Francisco, Californ

SOME RESULTS OF RECENT LEAFLET OPERATIONS

The following reactions have been received here in Washington from the field during the past two weeks:

Burma

From a letter dated April 4, 1945 to George E. Taylor, Deputy Director, Area III from Gustav Sword, for some twenty years a missionary in Burma and for fourteen years editor of a Kachin newspaper:

"I was very pleased to meet a large number of Kachin people when I visited Burma and to listen to their reactions to our leaflets and gifts. Our leaflets were more effective than I ever had dared to believe. Hundreds of people repeatedly told me that the leaflets and newspapers dropped by us had saved their lives. Also I found that hundreds of Kachins had joined the Rangers as a direct result of our leaflets. Our leaflets and messages caused the people not only to refuse to cooperate with the Japs but caused them to take up arms against the Japanese and a number of enemies were killed. This explains the hasty retreat of the Japanese through the Kachin hills."

A Burman Buddhist, aged 46, who remained in Mogok throughout the Japanese occupation and was a member of the Town Council there, reported that he was frequently consulted by the Sub-divisional Officer and asked for his advice. The S.D.O. brought him a number of leaflets, the first of which showed a map of Germany and Japan with Allied positions. The result of this was to encourage Burmans to hope for the return of the Allies. He and the S.D.O. accepted the news as true as did a local politician, with whom they discussed it. He believed that many other people in Mogok also read this and many other leaflets but because of his semi-official position and close Japanese surveillance, he dared not discuss such matters with them. He received hints, however, that ruby merchants were similarly influenced by the leaflets. In February 1944 he saw a copy of Lay Nat Tha at Mogok. He also saw Lay Nat Tha on two later occasions. It was both interesting and intelligible and its news was accepted as true. He saw two leaflets in Japanese, one the Paulownia (kiri) Leaf and the other dealing with the losses of the Japanese fleet. He helped gather up many copies and sent them to the Japanese, who were upset and angry on reading the message. One Japanese officer threw some of the leaflets to the floor and jumped on them in a tantrum.

We quote rather extensively from the Assam Team's most recent reaction reports received here in Washington, even though the reports have been circulated widely among our own outposts, for two reasons: 1) The reports are excellent and we are proud of them; 2) The Newsletter is now being circulated beyond OWI circles, among people and organizations showing an increasing awareness of the importance of psychological warfare in general and

and leaflets in particular. For example, thirty-five copies of each issue go to the Naval Air Operational Training Command and are used in the orientation programs throughout NAOTC centers in the Florida area. We feel that they and others will find these quotations from these reports interesting and useful.

From Report #4, dated March 15, 1945:

Reactions to American propaganda
Leaflets Air-dropped to Kachins
in the Kutkai Area:

1) From November 14, 1944 to February 18, 1945 B-25s of 10th USAAF dropped 326,414 OWI-PWT propaganda leaflets addressed to natives in the Kutkai and Hsenwi areas of Northern Burma.

2) The leaflets dropped included newspapers, brief news "extras", gifts of sewing packets and seeds, bomb warnings and special action appeals. The leaflets were dropped in support of the Chinese New 1st Army and the American Kachin Rangers advancing from the north.

3) The intelligence reported below was gathered by an OWI-PWT field unit operating in the KUTKAI area after its capture by the Chinese. This unit was attached to CIC-OSS Combat Interrogation Team #3.

4) Interrogations reported here were made between March 5 and March 11. Reactions are reported for the KUTKAI area only. Reactions from the HSENWI area will be covered in a subsequent report.

THE EFFECT OF "SATURATION"

In December PWT was for the first time able to make frequent and large scale leaflet drops on all main target areas behind Japanese lines. The first of these target areas to be investigated by PWT after capture was the KUTKAI area.

The effect of PWT's saturation drops was immediately apparent. Virtually every native - in towns and in widely scattered hill villages - had seen American leaflets. At first the Japanese attempted to control leaflet reading. Stiff fines were imposed. Orders were issued for leaflets to be collected and turned over to Army headquarters. Patrols were sent out to gather and burn leaflets.

But the leaflet drops increased in size and number; and the Japanese counter-measures became wholly ineffective. Leaflets were everywhere. There were so many leaflets the Japanese could do nothing about them. In the end they gave up.

With news leaflets arriving weekly KUTKAI'S news blackout was lifted. Confidence returned. Bomb warnings and action leaflets were received by the people - and action followed.

ACTIVE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE JAPANESE

Two leaflets dropped widely in the KUTKAI area seem to have been most effective in encouraging action by the Kachins. The first of these was Hsenwi Safe Conduct (XA-53), dropped over towns, villages, roads and trails in the Kutkai area on December 18. This leaflet had originally been requested by OSS, Detachmemt 101. It warned that the Japanese were being driven away and urged Kachins to flee to safety. The text concluded, "This is a safe-conduct pass. Take this pass and report to the nearest Allied troops..."

The Hsenwi Safe Conduct was printed on distinctive yellow paper. All previous leaflets dropped in the area had been printed on white paper.

Recruits for the Kachin Rangers

LOI GAW, 12 miles west of Kutkai beyond Nam Hkai river: Villager Lapyat Tut stated there was much talk about Hsenwi Safe Conduct the day it was dropped. Five young men immediately set out for Hpa-Poin and joined up at Ranger headquarters. Lapyat Tut spoke excitedly about the "yellow" leaflet which he called the "Ranger pass". He said, "Everyone knew from the news leaflets that the Allies were coming here. He wanted to do something. We had heard there was a headquarters to the north. We considered this yellow leaflet the order to join up."

MAN LONG, SO-8226: Villagers turned in Hsenwi Safe Conduct leaflets to their headman. Ding Rin Yaw, headman of the village, stated that two days later he took fifteen young men to Kachin Ranger headquarters, "many miles to the north" where they were recruited. (Ranger Hq. were at Hpa-Poin, SC-7823). Ding Rin Yaw said, "Your newspapers, seeds and needle kits gave us great hope and knowledge that the Allies would come and chase away the Japs. But we didn't know what to do until we read the yellow leaflet. This gave us something to do. We looked unitl we found the American headquarters. We hear our young men are well and fighting the Japanese."

(Space does not permit us to reproduce here the many other examples included in the report.)

The Hsenwi Warning

The second leaflet dropped widely in the Kutkai area which seems to have been effective in encouraging action was "Hsenwi Warning (XA-52). This leaflet was dropped in many areas between December 22 and January 13. It warned the people that fighting would soon take place, and urged them to refuse to aid the enemy Japanese, and to take their possessions and flee to the hills when the fighting entered their area. The leaflet warned that Allied planes would bomb all places where there were Japanese.

Seven Japs killed

NAMKYEK (SP-0781): Maran La, ex-soldier, stated that the "warning" leaflet (Hsenwi Warning) was discussed at length by the men in his village. The Kachins at once placed guards along trails. When Japanese were seen approaching, the village was warned and the people hid in the jungle. Some who had guns, however, kept hidden along the road. When there were not too many Japanese, they opened fire. Maran La reported that his villagers killed seven Japanese.

(Again, for lack of space, we omit here a long series of other examples.)

NEWS LEAFLETS STIFFEN NATIVE RESISTANCE TO THE JAPANESE

From mid-November to mid-February, B-25s of 10th USAAF dropped news leaflets and newspapers approximately once each week to natives in the KUTKAI area. These leaflets were printed in Burmese and Shan as well as in the local Kachin language.

OWI-PWT investigations indicate that these regular news drops did much to encourage resistance. Until the first news leaflets were received, the villagers were in complete ignorance of the North Burma campaign. The Japanese were firmly established in the area. The villagers were told that the Japanese were still advancing into India and that the Allies would never return.

The first news leaflets had an electric effect. The villagers felt that the Allies remembered them and wished them to know of the war's progress. One Kachin in DANYAU village said, "we were so happy that we could not even eat". Each leaflet drop was watched for anxiously. When more than a week passed without fresh news, the villagers were disappointed. Leaflets were passed from house to house, and from village to village.

The Japanese ordered certain Kachins to go out into the jungles to collect and destroy leaflets. These Kachins worked out a simple trick to outwit the Japanese. Single news leaflets would be placed in a forked bamboo stick thrust into the ground. These sticks were posted along trails and outside villages where they could be seen and read by passersby. The bulk of the leaflets were then gathered up and handed over to the Japanese.

MONG NGE (SP-0536): The headman reported, "Without your newspapers the people would never have known what was happening in the outer world. The news gave us hope and the belief that the Japanese were here only temporarily." The headman stated that the steady news drops gave the Kachins courage to follow leaflet instructions implicitly.

NAMKYEK Maran La, ex-soldier, stated: "The story about the killing of Kachins in the Bhamo area (Kachin Newspaper 13 XKN-13) was very effective. After this leaflet, no one trusted the Japs. When the Japs were at Wanting, they sent word to all the Kachin chiefs and leading elders to come to a conference at Wanting. Because of the leaflet, not one man dared to go. Instead they went into hiding. The Japs sent six men to each village to arrest the chiefs but they found none."

(Further examples omitted for lack of space)

PROPAGANDA "GIFTS" ENCOURAGE FRIENDSHIP FOR THE ALLIES

During the three-month period of leaflet dropping over the KUTKAI area, approximately 10,000 gift packets were distributed. In November and early December, seed packets were dropped. Sewing packets, containing needles, pins and thread, were distributed until mid-February.

Vegetable gardens flourishing in the villages

MONG NGE (SP-0556): OWI-PWT interrogators found several vegetable gardens growing in this village. Villagers of HSAIO MO, MAY HAN and HPATUM, who fled to the jungle, planted the seeds in their new jungle villages. They plan to go back and harvest the crop when it is fully grown. All of the villagers expressed gratitude for the gifts and reported that the drops gave them confidence that the Allies would "come soon". Sewing packets also dropped in the area of these villages.

NAMHSA area: S.C. Liu, refugee who crossed the Chinese lines in mid-February, reported that there were about forty flourishing vegetable gardens in this area, grown from American seed packets. Liu said the gift packets gave the natives hope that the Allies would return. Immediately after the seeds were first dropped the people stopped selling vegetables and other food, hiding their supplies against the coming of the Allied forces

KACHINS AID AMERICAN AIRMEN

Reverend Sword, in his interrogation, came upon several references to American pilots passing through the Kutkai area. The Kachins apparently had treated the pilots well, giving them food and guiding them when necessary. In all, Sword heard reports of five different airmen aided by the Kachins.

ALLIED WARNINGS TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY NATIVES

NAMKYEK, Kutkai area: Villager Maron Hkam reported that leaflets were helpful in keeping the pro-Japanese in check. As the leaflets continued to be received, the villagers' resistance stiffened and pro-Japanese were treated roughly. One pro-Jap, who ignored repeated warnings, was finally executed by the Kachins.

NAMMA, 8 miles southwest of Kutkai: ZauYaw, former assistant of Reverend Sword in the Kutkai Baptist Mission, was among those who joined the Kachin Rangers. This man reported, "Until your leaflets came, we were in a state of helplessness. Leaflets were secretly passed to friends and relatives so they could escape in time. In this way two friends of Zau Yaw, both government officers in HSENWI, were warned and in time and escaped the Japanese."

(From Report #5, dated March 20, 1945:)

JAPANESE ARMY IN BURMA WARNS ITS TROOPS AGAINST ALLIES' "CUNNING PROPAGANDA"

Enemy orders captured in Burma indicate that Japanese commanders have become increasingly concerned about their troops' morale and the effect of Allied propaganda. Japanese unit commanders are warned to tighten discipline. Captured orders specifically point out the danger of disaffection, of wounded soldiers "falling into enemy hands," and, in some cases, of "voluntary surrenders."

Now this concern has apparently become serious enough to demand open warnings addressed directly to Japanese troops.

In February, N.C.A.C. forces in Northern Burma captured two Japanese troop publications containing such warnings.

1. "Smash the Enemy's Propaganda Strategy..."

For Japanese troops "fighting in one corner of Yunnan and in Northern Burma", the Japanese Army propaganda section issued the first edition of GEKKAN TENRYU (Dragon Monthly), on January 1, 1945.

The magazine's inaugural foreword emphasized the growing crisis of the war situation and urged its readers to "renew your faith and determination to destroy the enemy." Then it openly admitted the counter-propaganda purpose of the magazine:

> "Particularly when the enemy's propaganda offensive has been intensified to the extreme, nothing will be more gratifying to us than if this magazine will help smash the enemy's propaganda strategy and give comfort to our troops."

2. "We must exert every caution...."

DAI TOWA SHIMBUN (Greater East Asia Newspaper) is the troop newspaper published by the propaganda section of the Japanese 33 Army in Burma.

Under the heading, "The Purpose of Enemy Propaganda Strategy , the paper's December 26, 1944, edition devotes a major article to Allied leaflets air-dropped in Burma. This article reads:

> "Three years after the start of the war, enemy America is already feeling deep concern over the manpower problem and has the greatest fear of military operations involving the sacrifice of human lives.
>
> "Recently, she has been actively carrying on a cunning propaganda strategy designed to bring about the collapse of the fighting spirit of our officers and men, and to alienate the native population from us.
>
> "Using her abundant material resources and superior planes, she has been disseminating all kinds of leaflets and newspapers and is striving to achieve effective results.
>
> "The purpose of this activity must not be lightly regarded."
>
> "Especially in the recent issues of Gunjin Shimbun * and other leaflets, the enemy has discarded his former methods of expression and is not resorting to blunt defamation. Instead, his object is to build up our interest and feeling of trust without our being conscious of it.
>
> "Our war objectives have from the beginning been made resolutely clear by the Imperial Word. We must exert every caution not to be taken in by these enemy strategems."

---

*SEAC Japanese newspaper air-dropped in Northern Burma through OWI-PWT by 10th USAAF.

From Report #7, Dated April 1, 1945:

HOW SHANS RESPONDED TO AMERICAN LEAFLETS

Hsenwi-Lashio area, Northern Shan States, Burma

On February 21, 1945, the Chinese First Army under American command captured HSENWI town, 32 miles north of LASHIO on the old Burma Road. On March 8, the First Army captured LASHIO.

During the previous three months, B-25s of the 10th AAF dropped 500,000 leaflets addressed to the natives of the HSENWI-LASHIO area, principally Shans. The leaflets included news, bomb warnings, and special "non-cooperation" appeals.

Shortly after HSENWI'S Capture, an OWI*PWT field unit began canvassing the area's key Shan villages to gather the reaction intelligence reported below. The OWI-PWT unit was attached to CIC-OSS Combat Interrogation Team #3, which operated with the First Army.

EVACUATION OF SHANS FROM MILITARY AREAS

Besides building general goodwill toward the advancing Allied troops, the end point of OWI-PWT native propaganda to the Hsenwi-Lashio area was Shan evacuation from fighting zones and from the enemy's main routes of retreat. Evacuation was sought for three principal reasons:

1) To avoid widespread civilian casualties from air attack and ground fire - casualties which would create antagonism toward the Allied forces.

2) To reduce the enemy's labor supply and, conversely, to assure labor for the Allied forces when they reached the area.

3) To deny the retreating Japanese access to native food supplies.

These three aims of Shan evacuation were largely accomplished.

WIDESPREAD DESERTIONS OF VILLAGES FOR SAFE JUNGLE HIDEOUTS

OWI-PWT's Hsenwi Warning (XA-52) was widely and frequently airdropped throughout the HSENWI-LASHIO area. Specifically addressed to the people of Hsenwi State, it urged them to protect themselves from bombs and the coming ground fighting - to leave their villages and hide their families, food, valuables in safe places.

News leaflets distributed during the same period reinforced the evacuation warning. They gave more detailed advice on safe hiding - plus stories from other areas emphasizing the need for protection against Allied bombs and retreating Japanese.

Throughout the Hsenwi-Lashio area, Hsenwi Warning and these other leaflets took immediate effect. In many cases, the warnings were received only a day or two before villages were bombed to the ground. When this happened, villagers almost invariably reported: "The American notices saved our lives."

Some typical evacuations:

People of 300 villages flee their homes. Godeik Subdivision includes about 300 villages in a 20-mile radius from Old Lashio. It is peopled by about 20,000 villagers, mostly Shans. Salein Da, subdivisional officer under the Sawbwa (chief) of Hsenwi, reported:

> "To my knowledge, every village in my subdivision fled from their homes when the planes dropped the American warnings."

"Paper things and loud death." At Maunghai, a few miles west of Hsenwi, olders reported that Hsenwi Warning leaflets were received on December 27 and 30. On the 30th, most villagers left Naunghai with food and possessions. Early on the 31st, the last villagers left. Later that day, Naunghai was bombed, destroying nearly every building. Because "we did what the Americans said to do", only one villager was killed, a man who stayed behind to beat paddy. "It was his own fault."

The fact that the warning leaflets preceded actual bombing so closely impressed the people of Naunghai. They said it convinced them that "any army which combined paper things and loud death so well" must surely win."

(Further examples omitted for lack of space.)

SLOW-DOWNS, DESERTIONS OF COOLIE LABORERS

The village evacuations noted above deprived the Japanese of their main labor supply. Before that, however, many of the headmen who were forced to supply the Japanese with laborers reported they found it impossible to comply completely with American "don't work" warnings. But the leaflets fanned the the people's feelings of resentment at the enemy's forced-labor system. "Nearly every paper said don't work for the Jap, don't stay near him. It made many of us feel we should do something about it."

Along the Burma Road and subsidiary roads to the east, Shan coolies embarked on unorganized, haphazard "slow-down" strikes. As one group of Shans explained it, "we made a show of working hard when the Japs were near. Then when they were not looking, we lounged about, smoked, and made dirty jokes about them." In several cases, such slow-downs were detected by the Japanese labor officers. The Shans were beaten or given the "water treatment."

(Series of reports by individuals omitted here for lack of space.)

SHANS HIDE FOOD FROM JAPANESE

Especially in retreat, Japanese troops in Northern Burma have been forced in many cases to "live off the country." Disrupted supply lines force the enemy to loot rice, fowl, vegetables, etc. from the natives.

To reduce this important source of enemy food supply, OWI-PWT leaflets and newspapers urged the Hsenwi-Lashio area Shans to hide their food. The leaflets gave detailed advice on best methods and hiding places.

The preservation of native food supply was also vital to smooth, unconfused reoccupation by the Allies. Refugees lacking food became an immediate problem to Allied supply and medical officers. Cargo-planes must divert space from military supplies to fly in at least a minimum subsistance ration for civilian refugees.

As indicated below, most people of the Hsenwi-Lashio area succeeded in hiding their food from the enemy and preserving it for their own needs.

(Quotations omitted for lack of space.)

ACTIVE AID TO THE ALLIES

OWI-PWT leaflets did not ask the Shans for active resistance against the enemy. The chance of action-appeals "back-firing"- of exposing Shans to enemy recrimination and thus engendering Allied ill-will-- was considered too great. Interrogation of Shans in the Hsenwi-Lashio area, however, revealed a willingness to give the Allies active aid. In several villages, aid such as the following was reported:

Rescue of Allied pilot. U. S. air-rescue units have reported downed pilots being rescued with the help of friendly Shans. Details of one rescue were given by the Old Lashio Circle headman:

> "About the middle of December, an Allied fighter plane came down near Na-lein, 15 miles south of Lashio. The pilot escaped near the place where the Na-lein people were hiding in the forest. The people took him in, and Ka Lein, the headman, sent a letter to me to pass on to the subdivisional officer. Soon the Japs sent out search parties for the pilot, questioning everyone. But I told all the Shans and the few Kachins in my Circle to tell nothing.
>
> "Two days later, another plane came to the Na-lein hiding place. The pilot and Aung Hpan, the headman's son, were taken away safely to India."

Enemy disposition information. Ten days after the above pilot rescue, according to the same Old Lashio Circle headman, he contacted an "American spy" (Kachin). "I gave him details of Japanese ammunition dumps, horse remount stations, food dumps, anti-aircraft positions, and other places."

(Further examples omitted for lack of space)

HOW U.S. NEWS AND WARNINGS SPREAD THROUGH THE HSENWI-LASHIO AREA

Before the first American leaflets, Japanese propaganda was "fairly successful" in the Hsenwi-Lashio area. The Shans got no Allied news. "We are a simple people. When the Japs told us things over and over again, we couldn't help but believe some of it." Even Shans who did not believe Japanese propaganda were confused by it and made to feel insecure.

Enemy attempts to counteract leaflets. When U. S. planes began leaflet-dropping last fall, "the black fog began to lift." At first, the Japanese enforced strict control. Patrols moved up and down roads out of Hsenwi and Lashio, collecting leaflets. Villagers were bribed with rice to turn in leaflets. In some cases, Shans caught with leaflets on their person were beaten or given the "water treatment."

As dropping increased, both in quantity and frequency, the Japanese gave up their attempt to prevent leaflet-reading. Instead, they tried counter-propaganda. A Japanese "schoolmaster" was brought to Hsenwi. He toured the villages, "deriding the American statements." Shans also reported that Japanese agents and MPs attempted to discredit American news with an organized "whispering" campaign. Japanese officers occasionally talked to Shans through interpreters, reiterating Japanese claims and denouncing news in U.S. leaflets.

Widespread knowledge of American messages. Virtually all villages surveyed had received OWI-PWT leaflets, or heard about them in detail. Even in areas of illiteracy, every village seemed to contain a few educated persons to read the news and warnings to the others. Typical of the way news spread is the experience of Man Kyaung village.

> "Our village was out of the way and seldom received leaflets. But everyone knew about them from bazaar-day at Man Hpa, a mile away. There we would hear stories of the Chinese, Americans, and British winning the war and killing many Japs.
>
> "One day at the Man Hpa marketplace, the Shans told me and my husband that the Americans ordered everyone to go to the jungle and hide everything. So we went back home and told our village. Next day, all our people left for the forest places."

Headmen set up information "network". According to the Gokeik Subdivisional officer, "the system of communication between headmen assured that all villages got word from the Americans." All the headmen in Old Lashio Circle, for instance, "agreed to keep in touch with each other to make sure everyone knew what the Americans were saying." Runners were sent from village to village "whenever the planes gave us important news or instructions."

In this way, nearly all Shans of the Hsenwi-Lashio area - even those who received few leaflets directly - were reached and influenced by American propaganda.

ORIENTING THE AIRMAN

IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

by

Captain John C. Lyons, AUS

(Captain Lyons, author of the article on Air Dissemination Devices in Vol. 1, No. 1 of the Newsletter, returned to the United States after serving for an extended period as Air Liaison Officer of the Italian Leaflet Section, PWB-AFHQ. During this period Captain Lyons helped to develop the M-26 Flare Bomb for use in leaflet dissemination. Previously he had served with the PWB Mobile Leaflet Unit during the Tunisian Campaign. At present he is temporarily assigned to OWI in Washington and is expected to be assigned to the Far East in the near future.

In our last issue there appeared an article by Major James Monroe on Psychological Warfare and the Airman. Out of his experience with the Eighth Air Force, Major Monroe pointed out why it is understandable - even logical - that an airman should be reluctant or antagonistic when first approached with the idea of risking his neck and his aircraft to drop bits of paper on the enemy. "Why paper? Why not bombs?" The airman, who doesn't understand what psychological warfare is all about views such activity with the same suspicion that one is inclined to display toward any activity that one doesn't understand. Major Monroe outlined some of the means which can be used in the field to overcome this initial reluctance on the part of the airman, to arouse his interest, and eventually to win his enthusiastic cooperation. The average flyer is highly intelligent, and psychological warfare is something that fires his imagination once he understands exactly what it is that we are trying to accomplish.

And then there come the $64-dollar questions which you have asked, and I have asked, and everyone who has had to do this work in the field has asked: "Well, why in blankety-blank hasn't someone back home done something about it? Why hasn't psychological warfare been brought to the attention of the airmen in the course of their training programs? It becomes part of their job after they get out in the field; why wait until they get out here to start explaining to them the role that propaganda leaflets play in total war? You don't wait until they get here to start explaining to them how to drop bombs."

All of which is very, very true. And so - at this point it occurs to us that you out in the field will be interested in knowing what the Intelligence and Leaflet Unit has been doing in the way of bringing psychological warfare to the attention of the armed forces, - especially the air forces.

We might start with this humble publication itself. In its inception it was intended primarily as a house organ for the information of OWI representatives in the field, but its contents have aroused the interest of other agencies and the distribution list grows with each issue. Half of the copies of Leaflet News Letter #3 went to Army and Navy units with a consequent spreading of information about leaflet operations and results. There is every reason to believe that this increase in circulation will continue and that, as more agencies comes to know about the publication, the requests for additional copies will mount.

Other activities are:

Exhibit panels. Some weeks ago the Leaflet Unit was asked to prepare a series of large wall panels which would show the story of the use and operation of leaflet propaganda. These were duly made and placed on display in the OWI Library in Washington. With them were six water colors by John Pike, of OWI; these illustrated the airfield end of a leaflet operation. Pike did them last summer during the course of an assignment to the 321st Bomb Group in Corsica. Army and Navy officers were among those who paid the exhibit a visit. After its showing in Washington the exhibit went to the Naval Air Operational Training Command at Jacksonville, Fla. for showings there.

Interest in the exhibit was such that it was decided to reproduce it in quantity and give it wide circulation. Five new panels were prepared and reproduction is now under way. Three panels deal with types and use of tactical and strategic leaflets, one with dissemination methods, and the other is a map showing where and how leaflets have been used in support of the military effort. The reproductions are promised for May 15th; when they are ready, some sets will be shipped overseas and others placed in strategic locations in this country.

Articles in service publications. You are doubtless familiar with the pictorial feature which appears on the back of each issue of NEWSMAP. The feature for a May issue deals with leaflet propaganda, - its purposes and effect. This publication has a circulation of approximately 100,000 and goes to all units of the Army as well as to some units of the Navy. In this connection, attention is called to the feature which appeared in the March 16th issue of the Southwest Pacific version of NEWSMAP. We had nothing to do with this one, but it shows how the idea of propaganda about propaganda is spreading.

The classified air force journal, IMPACT, carried a four-page pictorial story about psychological warfare in the March issue. The May issue of AIR FORCE carries a similar story on the role of leaflets in the overall military picture. It is hoped that in the near future arrangements can be made to place articles on psychological warfare in similar publications of the Navy Air Force.

Navy Air Force Orientation Program.

At the invitation of the Naval Air Operational Training Command, the Leaflet Unit brought the abovementioned original exhibit to Jacksonville in March and staged a demonstration for the officers of the training staff. This demonstration took the form of a lecture and explanation and discussion of the exhibit panels. Samples of the M-26 leaflet bomb and the 105 mm leaflet shell were likewise on display. Following the demonstration, it was decided that instruction in psychological warfare would be made a part of the training program. Thus, every Navy flier who goes out into the field may now have some conception of the objectives and achievements of psychological warfare. This plan will go into full-scale operation as soon as the panel reproductions are available and it is possible to place a set in each of the training units.

Army Air Force Orientation. A proposal that Army Air Force put into its training program a unit of instruction in psychological warfare similar to the one adopted by the Navy is now under consideration by the authorities of the Army Air Force Tactical Center at Orlando, Florida. It is hoped that this proposal will be accepted and that in the future Army as well as Navy fliers will arrive in the field thoroughly conscious of the value of propaganda leaflets and the necessity of accurate dissemination if the desired results are to be obtained.

Exhibit in the Pentagon Building. Preliminary arrangements are under way to place along the walls of the main ramp of the Pentagon Building an exhibit on psychological warfare more elaborate than the ones described in earlier paragraphs. This exhibit will be seen by the several score of thousands of people who pass through the Pentagon daily, and a comprehension of the working of psychological warfare will be expanded to that extent. The exhibit will be prepared by the Leaflet Unit and sponsored by the Propaganda Branch of the War Department. It is expected that the exhibit will go on display about June 1st and will remain there for three weeks, following at various military training centers in the U. S.

Exhibit for Conference at Orlando, Fla. From May 14-20 Army Air Force is holding at Orlando an elaborate conference on Air Force operations. This conference will be attended by representatives of Air Force units from all theatres. Since these men are operations, intelligence, and ordnance officers from the field, it is an ideal group before whom to place information about leaflet activities. Tentative arrangements have been made to send down an exhibit and to have it placed on display for the duration of the conference. It is believed that all who see the panels will come away with a clearer idea of leaflet warfare. Some of those attending will have had little or nothing to do with leaflet operations; others will have had a great deal to do with them. It is hoped that the discussions which should take place will make for an extensive interchange of information about what leaflets have accomplished in the various theatres.

Booklet on Psychological Warfare. Following our recent suggestion, Orientation Branch has cleared and given preliminary approval to publication and distribution, at the widest possible level, of a comprehensive booklet on propaganda in general and psychological warfare in particular. Present plans for the booklet, which is being prepared by the Leaflet Unit for Army sponsorship and distribution, call for an illustrated description of enemy and Allied propaganda methods and results, both before and during the war. Emphasis will also be placed on propaganda methods likely to be adopted by the defeated enemy.

Film on Psychological Warfare in the Field. The usefulness of a film on leaflet operations in the field has long been realized. In fact, there have been a number of inquiries about one, - both from overseas and from sundry military agencies in this country. Several operations have been shot by film units in various theatres, and prints are in film libraries in this country. However, they are all in crude form, - i. e. they have not been cut, edited, organized or narrated. Negotiations to obtain copies have been under way for some time, but there has been a good deal of delay in securing their release to the OWI Film Unit. This has finally been achieved and production of a finished film is now under way. We hope to see this finished and en route to you - and interested military agencies - in the comparatively near future.

Lectures and Talks. There is a constant flow of requests to have OWI speakers address groups of all sorts on the subject of psychological warfare, how it operates and what it has accomplished. Many are service groups or include members of the armed forces. Within the limitations of what it is permissible to divulge, these speakers have done much to acquaint the public (service as well as civilian) with what you in the field are achieving. Psychological warfare is still not very clear to all the people everywhere, certainly, but a lot more of them have some conception of it than was true a year or so ago.

This is a brief summary of our present efforts to bring the importance of your work home to the armed services - especially Air Force personnel. Admittedly this program is late, but we believe it is not too late to be useful to PW operations in the Far East.

THE AMERICAN PRESS ON YOUR WORK: A ROUNDUP

The most interesting recent item in the press on the subject of leaflets is a half page article in the "Talk of the Town" section of The New Yorker for April 28, 1945. The piece is called "Nickelling," from which it should be readily apparent that the article deals almost exclusively with leaflet operations in the European theatre, where the word "nickel" has become synonymous with the word leaflet, nobody knows why. We are not reproducing the article here because our space is limited and also because the overseas edition of The New Yorker is pretty widely and efficiently circulated. There is nothing in the article that is new to people who have been working with leaflets for some time, but it is particularly gratifying to see an intelligent and favorable article on the subject in a magazine as sensible, hard-headed, and well-written as The New Yorker. The material for the article was provided by a member of the Intelligence and Leaflet Unit, Area III, who was interviewed by The New Yorker writer. We apologize for the fact that the article did not say more about Far East leaflet operations. We gave them the stuff but we couldn't, of course, control the way they slanted it.

You may also have seen the March 31, 1945 issue of The Saturday Evening Post in which appeared a long article about OWI leaflet operations in the European theatre. The material for this article was also supplied by the Leaflet and Intelligence Unit, Area III and again we apologize for the fact that it was not slanted toward the Far East. The Post author wanted the story of the North African, Italian, and French leaflet operations and we happened to know it, having recently returned from there. We gave the author a good deal of material on our Far Eastern operations and perhaps in a future article Area III leaflet activities will receive similar attention. It is our theory that any favorable journalistic treatment of the subject of leaflets is good for all theatres, even though a particular theatre is not mentioned.

An April 3rd AP story datelined "With The United States Marine 3rd Amphibious Corps on Okinawa," stated: "The natives, or 'Okies' as they are called by the Marines, fled to the hills before the invasion started and today many started coming in voluntarily. They had been advised to leave the cities and airfield areas by 3,500,000 pamphlets dropped by American planes before the invasion."

Another AP story, dated April 9th, from San Francisco, dealing with the composition of the Suzuki Cabinet, says: "As the new cabinet was formed, Police Chief Shinjiro Hara banned listening to the 'Voice of America' broadcasts and promised punishment to persons failing to turn in American leaflets dropped by raiding planes."

We quote in full the following editorial from the April 16th issue of The Washington (D.C.) Post:

"PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR"

"Japanese civilians, and even soldiers, respond to ideas, it seems, in very natural, human ways. They fear death and seek to avoid it, despite the notion so prevalent among us that they are all guided by a blind fatalism and fanaticism. They care about freedom, peace and security. They love their land, much as we love ours, and hope for its improvement. These findings may be upsetting to Mr. Paul McNutt whose simple solution for the Japanese problem is to exterminate the Japanese people in toto. Nevertheless, the Office of War Information and the Army have found a recognition of such facts to be useful in directing propaganda toward Japan.

In the China and Burma war theaters, according to OWI officials, the dropping of "surrender passes" has had surprisingly effective results. These passes promise the Japanese honorable surrender, decent treatment and good food. Hesitatingly at first but latterly in greater numbers, the Japanese have been making use of these passes to come into American prisoner cages. OWI's psychological warfare scored one notable triumph over Japanese propaganda on Okinawa. Despite the Japanese warnings to civilians there that the Americans would torture and kill all who gave themselves up, the Saipan pattern of mass suicide was not followed. Instead, there were mass surrenders.

The "surrender pass" campaign is to be greatly expanded. In addition, three powerful radio transmitters are to be installed in Manila to beam broadcasts to the Japanese on their home islands. It is altogether possible that such measures will help to shorten the war against Japan, will hasten Japanese surrender and save the lives of American men. These efforts will not be advanced, however, by Mr. McNutt's recent effusion. It is as fatuous as it is barbaric to speak of exterminating a whole people.

From the April 16, 1945 issue of The Washington Post: "An American Division Command Post Luzon (Delayed) AP. -- A Japanese soldier who surrendered recently to Maj. James A. Moore of Kansas City, Mo., sure was fed up with bushido -- the Nippon warrior code. As he approached the major, waving a surrender leaflet, he shouted, "Japan phooey! Japan phooey!"

The Philadelphia Bulletin for April 17, 1945 carried the following story by Paul Cranston, the Bulletin's war correspondent in the Philippines:"A patrol of veteran First Cavalry

Division, working over the Japs in the hills of Luzon, spotted a lone Nip carrying a cage with a carrier pigeon inside. The Jap was on a spying mission near our lines with his little white bird trained to fly back to Jap headquarters with any message he might transcribe. The cavalrymen opened up on him but the nimble-footed Nip got away in the brush. But, in his excitement, he dropped his caged pigeon, and that's where our guys got their bright idea. They tied a surrender leaflet to the pigeon's leg and set him off on his way to Japanese lines."

We are watching The Philadelphia Bulletin like a hawk for a follow up story on this "dropping report."

The Herald News of Fall River, Mas., in its April 5, 1945 issue, carries a story by NEA Service titled, "Poems Are Weapons in Psychological Warfare Against Japs in CBI Area." The story is illustrated with reproductions of our leaflets XJA-15, XJKL-3, and XJM-10. The caption under the first reads: "Surrender Passes urge Japs to give up hopeless fight. English instructions are repeated in Chinese." The caption under the second and third says: "Sketch at left shows landing of airborne troops in Burma. Text tells Japs of their hopeless position. Sketch at right illustrates the "Death March," a poem set to dirge-like music." The story follows: "Japs in the China-Burma-India theatre of operations who are hungrey for well-illustrated literature in their native tongue find the Army-OWI Psychological Warfare teams most happy to accommodate them.

" 'Surrender passes' (top sketch) have been printed in gaudy colors and widely distributed over Jap lines. 'Those who live are the real Yamato Race,' the headline says. A photograph of a Jap soldier, retouched to guard his indentity, illustrates the pass. He is shown receiving a cigaret from a Chinese military policeman.

"....'Thousands of your comrades have died a meaningless death, like insects who jump into the flame,' the pass says. 'Why this slaughter? Those who die in the 'Beautiful' name of gyokusai (glorious death) take the road of fools.' The Japs are given additional reasons why they should surrender, and are provided with explicit instructions telling them how to give up.

"Following an airborne offensive in the CBI theater, the Japs received a leaflet illustrated with a drawing of British troops landing behind their lines (bottom left). 'Even as you read this,' the Japs are warned, 'British troops are landing behind you in giant American transport planes and silent night-flying gliders.... There is nowhere to go.'

"The Jap penchant for composing poetry is exploited by a leaflet called the 'Death March'. Written in the conventional Japanese metrical form of alternate seven and five-syllable lines, the 'Death March' is similar to those written by the soldier themselves. Its aim is to spread despondency and despair among its readers.

"Musical notes at the top of the front page (bottom right) are the opening bars of 'Aikeku Koshinkyoku,' which is Japan's best-known modern patriotic march. It is given a dirge-like quality by application of the first line of the 'Death March' to it.

"The first line reads.....'to the north, to the south, battles lost.'

"These are only a few samples of the leaflets used with telling effect by the Psychological Warfare teams. For Japan proper, other forms of propaganda, stressing other themes, are used."

The April 7, 1945 issue of The Christian Science Monitor carried a full page article on the front page of its second section by John Beaufort. The article was datelined Guam and titled: "U.S. Steps Up Propaganda Barrage Against Nipponese Home Front." We cannot reproduce the story here because of its length, but it is a fairly comprehensive and accurate picture of our radio and leaflet work. It is a bit more solid than the usual newspaper account, a trifle on the sober side, and handsomely illustrated with four of our leaflets.

Minor note from the European theatre: In a special dispatch to The New York Times dated April 30, 1945, dealing with the testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee on the treatment of prisoners of war in this country, Brig. Gen. B.M. Bryan, Jr., told the Committee that, of all the German prisoners who surrendered since D-Day (June 6, 1944) "more than 80 per cent brought with them into camp the leaflets scattered by American Air Forces containing assurances that no prisoners of war were or would be mistreated."

Again from the European Theatre: A special dispatch by Sidney Shalett to The New York Times dated April 23, 1945, under the headline "Big 3 In Stiff Note Warn On Captives," begins as follows: "Over the Nazi-held portions of Germany at 6 o'clock tonight Allied planes commenced dropping leaflets bearing the facsimile signatures of President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin solemnly warning all Gestapo men and other guards that every individual who mistreated any Allied prisoner of war, internee or deported citizen would be 'ruthlessly pursued and brought to punishment'."

Reproduced on the following page is the poster back of a recent Newsmap, put out by I. & E. Division, USAFFE, on "Psychological Warfare in Action," for Far Eastern distribution. Later this month, I. & E. Division, Army Orientation Branch, New York, will issue and distribute another Newsmap, entitled "Paper Bullets," for which layout, copy and artwork were supplied by the Leaflet Unit.




Failure of Military Leaders
Truth from Allied Leaflets
Comrades Surrendering
U.S. Treatment of Prisoners
ALONE
Deserted by Navy
SHIPPING LOSSES

Psychological Warfare in Action . . .

THIS Japanese soldier is making up his mind to surrender . . . Our troops have him cornered . . . Ordinarily he would fight to the death . . . He would die, but so might some American soldier who went out after him . . . Now he is wavering . . . A paper bullet did the trick. Not just by itself, of course. Propaganda will never take the place of cold steel. It's just one more weapon to be used . . . a new kind of weapon for a new kind of war . . . That old saying that the "only good Jap is a dead one" just isn't true. We need prisoners in this war. Prisoners tell us where the enemy is concentrated, what weapons he has and what he intends to do next. They point out artillery targets for us. The information we get from prisoners gives us the jump on the enemy and helps to save American lives. In the battles of today, Psychological Warfare is doing its part . . . Its ammunition is the printed truth . . . Its target is the Japanese soldier's mind . . . Printed leaflets dropped among enemy soldiers for them to read and learn what their leaders don't want them to know . . . Paper bullets cannot decide this war alone . . . but they will do their share in helping you win the right to live in peace again.

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LEAFLET WRITING HANDBOOK
(For Beginners Only)

Section 4

(Recapitulation: In Vol. 1, No. 1 of the Newsletter, these notes dealt with the general approach that might be employed by a man in the field who is looking for a leaflet writer to hire on the spot. In Vol. 1, No. 2, these notes dealt with four main principles that a man in the field, having hired a leaflet writer, might pass on to the new man to guide him in his new work. In Vol. 1, No. 3, these notes dealt with the breakdown of intelligence, the seven questions a leaflet writer should ask himself and answer to himself before he sits down to the actual writing of the leaflet. In this issue these notes deal with the structure of the leaflet itself.)

The basic structure of a leaflet has three main points:

I. A statement of the grievance
II. A holding out of hope
III. A call to action

These three main points, which might be called the bony structure or skeleton of the leaflet, will be fleshed out or amplified in different ways, depending on the nature of the particular leaflet, but these three main points are always present in any carefully thought out, well planned leaflet. This fleshing out process, or amplification, is in turn an application of the four guiding principles of leaflet writing, that were discussed in Vol.1, No. 2 of this Newsletter: 1) Simplicity, 2) Concreteness, 3) Repetition, 4) Action.

For purposes of discussion, let us take this three-point basic structure of any leaflet and amplify it by the application of these four guiding principles to form an outline for a sample leaflet designed, let us say, to urge a group of people in an enemy-occupied area to perform some act of sabotage against the occupying forces:

1. The statement of the grievance.
   The purpose of stating the grievance is obvious: to arouse in the mind of the leaflet reader a picture of what he has suffered at the hands of the enemy, to evoke the feeling of anger or resentment or bitterness or sorrow on which the leaflet

writer will play to get the leaflet reader to do what the leaflet calls for. If we apply to the statement of the grievance the second of our guiding principles, namely, concreteness, we see that it is unwise to state the grievance in so many words, to say, "You have been enslaved by the Japs" or "You have been starved by the Japs" or "You have been forced by the Germans to work sixteen hours a day for miserable pay." The trouble with stating the grievance in those terms is that, no matter how long or how careful you make the catalogue of the leaflet reader's sufferings at the hands of the enemy, you will nevertheless omit, almost inevitably, the one or two highly personal indignities or sufferings that he (not as a member of a group, but he personally) was subjected to. You can't help omitting it because, no matter how good or complete your assembled intelligence about the particular leaflet audience as a group, it is impossible to assemble all the details about each individual member of the audience. Furthermore, to state the grievance by cataloguing all the sufferings that this group went through, tends to be boring, even to the sufferers. You must find some device, either in the form of words or pictures, that will evoke the grievance in highly concrete terms (principle #2) and yet will not run the risk of boring the reader by being too lengthy or angering him by omitting the specific things he suffered from. Example: in this particular problem, if you could find a good photograph of the wanton devastation left behind by the enemy when he was driven out of a nearby city, let us say, and you placed this picture at the top or in the middle of this leaflet, with a simple explanatory caption, you will have admirably accomplished your purpose of stating the grievance to this particular leaflet reader: you have not bored him with a catalogue; you have not angered him by omitting from a list of sufferings imposed by the enemy on a whole group the one or two or more highly personal sufferings he was subjected to; and you have, vividly and immediately, evoked by indirection in the mind of the leaflet reader everything he personally has suffered. He looks at a picture of the cruel, senseless wreckage of one of his country's great cities and he thinks of the fact that the enemy who did this also stole his bicycle. You have aroused his anger or resentment or bitterness against the enemy. He is ready, without knowing he is ready, to hear the arguments in your leaflet and, if they are good arguments, to do the thing the leaflet calls for. Note: while the statement of the grievance is listed first in this outline, it does not necessarily have to appear first in the leaflet. It is important, however, that the grievance should strike the reader first. In the example given, if the picture with which you planned to evoke the grievance appeared, for layout purposes, in the middle of the page, but nevertheless dominated the entire page, it would strike the eye of the leaflet reader first and our purpose would be served.

2. But there is hope, and we, the signers of this leaflet can and will help you.
Having reawakened in the mind of the leaflet reader a sense of what he is suffering at the hands of the enemy, it is important to follow up by pointing out that the situation is not hopeless. Obviously, if it is really hopeless, no amount of argument in your leaflet, however good, will get the leaflet reader to perform an act that will involve discomfort or risk to himself. If the situation is hopeless, the risk and the discomfort would be pointless, perhaps even suicidal. It is important, therefore, in stating the grievance, not to overstate it. It has been our experience with new leaflet writers in the field that they have a tendency to go to town in stating the grievance, probably because this enthusiasm is admirable, but it puts the leaflet writer in the same position as a man who is painting the floor of a room, working away from the door, and finds he has painted himself into a corner. If the grievance is evoked effectively but not overwhelmingly, the statement of the hope will be reasonably convincing. This conviction, of course, like the conviction carried by any part of the leaflet, will be enhanced if it is stated in concrete rather than general terms. Using the words "but there is hope" is almost never enough. Stating the hope by means of an illustration or an example is more effective.

3. The "catch" or "hook" or what he, the leaflet reader, must do in order to earn this hope.
This is the act that the leaflet writer wants the leaflet reader to perform. This is the purpose for which the leaflet has been written. Obviously, it is not a point that can be stated bluntly, without adequate preparation, without a base of carefully prepared argument. In earlier sections of these notes, when we were discussing the first of our guiding principles, namely, simplicity, we spoke about the process known as linking. (See page 11, Vol. 1, No. 2) By the application of this principle

the leaflet writer cushions the shock, so to speak, conceals the bare bones of his leaflet structure from his leaflet reader. If employed correctly, with sound arguments, the leaflet reader will, at any rate should, take the hook. The remaining points in this outline, the fleshing out process referred to earlier, are designed to make sure, so nearly as is possible, that the leaflet reader does not shake the hook loose, does not slip out of the web of conviction, before he reaches the point where he feels he must do what the leaflet asks him to do.

4. How to do it.
In many cases this point can be omitted. In some cases it should be omitted. If your assembled intelligence (the answer to question #2 in your intelligence breakdown: see Vol. 1, No. 3) indicates that the leaflet reader knows more about the thing you are asking him to do than you, the leaflet writer, know about it, it is wiser to leave it out. For example: if this leaflet is being addressed to railroad workers, calling upon them to sabotage locomotives, turntables, and switches, the chances are that the leaflet reading railroad workers will know more about how to perform such sabotage effectively than you can possibly tell them. The danger in telling people how to do something that they know more about than you do is that you arouse in them, even though they may be your friends and eager to assist you, a slight feeling of irritation or amusement or contempt. These emotions are dangerous because they tend to widen the gap of space and time that exists between you, the leaflet writer, and them, the leaflet readers. Since the objective of leaflet writing is to narrow this gap, anything that widens it reduces the effectiveness of the leaflet. If, as often happens in the field, you should make some really bad blunder in this telling process, the effectiveness of the leaflet may disappear completely. In such cases, the leaflet should be devoted to convincing the leaflet reader that he should perform the sabotage rather than telling him in detail how to perform it.

5. When to do it or, as is sometimes the case, when not to do it.
The points made in the comments under #4 above apply here with equal force. It should also be borne in mind that, when you write leaflets, you are writing for the enemy as well as for your selected audience. It would be disastrous to take it for granted that not a single copy of your leaflet will fall into enemy hands. It is safer to assume that, once distributed, the leaflet is in the public domain, so to speak. Obviously, then, in certain cases,

to reveal in the leaflet when the act the leaflet calls for is to take place would, in effect, mean telling the enemy when to be on the lookout for the act.

6. Repetition of the hope and the reward the leaflet reader will get if he does what the leaflet asks him to do.
   This is an application of the third of our four guiding principles. (See Vol. 1, No. 2)

7. Repetition of the call to action.
   Again an application of our third guiding principle.

8. Signature.
   (See Page 24, Vol. 1, No. 3)

Note: it is not absolutely essential for the above outline to be followed rigidly. We have seen, in earlier sections of these notes, how the signature on a leaflet can appear in many different places and in many different ways. In discussing point #1 in these notes, we have seen how the grievance, which should strike the leaflet reader first, can do just that even though it does not appear at the top of the leaflet. The same is true of almost any of these points, depending upon which ones are being made by means of words and which ones are being made by means of pictures or drawings or maps. The important thing is to make sure that the sequence of impacts on the leaflet reader's mind is calculated and arranged so that, when he finishes reading the leaflet, he is convinced that

I. He should take the required action.
II. He can take the required action.
III. The required action justifies personal inconvenience or risk.

(So much for the body of the leaflet. In our next issue these notes will deal with captions, sub-captions, layout, style, and related items.)